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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s use of his inherited religious 
tradition in his autobiography Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit. It has as 
its premise the contention that, although scholarship has addressed to a considerable 
extent the question of Goethe’s personal religious beliefs and their bearing on his 
works, there has emerged no manifest scholarly agreement on the nature and 
significance of Goethe’s attitude to religion. This lack of consensus is explored, and 
possible reasons for it are posited. It is concluded that any attempt to define Goethe’s 
putative personally held beliefs is of limited historical and critical interest, and the 
focus of this study on Goethe’s application in his written works of material derived 
from the tradition of religion is justified. The use of religious concepts in an ostensibly 
non-religious context introduces the concept of secularization, which is analyzed in 
terms of its etymological and epistemological origins and implications. From this 
analysis emerges the relevance of the concept of binary synthesis for an appreciation 
of Goethe’s use of elements of his inherited religious tradition. Binary synthesis is 
defined as a heuristic, and then applied to the apparent polarities of sacral and secular, 
and of past entity and present formulation, in Goethe’s depiction of religious material 
in his autobiography. It is the titular paradox of the work which principally justifies 
the focus on Dichtung und Wahrheit, since the ‘truth’ of what the author is concerned 
to reveal to his reading public is explicitly couched in a veil of what he allusively calls 
‘poetry’. The relationship of conceptual meaning and rhetorical form in Goethe’s 
representation of inherited religious material in Dichtung und Wahrheit is analyzed in 
terms of what recent scholarship on Goethe’s attitude to his inherited tradition in 
general has adduced as a binary synthesis of form and meaning, through which the 
text functions aesthetically on the psyche of the perceptive reader. When applied to the 
representation of religion, it is contended that in Goethe’s representation of his 
religious tradition in the context of his autobiography there exists to be perceived a 
sense of the very essence of that tradition which is a deep-seated feeling of faith. Thus 
Goethe’s mode of secularization, by which elements of the sacral tradition are 
represented for renewed appraisal in the secular context of the literary text, it is 
argued, is to be understood as a binary synthesis of sacral material and secular form 
which operates on the reader in a particular way.
Goethe’s mode of secularization is to be viewed against the cultural 
background of his contemporary philosophical environment, and hence Goethe’s own 
attitude to his religious tradition is placed in the historical context of the Enlightenment 
as a general European phenomenon and in the specifically relevant context of the 
German Aufkldrung. As precursors and prefigurations of the particular use to which 
Goethe put his religious tradition in his autobiography, the views and expressions of 
the principal exponents of enlightened thought and philosophy are adumbrated, with a 
view to clarifying the focus on Goethe’s own particular contribution. This contribution 
is adduced primarily through an analysis of Goethe’s account of his contemporary 
philosophical milieu in Dichtung und Wahrheit, and then through detailed analysis of 
the relationship of form and meaning, and the significance of binary synthesis therein, 
in his treatment of the material of inherited religious culture in his autobiography. The 
implications of Goethe’s mode of secularization in representing for renewed appraisal 
and appreciation the essence of the sacral tradition are explored. In conclusion, some 
wider implications of what is to be understood as a peculiarly Goethean mode of 
secularization for an understanding and appreciation of the cultural role and function 
of the religious tradition are suggested.
INTRODUCTION
‘It may well be asked’, runs the preface to a major study of Goethe’s Protestant 
upbringing and its lasting effect on him, ‘whether it is possible to add much new 
material to what is already known concerning Goethe’s views on religion and 
Christianity’^The religious furrow of the extensive Goethean field is one to which 
many scholars have applied their plough, delving ever deeper into this specific area in 
the course of their consideration of religion in its relation to sundry other aspects of 
Goethe’s life and work. The question of Goethe’s religion is one which has fascinated 
readers and attracted a great deal of intense academic scrutiny, to the extent that this 
particular aspect of scholarship on Goethe, having been subjected to such a 
concentrated cycle of ploughing, sowing and harvesting, is now - if one takes the 
above remark as representative - considered barren and fruitless, and to have nothing 
further of note, merit or interest, to yield. However, the subject cannot be considered 
closed - all critical enquiry exhausted, all avenues explored, all questions answered 
and all answers consolidated - when it is apparent to the scholar approaching the field 
for the first time that what has emerged from this prodigious amount of investigative 
research into Goethe’s attitude to religion is little more than an imbroglio of 
incohesive, fragmentary, and often contradictory impressions of Goethe’s personal 
faith and its bearing on his works. The title of Reinhold Schneider’s essay of 1948, 
‘Das ungeloste Problem: Goethes Glaube’2 points to the ongoing failure of scholarship 
(at least as far as the immediate post-war years) to solve this problem; and more recent 
scholarship does not appear to have progressed very far from this acknowledgement 
of critical uncertainty: Schneider’s title is readily cited by one of the most prolific 
writers on Goethe’s religion of the latter half of the twentieth century, the late Derek 
Bowman, as unequivocal evidence of the ultimate insolubility of the problem3.
My decision to concentrate on the area of Goethe’s religion was inspired by an 
ad hoc remark made by my subsequent supervisor, R H Stephenson, that despite the
1 Harry Loewen, Goethe’s Response to Protestantism, Berne, Frankfurt am Main, 1972, (p.7).
2 In Schneider, Uber Dichter und Dichtung, Koln, 1953, pp.227-246.
3 See Derek Bowman, ‘Goethe’s Attitude to Religion in Dichtung und Wahrheit’, in German Life 
and Letters, Vol.20 (1966-67), pp.316-325: ‘Even to this day the problem is still with us; Reinhold 
Schneider, for example, writes an essay entitled “Das ungeloste Problem - Goethes Glaube’” (p.324). 
Some twenty years elapsed from Schneider’s essay to Bowman’s: the ‘problem’, for Bowman at least, 
remained unsolved.
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above-noted questioning of the need for, or potential contribution of, yet another 
investigation into Goethe’s religious view, there still remained much to be researched 
and written in respect of Goethe’s understanding of, and attitude to, the religious 
tradition in general and Christianity in particular. The following study is an attempt to 
divert from the course of primarily biographical and hence historically limited avenues 
of scholarship into Goethe’s religion. I seek to view ‘religion’ as one crucial aspect of 
a general tradition which Goethe was concerned to uphold through a particular kind of 
representation, eliciting a particular response, in his written works. I shall argue that 
the ongoing failure of scholarship to reach a critical consensus on the problem of 
Goethe’s religion lies not in the latter’s putative insolubility, but in the, in my view, 
misplaced concern to elucidate the nature of Goethe’s personal faith and to adduce a 
definitive structure of his ‘religious’ world-view. My own concern is more modest, 
but, I believe, potentially more enlightening: to consider Goethe’s ‘religion’ in terms 
of his use of the religious tradition in which he inhered in the context of the written 
word; to examine his deployment of his religious heritage; to present an analysis, not 
of what Goethe might have believed, but of what he does with the sacral tradition in 
the secular context of his writings. In this way I hope to transcend the affected 
cynicism of my borrowed starting-point by offering a wholly different approach to the 
question of Goethe’s religion in terms of his attitude to, and treatment of, a tradition of 
religion within his wider treatment and assimilation of inherited culture as a whole.
With this in mind, some justification is perhaps necessary of the decision to 
concentrate here on the explicitly autobiographical work Aus meinem Leben. 
Dichtung und Wahrheit. To a large extent - and possibly more so than with any other 
major author within the Western tradition - Goethe’s life and his works - literary, 
scientific and historical - have been viewed as complementary parts which together 
form the ‘whole’ Goethe, the ‘real’ Goethe as posterity appreciates him and 
scholarship understands him. Wolfgang Leppmann’s study The German Image o f 
Goethe notes the part played in the perpetuation of Goethe’s reputation by the 
countless accounts and impressions bequeathed to posterity by Goethe and his 
contemporaries: the image we have of Goethe, an image which underpins all 
consideration of his artistic and scientific endeavours, is shaped, according to 
Leppmann, in part if not in whole by the image projected consciously by Goethe of
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himself4.
Perhaps more so than with any other of Goethe’s highly pregnant but 
apparently throwaway remarks, his allusion in Dichtung und Wahrheit to all his works 
as ‘Bruchstiicke einer groBen Konfession’5 has been a honey-pot of potential 
nourishment to which scholars have, understandably, swarmed and clung. Goethe’s 
life and his works are generally viewed as a coherent whole: the works are determined 
by the life which produced them, and this life is held to be implicit in the works it 
brought forth. As Caroline M Cooper’s 1973 thesis discusses in depth, critical 
reception of Dichtung und Wahrheit has hinged, in the main, on the ‘confessional’ 
aspects of the autobiography6. Derek Bowman’s Life into Autobiography focusses on 
this primary example of Goethe’s autobiographical writings as, Bowman supposes, 
the closest available approximation, within a creative context, of Goethe’s own true 
standpoint. Bowman’s introductory justification of his study ends, in fact, on the 
premise:
But when all is said and done, the prime concern of the autobiographer is 
himself, and it is hoped that above all light will be cast on Goethe the man,
4 Oxford, 1961. ‘Goethe enjoys some distinct advantages, in regard to the survival o f his fame and 
influence, over the other indisputably “classical” authors of Western literature. He was so famous 
among his contemporaries that the story of his life became common knowledge to millions of them; 
he lived so recently that this knowledge has come down to us essentially intact; and he lived so long 
that he was able to add to it, in autobiographical writings and in commenting on what others said 
about him. Thus we have not one but two avenues leading to him: his works, and the story of his 
life, which is known to us in such detail as to let him emerge as a distinct human being even if none 
of the works had been preserved. In this, Goethe was more fortunate than Homer, who lived so long 
ago that his very existence is often denied, or Shakespeare, so obscure in life that even the authorship 
of part or all of “his” works is still occasionally disputed’ (p.xi). A somewhat different attitude to the 
prodigious amount of biographical material available on Goethe is adopted by Nicholas Boyle in the 
recently published first volume of his Goethe: The Poet and the Age (Oxford, 1991). D J Enright’s 
review notes that Boyle’s preface commences, ‘altogther correctly alas, that more must be known, “or 
at any rate there must be more to know” about him than about almost any other human being’, ‘A  
heart with testicles’, London Review o f  Books, 25 April 1991, pp.9-10 (p.9).
5 HA IX 283.
6 Caroline Mary Cooper, Goethe's ‘Dichtung und Wahrheit A  Methodological Study o f  Possible 
Approaches to the Autobiography o f a Poet (unpubl. diss., University of London, 1973). It is worth 
noting here the curious assertion made by Walter Kaufmann in Discovering the Mind, Volume I, 
Goethe, Kant and Hegel (New York etc., 1980) of the initial and ongoing critical reaction to the 
publication of Dichtung und Wahrheit: ‘The impact of this work was immense. It pointed the way for 
subsequent studies not only of Goethe but also of other poets and artists, and eventually of every 
human being’ (p.32). Curious because this is in fact Kaufmann’s only mention of the work he 
considers so seminal in his discussion of Goethe’s contribution to the sciences of philosophy and 
metaphysics. Cooper’s thesis puts in perspective why contemporary and subsequent reception of 
Dichtung und Wahrheit, while acknowledging the work’s significance, has not apparently articulated 
this significance coherently, and Kaufmann’s study of Goethe’s ‘mind’ evidently follows in this long­
standing tradition.
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whose life and works, if anybody’s, are all of a piece.7 
Bowman’s concentration on Dichtung und Wahrheit is justified, then, in terms of the 
evidence provided in this text of the views and attitudes of the man: the work, for 
Bowman, is wholly determined by the facts of the lived life it depicts, and the 
depiction is consequently viewed as an accurate, self-sufficient account of the life it 
charts.
But Goethe’s autobiography is more - because its very title claims less - than a 
factual description of the events of his life as he lived it. He presents details, items and 
commentaries ‘aus seinem Leben’, not a complete picture; his ‘confession’ is 
fragmentary, not an absolute whole8. Moreover, far from presenting a complete 
chronological picture of the life it describes, Goethe’s autobiography ends with his 
departure for the court at Weimar, at the point where, some would argue, his life - 
certainly with regard to the pinnacles of his artistic creation, scientific experimentation, 
and social intercourse - was just beginning9. Furthermore, Goethe’s titular linking of 
the concepts of ‘Dichtung’ and ‘Wahrheit’, as well as casting doubts on the 
uncompromising veracity of his account (which, as Cooper suggests, displeased his 
receiving public) also implies an equilibrium between the two elements which 
indicates the inadequacy, for example, of Bowman’s subordination of the ‘poetry’ of 
Goethe’s creative writing to the ‘truth’ of the events depicted. That Goethe ultimately 
reversed his original order of these elements from his working title ‘Wahrheit und 
Dichtung’ surely implies a deal of hesitancy over the necessity of according one 
element an initial, and the other a final emphasis. Erich Trunz, in his commentary to 
the Hamburger Ausgabe of Dichtung und Wahrheit, argues repeatedly that the paradox
Derek Bowman, Life into Autobiography. A  study o f Goethe's teDichtung und Wahrheit”, Beme, 
1971, (p .ll) .
8 Cooper notes that historical veracity, and hence personal confession, was the expected hallmark of 
autobiography in the eighteenth century, and discusses the significance of Goethe’s failure to present a 
cohesive and comprehensive account of his life in terms of contemporary expectations and reception: 
‘the “Vorwort” to Dichtung und Wahrheit contained no assurance that Goethe’s account of his life was 
complete, or even accurate. And not content with refraining from giving such assurance, he positively 
invites mistrust by requiring his readers to accept an autobiography which, apparently, lacked the very 
qualities which they had come to consider essential to the genre’ (op. cit., p.36).
9 Herbert von Einem notes in his commentary to the Hamburger Ausgabe of Goethe’s Italienische 
Reise that this work was originally intended to provide the second instalment of Goethe’s 
autobiography: ‘Im Erstdruck von 1816 und 1817 kam der autobiographische Charakter des Buches 
deutlich zum Ausdruck. Sein Titel hieB nicht Italienische Reise, sondern: Aus meinem Leben. 
Zweiter Abteilung Erster und Zweiter Teil. Erst die Ausgabe letzter Hand gab ihm 1829 den Titel 
Italienische Reise. Die “Erste Abteilung” ist Dichtung und Wahrheit, deren dritter Teil 1814 im Druck 
vorlag’ (HA XI 572f.). Nevertheless, the Weimar years remain autobiographically neglected, and 
Goethe deals explicitly with only the first half of his life.
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of the title inheres in the ‘poetry’ of the creative hand of the artist forming the ‘truth’ 
of a lived life10. Benjamin C Sax, in his recent study Images o f Identity, while 
claiming that the reversal of the titular concepts was ‘for euphonic reasons’, points to 
the integral inter-relationship of ‘Wahrheit’ and ‘Dichtung’ in revealing the 
significance of the life Goethe depicts11. That Goethe himself was aware of the 
possible misinterpretations of his titular paradox is apparent in his apologetic letter of 
12th January 1830 to King Ludwig I of Bavaria, in which he explains his title and its 
implications:
Was den freilich einigermaBen paradoxalen Titel der Vertraulichkeiten aus 
meinem Leben Wahrheit und Dichtung betrifft, so ward derselbige durch die 
Erfahrung veranlaBt, daG das Publikum immer an der Wahrhaftigkeit solcher 
biographischen Versuche einigen Zweifel hege. Diesem zu begegnen, 
bekannte ich mich von einer Art von Fiktion, gewissermaBen ohne Not, durch 
einen gewissen Widerspruchs-Geist getrieben, denn es war mein ernstestes 
Bestreben das eigentliche Grundwahre, das, insofern ich es einsah, in meinem 
Leben obgewaltet hatte, moglichst darzustellen und auszudriicken.12
The present focus on Dichtung und Wahrheit, then, is justified on two counts. Firstly, 
it is in autobiography - even in ‘that most misleading of autobiographies’, as Nicholas 
Boyle somewhat allusively calls Goethe’s 13 - that one expects to find the most candid 
expression of personal views and experiences that the author is prepared to give; 
secondly, and more pertinently, Goethe explicitly refuses to disassociate the concepts 
of experience and the relation thereof in a literary context. This study of Dichtung und 
Wahrheit as a particular kind of religious testament is founded on the notion of a 
‘Widerspruchs-Geist’ on Goethe’s part which prompts him to portray in an artistic 
context the ‘truths’ of a religious tradition of which he had direct experience. My 
intention is to consider Goethe’s treatment of religious material - the language and 
images of the Bible, the apocryphal canon, the liturgy, the psalter and hymnal, the 
conceptual argumentations of the entire theological tradition - in the light of this 
‘Widerspruchs-Geist’ which portrays ‘poetically’ (the term requires, and will receive, 
further elucidation) the events of a lived life, and accords the ‘poetry’ a stamp, an
10 See HA IX 611 and 640.
11 Benjamin C Sax, Images o f  Identity. Goethe and the Problem o f  Self-Conception in the 
Nineteenth Century, New York, Bern, Frankfurt am Main, Paris, 1987, pp. 11 If.
12 Trunz notes (HA IX 640) that Goethe sent a copy of this letter one month later to Karl Friedrich 
Zelter (see GA XXI 891), banking on the future publication of their correspondence and doubtless 
concerned that his reading public should be privy to his avowed intentions.
13 Goethe. The Poet and the Age, op. cit., p.101.
intuition, of possible truth. The legacy from Goethe in producing his autobiography, 
the ‘testament’ of Dichtung und Wahrheit, lies, I shall argue, in the invitation to 
participate in an appreciation of ‘truth’ in poetic form and ‘poetry’ in the relation of 
facts and events.
Concentration with regard to ‘religion’ on the Western Judaeo-Christian
tradition in its broadest sense is to be justified purely in terms of Goethe’s
predominant concern with the religious tradition to which he owed his religious
education and experience, and which constituted the general religious temper of his
world. Other religious traditions - particularly those of Eastern myth, cult and rite -
are, of course, not exempt from Goethe’s consideration, but are dealt with here only
in terms of their direct bearing on Dichtung und Wahrheit: the sundry and breakaway
religious sects of Goethe’s own religious milieu are in this respect more significant,
given their overall contribution to the religious temper of the German eighteenth
century. It is the tradition of Judaeo-Christianity which exercised the most constant
and far-reaching influence on Goethe’s thought and expression, an influence which is
evident from his earliest published poem, ‘Poetische Gedanken fiber die Hollenfahrt
Jesu Christi’ of 176514, to the last recorded conversation with Eckermann of 11th
March 1832, just a few days before Goethe’s death, which bears moving testimony to
a final acknowledgement of the spiritual and ethical force of the Christian tradition:
Mag die geistige Kultur nun immer fortschreiten, mogen die 
Naturwissenschaften in immer breiterer Ausdehnung und Tiefe wachsen, und 
der menschliche Geist sich erweitem, wie er will, fiber die Hoheit und sittliche 
Kultur des Christentums, wie es in den Evangelien schimmert und leuchtet, 
wird er nicht hinauskommen!15
Autobiography is, of course, a pre-eminent genre for religious self-expression 
within the Christian tradition. Derek Bowman’s account of Goethe’s attitude to 
religion in Life into Autobiography, for instance, places Dichtung und Wahrheit firmly 
within the tradition of autobiographies which are confessional in a religious sense:
14 HA I 9ff. David Luke notes in a recently published essay that Goethe later recalled to Eckermann 
that this poem, the theology of which is unquestionably orthodoxically Christian, was in fact written 
at the request of Susanne von Klettenberg, and that Goethe was apparently acutely embarrassed by its 
unauthorized publication in Frankfurt the following year. See Luke, “‘Vor Deinem Jammerkreuz”: 
Goethe’s Attitude to Christian Belief’, Publications o f  the English Goethe Society, New Series 
[henceforth abbreviated to PEGS, N S] Vol.59 (1988-89), pp.35-58 (p.39). See also Boyle, op. cit.,
p.68.
15 GA XXIV 771f.
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For centuries autobiography and religious confession were virtually identical, 
and it might well be argued that for better or for worse they are indissolubly 
bound together, for if the autobiographer cannot trace his life in the spirit of 
faith, whether orthodox or personal, then all he can see is a confusing 
succession of years swept away in triviality and pointlessness into the past. 
The faithless man is presented with a welter of time; the man of faith is sure of 
the pattern of his life.16
For Bowman, then, Dichtung und Wahrheit is not only a work of personal
confession, but also, by definition, a religious testimony; and hence, logically,
evidence of the personal faith of its author. Bowman conducted some searching
studies into the religious impulse of autobiography in general, and Dichtung und
Wahrheit in particular. His principal thesis, that religion is the main impetus of all
autobiography, is an arresting, if at first sight unwarranted, assertion17. Bowman’s
essay entitled “Goethe and the Christian Autobiographical Tradition” mentions several
possible ‘forefathers’ and models which Goethe might have been following in writing
Dichtung und Wahrheit as a testament of his own religious experience18. Bowman’s
understanding of autobiography as religious testament rests on acceptance of the
fundamentally confessional aspects of the genre and, it seems, on an unequivocally
evangelistic approach to Christianity by which the written word is designed - or,
indeed, ‘given’ to the world - to testify to the lived and living faith of the writer, and
should in turn encourage the reader to seek this faith in and for the self.
A more theologically specified understanding of autobiography is provided by
Rudolf Bultmann in his work Geschichte und Eschatologie, which states the verifiable
historico-literary fact that ‘real autobiography arose for the first time within
16 Op. cit., p.49.
17 The argument for a specifically Christian basis for all autobiography has stimulating implications 
for an analysis of, for example, Bertrand Russell’s autobiography, or Friedrich Engel’s memoirs, or 
Mein Kampfl The religious impulse allegedly present in all autobiography presupposes a far more 
general conception of religion than is catered for within the categorically Christian premise of 
Bowman’s thesis. Bowman does present a more general definition of the ‘religious’ impulse of 
autobiography which admits of such writers as Edward Gibbon and Rousseau, but his insistence that 
it is only the ‘man of faith’ who is sure enough of the pattern of his life to present a coherent literary 
account thereof narrows the perspective of autobiographical reflection once again to the specifically 
Chrisjian standpoint.
18 PEGS, NS, Vol. 41 (1971), pp.21-44 (p.22).
Christianity’19. Bultmann, however, is less concerned with the evangelical potential of 
the written word than with the historical view of man, central to the Christian way of 
thinking, by which man is prompted to view himself in his historical context, and to 
categorize his (Christian) being in terms of the tradition which forms his life. For 
Bowman, autobiography is a Christian genre, and serves - or should serve - to spread 
the Christian message: for Bultmann, the doctrines of Christianity prompt man to 
search for, identify, and account for himself. The religious impulse of autobiography 
is to be explained in terms of Christianity’s recognition of the historicity of man; 
autobiography being considered the most effective means available to man of 
expressing and conveying a sense of historical, geographical and social context.
M H Abrams in Natural Supematuralism takes the implications of historicity 
within Christianity to their logical historico-literary extreme in positing the notion of a 
Heilsgeschichte within a specifically Christian autobiographical tradition, which 
corresponds with the general Bildungsgeschichte of a certain kind of novel charting 
progressive self-education through life. As a Heilsgeschichte, autobiography explicitly 
owes its existence to the Christian tradition, and charts, for Abrams, progressive self- 
education towards that central notion of Christianity, ‘redemption’, being the 
attainment of ultimate salvation through discovery of the ‘self’. Geschichte, then, 
implies both the historical context and the (written) relation of it, and the affirmation of 
historicity is at the same time evidence of a striving towards a redemptive goal20.
Now, there is precious little overt evidence of a search for Christian 
redemption in the pages of Dichtung und Wahrheit: indeed, Derek Bowman finds 
cause gently to berate Goethe on several occasions for not showing enough reverence
19 ‘Aber kein Zweifel kann daran sein, daB ein radikales Verstandnis der Geschichtlichkeit im  
christlichen Glauben - vorbereitet im Alten Testament - aufgebrochen ist, wie dadurch dokumentiert 
wird, daB erst im Christentum die Autobiographien entstanden sind.’ Rudolph Bultmann, Geschichte 
und Eschatologie, Zweite Auflage, Tubingen 1964, p.178. (The essays contained in this collection 
were delivered as a series of Gifford lectures in Edinburgh, 1955, and first published as History and 
Eschatology, Edinburgh, 1957 [see p. 149]).
20 M H Abrams, Natural Supematuralism. Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature, London, 
1971, pp.l89f. Caroline Cooper’s discussion of the extent to which Dichtung und Wahrheit may be 
considered a religious autobiography starts, interestingly, with a suggestion of ‘the absence of any 
insistence on a gulf between spiritual and worldly life’, thus placing Dichtung und Wahrheit outwith 
the conventional tradition of religious autobiography, and goes on to stress the self-developmental 
aspects of the work in terms which echo the conventions of the Bildungsroman: ‘Goethe ... sees self­
development, self-knowledge and -understanding as attainable only through interchange with his 
environment’, (op. cit., p.170).
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before ‘the Almighty’ in his quest for himself21. But Goethe does affirm the principle 
of historical contextuality as the first task of autobiography:
Denn dieses scheint die Hauptaufgabe der Biographie zu sein, den Menschen
in seinen Zeitverhaltnissen darzustellen, und zu zeigen, inwiefern ihm das
Ganze widerstrebt, inwiefern es ihn begiinstigt, und wie er sie, wenn er
Kiinstler, Dichter, Schriftsteller ist, wieder nach auBen abgespiegelt.22
This is, however, no explicit avowal that he is working within a specifically Christian 
tradition. There is no reason to suppose that Goethe’s autobiography is to be read as a 
conscious expression of his progression towards spiritual redemption in any 
specifically Christian sense. He is, ostensibly, reporting on the events of his life and 
on the personalities met in the course of experience. Nothing in the tone or tenor of 
Dichtung und Wahrheit would seem to confirm Abrams’ conception of an 
autobiographical Heilsgeschichte, or to corroborate Bowman’s consideration of the 
work as paradigmatic of an explicitly and exclusively Christian genre. If Dichtung 
und Wahrheit is to be read as a religious testament, then, this aspect of the work is not 
manifest in any overt evangelical message, or in the self-conscious charting of a 
journey through life towards salvation and redemption. The ‘religious’ message 
within Dichtung und Wahrheit - and scholarship on the work seems generally agreed 
that this exists - is evidently subtle, diffuse, difficult to perceive and even more 
difficult to evaluate.
Chapter One of this study discusses some of Goethe’s manifold references to 
God, Christ, and the religious tradition in general, and adumbrates his important 
utterances on religion with explicit reference to himself. This is attempted primarily 
through a presentation of the problem of Goethe’s ‘religion’ in terms of the critical 
debate which has dealt specifically or obliquely with this area of research. The aim of 
this overview is to clarify the focus of this study by contrast with the prominent and 
recurrent views adduced by past investigation of Goethe’s religion. Such an approach
21 See, for example, Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.58 and passim. Elsewhere, however, 
Bowman qualifies his abhorrence at Goethe’s lack of reverence with the observation that ‘Goethe 
never indulges in irony or mockery for their own sake when treating religion in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit’, pointing out that Goethe was appalled by Voltaire’s persistently malicious attacks on the 
Church (see ‘Goethe’s Attitude to Religion in Dichtung und Wahrheit’, loc. cit., p.324). Perhaps 
Bowman’s unwillingness to proceed beyond his concern to make a Christian out of Goethe blinds 
him, as will be discussed, to the underlying implications of irony in general and of the ironic 
treatment of religious matters in particular.
22 HA IX 9.
immediately encounters a subordinate and related problem: the critical debate on 
Goethe’s religion does not reveal any clear chronological development or internal 
coherence, and successive commentators seem more concerned to argue for the 
application of a definitive and exclusive ‘label’ to the nature of Goethe’s religious 
beliefs. What the analysis in the first chapter of this study attempts to present, then, is 
not an exhaustive study of the relative merits and demerits of all scholarly 
investigations into Goethe’s religion; but a general overview of the main trends which 
have influenced the debate, the views of the principal scholars who have emerged 
therefrom, the attitudes they bring to bear and any particularly pertinent points they 
make in their discussion of Goethe’s religion. In this respect, the main works of 
criticism referred to, be they in contradiction or corroboration of one another, are 
included as being paradigmatic of successive trends in investigations of Goethe’s 
attitude to religion.
One conclusion common to many accounts of the question of Goethe’s 
religion is the argument for a deep-seated religious belief on his part, which manifests 
itself, not in any orthodox adherence to accepted religious practice, but in a personal 
and idiosyncratic way. It is this perception of a relationship between life and art, and 
more particularly, between religious faith and its expression, which in my opinion 
particularly justifies a concentration on Dichtung und Wahrheit, where the relationship 
between personal experience and artistic formulation is most explicit. My purpose, 
then, is to examine Goethe’s various utterances on religion in his autobiography with 
a view to determining the nature, and more particularly the function, of this personal 
expression of religion.
Goethe does of course state explicitly in Dichtung und Wahrheit that he 
evolved his own conception of Christianity for his own personal use, ‘ein 
Christentum zu meinem Privatgebrauch’ 2\  What is not always recognized, however, 
is that Goethe acknowledges this private response to, and use of, Christianity as a 
topos of his cultural milieu; as a commonplace of religious life, argument, and 
philosophy in the age in which he operated. The nebulous notion of 
‘Privatchristentum’, which scholarship seems to attribute to Goethe purely on the 
strength of the above autobiographical reference, is in fact a commonly-held 
propostition of Goethe’s day in its function as an explicitly recognized and specifically
23 HA X 45.
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embraced standpoint which is not peculiar to Goethe, but to which he may have 
evolved a particular attitude, and of which he may have acquired an individual 
understanding. ‘Privatchristentum’ as a critical concept has propagated two primary 
and apparently irreconcilable views of Goethe’s response to religion: an effete, vague 
and other-worldy internalization of faith in the face of an antagonistic world; or an 
egotistic and exploitative use of the trappings of Christianity for personal 
aggrandizement. Common to both these views is their underlying polar opposition of 
the realms of religion and religious faith on the one hand, and of secular manifestation 
and concretion on the other. It is, in my view, the failure of scholarship to relate 
Goethe’s appreciation of the nature and function of polar oppositions in general to this 
very particular polarity of the sacral and the secular which has led to the manifold 
interpretations of Goethe’s personal religion and hence to the contention that the 
‘problem’ of Goethe’s religion is, and remains, insoluble. I shall argue that Goethe’s 
use of his Christian heritage is indeed ‘private’, in that it is peculiar to him, but that the 
relevance of this particular usage transcends the historically limited relevance of a 
personal faith, having a crucial bearing on critical understanding of the nature and 
function of Goethe’s use of religious material, since Goethe’s ‘Privatchristentum’ 
necessarily involves the re-manifestation, for public appraisal, of inherited religious 
notions in the secular context of the written word.
The whole area of the utilization of sacral material in a secular context is a 
sensitive issue, due perhaps in the main to the popular idea that matters religious are 
somehow ‘sacrosanct’ and therefore beyond human exploitation. That Goethe did not 
shy away from using spiritual notions and sacral images in a secular context is 
apparent from even the most cursory glance at his literary works and autobiographical 
writings. Religion in general was a crucial element of the cultural tradition in which he 
inhered, and his concern with the perpetuation of this tradition in general is, of course, 
widely recognized. Indeed, perhaps one of the most significant and fruitful aspects of 
scholarship on Goethe and Schiller in the latter half of the twentieth century is the 
recognition that the exponents of Weimar Classicism embarked on a conscious and 
sustained programme concerned with the understanding and appreciation of cultural 
heritage in general, and the representation of this heritage in a form which invited its 
re-thinking, re-vitalization, and hence its perpetuation. This concern on Goethe’s part
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is explicit in one of his best-known and most-quoted maxims:
Alles Gescheite ist schon gedacht worden, man muB nur versuchen, es noch 
einmal zu denken.24
Of course, this aphorism, so well-known as almost to fulfil its own implicit prophecy
by appearing trite and trivial, raises many pertinent questions about the nature and
essence of authorial originality. Even the thought itself is not peculiar to Goethe, but
is, as Hecker’s commentary suggests25, modelled on Terence (nullum est jam dictum,
quod non dictum sit prius). It is the specific concern of this study to adduce and define
Goethe’s particular way of dealing with the religious aspect of this cultural tradition; to
perceive the ‘alles Gescheite’ of the Christian tradition in Goethe’s reformulation of
religious material, and to define how Goethe invites us to think it all through again26. I
shall argue that in the fabric of Goethe’s re-presentation of the ancient and inherited
wisdom of the Christian tradition, there is an intimation of sentient and dynamic faith.
Fundamental to my argument here are the methodological strategy, and the content in
detail, of R H Stephenson’s Goethe fs Wisdom Literature. A  Study in Aesthetic
Transmutation27. As Stephenson has argued, the above aphorism articulates the
challenge thrown out (here by Goethe) to re-articulate known truths in a manner which
gives them, not a new truth, but a newly perceived truth: a new import, then, born of
a new dynamism in the way the thought speaks to the percipient. Stephenson’s stated
point of departure is the arresting comment made by Elizabeth M Wilkinson on Andre
Gide’s remark on the banalite superieure which characterizes Goethe’s life and work:
What makes it ‘superior’ is that the thought has been felt and lived and that 
the formulation betrays this.28
24 HA XII 415.
25 Max Hecker (ed.), ‘Goethes Maximen und Reflexionert. Schriften der Goethe-Gesellschaft, Vol. 21, 
(1907). See note to §441.
26 The translation is Elizabeth M Wilkinson’s, in ‘Goethe’s Conception of Form’, reprinted in 
Elizabeth M Wilkinson and L A Willoughby, Goethe Poet and Thinker. Essays, 2nd ed., London, 
1970, pp.167-184 (p.168).
27 Bern, Frankfurt am Main, New York, 1983. Stephenson’s study provides a comprehensive analysis 
of Goethe’s ‘Wisdom Literature’ (a term itself borrowed, not without literary precedent, from the 
ecclesiastical tradition), and refers to the anthology of received wisdom in Goethe’s Maximen und 
Reflexionen, the Spriiche in Reimen, and the late philosophical poetry. See p. 13 for Stephenson’s 
justification of his focus, and p.9 for his account of its significance for current study: ‘In an age like 
our own, one that is in fact losing touch with that heritage Goethe took such pains to preserve and 
bring to life, this challenge thrown out by his wisdom literature is surely the most important of all 
its conceivable significances’.
28 Ibid., p.19 (Stephenson’s italics). Wilkinson’s comment is made in her article on Goethe in The 
N ew  Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1974, Vol. 8 (p.230). Gide’s remark is from his Journal, 1889-1939, 
(Paris, 1951), pp.42f.
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What is especially problematic in the context of this present study is that we are 
dealing with a very special kind of inherited cultural formulation, one which has a 
material form - in terms of rite and ritual, the textual basis of the Bible, hymnal, 
liturgy and catechism, and the whole tradition of theological and eschatological 
analysis and speculation - but which finds its meaning in a particular form of feeling 
we call ‘faith’; that is the hardening, or crystallization, of feeling into those settled 
convictions the eighteenth century called Gesinnungen29. I shall argue that it is the 
perpetuation, not just of his religious heritage, but of a sense of the feeling of faith, 
that gives Goethe’s concern with his religious tradition its recognized personal stamp 
and its over-riding significance. With specific reference to the tradition of religion, 
then, the use of sacral material in a secular context involves a reformulation of 
traditional religious material in a manner which somehow inspires in the perceiving 
subject a sense of that deep-seated feeling of faith. This is what I mean by ‘Goethe’s 
mode of secularization’ in Dichtung und Wahrheit: the representation in the secular, 
material world of what is essentially spiritual, non-material, and which instigates a 
singular kind of response by hardening inchoate religious feeling into the affirmative 
conviction of faith.
A detailed etymological and historical overview of the notion of secularization 
reveals just how inadequate the common conception of an antagonistic opposition of 
the realms of the sacral and the secular still is. This misconception is still apparently at 
work in much of the scholarship on Goethe. According to Elizabeth M Wilkinson, 
current misunderstandings and misuses of the concept:
have to be traced back to nineteenth-century misunderstandings of eighteenth-
century ‘secularisation’. Misunderstandings which still bedevil our scholarly
understanding of that ‘two-faced century’.30
Wilkinson’s reference to the ‘two-faced’ nature of the eighteenth century, particularly 
in the context of secularization, provided the spur to my application of the notion of a 
‘binary-type synthesis’, established with analytic clarity and precision by Wilkinson 
and L A Willoughby in their seminal edition of Schiller’s Asthetische Briefe31 as a
29 See Stephenson, ibid., p. 157.
30 Elizabeth M Wilkinson, ‘Goethe’s Faust Tragedy in the Diachronic Mode’, PEGS, NS 42 (1971- 
72), pp.116-174 (p.138, fn.).
31 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education o f Man in a Series o f  Letters. Edited and Translated, 
with an Introduction, Commentary and Glossary of Terms, by Elizabeth M Wilkinson and L A  
Willoughby, Oxford, 1967, reprinted 1982 (henceforth abbreviated to WW). See pp.lxxxvff. and 
Appendix III (II), pp.349f.
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crucial aspect of Schiller’s (and Goethe’s) thought. In binary synthesis, an alternation
of existing polarities in the world is resolved into a new synthesis which maintains
and expresses the individual properties of its component parts. According to the
conceptual analysis of Wilkinson and Willoughby, the entity which ensues from the
tension of polarized opposites in this type of synthesis is one or both of the primary
polarities ‘raised to a higher power’ through reciprocal interaction with the initial
opposite. Wilkinson and Willoughby convey this diagrammatically in their depiction
of the triangulation of two poles, synthesized into another entity at the apex, another
entity which contains, indeed is, one or both of the entities at the foot of the triangle
enhanced. It is characteristic of this type of synthesis that the enhanced entity at the
apex itself projects an antithesis; two new polarities which are in turn synthesized in a
process of intensification and constant refinement.
The notion of a process of constant refinement through interacting polarities is
not, of course, peculiar to Schiller (indeed, Wilkinson and Willoughby note their
discovery of something structurally very similar in an account of Zen Buddhism32).
And as they point out, it is, of course, central to Goethe’s own thought that the world
consists of polarities and turns progressively on their mutual enhancement through
interaction (‘die Anschauung der zwei groBen Triebrader aller Natur: der Begriff von
Polaritat und von Steigerung’33). The famous passage from Wilhelm Meisters
Wandeijahre on the relative merits of thinking and doing (reason and action, cognitive
reflection and practical activity) makes this clear: the one has no force and little sense
without the other, but together both may function to their full potential:
Denken und Tun, Tun und Denken, das ist die Summe aller Weisheit, von 
jeher anerkannt, von jeher geiibt, nicht eingesehen von einem jeden. Beides 
muB wie Aus- und Einatmen sich im Leben ewig fort hin- und wider bewegen: 
wie Frage und Antwort sollte eins ohne das andere nicht stattfinden.34
Thinking and doing, breathing in and breathing out, moving backwards and moving 
forwards, question and answer: pairs of opposites which make sense only in relation 
to one another, which function fully only in coordination. Goethe’s passage illustrates 
in a novelistic context that in the coexistence in tension of opposing polarities are to be
32 Ibid., p.lxxxvi, fn .l.
33 Contained in a letter to Kanzler von Muller of 24 v 1828. The letter is curiously missing from 
both the Gedenk and Hamburg editions of Goethe’s letters, and finds its place in editions of Goethe’s 
Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft. See Goethes Samtliche Werke, Jubilaums-Ausgabe, ed. Eduard von 
der Hellen, Stuttgart und Berlin, 1902-1907, Vol. XXXIX, pp.349f.
34 HA VIII 263.
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perceived and dynamically experienced the rhythms of life itself.
Lichtenberg surely had something similar in mind in his consideration in terms
of eighteenth-century physics of the properties of inertia and resistance:
Die absondernde Philosophic trennt Tragheit und Widerstand in der Lehre 
vom Korper, so wie sie in der Anthropologie den bloB tierischen Menschen 
vom bloB verniinftigen trennt, aber beide vereinigt sind nur allein wirklich 
da.35
Of course, with binary synthesis, we are not dealing with a fusion by which the 
polarized entities lose their distinct properties. Inertia and resistance can be thought of 
as existing separately; but they function fully only together, like cognition and action, 
instinct and reason. The danger in any type of postulated synthesis is that the 
distinction of the antithetical polarities may be blurred: the inherent, peculiar properties 
of one specific entity may seem lost in its ‘con-fusion’ with its polar opposite. Binary 
synthesis precludes such a blurring of distinction: Question exists, for example, but 
subordinates itself to Answer; Answer exists, but subordinated to Question; and only 
in working together do both produce an improved understanding of the world. The 
most arresting and stimulating aspect of the concept of binary synthesis is perhaps that 
it is not logical (in the sense that logic is a mode of thought based on conceptual 
implication): binary synthesis is descriptive of the process of existence rather than 
prescriptive of the process of thought. The oppositions in a binary synthesis function 
truly only together, but they remain distinct: either or both of the fundamental 
polarities may appear enhanced through reciprocal, subordinating interaction with the 
other. Binary synthesis, then, is not a dialectic in any Hegelian sense, but a heuristic: 
a means of explaining and rendering perceptible a process at work in the world. One 
pole attains real existence in terms of and through synthesis with its opposite, by 
which the distinction is maintained throughout the very process of mutual 
subordination.
One of the major contributions to the binary synthesis debate is the recent 
analysis of the mutual subordination of conceptual meaning and rhetorical form in 
Goethe’s wisdom literature, and the application of the Schillerian notion of ‘schoner 
Vortrag’, or aesthetic discourse, whereby logical, conceptual relations and poetic
351 am grateful to R H Stephenson for pointing out the relevance of Lichtenberg’s formulation to a
clarification of the concept of binary synthesis. Stephenson cites this passage in Goethe’s  Wisdom 
L iterature , op. cit., p.246. See Leitzmann’s edition of Lichtenberg’s Aphorismen, D eutsche 
Litteraturdenkmale des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin, 1902-1908, Vol. 141, p.21.
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structures in a text may be perceived as either coordinate with one another, or mutually
subordinated to one another:
The mode of linguistic organization Goethe employs, in all probability 
borrowed from Schiller and called by him schoner Vortrag. has a double 
structure. There is a conceptual structure, in which other features such as 
rhythm, rhyme, and alliteration are subordinated to the logical, conceptual 
relations; and there is, too, the poetic - as analysed by Herder - in which 
conceptual relations are coordinate with all others. These two modes - the 
logical and the aesthetic - themselves coexist in a relation of reciprocal 
subordination, so that the reader may take the piece of discourse as either 
communicative or poetic depending on his needs and capacities. It is this 
reciprocal subordinative relation of logical and aesthetic that constitutes 
‘aesthetic discourse’ proper (schoner Vortrag'l for Schiller, and that firmly 
distinguishes it from the complete fusion which takes place in poetry proper 
where a ‘merely’ coordinative relation is at work.36
My concern is with the particular function of logical and poetic relations in Goethe’s 
reformulation of religious material in Dichtung und Wahrheit, seeking to examine the
: t
relationship between ‘poetry’ and ‘truth’, between ‘form’ and ‘meaning’, in terms of a 
potential binary synthesis of the sacral realm of religious speculation and the secular 
context of the written word. The notion of a potential interpenetration in the ostensible 
polarity presented by ‘sacral’ and ‘secular’ is central to my consideration of Goethe’s 
mode of secularization, in terms of which his particular deployment of religious 
material in the secular context of the written text may be seen, not as an exploitative 
utilization of religious material to the unequivocal detriment of the realm of the sacral, 
but as a positive affirmation of the sacral, enhanced as it is by a particular kind of 
inclusion in the secular context.
Scholarly consideration of Goethe’s ‘secularization’, in terms of his ‘private 
use of Christianity’, tends to concentrate on Goethe’s employment of religious 
material, significantly that of the Christian tradition, in the secular context of his 
works. The adjective ‘secular’ and its corresponding noun ‘secularization’ appear with 
alarming frequency in the secondary literature on the theme of Goethe’s religion: 
alarming not only because the terms are notably absent from Goethe’s explicit 
utterances on the subject of his ‘religion’, but more particularly in that frequent use
38 Goethe's “Maximen und Reflexionen”. A  Selection. Edited and Translated, with an Introduction and 
Notes, by R H Stephenson. Scottish Papers in Germanic Studies 6, Glasgow, 1986, (p.6).
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has led to a reified critical conception of secularization; used as an absolute term
requiring in itself no further definition or justification to describe Goethe’s attitude to
religion. Erich Franz, for example, in a chapter of Goethe als religidser Denker
entitled ‘Sakularisierung des Christentums’, asserts the following:
Im iibrigen begegnet man auf Schritt und Tritt christlichen Begriffen und 
Vorstellungen, die von Goethe ins Weltliche, Menschliche, Natiirliche 
iibertragen und sakularisiert worden sind ... iiberall ist das Metaphysische, 
Dogmatische beseitigt, das Menschliche geblieben; alle christlichen Begriffe 
sind sakularisiert.37
Franz does not specify precisely what he understands by ‘iibertragen und 
sakularisiert’, but I hope that the analysis of the process of secularization I offer in 
Chapter One will provide a more informed historical and conceptual context in which 
Goethe’s attitude to religion, and the secularization thereof,, lies. For Franz’s major 
contribution to the question of Goethe’s secularization consists, in my view, not in 
any detailed and conclusive analysis of the nature and implications of the process, but 
in his recognition of the contextual significance of Goethe’s attitude to religion as a 
response to a general phenomenon of the eighteenth century, and most particularly as 
an attitude prevalent in the Germany of the Enlightenment.
Franz’s acknowledgement of the cultural conditioning operative in what he 
called Goethe’s ‘Sakularisierung des Christentums’38 did much to clarify the focus of 
Goethe’s ‘religion’ in terms of a re-objectification of traditional religion conditioned 
by the prevailing philosophical temper of his world. Subsequent studies have not, 
however, considered the nature of Goethe’s secularization in terms of this 
contribution, but seem to limit themselves consistently to considerations of the ethical 
validity or invalidity of the utilitarian approach to religion which emerged as a 
corollary to the philosophical movement of ‘The Enlightenment’. More recent 
scholarship recognizes that this attitude inheres in Goethe’s own ‘enlightened’ cultural 
milieu, but seems to tend toward general assumptions which are not corroborated by 
particular analyses. For example, Ronald Peacock’s investigation of ‘The Ethics of 
Goethe’s Die Wahlverwandschaften’ mentions the ‘sensibility and secularized 
philosophy of Goethe’s Humanitaf which is attributed by the author to Goethe’s 
philosophical milieu:
Goethe’s position is logical, vital, and affirmative, and should be seen as a
37 Tubingen, 1932, pp.l98f.
38 Ibid., p. 193.
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positive achievement in relation to the problem of cynicism created by 
eighteenth-century atheism, and it shows Goethe in a progressive development 
towards modernity.39
Peacock’s conclusion, that Goethe ‘has made a story that is in harmony with his
secular piety’40, utilizes what in my view is an inadequate and unsubstantiated
juxtaposition which does not elucidate the significance of the convenient oxymoron
‘secular piety’, and which fails to take into consideration the potential interpenetration
of sacral and secular realms in the postulation of a religious world-view peculiar to
Goethe. Secularization is surely no glib one-word answer to the problem of Goethe’s
attitude to religion, but requires careful appraisal in terms of its etymological
implications, its evolved meaning, and its significance, for Goethe, as a topos of his
world. Similarly, T J Reed’s slim popular introduction to Goethe skirts the essence of
the issues at hand (Reed may be excused a lack of in-depth analysis on the grounds of
necessary concision) in the following synopsis:
The first half of Goethe’s life coincided with the later Enlightenment. Though 
he is not usually thought of as part of it, its principles are present in his work 
as an unspoken foundation: empiricism, attachment to the sensuous world, 
intellectual independence and secularism, confidence in man’s nature and 
particularly in his own, a forthright clarity of thought. If he said little about 
these things as principles, it was because he was busy living them and 
charging them with the vitality of his personal mode of vision and 
experience.41
Again, what we meet here is the assertion of a ‘personal mode of vision and 
experience’ on Goethe’s part: clearly, the nature and implications of this ‘personal 
mode’ require further examination and elucidation. Since the general implication of 
scholarly consideration of Goethe’s understanding of secularization is that this notion 
is somehow held to inhere in the intellectual climate of eighteenth-century Germany, a 
consideration of secularization in terms of the intellectual and philosophical temper of 
Goethe’s age in its bearing on religion is evidently required. Chapter Two of this 
study, consulting major works of scholarship on the ‘Age of Enlightenment’, 
examines the phenomenon of secularization in the eighteenth century, in order to 
clarify the focus of Goethe’s particular use of, and contribution to, his religious 
heritage. In this respect, acknowledgement of a specific debt on my part is due to
39 Modern Language Review , Vol. 71 (1976), pp.330-343, (p.339).
40 Ibid., p.342.
41 T J Reed, Goethe, Oxford, New York, 1984, p.6.
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Peter Gay’s The Enlightenment: An Interpretation42 which furnished me with much 
invaluable information on the major movements of thought and the individual 
personalities involved in the Enlightenment throughout Europe and North America; 
and to Ernst Cassirer’s Die Philosophic der Aufklarung43 for a less general, and hence 
for my purposes even more pertinent, account of the significance of European 
enlightened philosophy in the German context. Gay’s language, and Cassirer’s 
terminology, pervade my account: acknowledgement is made where explicitly due, but 
the overall impact of these works is assimilated into my own understanding and 
appreciation of the Enlightenment. For the purposes of orientation, the Enlightenment 
is considered primarily as a European phenomenon, with a subsequent concentration 
on the German Aufklarung. The former provides the backdrop for the latter, which 
emerged therefrom, and although implicitly linked with the general aims and ideals of 
the international Enlightenment, the Aufklarung reveals some distinct features with 
specific implications for a consideration of religion in eighteenth-century Germany.
It is an established commonplace of scholarship that the Enlightenment is to be 
considered an age of radical antipathy towards religion, as an era when the ‘secular’ 
world of manifestation and phenomenon takes precedence over the ‘sacral’ premise of 
the numinous. The subtitle of Peter Gay’s major work makes this plain: his preface 
explains his description of the men he calls the philosophes as ‘modern pagans’ in 
terms of their recourse to Classical models, and their abrogation of the established 
Christian interpretation of the world in favour of an anthropomorphic concentration on 
the well-being of humanity in the material world. However, an analysis of the origins 
and the nature of the antipathy to religion ascribed to the Age of Enlightenment reveals 
some interesting inner contradictions which have a particular relevance to a study of 
the process of secularization in the eighteenth century. Erich Franz’s allusion to a 
‘crisis of Christianity’ offers a different perspective on the religious antipathy of the 
age: etymologically, the term ‘crisis’ implies not just a problematic situation, but one 
which demands an outcome; a situation in which a decision is to be made in favour of
42 Subtitled ‘The Rise of Modern Paganism’, London, 1966.
43 Tubingen, 1932.
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a particular course of action44. It is apparent in the more astute works of scholarship on 
the eighteenth century that the term ‘secularization’, when applied to the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment, does not signify the negation of religion, but a critical re-appraisal 
by which the significance of religion in the world is called into question and then 
either rejected or re-validated45. In this respect, an analysis of the specific context of 
the German Aufklarung provides the focus for an appreciation of the very particular 
relationship between the established polarities of reason and religion, Church and 
State, God-centred and human-centred world-views which is to be understood as the 
process of secularization. Evidently, if Goethe evolved a personal concept of 
secularization, then the historical and philosophical context in which he worked is vital 
for an appraisal of its significance: I shall argue for the relevance of the historical basis 
of the secularization process in eighteenth-century Germany, upon which Goethe’s 
understanding of the process, and more particularly, his attitude to and treatment of 
the sacral tradition in the secular context, are to be viewed.
Chapter Three goes on to discuss Goethe’s personal account of his own 
historical context in Dichtung und Wahrheit, with particular reference to his 
understanding and appreciation of his religious culture. Any informed analysis of 
Goethe’s depiction of the principal exponents and tenets of European Enlightenment, 
of the religious and anti-religious movements, controversies and debates of the late 
eighteenth century in Dichtung und Wahrheit, of course, takes account of that 
paramount paradox of autobiographical writing as a whole, which is the temporal and 
experiential gulf between the mature author and the protagonist. It is with this in mind 
that Goethe’s explicit attitude to his religious milieu must be approached, and in this 
respect that the significance of the concept of binary synthesis, culled as it was from
44 Grimm’s Deutsches Worterbuch defines ‘Krise’ as: ‘Die Entscheidung in einem Zustand, in dem 
altes und neues, Krankheit und Gesundheit u.a. mit einander streiten’. Duden Etymologie adds the 
following pertinent point: ‘Das seit dem 16.Jh. bezeugte, aus gr. krisis > lat. crisis “Entscheidung, 
entscheidende Wendung” ... Im 18.Jh. beginnt unter dem EinfluB von frz. crise der iibertragene 
allgemeine Gebrauch des Wortes im Sinne von “entscheidende, schwierige Situation; Klemme’” . 
Contemporary etymologists consider the word ‘crisis’ to derive ultimately from the Proto-Germanic 
postulate hri, meaning ‘sieve’. A crisis, and in particular the ‘crisis of Christianity’ in the 18th 
century, is a positive phenomenon from which emerges what is actively worth retaining.
45 The introduction to Owen Chadwick’s The Secularization o f  the European Mind in the 19th 
Century (Cambridge, 1975) summarizes the problem of secularization in relation to the problem of 
the Enlightenment, rooting the observation that the process of secularization cannot imply a simple 
degeneration from a faithful idyll to an age without faith in the philosophical movements which 
began in the 18th century. See esp. pp.9f.
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Goethe’s later scientific experimentation, becomes most apparent for an understanding 
of Goethe’s representation of theological and philosophical movements. For Goethe’s 
account of his religious world in Dichtung und Wahrheit hinges on his awareness of 
historical and cultural progression through oscillations from one extreme to another, 
from controversy to antithetical controversy, from heresy to orthodoxy and back 
again. Furthermore, it is from his affirmed awareness that the history of Christian 
theology is characterized by a process of dogma and counter-dogma which has lost 
sight of its original precepts that Goethe explicitly evolves his ‘Christentum zu 
meinem Privatgebrauch’. There are clear implications here for an understanding of 
Goethe’s mode of secularization in a temporal sense: the significance of Goethe’s 
affirmed predisposition towards the ‘original Christianity’ of Christ himself and the 
early Church must be carefully adduced. What emerges is the broad and, at first sight, 
obvious conclusion that Goethe’s material - the thoughts, philosophies and theologies 
- is not original, but is drawn from his world and derived from his tradition. This 
must, however, be juxtaposed with the notion that Goethe is held somehow to achieve 
originality in his treatment of derived material. It is here that the crux of my argument 
for a particular mode of secularization on Goethe’s part emerges: since scholarship on 
Goethe’s religion has not adduced a definitive stance, and since this appears to be due 
at least in part to inadequate appraisals of what Goethe did with the religious tradition 
he inherited, it is here that the attitude to tradition and concern with its perpetuation 
perceived by late twentieth-century Goethe scholarship reveals its particular relevance 
to my argument. There are factors in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, and 
Goethe’s account of his reception thereof, which point to the significance of polarities 
and their synthesis in attempting to reconcile reason and religion, God and man, the 
secular and the sacral. Is there, then, a peculiarly Goethean attitude to the religious 
tradition in Dichtung und Wahrheit, and what is the nature and function of Goethe’s 
application of binary synthesis in the very fabric of his autobiography to overcome the 
intransigence of polarized opposition and to present the sentient vitality of lived faith?
Several critics have referred to the potential fruitfulness of a stylistic analysis 
of Goethe’s accounts of the religious tradition in Dichtung und Wahrheit. Trunz noted 
with regard to Goethe’s depiction of Catholic sacramentalism in the 7th Book:
Es ware einer besonderen Betrachtung wert, wie weit Goethe aus seiner Art
heraus, das Gottliche im Irdischen zu suchen und nicht vom Wort her,
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sondern vom Symbol her religios zu erleben, Sinn fur das Sakramentale hat 
und in seiner Darstellung ... das Gegebene versteht, es aber auch umwandelt 
und eigener Anschauung annahert.46
Derek Bowman’s article ‘Goethe’s Attitude to Religion in Dichtung und Wahrheit’
ends with the suggestion that some ‘close stylistic analysis’ of Goethe’s attitude to
religion might prove rewarding47. Caroline Cooper perceives this suggestion as
Bowman’s most significant contribution to the debate on Goethe’s ‘religion’ as
presented in Dichtung und Wahrheit*8. To my knowledge, no critic has yet embarked
on such an analysis in depth: I propose to do this in Chapter Four with reference to
passages of particular relevance to Goethe’s representation of his religious tradition.
Here, the significance of the concept of binary synthesis for an understanding and
appreciation of what Goethe was concerned to achieve in re-presenting his religious
tradition for re-appraisal and re-assimilation is made clear. Key passages from
Dichtung und Wahrheit are analysed in terms of their conceptual message and
rhetorical form, with a view to corroborating the postulation that the particular kind of
discourse which Goethe offers in his philosophical maxims is also present in his
autobiography, and has a specific function within his textual accounts of his religious
heritage. In order to exemplify what I intend to indicate as the type of discourse
operating in the religious passages in Goethe’s autobiography, I present in the first
instance an analysis of one of Goethe’s philosophical maxims in terms of its
coordination, and mutual subordination, of rhetorical form and conceptual meaning,
containing and expressing thereby, I shall argue, a particular intimation of religious
feeling.
The premise of Chapter Four’s title, ‘Goethe’s Mode of Secularization: the 
Recreation of Religious Faith’ perhaps requires some preliminary justification and 
elucidation here. I shall present analyses of pertinent passages from Dichtung und 
Wahrheit where, I shall argue, the mode of discourse employed by Goethe mutually 
subordinates the conceptual meaning of his discussions of religion and the rhetorical 
form of the words, phrases and linguistic patterns he uses. This mode of discourse in 
treating aspects of the religious tradition operates on the perceiving reader in many 
ways. The conceptual meaning may be appreciated, and augmented knowledge about
46 HA IX 732.
47 Loc. cit., p.323.
48 Op. cit., pp.!71f.
22
Goethe’s attitude to his religious tradition will result. The poetic relations are there to 
be felt, by the reader who perceives them, in the fabric of the text. And the two 
together - operating in that process of binary synthesis of form and meaning, of poetic 
and conceptual relations discussed above - offer a novel and telling insight into the 
religious tradition with which Goethe is dealing, and which he is concerned to 
perpetuate. Furthermore, this perpetuation takes account of that aspect of binary 
synthesis which involves an acknowledgement of regression as the necessary 
precursor of forward movement49: Goethe’s attitude to the religious tradition 
necessarily involves recourse to the past in order to project anew and invigored into 
the future. And the accounts he presents involve the reader in an activity that is re­
creational in its recourse to original cultural models, and recreational in its playful 
exploitation of the plasticity of the medium. For the aesthetic significance and function 
of the quality of play which, as Schiller argued, is the ‘distinguishing mark’ of art, is, 
I shall argue, as relevant to Goethe’s depiction of his religious tradition in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit as it is central, for example, to the import and communication of the 
message of Faust. For Wilkinson, it is the playful irony of affected impersonality in 
Goethe’s authorial manipulation of medium and genre in his drama which constitutes 
the essential ‘self-reflectiveness’ of the account, and thereby:
‘distances’ the weight and seriousness of the heterogenous cultural material he 
had used in the making of his form in an attempt ... to ensure that we shall 
respond to his tragedy as art, as theatre: as ‘Scherze’ which may be, and 
indeed are, ‘sehr ernst’, but nevertheless partake of that quality of ‘play’ 
which, according to the aesthetic theory evolved in collaboration with Schiller, 
is the distinguishing mark of all true art.50
I hope to show, then, that within the reformulation and representation of the religious 
tradition in Dichtung und Wahrheit, there exists an intimation of faith that is real and 
active, if the reader is open to its perception. What emerges is, I hope, a 
demonstration of the significance of Goethe’s mode of secularization for an informed 
and enlightening understanding of Goethe’s attitude to the religious tradition, with 
possible implications for his oeuvre as a whole.
49 See WW, p.lxxxi: ‘The paradox that in order to go forward it may well be necessary to take a step 
backwards is, after all, enshrined in the French proverb not infrequently quoted by C G Jung to 
express the creative significance of regression: reculer pour mieux saute?.
50 Elizabeth M Wilkinson, ‘Goethe’s Faust: Tragedy in the Diachronic Mode’, loc. cit., p.155.
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CHAPTER I
PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
Any attempt to treat of religion as a general cultural phenomenon touches upon the 
paradox of the numinous lying at the very centre of all theological speculation, which
is that the concept called ‘God’ cannot be logically defined; the Beocr defies the
X oyoa; that which is ‘ineffable’ cannot be expressed in terms of human
comprehension, given verbal and substantial form, and rationally apprehended. A
recently republished work of theological scholarship asserts that religion ‘cannot be
defined, it can only be explored’1, and indeed the whole tradition of Christian and pre-
Christian theological argument is this exploration, which begins and ends with the
premise that absolute and irrefutable intellectual certainty about matters religious,
about the nature and meaning of God, about the place and function of humankind in
the universe, is ultimately unattainable. An investigation into the nature and
significance of Goethe’s attitude to religion, therefore, partakes of the principal and
primary problem of any study of religion itself: the object of religious worship cannot
be defined, but approaches to this object, which the Western tradition calls God, do
invite exploration. In an essay which brings theological considerations directly to bear
on a facet of Goethe’s literary achievements, Elizabeth M Wilkinson, while noting ‘the
ultimate impotence of names to name the Eternally Nameless’2, reminds us of the
charge enjoined by Origen, Goethe’s acknowledged favourite Church Father, that man
must attempt the impossible task of defining and apprehending God in logical, verbal
form, in full awareness that he cannot wholly succeed. Elsewhere, Wilkinson and L A
Willoughby remark:
And had not that same Origen, of all the Church Fathers the one most 
congenial to the eighteenth century, made it unambiguously clear in a famous 
passage that the paradox of theology was rooted in the paradox of language 
itself? That the powerlessness of words to represent the attributes of God was 
but one aspect of the powerlessness of words to convey the individual
1 Frederick J Streng, Understanding Religious Life, California, 1969, 1976. (Preface to the First 
Edition.)
2 E M Wilkinson, ‘The Theological Basis of Faust’s Credo \  German Life and Letters, Vol. X, 1956- 
7, p.230. The passage referred to is Origen’s Contra Celsum, VI, 65.
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qualities of things in general? And had he not also, and in the same locus 
classicus, gone on to make it equally clear that this was no reason for not 
trying?3
allusion here to the paradoxical futility and necessity of attempting to 
encapsulate the essence of religion in conceptual, linguistic form is a crucial starting- 
point for this present analysis. I hope to demonstrate that it is in a peculiar synthesis of 
linguistic form and conceptual meaning that the key to an understanding of Goethe’s 
attitude to religion in general and Christianity in particular lies. Before investigating 
this proposition in detail, however, I shall examine the scholarly debate on Goethe’s 
attitude to religion, in order to clarify the focus of my own analysis. The following, 
therefore, is an attempt to summarize scholarship's reception and analysis of Goethe’s 
expressions of his views and opinions on matters religious.
Goethe’s letters and conversations, the most accurate barometer of his 
assimilation of and contribution to his immediate cultural environment, are full of 
references to religion and faith, and resound with biblical, canonical, and extra- 
Christian religious echoes and allusions. Indeed, any attempt to posit a definition of 
Goethe’s own faith is dogged by his countless refractory and contradictory statements 
on the nature of God and the workings of the universe. Goethe’s explicit utterances on 
religion and the concept of the divinity (in his autobiographical writings, his diaries 
and correspondence, his scientific treatises and his literary works) are as disparate as 
they are profuse, and as apparently contradictory as they are manifestly eclectic. They 
include his rejection of some of the fundamental tenets of the established Christian 
Church - notably the Three-in-One Godhead of the Christian Trinity4, and the notion 
of ‘original sin’ which is the corner-stone of Protestant asceticism in its assertion of 
man’s inherent sinfulness. Heinrich Hoffmann notes that Goethe adumbrates in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit his dissatisfaction with the orthodox notion of ‘original sin’ 
which does not allow of a complementary, antithetical ‘original virtue’5. H A Korff’s 
late nineteenth-century overview of the Goethean Age stresses Goethe’s ‘paganism’,
3 WW, pp. cxxiiif.
4 Loewen (op. cit., p.160) cites Goethe’s conversation with Eckermann of 4 i 1824: ‘Ich glaube an 
Gott und die Natur, und an den Sieg des Edlen iiber das Schlechte; aber das war den frommen Seelen 
nicht genug, ich sollte auch glauben, dass drei eins sei und eins drei; das aber widerstrebte dem 
Wahrheitsgefiihl meiner Seele; auch sah ich nicht ein, dass mir damit auch nur im mindesten ware 
geholfen gewesen’ (GA XXTV 548).
5 Op. cit., pp.6f. See, too, Trunz’s commentary on Goethe’s account of the Pelagian heresy in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit: ‘Unter den religiosen Motiven in D u W  ist der Gegensatz zur 
protestantischen Sundenlehre eins der wesentlichsten’ (HA X 591).
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which Korff holds to stem directly from Goethe’s negation of fundamental Christian
dogma6; and it has become something of a commonplace among scholars of Goethe’s
religion to attribute his evidently uneasy relationship with the established Church of
his day to his inability or unwillingness wholly to accept the letter of certain crucial
Christian dogmas. This has led some scholars to seek to define Goethe’s attitude to
religion in terms of an adherence to specifically non-Christian theologies. Katharina
Mommsen, in her study ‘Der unbequeme Goethe’, which concentrates on what
Mommsen perceives as Goethe’s Spinozistic pantheism, notes that:
auf religiosem Gebiet kam er mit dem Christentum in Konflikt durch seinen 
Pantheismus und die Ablehnung bestimmter Dogmen wie der 
Dreieinigkeitslehre.7
Gustav Kruger in Die Religion der Goethezeit notes than some scholars have
attributed a panentheistic stamp to Goethe's personal ‘religion’8, and Hans Joachim
Schrimpf’s 1956 study Das Weltbild des spaten Goethe extends this implied notion of
a striving towards the primeval sources of nature to argue for Goethe’s Koran-
oriented concern with Eastern mysticism9.
Antipathy towards the dogmatic teachings of the orthodox Church is evidenced
by explicit statements by Goethe documenting a personal rejection of Christianity as a
way of life for him. Goethe’s much-quoted remark of 1782 to Lavater: ‘Da ich kein
Widerchrist, kein Unchrist, aber doch ein dezidirter Nichtchrist bin’10, has been read
as a denial of the doctrines of orthodox Christianity quite consonant with the thinking
of one so antipathetic towards the established Church. Yet much later, in 1830,
Goethe declares himself a Christian in the truest and purest sense of the word:
Wer ist denn heutzutage ein Christ, wie Christus ihn haben wollte? Ich allein 
vielleicht, ob ihr mich gleich fiir einen Heiden haltet.11
Goethe’s own particular understanding of Christianity may have little in common with 
the doctrines of the established religion of his day, but it does seem, in his professed
6 See Geist der Goethezeit. Versuch einer ideelen Entwicklung der Klassisch-Romantischen
Literaturgeschichte, Leipzig, 1923, Vol. I, pp.273ff.: ‘1st nach der Vorstellung der christlichen Kirche 
jeder, der den Glauben as das christliche Dogma verweigert, ein Heide, so ist Goethe ein 
vollkommener Heide. Und die deutsche Geistesgeschichte tritt mit Lessing und Goethe in die Periode 
ihres Heidentums! Daran kann, darf und soil nicht geriittelt werden’ (p.276).
7 Katharina Mommsen, ‘Der Unbequeme Goethe’, PEGS, N S 38 (1967-68), pp.12-42 (p.14).
8 Tubingen, 1931, p.93.
8 Das Weltbild des spaten Goethe. Uberlieferung und Bewahrung in Goethes Alterswerk, Stuttgart, 
1956, pp.70ff.
10 To Lavater, 29 vii 1782, GA XVIII 680.
11 To F von Muller, 7 iv 1830, GA XXIII 686.
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view, to relate directly to the original Christianity of Christ himself. Of course, one 
must be careful to take the irony of Goethe’s remarks into account, perhaps bom of an 
exasperation with those who would attempt to characterize his personal faith, as in his 
observation that the execution of Gretchen and death by starvation of Ottilie should be 
evidence enough of his Christianity12. David Luke has recently referred to Goethe’s 
famous obfuscatory profession of non-Christianity to Lavater as a ‘kind of verbal 
juggling’ which furnishes more ‘protective’ critics with reason for maintaining that 
Goethe rejected, not Christianity itself, but the Christianity of the established Church, 
‘das KzrcAenchristentum’13. Luke cites Goethe’s unequivocal reference, in a letter to 
Herder of May 1775, to Christian doctrine as ‘ein ScheiBding’14, and his observation 
to Charlotte von Stein in 1782 that his satiety with the doctrines of Christianity is such 
that he would be prepared to hear more only from Christ Himself. Luke is careful to 
place these anti-Christian comments in their correct contexts; nevertheless, Goethe 
does seem to assert his own Christianity in his own terms and in a way which is 
unorthodox in its peculiar deployment of the dogmatic precepts of orthodoxy: “‘Ich 
bin ein Christ”, sagte er, “das dank mir der Teufel ...”’15.
Critical reaction to the welter of information, declarations, statements and 
implications by Goethe about religion in general, and his particular attitude to it, has 
been, perhaps understandably, confused. Indeed, the failure of scholarship to derive a 
coherent picture of Goethe’s religious views and their expression is aptly summed up 
by Ernst Cassirer’s judgement of the critical debate on Goethe’s religion as ‘ein Chaos 
unvereinbarer Aufierungen’16: a pertinent description of a century of scholarly 
confusion. This is corroborated by Gustav Kruger’s later advocacy of extreme caution 
in the face of the profusion of contradictory religious testimonies offered by Goethe17.
12 Noted by Enright, loc. cit., p.9.
13 David Luke, ‘“Vor Deinem Jammerkreuz”: Goethe’s Attitude to Christian Belief’, loc. cit., 
pp.36f.
14 A source of evident embarrassment to later editors, as Luke notes: ‘The [Weimarer Ausgabe] (iv, II, 
26 If.) had prudishly altered this to *Scheinding”, while reporting in the Lesearten (II, 333) that the n 
is “undeutlich, vielleicht s” - thus saving decorum, if not also scholarship. The GA simply omits this 
letter altogether’ (ibid., p.37). See, however, Der Junge Goethe. Neue Ausgabe in Sechs Banden, ed. 
Max Morris, Leipzig, 1909-12, Vol. V, p.30.
15 Conversation reported by F Schubart, 1811-2 (GA XXII 757).
18 Ernst Cassirer, Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte, Berlin, 1916, p.394.
17 Die Religion der Goethezeit, op. cit.: ‘auf diesem Wege stoBen wir nun ja uberhaupt auf eine solche 
verwirrende Fiille von sich kreuzenden Zeugnissen, daB wir nicht vorsichtig genug FuB zu FuB setzen 
konnen’ (p.96).
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Indeed, Kruger notes that some scholars play the apparent contradictions in Goethe’s 
religious utterances off against one another in order deliberately to give the impression 
that a unified image of Goethe’s attitude towards religion in general and Christianity in 
particular is simply not possible. It is perhaps due to a collective version of what E D 
Hirsch has referred to as the ‘fallacy of imitative form’18 - the tendency amongst 
commentators to imitate the general style of a text or texts in their critical consideration 
thereof - that scholarly research into Goethe’s attitude to faith and religious belief has 
produced such an array of opposed, contradictory and overlapping conclusions - and 
non-conclusions.
An attempt at a critical overview of the debate on Goethe’s religion is dogged, 
moreover, by the more general problem of the concentration by individual 
commentators on specific aspects of Goethe’s utterances on religion to the exclusion 
of other, perhaps potentially contradictory, statements and stated views. This allows 
the scholar to attribute to Goethe a religious view which concurs with the scholar’s 
own religious or non-religious standpoint. Clearly, the nature and profusion of 
Goethe’s accounts of religion as a cultural phenomenon on the one hand, and his 
testimonies of a personal religious standpoint on the other, are such that many critics 
are able to content themselves with a one-sided approach which confirms their own 
convictions, applying a specious and spurious general interpretation to carefully 
selected pronouncements by Goethe, pronouncements which span a lifetime of 
evolving experience and which are couched in literary, poetic, conversational or 
epistolary contexts all too carelessly ignored on occasion.
One of the fundamental problems posed by a consideration of Goethe’s 
‘religion’ is pinpointed by Gustav Kruger in his awareness of the tendency, here 
specifically within the German literary tradition and its criticism, to endow a nation’s 
great figures with virtues which an entire nation is called upon to embrace and 
promote. If Germany is to consider herself a Christian nation - and it seems to be the 
unspecified and unsubstantiated claim of many researchers that she should - it follows 
that the ‘greatest son’, in his acquired role as national figurehead, should 
wholeheartedly embrace the tenets of Christianity. It is therefore the assumed duty of 
the obliging critic to accord the public an understanding of Goethe’s life and works 
which is consonant with, and contributory to, the accepted precepts of the Western
18 E D Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, New Haven and London, 1967, p.ix.
28
Christian tradition in which he operated. In this respect, any calling into question of 
Goethe’s ‘true faith’ is met by the reading public with disapproval of the scholar and 
his or her standpoint. Kruger notes:
daB man uns als ‘unreine Geister’ in Anspruch nimmt, die geneigt sein sollen,
unseren groBten Dichter immer wieder zum Christen zu machen.19
Such a concern to promote the image of Goethe as an acceptable representative of 
national, cultural values is apparent in Karl Bornhausen’s exhortation to his 
compatriots, almost a century after Goethe’s death, to re-affirm their faith in the values 
of Classicism and Romanticism - values which Bornhausen perceives as positively 
and unilaterally religious - leading him into an effusive, congratulatory classification 
of Germany’s greatest national figures which culminates in his appreciation of Goethe 
‘als Symbol fur die Gegenwartsgestalt deutscher Religion’20. It is apparent from the 
provocative, excitatory tone of Bornhausen’s advocacy of adhesion to these historical 
and cultural precepts that he considers Goethe in this light an entirely positive and 
valid figurehead for contemporary German religion.
This popular idealization of Goethe as a religious model persists, and has led 
to a general unwillingness objectively to question the very existence of his faith, let 
alone its status as the determinative impulse of his life. The American scholar H W 
Kelling has noted the overwhelmingly antagonistic response in the German press and 
scholarly journals in the early 1960s to Richard Friedenthal’s Goethe biography21. 
Friedenthal’s affirmed intention was to depict the ‘man’ rather than the ‘myth’, to 
probe beneath the layers of reverential adulation and present, as far as possible, the 
objective reality of Goethe’s life and of the values he explicitly and implicitly 
embraced or rejected. Of course, it may be that in the laudable pursuit of objectivity 
and realistic appraisal, the finished biography may be considered to have gone beyond 
the avowed intention of the author and to have presented a gratuitously irreverent, 
scandal-mongering account of Goethe’s life. What is significant here is not that 
Friedenthal offers a ‘baser’ image of Goethe than is normally the case within the 
history of German literary criticism, but that a great many of Goethe’s compatriots 
seem to have baulked at what they considered an iconoclastic attitude to an immutably 
legendary and symbolic figure:
19 Kruger, op. cit., pp.87f.
20 Karl Bornhausen, Wir heissen’s fromm sein. Ein Beitrag zur Religion der Goethezeit und ihrer 
gegenwartigen Bedeutung, Gotha, 1926, p.3.
21 Richard Friedenthal, Goethe. Sein Leben und seine Zeit, Miinchen, 1963.
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A secondary school teacher contended that the destruction of the ‘Goethe 
myth’ was tantamount to the negation of an essential aspect of Germany’s 
spiritual and intellectual life. Friedenthal is accused of stressing trifling and 
degrading incidents, of catering to the low taste of those demanding the 
sensational, of one-sided concentration on trite occurrences in Goethe’s life, of 
wallowing in the dirt, and of daring to make cheap insinuations and, above all, 
of destroying the ideals of youth.22
The tone and tenor of Friedenthal’s biography is symptomatic of a late twentieth-
century concern to weed out the ‘truths’ of Goethe’s life from the thicket of
haphazardly imaginative, apocryphal and subjective ‘Goethe mythology’ propagated
by preceding generations and trends. On the one hand, then, we are dealing with
attempts to ‘debunk’ Goethe from his acquired status as a paragon of culturally
acceptable religious virtues, and reveal his human failings. On the other hand,
attempts to discern what Goethe revered have also been dogged by indiscriminate
reverence towards Goethe himself, as is aptly encapsulated in the title of a recent
collection of essays, Mein Gott Goethe™. Indiscriminate iconoclasm is of course as
meretricious and unthinking an approach as ill-considered idolatry. Nevertheless, the
notion of Goethe as a religious example to be emulated - either as the historical
incarnation of all positive religious principles or in the more dangerous ‘deification’ of
him as a religious figurehead - remains an obstacle to objective scholarship on
Goethe’s ‘religion’, since it seems to put him beyond critical scrutiny and colour both
the scholarly approach and the presentation of the research findings.
Scholarship is also confronted with the yet more daunting problem of the
apparent lack of clarity and cohesion in Goethe’s own treatment of religion. Friedrich
Jodi’s late nineteenth-century lamentation about his age’s obfuscation of the ideas and
ideals of German Classicism differs from Bornhausen’s exaltation of Goethe as a
religious example in its candid statement of the task facing the critic considering
Goethe’s religion. Jodi posits two potential approaches to the problem of Goethe’s
religion - a biographical overview of sources and influences, and a systematic analysis
of their progressive evolution - which both seem at first sight impossible because:
Aus alien Perioden seines Lebens haben wir von ihm zahlreiche AuBerungen 
iiber religiose Dinge, in prosaischer wie poetischer Form, welche Zeugnis
22 H W Kelling, ‘Goethe the “Dichterprophet”. Thoughts on Interpreting Goethe’s Religion’, 
German Life and Letters, Vol. XXVI, 1972-3, pp.112-9 (p.112).
23 Leo Kreutzer, Mein Gott Goethe. Essays, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1980.
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davon geben, wie zahlreich und mannigfaltig die Gesichtspunkte waren, unter 
welchen Goethe die Religion betrachtete.24
Indeed, Jodi notes in 1898 what many scholars have since found to be typical of
Goethe’s attitude to religion: that it is ‘unsystematic’. Since Goethe was no systematic
theoretician of religion as an objective phenomenon in the mould of some of his
philosophical forefathers such as Thomasius, Wolff or Leibniz, and since his
subjective standpoint evolved gradually from ever-growing experience, from social
and educational sources, from the developing philosophical and cultural climate of his
day, any attempt to define a rigid systematization in his attitude to religion is surely
quite misplaced. For Jodi, the manifold influences upon Goethe and the variety of his
treatment thereof combine to form an indefinable and discordant ensemble:
Goethe war ja kein Theoretiker der Religion. Nirgends hat er sich in 
systematischer Weise fiber religiose Probleme ausgesprochen. Alles, was wir 
von ihm besitzen, sind gelegentliche AuBerungen im Zusammenhang einer 
bestimmten Situation, aus einer gegebenen Stimmung heraus entstanden und 
darum keineswegs unter sich in Einklang.25
This assertion of the inherently unsystematic nature of Goethe’s religious views leads
some commentators to deny the validity of any systematic approach to the problem.
For Walter Naumann:
Goethe’s theology is not strictly defined, and it is fluctuating. The reason for 
this is that Goethe was not interested in any such speculations.26
Whether Goethe was ‘interested’ in theological speculation or not is of course
contentious. Naumann’s categorical statement would imply that the manifestly
unsystematic nature of Goethe’s explicit attitude to religion denies the validity of any
systematic scholarly approach to it. Illogically, lack of system in the object of analysis
is seen to justify a lack of system in the analytical procedure. Eduard Spranger even
asserts the curious thesis that it is quite erroneous to expect any sort of religious
system to inhere in the works of a poet (it is contextually obvious that Goethe is the
poet he has in mind):
Wenn wir von der Weltanschauung eines Dichters sprechen, so wissen wir im
24 Friedrich Jodi, ‘Goethes Stellung zum religiosen Problem’ (1898). In Jodi, Vom Lebenswege, 
Stuttgart, Berlin, 1916, pp.54-81 (p.57).
25 Ibid., p.58.
26 Naumann, ‘Goethe’s Religion’, loc. cit., p.189.
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voraus, daB wir kein System erwarten diirfen.27
However, despite the contention that any attempt to posit a logical systematization
within Goethe’s religious utterances and views is untenable and mistaken, many
scholars are concerned nonetheless to attempt the definition of a systematically
coherent ‘religion’ attributable to Goethe, basing their judgement of the disparate
views he explicitly stated, and their implicit sources, on a biographical
compartmentalization of his life into definable temporal periods of influence and
expression. Spranger’s concern to disprove his own thesis of a poet’s lack of interest
in metaphysical speculation leads him to consider the disparity of Goethe’s professed
views in terms of a schematic synthesis of early mysticism, of Pietistic and neo-
Platonist influences, and of alchemistic experimentation, with the neo-Classical
formalism of Goethe’s middle years; issuing in the all-embracing, all-subsuming
religious world-view of his maturity28. Heinrich Hoffmann, while also professing the
view that a systematizing approach to the problem of Goethe’s religion is ill-advised -
‘Wenn man von Goethes Religion redet, muB man sich hiiten, sie in ein System
bringen zu wollen’29- asserts notwithstanding that a strong, unifying thread pervades
all Goethe’s positive religious influences and utterances, and provides the outline of a
potentially harmonious and hence systematically viable whole. For Hoffmann, this
putative religious harmony on the part of Goethe is positively and unifyingly
Christian: it is the formal and catechetical religious influences of Goethe’s youth
which combine with the education of life and experience to provide what for
Hoffmann is Goethe’s ‘freie Stellung innerhalb des Christentums’30. More recently,
Gerhard Mobus has asserted Goethe’s overwhelming and persistent tenacity in respect
of the Christian religious ideals of his youth, and has criticised:
jene Biographen Goethes, die bis zur Stunde das Verhaltnis Goethes zum 
Christentum reduzieren zur infantilen Reminiszenz, weil sie iiberzeugt sind, 
daB Goethe mit dem Abschied von Frankfurt und seit dem Aufenthalt in 
Leipzig weit iiber das Christentum als Kirche und als Religiositat
27 Eduard Spranger, Goethes Weltanschauung, Leipzig, 1932, p. 1 9 .1 am grateful to my supervisor for 
pointing out that, for example, Dante was indubitably a poet who presented an evident and coherently 
systematic religious world-view! A concise account of the religious system of Dante and its poetical 
expression is to be found in Bertrand Russell’s History o f  Western Philosophy and its Connection 
with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, Second Edition, 
London, 1961. (See esp. p.216). See also David Daiches, God and the Poets. The Gifford Lectures, 
1983, Oxford, 1984, pp.79ff. and passim.
28 See Spranger, ibid., pp25f.
29 Hoffmann, op. cit., p.3.
30 Ibid., p.22.
hinausgewachsen ist.31 
Mobus evidently belongs to the school of thought among Goethe critics which 
maintains that the determining impulse of Goethe’s life was indeed provided by his 
childhood experiences. However, as David Luke’s essay points out, there is little 
direct evidence to corroborate the contention of the residual effect upon Goethe of an 
early Christian sensibility32. Mobus’s implied disagreement with Hoffmann lies in the 
former’s concern to view this formal religious education as a non-mutating, non­
evolving absolute throughout Goethe’s life. Clearly, no coherent critical consensus on 
the nature of Goethe’s personal faith and its implications for scholarly reception of his 
works emerges from this phase of the debate. Nor is there any agreement on how 
Goethe’s attitude to religion is to be perceived and evaluated: in terms of the evolving 
and developing experiences of his life; the residual influence of his early education; or 
the manifold and discrete contexts of his expression.
A different approach to the problem of systematic analysis of Goethe’s attitude 
to religion was postulated by H W Kelling in the early 1970s with his recognition that 
the inability of scholarship to posit a clear picture of the nature and significance of 
Goethe’s religious views rests not in any confusion and unclarity in the attitude to 
religion itself, but in the picture that Goethe painted of it. Kelling asserts:
An evaluation of Goethe’s religious feelings and convictions is difficult and 
perhaps not very interesting to an objective analyst, and in the past has 
certainly led to a great diversity of thought and contradictory results... While 
Goethe generally appears to be quite eager to make confessions, to reveal his 
ideas and to preserve for posterity a detailed account of his personal life and 
philosophy, he is extremely hesitant to state his religious convictions clearly.33
In an essay entitled ‘The Coherence of Goethe’s Political Outlook’, R H Stephenson
makes the point that Goethe stated quite unequivocally, in the course of a conversation
with Eckermann, that he had in fact been consistently concerned to express religious,
scientific and political views with unqualified sincerity. Stephenson notes, with
specific reference to Goethe’s expressed political outlook, ‘the curious fact’ that
1 Gerhard Mobus, Die Christus-Frage in Goethes Leben und Werk, Osnabruck, 1964, p.25.
32 Luke, ‘Goethe’s Attitude to Christian Belief, loc. cit., p.39.
33 Kelling, op. cit., pp.ll4f.
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‘successive scholars have apparently not believed him’34. It seems that Kelling is here
unwilling to perceive any coherence in Goethe’s explicit accounts of his religious
views. He attributes the putative reluctance on Goethe’s part to give clear expression
to these to an accommodation of the philosophical trends and expectations of Goethe’s
contemporary milieu:
The religious sphere was no longer felt to be an objective reality which could 
be shared and experienced by all people and the details of which could be 
discussed and explained almost as easily as those of the empirical sphere. 
During the eighteenth century religious feelings and thoughts came to be 
considered more subjectively and privately, and were not readily shared with 
others.35
Given that the eighteenth century is generally regarded as an age of experimental 
philosophical innovation, of constant questioning, of human assertion of - albeit 
limited - autonomy with regard to life and destiny, it seems odd that Kelling considers 
the apparent inconsistency of Goethe’s stated convictions as evidence of a mere 
unwillingness to proclaim his own faith, rather than as symptomatic of a general 
philosophical trend towards enquiry and investigation. Kelling would hold that 
Goethe maintained a religious faith which persisted, constant and immutable, but in an 
internalized form defying expression and proclamation. Kelling seems to imply that 
Goethe’s faith survived the objective rationalization of the Enlightenment by turning 
itself inward into a private religion which did not compromise itself through 
externalization and explicit investigation. For Kelling, Goethe’s religion was an inner 
belief which persisted untarnished and unchanged by an enlightened philosophical age 
which caused its internalization.
Indeed, there is considerable scholarly agreement that the apparent lack of 
cohesion in Goethe’s explicit religious views is directly attributable to the investigative 
philosophical temper of his immediate ‘enlightened’ cultural milieu, given the growing 
reluctance at the time to accept the absolute authority of the established Church, and 
the corresponding concern to investigate the true nature of original Christian faith in its
34 R H Stephenson, ‘The Coherence of Goethe’s Political Outlook’, in Tradition and Creation. 
Essays in Honour o f  Elizabeth Mary Wilkinson, ed. C P Magill et al., Leeds, 1978, pp.77-88, 
(p.79). The pertinent point is made to Eckermann, 4 i 1824: ‘In religiosen Dingen, in 
wissenschaftfchen und politischen, iiberall machte es mir zu schaffen, daB ich nicht heuchelte, und daB 
ich den Mut hatte, mich auszusprechen, wie ich empfand’ (GA XXTV 547f).
35 Kelling, op. cit., p.115.
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purest perceptible manifestation, untarnished by dogmatic apocrypha and formal
religious procedure. Friedrich Jodi posits the view that the eclecticism of Goethe’s
religious utterances is a direct reflection of the disparate religious movements, creeds
and beliefs of his age; and that he displayed courageous individuality in arriving at his
own particular religious standpoint - which Jodi does not specify - in the face of this
welter of influences and sources:
Es gibt wenig Menschen, die mit so feinfiihliger Empindsamkeit diese 
Schwingungen des religiosen Athers, der sie umgab, aufgenommen und 
dargestellt hatten, ohne doch ihrer Individualist dadurch untreu zu werden und 
sie an fremde Einflusse dauernd zu verlieren.36
It is the Enlightenment, in the role of a general European cultural phenomenon, which
provided, for Jodi, a significant vehicle for reforming orthodox and dogmatic religion
into a valid, positive concern with the active improvement of the human condition.
However, Jodi’s conception of Goethe’s appreciation of the unadulterated,
undogmatic purity of original Christian life hinges on the quite contradictory assertion
that Goethe’s religious outlook remained wholly unaffected by historical and cultural
religious form. Of Goethe, Jodi notes:
seine tiefe Verehrung fur den Gedankengehalt der Religion und ihre 
menschlich bildende Kraft; und zugleich die voile Unabhangigheit des groBen 
Mannes von alien uberlieferten Formen der Religion.37
This formulation by Jodi of Goethe’s attitude to religious tradition - his rejection of
doctrine in favour of the purity of ‘original’ Christianity - implies an absolute
independence which is, surely, historically and culturally untenable (even to reject a
tradition is still, surely, to work within that tradition). Jodi differentiates two
apparently irreconcilable realms of religious experience: the external formality of
established religious practice and the inner motivation of thought and action accorded
by personal appreciation of the fundamental precepts of religion. By this analysis,
Goethe’s appreciation of religion in general would be founded uniquely on his
personal awareness of, and respect for, the individually fortifying power of original
religious thought: the ‘Uberlieferung’, from which Jodi maintains Goethe remained
independent, would imply only the contemporary tradition of external formality in
worship, which eschews the wider implications of any developing consciousness of
the intrinsic value of religion for the self. Jodi’s criticism of any chronological
38 Jodi, op. cit., p.56.
37 Ibid., pp.73f.
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compartmentalization of Goethe’s religious views involves an insistence that Goethe
appreciated and understood historical Christianity in terms of its moral and
psychological fundaments, which in turn allowed him to posit a personal image of true
Christianity; an image which is dynamic in its constant personal evolution, and one
which promotes the active perpetuation of the fundamental religion it re-enacts:
Niemals ... hat Goethe aufgehort, die historische Religion und ihre Urkunde 
aus der Tiefe ihrer psychologischen Grundlagen heraus zu verstehen; und 
niemals ... hat er sich den Gebilden des historischen Glaubens und den 
Satzungen jedweden Kirchentums gegeniiber die voile Freiheit des 
personlichen Gestaltens und Anneigens rauben lassen.38
In a similar vein, Kelling recognized what he claimed was Goethe’s ‘unique
contribution’ - it is unclear from Kelling’s context to whom or what or in which form
this contribution is to occur - which is:
his attempt to overcome the crisis of Christianity and yet preserve its ideals by 
a new way of thinking and feeling, since the existing forms have become 
suspect to him.39
Kelling is here echoing a recurrent scholarly view of Goethe’s religion in its historical
context: Erich Franz also perceived Goethe’s religious views and intentions against the
background of the ‘crisis of Christianity’ brought about by the intellectual movement
towards Enlightenment:
Man muB sich um Goethes Stellungnahme richtig einzuschatzen, die geistige 
Gesamtlage und die groBe Krisis des Christentums in der Aufklarungszeit 
vergegenwartigen.40
For Franz, the insistence of the philosophers of the Enlightenment on a proclamation
of humanity and the individual’s control over his or her own destiny is analogous to
the spiritual notion of the recognition of inherent human sinfulness. Religious tradition
holds knowledge as the corollary to sin: rational investigation into the workings of the
universe and the supremacy of the human being therein can only lead, according to
Franz, to a realization of the original loss of human purity which the Judaeo-Christian
tradition attributes to the ‘Fall’ of primal man and woman:
Der Schritt vom naiven Glauben zum anerkennenden Verstehen ist eigentlich 
der geistige Siindenfall, die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies.41
38 Ibid., pp.58f.
39 Kelling, op. cit., p. 116.
40 Franz, op. cit., p. 193.
41 Ibid., p.67.
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A reconciliation of these two potential approaches to the problem of Goethe’s
‘religion’ in its historical context - the individual’s assertion of control over his or her
own destiny, and the recourse to the precepts of original Christianity - would imply
that Goethe side-stepped the investigative philosophical temper of his age by
concentrating, in his own mind and for his own benefit, on the purity of original
worship. As a scholarly viewpoint, this is, as we shall see, untenable, and must be
tempered by an awareness of the conscious attitude to religion in the Enlightenment.
Arnold Bergstrasser attributes to Franz’s contribution to the debate on Goethe’s
religion a recognition that Korff’s proclamation of Goethe’s anti-establishment
‘paganism’ misunderstands Goethe’s appreciation of the spiritual values of original
Christianity, devoid of the obscurantist precepts of contemporary orthodoxy, and
functioning dynamically for the individual in the present moment of experience:
Franz greatly clarified the controversy about Goethe’s relation to Christianity 
by stating that Korff’s sharp formulation can be accepted as referring to ‘the 
Christian dogmatics, the system of ecclesiastical metaphysics only, whereas 
Goethe, on the other hand, not only faced without prejudice the spiritual 
values of Christianity but was deeply influenced by them in essential points of 
his whole work’.42
Bergstrasser’s argument, too, rests on the appreciation of opposing tendencies in 
Goethe’s religious thought. He maintains that Goethe resolved for himself the tension 
between orthodoxy and Enlightenment, between established religious practice and 
man’s assertion of his rational autonomy, by extending the domain of religious 
inspiration far beyond the traditional interpretation of the Bible and the primary 
Christian witnesses43. This is, indeed, the conventionally-held understanding of 
Goethe’s explicit statement in a letter to his friend and religious adversary Johann 
Kaspar Lavater of his, Goethe’s, appreciation of manifold sources of religious 
inspiration:
Du findest nichts schoner als das Evangelium, ich finde Tausend geschriebene 
Blatter alter und neuer von Gott begnadigter Menschen eben so schon, und der 
Menschheit ebenso niitzlich und unentbehrlich.44
The tendency towards ‘original Christianity’ which is perceived by scholars to inhere
in Goethe’s apparent dissatisfaction with the precepts and doctrines of the established
42 Bergstrasser, ‘Goethe’s View of Christ’, Modern Philology, Vol. 46 (1948-49), pp.172-202, 
(p.186). See Franz, op.cit., p.268.
43 Bergstrasser, op. cit., p. 175.
44 To Lavater, 9 viii 1782 (GA XIX 686).
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Church of his day is therefore quite evidently consonant with a denial of the absolute 
and immutable veracity of orthodox religious sources, and leads to a novel 
appreciation of religious inspiration in general. As I shall argue, it is surely this 
reappraisal of religion, rather than the coy, self-effacing, religious timidity postulated 
by Kelling, which is the significant effect of the philosophical temper of the 
Enlightenment on Goethe’s attitude to religion. Bergstrasser notes that Ernst 
Troeltsch’s study Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kitchen und Gruppen45 posits an 
understanding of the Pietist faith (which Goethe acknowledges he actively embraced 
in his youth and of which the influence throughout his life is both demonstrable and 
well-documented) that involves a tendency towards the precepts of the original 
Christian church in its purity of thought and simplicity of action. The internalization of 
faith and recourse to simple religious practices are evident responses to the problem of 
religion in the eighteenth century, and in this sense may be seen as conditioning 
Goethe’s assimilation of both the philosophical temper of his age and its religious 
upheaval.
Recognition of all these factors - dissatisfaction with doctrinaire orthodoxy; 
refusal to acknowledge the Bible as the absolute and unique source of religious 
inspiration; the personalization of religious thought through rational analysis or its 
internalization in the face of rational attack - combine in different ways in different 
accounts of Goethe’s religious views and their expression to produce the nebulous 
critical concept of Privatchristentum. For instance, critics seeking to discern a coherent 
metaphysical world-view in Goethe’s attitude to Christianity have seized eagerly upon 
his documentation in Dichtung und Wahrheit of his antipathetic response to some of 
the more stringent Pietist doctrines, an antipathy which eventually led Goethe to 
evolve what he describes as ‘ein Christentum zu meinem Privatgebrauch’46. This 
cryptic phrase clearly demands careful unpacking in order that Goethe’s precise 
meaning may be discerned. As it is, it has been adapted by successive commentators 
to concur with their differing accounts of the nature and significance of Goethe’s 
religiosity. Heinrich Hoffmann, noting that Goethe inherited from Gottfried Arnold 
the notion ‘daB jeder seine eigene Religion haben durfe’47, proclaims Goethe’s ‘freie
45 Tubingen, 1912; see Bergstrasser, op. cit., p.177.
48 HA X 45.
47 Hoffmann, op. cit., p.7.
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Stellung innerhalb des Christentums’48 as a personal and personalized creed which
broadly conforms with conventional Christian dogma, in accordance with the critic’s
avowal of Goethe’s deep-seated personal faith which promoted, in Hoffmann’s view,
a persistent and all-embracing Christianity throughout Goethe’s life and works. By
contrast, Bergstrasser’s account of ‘Goethe’s view of Christ’49 declares a selective
approval of Christianity by which Goethe allows himself to reject what he considers
untenable, thereby effecting a reconciliation between his acknowledged dislike and
mistrust of the established Church of his day and his profound respect, as
Bergstrasser sees it, for the figure of Christ and the purity of the early Christian
church. Derek Bowman’s disapproval of what he terms Goethe’s ‘Hypsistarian
eclecticism’50 delineates an exploitative approach to the Christian tradition by which
Goethe is able to appropriate certain selected elements from this tradition, in
conjunction with elements from other religions and religious traditions, for personal
satisfaction and for personal ends. Similarly, Katharina Mommsen’s account of
Goethe’s pantheistically-orientated religiosity51 seeks to indicate that Goethe’s is a
mystical, individual and entirely personal faith in a hidden benevolent Godhead which
defies definition. Mommsen emphasizes that it was the study of Spinoza, documented
in the sixteenth book of Dichtung und Wahrheit and therefore contextually close to
Goethe’s account of his evolution of ‘ein Christentum zu meinem Privatgebrauch’,
which provided Goethe with ‘die Grundlage fur seine eigene Religiositat’. She insists
that this personalized ‘religiosity’ led Goethe into ever-more entrenched controversy
with the religious establishment, and prevented his ever achieving, in orthodox
circles, what Mommsen describes as ‘true religiosity’:
Fortan wurde auch Goethe immer wieder die echte Religiositat abgestritten. 
Dieser Vorwurf traf den Dichter von alien am tiefsten, er ist aber aufrecht 
erhalten worden bis in neueste Zeit.52
Mommsen’s differentiation between Goethe’s ‘eigene Religiositat’ and ‘echte
48 Ibid., p.22.
49 Loc. cit.
50 Derek Bowman, ‘Goethe and the Christian Autobiographical Tradition’, loc cit., p.22. Cf. 
Bowman, Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.60, where the author justifies his account o f Goethe’s 
discriminatory eclecticism by citing his letter to Sulpiz Boisseree of 22 iii 1831: ‘Nun erfahr ich aber 
in meinen alten Tagen von einer Sekte der Hypsistarier, welche, zwischen Heiden, Juden und Christen 
geklemmt, sich erklarten, das Beste, Vollkommenste, was zu ihrer Kenntnis kame, zu schatzen, zu 
bewundern, zu verehren und, insofern es also mit der Gottheit im nahen Verhaltnis stehen miisse, 
anzubeten’ (GA XXI 976).
51 Mommsen, op. cit., pp.l4ff.
62 Ibid., p.15.
Religiositat’ is unclear and unspecified, but seems to be based on Goethe’s putative
disagreement with and dislike of the orthodox Church. The right of the latter to claim
‘echte Religiositat’ is not questioned; nor is the veracity of the reproachful attitude
which, Mommsen maintains, is still addressed to Goethe’s religious reputation.
However, Mommsen subsequently specifies Goethe’s conception of ‘echte
Religiositat’ as pertaining to Christianity in action; the activist objectification of faith as
it works in the world. This is, for Mommsen, the node of Goethe’s disagreement with
the vague internalization of religion which was encouraged by the Romantic
movement in its alleged insistence on inward-seeking feeling rather than on activity
and operative function:
Wenn Goethe die Religiositat der Romantiker in dieser Weise bezweifelte, so 
darum, weil nach seiner Uberzeugung Christentum sich beweisen muBte durch 
die Tat, durch ein im Sinne Christi gefiihrtes Leben. Daran fehlte es den 
Romantikern. Sie brachten in Literatur und bildende Kunst ein vages 
Schwarmen fur die christliche Religion, dem kein Ton folgte, das sich im 
Leben nicht bestatigte.53
Conversely, Bergstrasser, for example, asserts that ‘true religion remains something
inward and even personal’54 and maintains that Goethe evolved for himself a
personalized religion quite valid in its own terms and consonant with the fundamental
precepts of Christianity:
Not merely tolerant but, in his own way, believing, Goethe kept separated 
from the doctrines and practices of churches and sects the pure gospel and the 
pure image of Christ.55
It is hardly surprising, given the aforementioned difficulties of objective religious
analysis, that critics should disagree so glaringly on the nature and definition of ‘true
religion’, and this has a necessary bearing on scholarly understanding and
appreciation of Goethe’s relation to religion, ‘true’ or otherwise. Mommsen mentions
Goethe’s ‘besondere Art des Christentums’56 which, according to her analysis, is
Spinozistic, pantheistic and fatalistic; and hence diametrically opposed to Hoffmann’s
postulation of an analogous ‘freie Stellung innerhalb des Christentums’; which, in its
affirmation of Goethe’s lasting orthodoxy, is itself quite incompatible with the
‘iiberkonfessionelles Christentum’ of Herbert Biesel’s more recent analysis of
53 Mommsen, op. cit., p. 19.
54 Bergstrasser, op. cit., p. 172.
65 Ibid., p.158.
58 Mommsen, op. cit., p.23.
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Goethe’s religion, which proclaims Goethe a ‘naturfrommer, antik-moderner Heide’57.
It seems, then, that successive scholars have adopted the notion of 
Privatchristentum as a self-sufficient explanatory concept describing an immutable 
world-view peculiar to Goethe, and have sought to define the term no further. 
Kelling, for example, speaks of ‘the undenomenational and undogmatic 
“Privatchristentum” which originated with Goethe’58, but does not substantiate his 
claim that Goethe explicitly initiated this particular religious unorthodoxy, any more 
than he (Kelling) clarifies its nature. Kelling’s adoption of the term as a notional 
absolute does not indicate whether Privatchristentum is to be understood as an 
idiosyncratic but nonetheless objectively valid approach to traditional Christianity, or a 
sort of Pietist ‘Verinnerlichung’ and mystical communion with an entirely personal 
God. The title of Walter Bienert’s earlier study, Goethes pietistisch-humanistisches 
Privatchristentum59, defines at least the direction of the notion’s application, but only 
by according it a conceptual validity which does not appear to be borne out by any 
explicit reference on Goethe’s part. Walter Naumann’s assertion that Goethe 
postulated a ‘private substitute for traditional religion’60 is equally vague and non­
committal, and serves more to further the confusion about Goethe’s attitude to religion 
in general and Christianity in particular than to clarify the question of ‘ein Christentum 
zu meinem Privatgebrauch’. Indeed, what is apparently assumed by many 
commentators to provide the answer to the problem of Goethe’s ‘religion’ serves in 
effect only to beg more questions, about the nature of this process of ‘privatization’, 
its impact in the re-externalization of Goethe’s religious views, and its relation to the 
religion of tradition and accepted orthodoxy it is held to replace and supersede in terms 
of Goethe’s own ‘religion’.
Even more significantly, what successive scholarly assertions of Goethe’s 
‘Privatchristentum’ have failed to acknowledge is that his account of individualism in 
faith, in proclamation of an idiosyncratic and personally valid religion, is an attitude 
not peculiar to Goethe, but in response to a commonly-held supposition of his time:
da ich oft genug hatte sagen horen, jeder Mensch habe am Ende doch seine
eigene Religion, da kam mir nichts natiirlicher vor, als daB ich mir auch meine
57 Herbert Biesel, Dichtung und Prophetie, Diisseldorf, 1972, p.17.
68 Kelling, op. cit., p.116.
59 Halle, 1935.
60 Naumann, ‘Goethe’s Religion’, loc. cit., p.190.
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eigene bilden konne.61
Moreover, Goethe displays, within the context of Dichtung und Wahrheit, a
subsequent unwillingness to concur wholeheartedly with the idea that religious
expansion and tolerance in the late eighteenth century gave validity and credibility to
the notion of idiosyncratic faith:
Man wiederholte so oft in jenen toleranten Zeiten, jeder Mensch habe seine 
eigene Religion, seine eigene Art der Gottesverehrung. Ob ich nun gleich dies 
nicht geradezu behauptete, so konnte ich doch im gegenwartigen Fall 
bemerken, daB Manner und Frauen einen verschiedenen Heiland bediirfen.62 
Evolution of a personal religious code depends, according to Goethe’s own account,
on influence, education, cultural environment, personality, and even, as Goethe’s
formulation makes explicit, on gender63. If this is the personal and private religious
code that is to be understood as Goethe’s ‘Privatchristentum’, it must first be
acknowledged that such an approach neither originated with Goethe, since it was a
commonly understood and held religious attitude; nor can it be defined simply as a
private substitute for traditional religion, since it seems to have been traditionally
understood, within the cultural milieu in which Goethe inhered, that faith as an
objective phenomenon demanded a personal approach by the subject. Indeed, the
concept of Privatchristentum, as an internalization of religion defying re-
externalization in the face of a hostile world, as a renunciation of the objective world
as the significant matrix for religious expression, would imply a wholly internal,
subjective religion embraced and advocated by Goethe, and is categorically
contradicted in the first instance by his objective interest in religious phenomena in
general and their expression. It seems to be evident from the very nature of Goethe’s
utterances on religion that this privatization of Christianity, of which he was aware as
a popular trend of his age, signified for him no renunciative retreat from the world,
but rather a personal religion evolved by the self for the self, partly in terms of and
according to the external world of religious formality - that is to say, in terms of an
individual re-assimilation of traditional, and hence in part conventional, religion.
Harry Loewen’s attribution of Goethe’s evolution of a personal religious code to a
disillusionment with Pietism implies the creative impulse to write, to objectify
6’ HA IX 350.
62 HA X 22. My italics.
63 Although it must be noted that Goethe is here generalizing from his own experience o f two 
particular examples: the pietistically devout Susanne von Klettenberg and the dogmatically 
fundamentalist Lavater.
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experience, which to some extent confirms this equation of a ‘Christentum zu meinem
Privatgebrauch’ (misquoted by Loewen) with an appropriative, externalizing
conception of ‘Privatchristentum’:
He turned away from the world-negating view of the Pietists, decided to 
become an author, and embarked upon a new course - the working out of a 
‘Religion zu meinem Privatgebrauch’ js/cT] of which he speaks in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit.M
Loewen conceives of what he calls Goethe’s ‘private Christianity’ in terms of an 
idiosyncratic abrogation of the dogmas of doctrinaire religion, and the unorthodox 
sects with which he was familiar, bom of an insistence on the individual’s freedom of 
response to the Christian faith; an attitude which Goethe, according to Loewen, shared 
with his contemporary religious thinkers. This involves, for Loewen, an appreciation 
of the purity of the early Christian church and is the primary impulse in Goethe’s 
conscious integration of the religious tradition in which he inhered, and the creative 
vocation he followed65. The concept of Privatchristentum, viewed in this light, has the 
virtue of having a direct bearing on the appreciation of Goethe’s use of sacral material 
in the secular context of his art and his contribution to historical culture, and runs 
contrary to the persistent widespread conception of Goethe’s Privatchristentum as a 
vague ‘religion’ of inward-seeking experience and subjective emotionalism in both its 
genesis and its direction.
The understanding of Privatchristentum as merely a private internalization of 
faith is, moreover, implicitly belied by the notion adumbrated by some scholars that 
Goethe’s evolved religious standpoint involves a recognition of the existential validity 
of the objective world as the medium in and through which religious faith is to find its 
meaning and its expression. Hoffmann’s professed awareness that Goethe’s personal 
faith involved a striving to the infinite through the finite accords the phenomenal world 
the status of a significant matrix which is the only valid and conceivable means of 
approximating the absolute that is God66: the objective world of manifestation and 
phenomenon is the religious subject’s frame of reference; he aspires to the abstract 
through the concrete. Likewise, Hans Joachim Schrimpf’s assertion that Goethe
64 Loewen, op. cit., p.28.
65 Ibid., p.31: ‘While clinging to what he considered early Christianity, he declared his independence 
from the institutionalism and orthodoxy of the church, and began consciously to integrate his faith 
with his chosen course as a writer’.
66 See Hoffmann, op. cit., pp.9ff.
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dismisses the ‘other-worldly’ aspect of religious belief67 also accords the material 
world a vital referential significance for Goethe’s religious experience and its 
expression. In a similar vein, Naumann notes that Goethe’s understanding of the 
divine principle does not inhere in any abstract speculation or idle emotionalism, but is 
concerned with the active apprehension of the numinous in and through the 
phenomenal:
like Faust, he turns his eye inward toward the refraction of the Divine light in
the universe about us. To recognise the working of this universe, to be active
in it - that is our duty.68
Leaving aside for the present the obviously uncertain and potentially dangerous 
practice, apparently indulged in here by Naumann too, of taking literary constructs as 
evidence of the personal standpoint of their author, it is worth noting that it is implicit 
in the accounts of many commentators that Goethe approved of a religion of positive 
action and effect upon the manifest world. Even Mommsen’s discussion of Goethe’s 
particular individual and individualistic religion views this, not in terms of a mere 
emotional experience, ‘ein vages Schwarmen fur die christliche Religion’, but as a 
faith which proves its worth ‘durch die Tat’69: Goethe’s personally-evolved religious 
code is not then, after all, a retreat from the world, but demands active manifestation 
and expression in the world. ‘Privatchristentum’ is not just a verbal corruption, but a 
misleadingly tendentious misinterpretation of ‘ein Christentum zu meinem 
Privatgebrauch’, for ‘Gebrauch’ implies that there is to be a use, a function, of the 
‘Christianity’ which is appropriated. It is the nature of this function which is the 
concern of this study.
Significantly, Erich Franz pre-empts and anticipatorily supersedes all 
subsequent discussion of Goethe’s ‘Privatchristentum’, its significance and its 
repercussions, in noting Goethe’s ‘Lieblingsgedanke, daB jeder nach seiner Weise 
und nach seinen Kraften das Gottliche auffassen moge’70. The ‘personal’ nature of 
Goethe’s religion inheres in this respect in the appeal to the personal subject to evolve 
his or her own conception of the divine: the existential validity of the conception lies, 
for Franz, in its objectification and manifest formality in the phenomenal world itself,
67 Das Weltbild des spaten Goethe, op. cit., p.293: ‘Der religiose Mensch muB sich nach Goethe in 
der Welt “zu Hause” fiihlen und nicht “wie geborgt oder im Exil’”.
68 Naumann, loc. cit., p. 189.
69 Mommsen, loc. cit., p. 19.
70 Franz, op. cit., p.53.
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in the apprehension of the ineffable sacral in terms of and within the matrix of the 
secular. Franz’s understanding of Goethe’s ‘Christentum zum Privatgebrauch’ (sic) is 
firmly situated within its historical context, as a direct result of the Enlightenment in 
Germany, which involved and demanded what Franz describes as a ‘Sakularisierung 
des Christentums’71. This process of secularization is thus perceived as a historical 
phenomenon which in turn allows of the appropriation and utilization of religious 
material; this being, for Goethe, also a function of his age.
What is not apparent in Franz’s account, however, is a precise understanding 
of the concept of secularization in its relation to the problem of Goethe’s ‘religion’. 
Clearly, it is not sufficient to state, as Franz does, that Christian notions are 
‘iibertragen und sakularisiert’ in Goethe’s religious utterances, without attempting to 
analyse the conceptual significance and application of the secularization process. A 
consideration of what Goethe understood and implied by ‘ein Christentum zu meinem 
Privatgebrauch’ is evidently still required, one which recognizes Goethe’s particular 
and selective evolution of a personal code, but seeks not merely to evaluate the extent 
to which this code may be considered consonant with a specific orthodoxy or heresy. 
The diffuse problem of the ethical validity of Goethe’s ‘private use of Christianity’ 
may to this end be subsumed under the particular question of the matter and manner of 
his use of sacral material - pertaining to the realm of religious worship - in the 
secular world of discourse, action, and physical manifestation.
Scholarship’s recognition of the significance of Goethe’s acute awareness of
his cultural inheritance, including that of the Western Christian tradition, and his
conscious contribution to its perpetuation, has been mentioned in the introduction to
this study above. It is significant here to note that of this legacy, the single most
important and meaningful item for Goethe is demonstrably the Judaeo-Christian Bible.
In Dichtung und Wahrheit he notes the appeal of the Bible’s ethical message to him,
and most particularly, its effect upon him through life:
Ich fur meine Person hatte sie lieb und wert: denn fast ihr allein war ich meine 
sittliche Bildung schuldig, und die Begebenheiten, die Lehren, die Symbole, 
die Gleichnisse, alles hatte sich tief bei mir eingedriickt und war auf eine oder 
die andere Weise wirksam gewesen.72
71 See ibid., p.193.
72 HA IX 274f.
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Goethe’s account to Eckermann in March 1832 of the ethical power and validity of 
Christianity maintains that it is the witness of the Christian Bible (‘wie es in den 
Evangelien schimmert und leuchtet’73) which transcends and illuminates all scientific 
and cultural progress. As Elizabeth M Wilkinson, amongst many others, has 
emphasized, Goethe ‘was and remained a grateful heir of the Christian tradition - 
bibelfest, rooted in the Bible, as his language constantly proclaims’74. It is this 
linguistic proclamation and manifestation of his religious inheritance which is 
traditionally understood in scholarship, after Franz, as Goethe’s ‘Sakularisierung des 
Christentums’: his use of biblical language - and, by logical extension, the language of 
the hymnal, the prayer-book, the liturgy and creed, and the conceptual terminology of 
the theological tradition - in the ostensibly secular context of biographical account, 
epistolary correspondence, scientific discourse, and poetic, narrative or dramatic 
depiction. Such an enumeration of the areas in which the process of secularization 
takes place - the use of sacral material in a secular context - does not, however, further 
any precise and fruitful understanding of the function of the process itself, nor a 
coherent evaluation of the significance of such a ‘Sakularisierung des Christentums’ 
for Goethe’s own ‘religion’. There is general agreement that such a secularizing 
attitude to the Christian religion is not peculiar to Goethe, but is rooted in the 
intellectual climate in which he operated. That there was, however, a specifically and 
peculiarly Goethean understanding of secularization, unique to him and conducive to 
the evolution of a personal religious code, is implicit in the accounts of many 
commentators. The precise nature of this concept, and its bearing on Goethe’s 
‘religion’, remains, however, undefined and largely unappreciated.
Before attempting to determine the nature of Goethe’s understanding of the 
process of secularization and his practice thereof, I propose to consider the concept of 
secularization itself as a cultural phenomenon with general historical and cultural 
repercussions and significance, since these in turn have a direct bearing on the 
repercussions and significance of ‘secularization’ for an understanding of the problem 
of Goethe’s ‘religion’. I shall, therefore, consider the etymological implications of the 
concept of secularization with a view to clarifying Goethe’s understanding of the
73 GA XXIV 771f.
74 ‘Goethe’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, 15th edition, 1985, Vol XX, pp.181-188,
(p.186).
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process as a general cultural phenomenon of implicit and direct relevance to his 
affirmed and acknowledged use of sacral material in the particular secular context of 
his discourse. As we shall see, my titular reference to ‘Goethe’s Mode of 
Secularization’ implies both the manner of his secularizing and its re-manifestation of 
historical religion on the continuum of historical culture.
The Latin noun saeculum, from which are derived the English adjective 
‘secular’, its related noun ‘secularism’, and the corresponding process of 
‘secularization’, is to be understood, according to the Oxford Latin Dictionary, in an 
exclusively and specifically temporal sense. This dictionary gives nine such 
definitions of saeculum, as an ‘age’, a ‘period’, or, by extension, a ‘human 
generation’. Only by further extension of the evolved meaning of saeculum as a 
human lifetime does the Latin term come to imply a period of one hundred years, or 
century, as the putative extreme limit of such a lifetime, and it is this which gives rise 
to the contemporary French cognate siecle. It is almost as an afterthought that the OLD 
offers a tenth definition of saeculum, ‘human life, the world’, which seems to have 
evolved from one of the more extended temporal definitions, ‘the course of human 
affairs’. Yet the notion of secularism, in the common thought and parlance of today, is 
almost exclusively equated with this apparently secondary meaning of its etymological 
forefather. Drawing principally on the etymological history of the term and the 
significance of this for evolving sociological and theological understandings of things 
secular, I shall now attempt to give an account of this shift of emphasis which 
underlies the modern conception of the secular as pertaining to the things of this 
world, and to evaluate the significance of the term for the process of secularization as 
a cultural phemonemon.
According to Wolfgang Binder, it was Augustine of Hippo, in his Christian 
Latin writings, who first explicitly equated ‘the secular’ with ‘the world’75. A secular 
matter is, for Augustine, one which concentrates on the contemporary age rather than 
on eternity, on the goods of the present world rather than on the salvation of the soul. 
Thus is established the antithesis of secular and sacral realms of significance and 
application, in terms of the opposition of Church and State which is held to determine 
the course of Western civilization, underpinning both theological and sociological
75 ‘Grundformen der Sakularisation: Goethe, Schiller, Holderlin’, in Aufschliisse. Studien zur  
deutschen Literatur, Zurich, Munchen, 1976, pp.35-62: ‘Man spricht von Verweltlichung, weil
saeculum seit Augustin mit mundus identifiziert wird’ (p.44).
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thinking.
Nevertheless, these two discrete yet implicitly inter-related understandings of 
‘secular’ - as a chronological division and as an ecclesiastical term for the non- 
ecclesiastical - seem to have co-existed in the Romance languages, and languages 
borrowing extensively from the Romance source, at least as late as the early 
seventeenth century. One obvious - and obviously important - exception is the 
German borrowing Sakulum, which according to Grimm’s Deutsches Worterbuch of 
the late nineteenth century is to be understood, as are its derivates Sakular- and 
sakularisch-, as referring specifically to a period of one hundred years. The Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary provides an example of the use of the adjective ‘secular’ in 
1599 to describe an event which ‘occurs or is celebrated once in an age, century or 
long time’, together with a 1629 definition of ‘secular’ as that which is non- 
ecclesiastical and thus ‘pertaining to the common or unlearned people’. It is this latter 
equation of the secular with the common or lowly which has attained prominence in 
general usage of the term, and has given rise to the negative inflection which gradually 
but inexorably lends a pejorative sense in some contexts to the notions of secularism 
and secularization. This may best be illustrated and corroborated by a consideration of 
the analogous concept of ‘profanity’. The Latin term prof anus designates in the first 
instance a strict spatial location ‘outwith the temple’ (pro = before; fanum = temple). 
Originally, therefore, the ‘profane’ was synonymous with Augustine’s understanding 
of the ‘secular’: civil as distinct from ecclesiastical, lay or common as opposed to 
spiritual. Diverse etymological overviews consistently reveal that overtones of 
contempt, irreverence and blasphemy were acquired in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, and ‘profane’ assumed the wholly negative implications of misuse, abuse, 
violation, defilation and pollution (primarily but not exclusively of matters religious). 
Such a change of meaning by shift of emphasis may be explained partly in terms of 
the fiercely religiocentric nature of late medieval educated society which allowed of no 
development - economic, social or personal - which was not ecclesiastically approved 
and ordained76. The overwhelmingly negative inflection acquired by the notion of 
‘profanity’ is held thereby to result from the deep suspicion with which the Church,
78 Beryl Smalley, The Study o f  the Bible in the Middle A ges , 3rd edition, Oxford, 1983, notes the 
significance of the Bible, as the foundation of the ecclesiastical canon, in all walks of medieval life; 
as the basis of all formal education (‘The Bible was the most studied book of the middle ages. Bible 
study represented the highest branch of learning’, p.xxvii), and also in the wider implications o f its 
relevance to all social and institutional bodies and concerns (see pp.xxixf).
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its political power and authority threatened, viewed secular social elements. The
‘profane’ was no longer merely the non-ecclesiastical, but had come to signify all that
was destructive and undesirable from the point of view of those social and clerical
institutions determined to found and maintain a religious fabric.
Secularism has, however, remained a more specialized term than profanity and
therefore less accessible to - though by no means exempt from - popular pejoration.
The antithesis of secular and sacral does not seem to imply the dogmatic opposition of
good and evil of the more common antithesis of sacred and profane. Moreover, in the
specialist terminology of scientific discourse, certain uses of ‘secular’ show some
perpetuation of the primary Latin understanding of saeculum. In the realms of
astronomical observation or geophysical time, a secular process of change is one of
enormous temporal length, one which continues through long ages. The ‘secular
trend’, used in this sense of a long and gradual change, is in fact a commonplace in
the terminology of economic science. Fernand Braudel’s discussion, within the fabric
of his consideration of the history of world economy, includes the following
definition of what he calls the ‘trend seculaire’:
Barely visible in everyday life, but plodding inexorably on, always in the 
same direction, the trend is a cumulative process, building on its own 
achievements ... until some turning point when, with equal obstinacy, it 
begins to work to bring them down again, slowly and imperceptibly but over a 
long period.77
Of particular significance in this respect is the translator’s repeated rendering of 
Braudel’s ‘siecle’ (‘aurions-nous le privilege ... de voir de nos yeux le siecle basculer 
vers le bas’) as ‘century’ (‘the unenviable privilege of seeing with our own eyes the 
century begin its downward turn’)78. Evidently, the French siecle retains a sense of the 
original meaning of saeculum as an age, or long period of time, which renders the 
specifically temporally defined English ‘century’ somewhat inappropriate in this 
context. It is, nonetheless, apparent from those applications of the ‘secular’ in the 
realms of natural and economic science that the usual understanding of the term as all
77 Femand Braudel, The Perspective o f the World. Vol. Ill of Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th 
Century. Translated from the French by Sian Reynolds, London, 1984, p.77. Originally published 
under the title Le Temps du Monde. Civilisation materielle, economie et capitalisme XVe-XVIIIe 
sidcle, Tome 3, Paris, 1979: ‘Peu perceptible dans l’instant mais allant son bonhomme de chemin, 
toujours dans une meme direction, le trend est un processus cumulatif. II s ’ajoute a lui-meme ... 
jusqu’au moment ou, dans le sens inverse, avec la meme obstination, il se met a travailler h leur 
baisse generate, imperceptible, lente, mais prolongee’ (p.61).
78 Le Temps du Monde, ed. cit., p.63; The Perspective o f  the World, ed. cit., p.80.
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that is not ecclesiastically or religiously orientated is not the only - nor even the 
semantically primary - meaning of the term. But the related process of secularization, 
by which an entity is rendered secular, is generally defined and understood in terms of 
the equation of secularism and worldliness, and the opposition of the secular and the 
sacral. Within a sociological framework, ‘secularization’ is the term applied to 
describe the trend away from a religio-centric society; the decreasing significance of 
the Church as a social power and the corresponding increase in the authority of the 
secular body of the State. As a theological phenomenon, secularization is held to 
denote ‘the historical process by which the world is de-divinized’79, implying not so 
much the notion of a deus absconditus - a God who created the world and then 
withdrew to leave it spinning eternally in vacuo - but rather the Nietzschean idea of a 
God whose ‘death’ is caused by his falling significance in human consciousness. 
What both the theological and sociological uses of ‘secularization’ have in common is 
an understanding of the term as a historical process involving a loss on the sacral side 
and a corresponding gain on the secular. The first recorded use of the German 
Sakularisation is in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to denote the dissolution of 
ecclesiastical orders and the transfer of their property to State control80. In this sense, 
secularization refers to a process of material transfer by which the secular world’s 
gains are directly proportional to the losses incurred by the ecclesiastical body. But as 
has been indicated above, ‘secular’ carries within it implications of common-ness, of 
vulgarity and impurity; and the sense of irredeemable loss on the side of the sacred is 
compounded by the notion that the world perverts its gains, giving rise to a 
predominantly negative understanding of the process of secularization in culture. 
However, such a consideration of secularization as a simple transfer from one realm 
of application to another occurring along a strict chronological continuum is clearly an 
inadequate appreciation of the nature and implications of the concept as a cultural 
process. For the transfer of property from an ecclesiastical to a secular body means 
that the material entity remains intact and unchanged, but loses all spiritual implication 
in order to belong entirely to the worldly realm. Secularization as a process of cultural 
transition, certainly as far as the principal scholars within the German literary tradition 
who have treated of the term and its implications are concerned, is not materially finite
79 See Arnold E Loen, Secularization. Science without God?, London, 1967, p.7.
80 See Albrecht Schone, ‘Sakularisation als sprachbildende Kraft. Studien zur Dichtung deutscher 
Pfarrersohne’, Palaestra, Vol. 226, Gottingen, 1958, p.22.
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in this sense: words and phrases, images and idioms, once appropriated from their
spiritual origins, are not stolen forever, but are copied, imitated, and hence
perpetuated. The process of secularization in culture is in this respect no unilateral
theft, but a borrowing which is subsequently to be paid back with interest. The
secularization of cultural entities has positive, not negative, implications for the sacral
realm, and the overtones of perversion and distortion, which secularization
traditionally seems to imply, inhere not in the secularized entity itself, which remains
intact, but in perception of it in a new context which is seen to reflect unfavourably
upon it and, by association, on its original context. Hence the implications of
secularization in the cultural tradition depend on how the ‘sacral’ notion is perceived in
the novel, ‘secular’ context, for once an idea has been transferred it does not cease to
function in its original context, but may continue in its primary function and, indeed,
engage in a limitless cycle of borrowing and appropriation to an infinite variety of
secular applications. Secularization in the historico-sociological sense is finite:
secularization as a cultural process is, to borrow a telling phrase from Albrecht
Schone, ‘unerschopflich fruchtbar’81. Schone’s analogy of a slab of marble from a
ruined temple used as part of the foundation of a block of modern flats graphically
illustrates his consideration of the sustained and sustaining influence and implication
of a spiritual entity in a secular context:
Jene geformten Steine aber, die aus dem Sakralbau der religiosen Sprache 
gebrochen und in das dichterische Kunstwerk eingefiigt werden, sind kein 
neutrales Material, sie bringen, auch wenn sie nicht obenhin sichtbar sind, 
mehr als sich selber aus dem alten in den neuen Bau. Auf diesem ‘mehr’ 
beruht die Bedeutung des Sakularisations-prozeBes fur die Auslegung des 
dichterischen Werkes.82
So, for Schone, secularization is a redeeming process, by which the secular world 
gains by the appropriation of a spiritual entity, and gains far more than the sacral 
world’s apparent corresponding loss. Schone’s understanding of secularization 
involves a process of transformation by which that which is brought to bear in the 
secular world transcends itself and its original implication to signify something 
greater, something above and beyond itself. Schone’s study is specifically orientated
81 Ibid., p.23.
82 Ibid., p.25. My italics.
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towards the significant literary contribution of the offspring of the German clergy83: 
his concern is with the role of sacral discourse in the secular writings of the sons of 
the ‘Pfarrhaus’. This integrated world of discourse, inhering in the religious education 
and milieu of the writers and their concern to express themselves in the world, which 
is described by Schone as ‘pastorale weltlich-schongeistige Literatur’84, is said by 
Herbert Schoffler (whom Schone explicitly acknowledges as his predecessor and 
inspiration in the secularization debate), to have arisen directly from the freedom of 
ideas and flexibility of thought characteristic of the period of the Enlightenment, which 
led to the relaxation of the formerly rigid boundaries between religious and secular life 
and experience and, by facilitating access to both spiritual and secular texts, pointed 
towards the fruitful co-existence of these two previously independent, even 
diametrically opposed, realms of discourse85. For Schone’s elaboration of Schoffler’s 
account of the Enlightenment as the liberation of thought in general from the 
constraints of traditional Protestant asceticism involves a perception of the mutual 
integration of sacral and secular modes of expression in the process of rationalization. 
Schone’s ‘pastorale weltlich-schongeistige Literatur’ describes not only the use of 
sacral material in secular discourse, but the influence of secular forms of thought and 
expression on the tradition of spirituality. Moreover, this is, for Schone, something 
indigenous to the Protestant tradition in Germany as a whole. Calvin’s religious 
society was, according to Schone’s analysis, founded on an appreciation of the 
political state advocated by Plato; Luther’s views on the nature of religious worship 
are held to have been formed in part by an appreciation of Aristotelian aesthetics. 
Although these judgements are implicitly negated by their absence from Ernst 
Troeltsch’s extensive study, considered definitive, of Die Soziallehren der 
christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen86, Schone’s thesis that secular culture was 
integrated into the German religious mind long before the Aufklarung and the rise in
83 This particular milieu is generally recognized for its contribution to German culture: see for 
example Victor Lange, The Classical Age o f German Literature 1740-1815, London, 1982: ‘Far more 
than the English vicarage, the German “Pfarrhaus” was for most of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the focus of spiritual and imaginative life; its history offers an impressive record of 
intellectual and moral discipline; the number of German writers and artists, scholars and public figures 
who were the sons of Protestant pastors is astonishing’ (pp.47f).
84 Schone, op. cit., p.9.
85 See Herbert Schoffler, Protestantismus und Literatur. Neue Wege zur englischen Literatur des 18.
Jahrhunderts, Gottingen, 1958, and Schoffler, Deutscher Geist im 18. Jahrhundert. Essays zur
Geistes- und Religionsgeschichte, Gottingen, 1956.
88 Ed. cit.
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the phenomenon of ‘rational religion’ is nonetheless upheld by his specific focus on
the Bible as the primary sacral phenomenon, and, more particularly, by the familiar
point he makes about the function of the Bible in the secular world:
Es ist oft betont worden, daB es eine Entdeckung des 18. Jahrhunderts, eine 
Leistung Herders war, die Heilige Schrift als asthetisches Phanomen zu 
begreifen und zu wiirdigen ... Aber langst vor diesem Akt bewuBter Einsicht 
und Erkenntnisformulierung hat die Bibel ja als asthetisches Phanomen 
gewirkt.81
Most significant - and that which has been significantly ignored by some of his 
scholarly successors in the secularization debate - is Schone’s insistence that the 
presence or absence of sacral entities in the secular context of art or discourse has no 
evidential bearing on the ‘Religiositat des Dichters’: what is alone important for 
Schone is not the ethical and religious justification of this exploitation of the biblical 
source, but ‘das dichterische Werk’ itself as a functioning, artistic entity88.
Wolfgang Binder acknowledges Schoffler and Schone as his predecessors and 
primary influences in the evolution of a conceptual analysis of secularization89. Binder 
attempts to reconcile the understanding of secularization as a straightforward historical 
displacement involving sacral loss with the perception, adumbrated by Schone in 
particular, of a dynamic process involving mutual enhancement of sacral and secular 
realms; by concentrating, as Schone advocated, on the use of sacral entities in the 
secular world of discourse, and by limiting his study to the nature and function of 
these entities in context. However, Binder’s primary concern seems to be with the 
secularization process as one of the displacements of ideas, by which theological 
notions are given a worldly sense and frame of reference. But to consider, for 
example, the capitalist ideology which governs Western society today as but the 
actualized expression of early Protestant principles - dignity to labour, justification to 
acquisition - has since Weber become a commonplace within the sociological study of
religion90. In a literary context, it is also the basis of Ludwig Kahn’s short essay
entitled ‘Voltaire’s “Candide” and the Problem of Secularization’91 in which the 
eponymous hero of Goethe’s Faust is caricatured as the incarnation of such capitalist 
principles. But as Binder is aware, such an understanding of secularization as a
87 Schone, op. cit., p.18 (Schone’s italics).
88 See ibid., p.24.
89 Binder, op. cit., p.35.
90 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism, London, 1930, 1976.
91 Publications o f  the Modem Languages Association, Vol. 67, 1952, pp.886-8.
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historico-philosophical phenomenon defined by strict temporal contingencies is quite 
inadequate:
Warum und wozu und unter welchen Bedingungen ihn [ie. the appropriated 
notion] ein Dichter aufgegriffen, wie er ihn verwandelt, wodurch er ihn die 
Intention seines Werkes dienstbar gemacht und welche Sprachgestalt er ihm 
gegeben oder belassen hat - all das bleibt unbeantwortet.92
Binder sets the empirical boundaries of secularization as:
Evangelium, Credo, Dogma, Kirche, Liturgie und Gesangbuch auf der einen 
und Dichtung, Kunst, Philosophic, Staat und Gesellschaft auf der anderen 
Seite.93
His concern is with the extent to which linguistic entities from the sacral realm 
deployed in the secular contexts he enumerates may be considered consonant with, or 
contradictory to, their original sense and context. To this end he defines three distinct 
and differentiated uses of sacral material. The deployment of ‘Bibelworte in 
weltlichem Interesse, aber in ihrem biblischen Sinn’94 is not, according to Binder’s 
analysis, an example of secularization. Precisely what Binder means by ‘worldly 
interest’ and ‘biblical sense’ is not at all clear. Nor are these clarified by specific 
analysis of the terms in the ‘worldly’ and ‘biblical’ contexts Binder enumerates. And 
by citing Schoffler’s interpretation of Goethe’s Die Leiden des Jungen Werthers as an 
example of this use of biblical material in its biblical sense but in a ‘worldly interest’ 
he only adds to the obscurity. Schoffler’s view of Werther as a literary incarnation of 
all positive Christian virtues, of his fate as analogous to that of Christ, is surely a 
simplification, not to say misunderstanding, of Goethe’s highly conscious and highly 
stylized use of biblical language in his novel95. Nor do Binder’s second and third 
definitions of secularization do anything to clarify the significance and application of 
the concept:
82 Binder, op. cit., p.42.
93 Ibid., p.45.
84 Ibid., p.36.
85 See Schoffler, Deutscher Geist im 18. Jahrhundert, op. cit., pp.H5ff. Much of the confusion
engendered by Binder’s reference to Schoffler’s interpretation has recently been clarified by Martin
Swales in his critical analysis of Werther. Where, for Binder, this interpretation by Schoffler is not an
example of secularization, for Swales, Schoffler’s analysis of Werther’s suffering pointed out that
‘ Werther bears witness to the glory and the anguish that are part of a particular stage in the emergence
of modem, secular individualism’. Swales perceives the character of Werther as ‘representative of a
generation caught between the waning of religious faith (under the impact of the Enlightenment) and
the coming of that new kind of secular (that is, historicized) spirituality that would be announced
some thirty years later by the German Idealist philosophers (particularly Hegel)’, ( Goethe. The
Sorrows o f  Young Werther, Cambridge, 1987, p.66).
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Man kann, zweitens, Bibelworte in einem weltlichen Sinne verwenden, ohne 
mit dem biblischen Interesse in Konflikt zu geraten. Hier wird die 
Verweltlichung nicht als solche empfunden, so z.B. bei vielen 
sprichwortlichen Redensarten, die aus dem Alten und Neuen Testament 
stammen. Nur wenn ein Bibelwort in antibiblischem Sinne gebraucht wird, 
ist der Tatbestand der Sakularisation eindeutig erfiillt.96
What Binder means by ‘antibiblical sense’ is unclear. He would seem to imply that
only the use of biblical language in a context which lends the appropriated idea one
single significance which conflicts with its conjectured original sense can be
considered a true example of secularization. However, Binder does admit that this
definition of secularization is too narrow and requires extensive modification97. He
alludes to a potential interchange of significance between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’
contexts in his depiction of:
ein Weltbild, das die Welt mythisiert, also gleichsam hinter ihre christliche 
Entgotterung zuruckgreift, sich aber der christlichen Verkiindigung, da sie 
vorliegt, auch nicht entziehen kann, so dab ein religioser Eklektizismus 
entsteht, der Bibelworte auch in einem paganen und profane Worte auch in 
einem sakralen Sinne gebrauchen kann.98
Here again, it is unclear precisely what Binder means by adducing the potential use of
‘biblical’ words in a ‘pagan’ sense, and ‘profane’ words in a ‘sacral’ sense: his
definition rests under the general rubric of a ‘religious eclecticism’ which maintains,
despite the acknowledgement by Albrecht Schone of a potential symbiotic
interpenetration of sacral and secular modes of discourse, two discrete,
interchangeable but not interlocking, realms of application. Binder’s insistence on the
‘anti-biblical’ sense of true secularization, according to the terms of his definition,
harps back to the predominantly negative implications of secularization which
undermine appreciation of it as an enhancing process of integration and mutual growth
and development. This equation of the secularization process with a parodistic
distortion of scriptural values is precisely that described by the sociologist David
Martin, who has considered the concept of secularization in great detail, viewing it as
a process of demystification and distortion, by which religious symbols and concepts
are relocated within a human and temporal reference, losing thereby all spiritual and
other-worldly implication to be locked forever in a prosaic perversion of their original
Binder, op. cit., pp.36f. My italics.
97 Ibid., p.37.
98 Ibid., p.44.
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value:
Secularization involves the increase of any attitude which rejects the 
reverential, or is indifferent to charismatic appeals, halo effects, awe, or the 
numinous. There is a decrease in any sense of something beyond, deeply 
interfused, underlying. By extension this can be seen as leading to a lack of 
deep seriousness, dedication, and ultimate concern and by a further extension 
as manipulative, cynical, even unprincipled."
Martin’s study sees the process of secularization as explicitly symptomatic of the
genesis of the ‘Modern Age’, which he locates specifically within the temporal context
of the eighteenth century100: his General Study o f Secularization (1978) involves a
determination of the precise historical significance of the concept of secularization:
The transition to ‘modernity’ is assisted either by Calvinism or by the 
Enlightenment. Calvinism is the less explicitly modern of the two, and 
achieves an important symbiosis with the rationalistic variant of the 
Enlightenment ... In short, the secularizing potentiality occurs either through 
Calvinism plus the Enlightenment or the Enlightenment plus its historicized 
variant.101
Martin’s view of the secularization process as one of distortion and deletion of sacral
values is, however, implicitly contradicted by M H Abrams’ analysis in Natural
Supernaturalism of the secularization of inherited theological ideas and ways of
thinking in literary and artistic contexts:
It is a historical commonplace that the course of Western thought since the 
Renaissance has been one of progressive secularization, but it is easy to 
mistake the way in which that process took place ... The process - outside the 
exact sciences at any rate - has not been the deletion and replacement of 
religious ideas but rather the assimilation and reinterpretation of religious 
ideals, as constitutive elements in a world view founded on secular 
premises.102
For Abrams, the manifestly secularized nature of the ideas and values of eighteenth- 
century Enlightenment are not, as they evidently are for Martin, something new and 
peculiar to this age: instead, secularization in the eighteenth century is to be viewed as
99 The Religious and the Secular. Studies in Secularization, London, 1969, p.54. The introduction to 
Chadwick’s The Secularization o f the European Mind inthe 19th Century (op. cit.) refers specifically 
to Martin’s work in perceiving the ‘doctrinaire’ interpretations of secularization which have 
characterized the debate on the term’s sociological relevance, and acknowledges Martin’s salutary 
warning against arbitrary applications of the term as a tool for counter-religious polemics (p.2).
100 The Religious and the Secular, op. cit., p.3.
101 Oxford, 1978, p.8. (The ‘historicized variant’ to which Martin refers is Marxism).
102 Abrams, op. cit., p.13.
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symptomatic of a constant and recurrent, though perhaps more intensified,
phenomenon within the course of Western civilization. Moreover, the process of
secularization, according to Abrams, is no unilateral exchange of sacral for secular
values, but a reformulative displacement of values from traditionally sacral to
ostensibly secular realms of application, by which the original values persist as
determinative categorizations of man’s view of himself in the world. This is, for
Abrams, a characteristic of the Romantic school of thought, philosophy and
discourse. Abrams’ categorization of certain writers as ‘Romantic’ rests upon his
perception that they:
undertook, whatever their religious creed or lack of creed, to save traditional 
concepts, schemes and values which had been based on the relation of the 
Creator to his creature and creation, but [in order] to reformulate them within 
the prevailing two-term system of subject and object, ego and non-ego, the 
human mind or consciousness and its transactions within nature. Despite their 
displacement from a supernatural to a natural frame of reference, however, the 
ancient problems, terminology and ways of thinking about human nature and 
history survived, as the implicit distinctions and categories through which 
even radically secular writers saw themselves and their world, and as the 
presuppositions and focus of their thinking about the condition, the milieu, the 
essential values and aspirations, and the history and destiny of the individual 
and of mankind.103
Secularization in these terms demands a transfer of realm of application - from that 
traditionally designated as the realm of the sacral to that of the world and material 
function therein - which involves a retention of values: the sense of ‘irredeemable 
loss’ postulated by Martin is refuted by Abrams. These values are then presented to 
the world in a necessarily different form; a reformulation which, far from explicitly 
negating the original values, enhances and quickens them by subsuming past history 
and future destiny in a present form which points backwards, to the original, ‘sacral’, 
function; and forwards, to the future potentiality of the reformulated values in culture. 
Secularization in this sense is to be understood as both a worldly and a temporal 
relocation: Abrams’ analysis encapsulates both principal etymological significances of 
the term, as the material displacement of the expression of sacral values encourages 
the reconsideration of these values in a new context.
Abrams’ account here thus explicitly negates the consideration of 
secularization as a simple transfer from one realm of application to another, which
103 ti . jIbid.
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would result, at worst, in the ultimate deletion of all sacral values, and at best, in their 
distortion and perversion. However, the process of secularization seems persistently 
to be associated with the devaluation of religion in society and culture. ‘God’, being 
the object of religious worship, is traditionally conceived of as absolute and 
immutable, and the external manifestations and trappings of this worship are 
consequently regarded as untouchable, unchangeable entities which are but forever 
tarnished and devalued by human interference. It is, of course, a commonplace of 
thought that any translation - and the displacement of religious and biblical notions 
necessitates some sort of a translation of their function and application - involves a 
degree of interpretation, and interpretation presupposes in turn a subjective and hence 
implicitly dubious inflection. If the Bible, as the primary and fundamental reflection of 
the divine absolute, is not treated as sacrosanct and ultimately untranslatable, then the 
message contained therein, it is the general view, seems implicitly to be called into 
question104. This is surely little more than a perpetuation of medieval religious 
esoterism which obstructed general access to religious texts on the grounds that 
familiarity breeds contempt, that understanding leads to perversion105.
To this notion that the biblical text is immutable and sacrosanct may 
undoubtedly be traced some of the inappropriate judgements of Goethe’s ‘religion’ 
discussed above. For, as Kelling has pointed out, measured against the absolute 
criterion of orthodox Christian dogma:
Goethe’s religious convictions very likely will appear as a secularized religion
in which spiritual truths are but vaguely reflected or completely distorted.106
Such an approach, says Kelling, can only result in ‘a negative view of Goethe’s 
religious attitude’107, and this in turn is inextricably bound up with the persistent 
conception of secularization as a process of moral loss and atrophy: Goethe’s attitude 
to religion being viewed as one of cynical perversion furthering the dissolution of
104 The question of the immutability of the biblical text is, of course, contentious, and seems 
predominantly to be based on superstitious interpretations of the warning at the end of the Revelation 
of John: ‘For my part, I give this warning to everyone who is listening to the words of prophecy in 
this book: should anyone add to them, God will add to him the plagues described in this book; should 
anyone take away from the words in this book of prophecy, God will take away from him his share in 
the tree of life and the Holy City, described in this book’ (Rev. 22:18-19).
105 Smalley’s judgement of the Bible as ‘the most studied book of the middle ages’ (op. cit., p.cxxvii) 
still maintains biblical study as the domain of a social and intellectual elite and not open to general 
public consumption in anything other than the accepted and orthodox doctrinal form.
106 Kelling, op. cit., p.116.
107 Ibid.
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traditional religious values. This negative view is eminently illustrated by the studies 
of Derek Bowman, who considers that Goethe:
tries to get the best of both worlds, as it were, by using the trappings, the
phraseology, and even the symbolism of Christianity for artistic effect in such
writings as, say, Die Geheimnisse or Faust. Zweiter Teil.
Bowman apparently considers Goethe a rather muddled und unhappy schizophrenic, 
alternating frantically between religious conviction and artistic calling. Goethe’s 
attempts at reconciliation of the two in a secularization of sacral entites into the fabric 
of his art lead, for Bowman, only to spiritual loss:
But does not the virtue, so to speak, go out of them under such conditions?108 
Bowman begs the question. However, if by ‘virtue’ he means the original Christian 
sense of the divine power of Jesus which, for example, ‘went out of him’ when the 
woman with haemorrhages touched his cloak109, Bowman is himself guilty of 
appropriating a biblical notion for his own ends. However consciously he makes this 
allusion, the influence of the Christian tradition on his own thought and formulations 
is evident. But within the terms of Bowman’s argument, Goethe’s use of sacral 
material in the secular context of his art reflects unfavourably on his religious 
disposition, and heralds, if taken to its logical extreme, his ultimate spiritual 
dissolution. Bowman’s view thus reflects the conception of secularization as a process 
of moral disintegration and loss: Goethe’s attitude to religion being viewed as one of 
perversion, distortion and, most regrettably for Bowman, of irreverence in the face of 
the Absolute.
Bowman’s citing of aesthetic products as direct evidence of the personal 
attitude and standpoint of their author is, in my view, deeply naive: he accords 
Goethe’s literary creations a definitive evidential status for the explicit views of their 
creator, and unfavourably judges Goethe’s own religious attitude on this basis110.
108 ‘Goethe and the Christian Autobiographical Tradition’, loc. cit., p.34.
108 See Mark 5:30. The Interlinear Greek-English N ew Testament. The Nestle Greek Text with a 
Literal English Translation, Alfred Marshall, London, 1958, offers ‘virtue’ in the sense of inherent 
power as a translation of the Greek Suvajuiv.
110 See ibid., pp.34f., where Bowman cites Goethe’s injunction, expressed in Wilhelm Meisters 
Lehijahre, to ‘appreciate life’ (‘Gedenke zu leben!’; HA VII 540). On this basis, Bowman criticises 
Goethe’s apparent failure to take the Christian tradition of ascetic retreat from life into account as 
evidence of the author’s lack of true religious feeling: ‘Witness the whole monastic tradition. Goethe 
does not seem to give the view proper consideration, but a trifle impatiently takes his stand as secular 
humanist (‘jeder tuchtige Mensch’, as he puts it), rather than otherworldly man of God’.
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Moreover, his criticism of what he terms Goethe’s ‘moralizing ritual’ of ‘drawing glib
biblical parallels’111 reveals a failure to take into consideration any conceivable
awareness of the significant function of the sacral in the secular, and of the relevance
of the secular for the sacral; not as a specious spiritualization, as Bowman would have
it, of the secular text by means of recognizable sacral references, but as a reciprocal
relationship between sacral and secular realms by which both aspire to their full
potential significance on the cultural continuum. Abrams’ consideration of religious
entites in the secular context of the literary text is more differentiated and hence more
meaningful, certainly in respect of Goethe, based as it is on the function of these
entities within the text itself and not on their reflection of, or on, the attitude of the
author. Thus Abrams rightly views Goethe’s appropriation of Christian mythology in
terms of an assimilation and progressive perpetuation, leading not to the negation but
to the enhancement of the appropriated sacral notion within the secular world of the
literary text. For Abrams, it is this text which is the significant frame of reference,
with a bearing not on the spiritual well-being, or dissolution, of the author, but on the
continuing significance of religion in culture. Abrams’ analysis of Goethe’s Faust, for
all its limitations, does not pivot on any judgement of the ethics of Goethe’s use of
religious phraseology, but comments on the significant role of the sacral within the
secular in terms of the implications of the precepts and philosophy of religion for
human life as it is lived. Goethe’s secularization, which for Bowman is analogical,
based on unilateral and unbreachable parallels between sacral and secular realms, and
thus evidence of Goethe’s lamentably irreverent attitude112, involves for Abrams the
radical and all-encompassing reinterpretation of traditional sacral values in terms of
their function in the secular world: not, therefore, as a parallelism between two realms
which never touch, but as a close and tightly-knit unity in inter-relationship:
The two parts of Faust are of particular interest because, instead of 
assimilating the Christian supernaturalism into a naturalistic account, it adopts, 
but in order radically to reinterpret, the Christian supernatural itself.113
Abrams considers Goethe’s secularization in terms of the relevance of the sacral for
111 Bowman, 'The Path o f Life. Attitudes to the Bible in some autobiographies of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries’, Publications o f  the Institute o f Germanic Studies, Vol. 15, Essays in German 
and Dutch Literature, ed. W D Robson-Scott, London, 1973, pp.65-83 (p.77).
112 See ‘Goethe and the Christian Autobiographical Tradition’, loc. cit., where Bowman notes in this 
connection Benjamin Constant’s criticism of what he termed Goethe’s ‘abus de l’analogie’ (see GA 
XXII 326), particularly in his scientific experimentation and writings.
113 Abrams, op. cit., p.244.
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the secular text, and the corresponding implications of this for the perpetuation of 
religion in culture. Bowman, on the other hand, is persistently concerned with the 
relationship of the secular to the sacral, which constitutes, he claims, an ethical 
transgression on Goethe’s part. What dogs Bowman’s judgement is his repeated 
implicit - or explicit - denigration of ‘artistic effect’ as something quite untenable in the 
discussion of religion or use of ostensibly religious entities, as being somehow on a 
lower plane of existence to that of the sacral and hence quite irreconcilable with it. Any 
use of religion ‘for artistic effect’ is, for Bowman, equated with the notion of a 
perversion and distortion of values consonant with a negative understanding of the 
secularization process. It seems that Bowman considers it wholly untenable and 
inappropriate that Goethe should treat his religious inheritance like any other culturally 
derived material, as Stoff for artistic formulation, open to perception, appropriation, 
manifestation and perpetuation in and through the medium of his art.
However, the handling of intellectual concepts - and, by extension, of spiritual 
notions and biblical concepts - as common property and therefore as material entities 
ripe for artistic formulation is, of course, another significant topos of eighteenth- 
century thought114. Goethe himself declared, in what has become a crux for 
scholarship on Goethe’s attitude to his religious tradition, that elements from the 
tradition of religion are no less open to appropriation and deployment in non-sacral, 
artistic contexts, than any other of what he terms ‘life’s higher interests’:
Die Religion ... steht in demselbigen Verhaltnis zur Kunst wie jedes andere
hohere Lebensinteresse auch. Sie ist bloB als Stoff zu betrachten, der mit alien
iibrigen Lebensstoffen gleiche Rechte hat.115
Which is not necessarily to say that for Goethe, nothing is sacred! But just as artistic 
originality is held by the theoreticians and practitioners of art in the eighteenth century 
to reside not in the thought itself but in its appropriate treatment - attitudes to 
intellectual property being implicitly related to contemporary understanding of the 
nature and matter of property in general116 - so artistic acceptability is to be decided, 
not by the matter which is appropriated, but by the manner of its appropriation, 
focusing thus not on the ethical validity or invalidity of the use of a sacral entity, idea,
114 See R H Stephenson, Goethe’s  Wisdom Literature, op. cit., esp. Chs. 3 & 4 passim.
115 Conversation with Eckermann, 2 v 1824 (GA XXIV 115).
118 See Vicky Rippere, Schiller and *.Alienation', Bern, Frankfurt am Main, Las Vegas, 1981, p.73 & 
fn.29, p.197.
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notion, phrase or symbol in an artistic context, but on the function of that entity in
context. However, Goethe’s claim that religion is to be considered on a par with all of
‘life’s higher interests’, with poetry and philosophy and art, as part of a common
cultural inheritance, meets with strong disapproval from Derek Bowman:
The danger of such an attitude is that religion may come to be regarded merely 
as material for art, its truths may be manipulated aesthetically and not lived out 
and worshipped ‘in spirit and in truth’ .117
Bowman’s own consideration of the so-called ‘poetic considerations’ to which Goethe
apparently subverts true and valid religious practice seems, despite his assertions and
protestations of unity on Goethe’s part, to be selective, sporadic and piecemeal.
Bowman’s claim that Goethe shows disrespect to the religious tradition he exploits in
his works, through not living out the faith to which he alludes ‘in spirit and in truth’ is
tempered by the critic’s perception of the ‘great good’ which Goethe’s works have
done118; which, according to Bowman’s analysis, should have stood the poet in almost
as good stead in the eyes of the Almighty as if he had lived a life along the straight and
narrow path of Christian virtue (which he evidently, certainly as far as Bowman is
concerned, did not). Moreover, Bowman’s claim that Goethe sacrifices religion to art
would seem to accord religion a status higher than that which Goethe himself was at
pains to claim for it in his discussion of ‘hohere Lebensinteressen’, and hence belies
Bowman’s assertion of Goethe’s unity of thought, expression and action in Dichtung
und Wahrheit: the autobiography is, for Bowman, a poetic construct only in terms of
its putative invalidation, through poeticization, of religion: in all else, it is life itself.
The terms of Bowman’s argument may be valid: his application of them in criticism of
Goethe’s attitude to religion invalidates itself. Moreover, Bowman seems to justify his
assertion of a unity of religious thought in Dichtung und Wahrheit on the grounds
that, although religious interest cedes to poetic considerations in Goethe’s
autobiography, the ‘aesthetic’ is but a minor consideration in the scrutiny of Goethe’s
work119. Precisely what Bowman understands by the ‘aesthetic’ is not defined in the
context of his analysis of Dichtung und Wahrheit. What is evident, however, is that he
frowns upon the seemingly merciless exploitation and manipulation of religious
17 Life into Autobiography, op. cit., pp.65f.
118 Bowman cites (ibid., p.66) the biblical dictum ‘by their fruits ye shall know them’ as evidence of 
Goethe’s potential religious rehabilitation.
119 ‘Thus in “Dichtung und Wahrheit” religion gives way to poetry ... if the work stands up to close 
scrutiny from all sides - and the aesthetic is only one of them, to my mind a minor one . . . ’. (Ibid).
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material in Dichtung und Wahrheit by which all higher religious sense apparently 
perishes in order that the artist’s concern for his art may be advanced. Bowman 
persists in his concern that the presence of religious material in an ostensibly non­
religious context is ultimately detrimental to religious morality:
one cannot help wondering if in such circumstances the virtue does not go out
of religion, at least for the holder of such a tenet. Can an artist make really
effective use of religious motifs, if he does not believe in them?120
Again, Bowman begs the question. He does not detail what he means by the ‘religious 
motifs’ he perceives to exist in the text of Dichtung und Wahrheit, and he does not 
seem to differentiate between the factual, quasi-objective accounts of the author’s 
experience, the analogical reformulations of biblical stories, and the inclusion of 
specific and sporadic religious images and idioms in Goethe’s text. Whether or not 
Goethe ‘believed’ in these, Bowman is surely in no position to judge (his judgement 
being in any case based on a misplaced faith in the simple evidential status of the 
literary text, autobiographical or otherwise), and to what ‘effective use’ Goethe is to 
put them is not covered by the terms of Bowman’s argument.
I hope it will be clear, then, that scholarship on Goethe’s ‘religion’ - even 
Bowman’s exceptionally bold attempt to move beyond vague generalizations - has put 
forward no valid and tenable thesis to gauge the function of Goethe’s use of religious 
material in terms of his artistic contextualization, nor an adequate formulation of the 
‘aesthetic considerations’ to which he is held to subvert religion in his works. That 
this inheres in part at least in an inadequate critical appraisal of Goethe’s personally- 
held beliefs has, I hope, been shown; and this inadequacy is in turn compounded by 
the persistent view of the secularization process in culture as of something negative 
and detrimental to religion. An overview of the critical debate on Goethe’s religion 
reveals a confusion based on conflicting interpretations of the elements from the 
religious tradition manifest in the works of Goethe, interpretations which bring his 
putative personal faith to bear on these elements. A certain degree of critical consensus 
is manifest, notably with regard to the interest, explicitly acknowledged by Goethe, in 
the precepts and manifestations of the early Church and original Christianity, and the 
significance of his own cultural milieu for the evolution of a personal and personalized 
religious creed. Franz’s postulation of Goethe’s ‘Sakularisierung des Christentums’
120 Ibid.
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did much to clarify the focus of Goethe’s ‘religion’ in terms of a re-objectification of 
traditional religion in his contribution to the Western cultural tradition. Subsequent 
studies have not, however, considered the nature of Goethe’s secularization in terms 
of this contribution, but seem persistently to be concerned with the ethical validity or 
invalidity of using religious material in a secular context. Contemporary scholarship 
recognizes that this attitude inheres in Goethe’s own post-Enlightenment milieu, but 
tends towards general assumptions which are not corroborated by particular analyses. 
Clearly, the way is open for an interpretation of Goethe’s use of his religious 
inheritance which appreciates his overriding concern with the perpetuation of tradition 
in the midst of change, and which eschews the historically limited question of the 
ethical appropriateness or inappropriateness of secularizing religious notions and 
entities in art. For the eighteenth century was without doubt an age in which all 
established notions - be they religious, scientific, philosophical, or ethical - were 
called into question and hence validated or invalidated by investigative thought. It is 
against this background that Goethe’s particular mode of secularization must be 
viewed.
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Man muB sich um Goethes Stellungnahme richtig einzuschatzen, 
die geistige Gesamtlage und die groBe Krisis des Christentums 
in der Aufklarungszeit vergegenwartigen.1
CHAPTER II
THE RELEVANT CULTURAL CONTEXT:
THE PHENOMENON OF SECULARIZATION 
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
That the eighteenth century is to be considered primarily and unequivocally as the 
philosophical ‘Age of Enlightenment’ is a commonplace of post-eighteenth-century 
scholarship of that period. The popular French textbook series Les Metamorphoses 
de l'Humanite, for instance, neatly categorizes the years 1700-1800 as ‘le temps des 
libertes’ in its volume Les Aventures et les Revolutions2. Slightly more informed, 
perhaps, but nonetheless artificial, is the setting of the boundaries of the Age of 
Enlightenment in convenient secular (in the temporal sense of the term) division 
initially with the birth in 1689 of Montesquieu3 - the free-thinking sceptic whose 
writings are held to have pioneered much of the subsequent questioning and ultimate 
rejection of established philosophical and social norms in his native France, and 
consequently throughout eighteenth-century Europe4 - and finally with the advent of 
the French Revolution exactly one hundred years later. The prefigurative social and 
political watershed year of 1715 and the disillusioned transition into intellectual 
Romanticism in the post-1795 era also provide a convenient temporal classification of 
the Age of Enlightenment. Whatever the inevitably artificial temporal barriers, the 
intervening years which span the notional eighteenth century are traditionally regarded 
as the ‘century of light’; the period in intellectual and social history in which man
1 Erich Franz, op. cit., p.163.
2 Les Metamorphoses de l'Humanite. Une Histoire de Tart et du monde. Sous la direction de Robert 
Philippe. ‘1700-1800 Le Temps des Libertes. Les Aventures et les Revolutions’, Paris, 1967.
3 See for example the titular premise of Paul Hazard’s La Pensee Europeenne au XVIIIe siecle. De 
Montesquieu a Lessing, (2 volumes), Paris, 1946. (Reference will also be made here to J Lewis 
May’s translation, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century. From Montesquieu to Lessing, 
London, 1954).
4 Mark Hulliung, Montesquieu and the Old Regime, (London, Berkeley, 1976) characterizes 
Montesquieu’s attack on the political establishment of his day as ‘the Aufhebung o f old regime 
thought’ (p. x); perceiving Montesquieu as the theoretician whose ideas were to be realized by his 
successors: ‘Montesquieu had interpreted the world, others would have to change it’ (p.230).
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asserted himself and his control over his spiritual and social destiny; the century of 
antipathy to religion, of the overwhelming abrogation of blind faith, and the demand 
for assurance and certitude in the apprehendable facts of concrete, material existence. 
The eighteenth century is, therefore, tautologically, a ‘century’ of ‘secularization’, 
combining the two primary definitions of the term in a concept of worldliness and 
temporality. Humankind, and not God, was proclaimed the centre of the eighteenth- 
century world and all that went on within it. The political importance of the Church 
diminished in direct proportion to the rise of the State politic. Material certainty in the 
present took commanding precedence over a vague hope for spiritual salvation. 
Happiness and satisfaction in the actual world of the ‘here and now’ were asserted 
over a putative eternal blessedness in the postulated otherworldly realm called Heaven. 
The eighteenth century wanted things accomplished for the people who lived then and 
there, and accomplished in the tangible, experiential world: it was, on the face of it, an 
inherently secular age.
Enlightened philosophy, the intellectual child of eighteenth-century secularism, 
prospered throughout Western civilization and is fundamentally a European 
phenomenon. Before concentrating on the situation in Germany which is obviously 
specifically relevant to Goethe, I propose to consider the Enlightenment in its wider 
significance as a broadly European cultural, philosophical and intellectual movement; 
to examine the nature of the process of secularization as a dimension of the 
Enlightenment and as an ongoing result of the movement in a ‘secular’ age; in order to 
clarify the particular focus of eighteenth-century philosophical and cultural trends in 
Germany; and ultimately to view Goethe’s particular mode of secularization against 
his immediate background and in terms of the Enlightenment as a general cultural 
phenomenon.
That Goethe was born into the middle of the century of Enlightenment is a 
demonstrable historical fact requiring no special emphasis here. That he is not 
generally considered a representative figure of the movement, but rather an 
idiosyncratic observer, and something of an unwilling heir, of this particular 
intellectual climate, is an apparently accepted view in most Goethe scholarship5. That 
the significance of this enlightened inheritance for Goethe is to be considered merely
5 Wilkinson and Willoughby’s Goethe. Poet and Thinker (op. cit.) and T J Reed’s Goethe (op. cit.) 
are notable exceptions to this view.
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as an accident of birth (the facile assumption, for example, that Goethe was born 50 
years too late to have been actively involved in the Enlightenment) is, of course, a 
specious and insufficient appraisal of the man, the movement and the nature of the 
inheritance. Subsequent focus on Goethe’s assimilation of the enlightened tradition 
into which he was born, in which he was intellectually and socially raised, which 
influenced his world, his perception of this world, and his contribution to it, will, I 
hope, reveal definite and tangible links between Goethe’s cultural activity and the 
secular Age of Enlightenment in what I shall argue is Goethe’s particular mode of 
secularization.
Consideration of the Enlightenment as an age of radical antipathy toward 
religion, of faithlessness and godlessness and a wholly inimical attitude toward the 
Church and all it represents, is a common conception aptly summarized by Ernst 
Cassirer at the outset of his study of religion within his text Die Philosophic der 
Aufklarung:
Wenn man nach einer allgemeinen Charakteristik des Aufklarungszeitalters 
fragt, so scheint fur die traditionelle Auffassung und Beurteilung nichts so 
sehr festzustellen, als da!3 die kritische und skeptische Haltung gegeniiber der 
Religion zu den eigentlichen Wesensbestimmungen der Aufklarung gehort.6
According to Cassirer, the Age of Enlightenment affirms the autonomy of the human
race and proclaims the individual’s sole responsibility for its own life and
orchestration of its own destiny. The Age of Enlightenment, as the implicit dialectic of
its self-assumed title suggests7, involves an increase in the light of reason employed to
promote a corresponding diminution in the darkness of superstition and mystical
obscurantism which had, in the reckoning of the new, ‘enlightened’ thinkers, clouded
human judgement and self-appreciation throughout the course of Western civilization.
The principal late twentieth-century scholars of the Enlightenment emphasize this
radically anti-clerical aspect of the age, its philosophy and its adherents. Peter Gay,
for instance, perceives the vehemence of eighteenth-century religious antipathy as the
terminal point in a long process of alienation and disenchantment, the seeds of which
6 Op. cit., p. 178. English translations of Cassirer’s work, where appropriate, are taken from Cassirer, 
The Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment, translated by Fritz C A Koelln and James P Pettigrove, 
Boston, 1955 (see p. 134).
7 See H B Nisbet, ‘“Was ist Aufklarung?” The Concept of Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century 
Germany’, Journal o f  European Studies, Vol. XII, 1982, pp.77-95 (p.84).
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were sown in Renaissance humanism8; to germinate initially in the revolutionary 
philosophical, sociological and educational ideas of Locke, Newton and the English 
deistic humanists, and, transplanted across the Channel through the broadening of 
national perspectives and increasing awareness of other lands and climes which was 
also a social factor of the exploratory eighteenth century9, flourishing in a blaze of 
anti-clericalism and antipathy toward religious interpretations of the world with the 
advent of French Encyclopaedism.
The Encyclopaedists, a self-proclaimed and jealously self-guarding 
philosophical elite, compilers of the self-assumed definitive dictionary of intellectual 
and social concepts valid for their modern world, were more than scathing in their 
condemnation of the Church and its adherents, in their proclamation of their new 
philosophy and new world-view as the only legitimate and justifiable way forward to 
freedom from slavery and liberty from tyranny; and in the real, socio-political, sense 
as well as in the realms of morality, psychology and philosophy. ‘Religion’ is not 
accorded a mention in its own right, but is discussed under the, for the 
Encyclopaedists thoroughly disagreeable, concept of ‘superstition’, which is ‘tout 
exces de la religion en generate’10, and is contrasted unfavourably with atheism which, 
contrary to superstition, has not hampered or hindered the intellectual progress of 
humankind, does not further social injustice in its quest for the fulfilment of its cause, 
does not place unnatural moral exigences on the individual, but allows the human 
being to develop his or her personal potential to the full. There is no further discussion 
of the ‘Etre supreme’ mentioned in the article on superstition; indeed, an entry on 
‘Dieu’ is conspicuous by its absence in the Encyclopaedia, its alphabetical place being 
putatively, and perhaps not insignificantly, between the articles on Diane, the daughter 
of Jupiter, and the pagan goddess Dione11.
Voltaire it was who coined the famous battle-cry of the assault on the
8 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation, op. cit., p.255. Gay’s subtitle, ‘The Rise of 
Modem Paganism’, marks from the outset the rebellion against Christianity which categorizes his 
characterization of the men he calls the ‘philosophes’ and the particular philosophy they embraced and 
promoted.
9 For an account of the corresponding effect of the broadening of geographical horizons upon cultural 
horizons, see Hazard, trans. cit., pp.4ff.
10 John Lough’s edition of selected articles from The Encyclopedic o f  Diderot and d'Alembert 
(Cambridge, 1969) includes this discussion on ‘superstition’ (pp.212ff.) which is curiously absent 
from the Hermann edition of Diderot’s Oeuvres Completes (cf. below), on which Lough collaborated.
11 Diderot, Oeuvres Completes, Edition critique et annotee, ed. John Lough, Jacques Proust, Paris, 
1975-, (25 Vols.), Vol. XVII, pp.l2f.
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superstitious excesses of the religious tradition, ecrasez l'infame, of which the frame
of reference was quickly extended as open war was declared on religion in general, in
all its forms and in all its manifestations. The bellicose nature of this assault is
reflected in the imagery of commentators on the philosophy of the age: Gay speaks of
‘conflict’; of confrontation with the ‘enemy’; of ‘neutral zones’; of militancy and
domination; antagonism, warring factions and strife12. Paul Hazard’s categorization of
the militant nature of eighteenth-century philosophical and social demands emphasizes
their revolutionary zeal which would have no truck with gradual and peaceful reform:
It was more than a reformation that the eighteenth century demanded, it was 
the total overthrow of the Cross, the utter repudiation of the belief that man 
had ever received a direct communication from God; of the belief, in other 
words, in Revelation. What the critics were determined to destroy, was the 
religious interpretation of life13.
The Christian tradition was, for the ‘new’ thinkers of the eighteenth century, the major 
determinant of the society and philosophy they were concerned to revolutionize; and 
together with the commonplace assumption that the philosophers of the Enlightenment 
were concerned to abolish their Christian religious heritage, comes the notion that the 
eighteenth century had no conception of cultural evolution in general: that 
‘enlightened’ thinkers disregarded history and the historical process as chaotic and 
meaningless. They are held to have considered in supreme self-confidence the era in 
which they themselves were living and working as the primary period in world 
history, and to underestimate to the point of dismissal the achievements of the past, in 
a gross negation of the value of historical and cultural tradition. There seems to be 
some scholarly disagreement regarding the philosophical nature of the ensuing 
ostensibly non-traditional, non-theological world. One critic has noted the 
Enlightenment’s ‘blithe disregard for anthropology’14, commenting that the cultural 
milieu of the eighteenth century had no truck with evolution in what he calls ‘the 
anthropological sense’15. The German theologian and historian Ernst Troeltsch had 
pointed, however, to the historically defined nature of the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, which he perceived as a united movement against the received 
religious tradition: its impetus inspired and maintained by its overwhelming concern to
12 Gay, op. cit., pp.37, 59 and passim.
13 Hazard, trans. cit., p.xviii.
14 Robert T Clark, Herder. His Life and Thought, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955, p.216.
15 Ibid., p. 188.
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root out the natural basis of a united metaphysic precisely by taking stock o f the
historical and traditional elements thereof:
In alledem ist [die Aufklarung] die erste umfassende und prinzipielle 
Opposition gegen die dualistisch-supranaturalistische Gestalt der Religion. 
Aber indem sie das ist, ist sie keineswegs wie sie und ihre Gegner oft geglaubt 
haben, die natiirliche und normale Form des menschlichen, frei sich selbst 
iiberlassenen Denkens, sondern ein durch und durch historisch bestimmtes 
Ereignis bestimmter Verhaltnisse und Lagen.16
Cassirer, moreover, had noted and examined philosophical anthropology - collation 
of, and reflection on, all information, notional and factual, available on man and 
humanity - as the predominant metaphysical science of the eighteenth century17: the 
Enlightenment is, for Cassirer, a fundamentally anthropological age, and the world­
view it promoted is consequently unequivocally anthropological. It was the happiness, 
comfort and material well-being of humankind in an acclaimed human-centred world 
which was the priority of the eighteenth century. The individual engaged in self- 
indulgence, not through frivolous hedonism, but in actual awareness of personal 
wants and needs, and of the ability, the self-assumed directive, to attend to their 
fulfilment. The Enlightenment, then, far from disregarding anthropology, made the 
science of humanity both its impetus and its goal; and historical conditions were of 
paramount importance in understanding the nature of humankind in the present. 
Scientific progress proceeds by means of questioning established precepts, and the 
objective of this progress is the amelioration of the human condition. Hence traditional 
Christian mortification of the flesh and general hostility to the things of this world, the 
implicit abasement of humankind, the necessity of humility and self-sacrifice preached 
by the Church and demanded by the religious tradition, were wholly and
18 Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Aufklarung’ [from Realencyclopadie fur protestantische Theologie und Kirche, 3. 
Auflage, ed. Albert Hanck, 2.Bd., Leipzig, 1897, pp.225-241]. Reprinted in Troeltsch, Gesammelte 
Schriften , Bd. 4, Aufsatze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie, hrsg. Hans Baron, 
Tubingen, 1925 (pp.338-374), and in Aufklarung, Absolutismus und Burgertum in Deutschland, 
hrsg. Franklin Kopitsch, Miinchen, 1976, pp. 245ff., (p.246).
17 See Cassirer, op. cit., Zweites Kapitel, ‘Natur und Naturerkenntnis im Denken der Aufklarungs- 
philosophie’, which starts with the premise: ‘Um die Bedeutung zu ermessen, die die Naturerkenntnis 
fur die Entstehung und Gestaltung des modemen Weltbildes besitzt, darf man nicht bei der Betrachtung 
all der Einzelziige stehen bleiben, die sie dem Inhalt dieses Weltbildes eingefugt und durch welche sie 
es entscheidend umgestaltet hat. Der Umfang dieser Einwirkungen scheint fast unermeBlich zu sein; 
und doch erschopft sich in ihm keineswegs das Ganze der bildenden Kraft, die von der Naturerkenntnis 
ausgegangen ist. Ihre entscheidende Leistung liegt vielmehr an einer anderen Stelle: sie besteht nicht 
sowohl in dem neuen gegenstandlichen Gehalt, der durch sie dem menschlichen Geiste vermittelt und 
zuganglich gemacht wurde, als vielmehr in der neuen Funktion, die sie ihm zuwies. Die 
Naturerkenntnis fiihrt nicht schlechthin in die Welt der Gegenstande hinaus: sondern sie wird fur den 
Geist zum Medium, innerhalb dessen er seine eigene Selbsterkenntnis vollzieht’ (p.48).
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unequivocally rejected. The era of superstitious religious belief was proclaimed over, 
a medieval anachronism of no relevance in the modern world, an unwanted, 
unsolicited impediment to human social and moral progress. The overall trend was 
one from Church to world, from God to humanity, from religious to secular; and 
manifested itself in the conceited optimism of a philosophy which refused to admit of 
predecessors and successors in its proclamation of the supremacy of the present 
moment.
Now, this general view of the Enlightenment as a social and intellectual 
movement proclaiming itself the beginning and end of all civilization, as an age which 
disclaimed its entire cultural heritage and displayed particularly virulent hostility 
towards religion, is of course, as has been pointed out by Gay and Cassirer, for 
example, erroneously simplistic; and some reconsideration needs to be borne in mind 
if gross misjudgements of the period and its philosophy are to be avoided. That 
enlightened philosophy, certainly in France, was inimical to the established Church 
and its doctrines is not to be denied. The Encyclopaedia of Diderot and d’Alembert, 
and the violently anti-religious atheism of d’Holbach, are testimony enough of the 
extreme religious antipathy of the leading figures of the French Enlightenment. Nor 
was the primary motive-factor in the founding of the new philosophy less than an 
urgent concern to cast off the shackles of inherited culture and proclaim a New Man in 
a New, and newly discovered, World. Less apparent, however, is the background to 
this urgency; the reasons - both personal and cultural - behind the philosophers’ 
vehement dislike, distrust and disavowal of their Christian tradition. For as Gay has 
argued18, it was more - or less - than a disinterested concern for philosophical truth 
and intellectual purity which fired the philosophers’ consuming desire to annihilate 
religious belief. By Gay’s analysis, if the philosophers’ overall aim was an 
honourable one - the amelioration of the human condition in the material world - their 
means were somewhat less than righteous. Their aversion to Christianity cannot be 
explained simply in terms of a struggle to uphold the light of reason against what they 
considered the obscurity and obscurantism of revealed religion, a fight for the rights 
of man against the conception of a God who seems to deny the claims of humankind 
and to work against the better interests of his own created image. To contest to the
18 See Gay, op. cit., pp.37ff. and passim.
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point of outright denial the validity of the established and venerated tradition of
Christianity was an audacious act: it was this sheer audacity which necessitated the
vehemence of their assault on the precepts of religion. Unable to admit of any
justification for the Christian religion, any virtue or value in its precepts, unwilling to
concede of any benefits at all in adherence to the Christian God, the philosophers in
the main were forced into ever more radical positions, compelled to demand the
negation of the Christian faith in all its manifestations, to abrogate the very existence
of God and to dismiss all notions of belief, faith and worship as chimeric, fallacious
and contrary to the best interests of humankind and human civilization. For their
denial and abrogation of Christianity to be of any effect and to any purpose, it had to
be, or certainly to seem , total: the ferocity of their attack is itself suspiciously
defensive. Only in opposition to a worthy adversary could the philosophers of the
Enlightenment, acting in accordance with the general socio-political climate of their
age, account for themselves and recognize themselves as a group, as a valid
intellectual movement. Their unified goal, the objective which gave the movement its
impetus and the philosophy its substance, was the repudiation of revealed religion and
the annihilation of the Church which proclaimed it.
In this respect, Isaiah Berlin’s euphoric appreciation of ‘the intellectual power,
honesty, lucidity, courage and disinterested love of the truth of the most gifted
thinkers of the eighteenth century’19 rings rather hollow. Far more sophisticated are
Gay’s balanced and clear perceptions of the intellectual vicissitudes of the leading
proponents of enlightened philosophy - their bias, their bigotry, their obstinacy - the
understanding of which in no way diminishes his appreciation of their merits. Gay
notes that the affirmed quest for knowledge which fired the enthusiasm and
determined the direction of the major figures of the European Enlightenment, a quest
undertaken with the Horatian tag sapere aude as its motto and its justification,
disguises but feebly the need of the philosophers to vindicate their own existence and
the force and direction of their philosophical attack in a general condemnation of the
Christian tradition as a whole:
In the midst of the struggle for objectivity they could not themselves be 
objective: myth could be sympathetically understood only after it had been 
fully conquered, but in the course of its conquest it had to be faced as the 
enemy ... The Enlightenment had to treat religion as superstition and error in
19 The A ge o f  Enlightenment. The 18th Century Philosophers. Selected, with introduction and 
interpretive commentary, by Isaiah Berlin, New York, 1956, (p.29).
72
order to recognize itself.20 
Christianity in the eighteenth century, then, is not condemned by its own precepts, but 
by what Gay considers as the bigoted tendency of enlightened thought which had to 
equate religion with obscurantist, fear-provoking and intellectually suffocating 
superstition in order to realize itself and justify its attack in countering an enemy 
worthy of the campaign they sought to wage. The leading exponents of enlightened 
philosophy, certainly the French Encyclopaedists who were the most prolific and 
vociferous champions of the movement, brooked in general no distinction between 
Church and faith, between dogmatic institutionalization and personal belief, between 
noxious superstition and caring, ameliorative religion. Their antagonist was the 
Christian world:
the most militant battle cry of the Enlightenment, ecrasez l ’infame, was 
directed against Christianity itself, against Christian dogma in all its forms, 
Christian institutions, Christian ethics, and the Christian view of man.21
Thus it would seem that the enlightened thinkers, with their general aversion to
religion, could not accept that the Christian faith was of any worth or had any valid
place in their modern world. On the contrary, it was, for them, a diseased cultural
organ whose removal from the body of their new civilization they sought most
determinedly. Their annihilation of superstition - of obscurantist mythopoeia and
ecclesiastical pomp and ceremony - included the annulment of personal faith and
devotion, and demanded the abrogation of the existence of any revealed God. Gay
mentions ‘the philosophes’ bland identification of religion with superstition’22. But
Cassirer notes the pertinent point that Voltaire’s cautious distinction between faith and
superstition - by which l'infame is held to imply not Christian faith proper, but what
the Church had done to distort the purity of the original Christian message and the
potential of personal adherence to this doctrine - was not upheld by the next generation
of enlightened thinkers, notably the Encyclopaedists, who hailed Voltaire as their
spiritual leader and intellectual example23. The common understanding of the
Enlightenment as a philosophical temper wholly inimical to the principles of religion is
certainly not consonant with Cassirer’s perception of a union of faith and knowledge
against the common enemy of superstition: superstitious fear and empty ceremony are,
20 Gay, op. cit., p.37.
21 Ibid., p.59.
22 Gay, ib id  •> p.237.
23 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 178.
73
for Cassirer, as contrary to the spirit of true faith as they are inimical to the quest for
rational knowledge and intellectual clarity:
Der eigentliche radikale Gegensatz zum Glauben ist nicht der Unglaube, 
sondern der Aberglaube, denn er riihrt an die Wurzeln des Glaubens, er laBt 
den Quell versiegen, aus dem die echte Religion entspringt. Hier sehen sich 
daher Wissen und Glauben einem gemeinsamen Gegner gegeniiber: und der 
Kampf gegen ihn ist die erste und dringendste Aufgabe, die es zu bewaltigen 
gilt. In ihr konnen und sollen sich beide vereinen: und erst auf Grund dieser 
Einigung wird sich sodann die Auseinandersetzung zwischen ihnen selbst und 
die Bestimmung ihrer beiderseitigen Grenzen vollziehen lassen.24
Cassirer’s perception of the beneficial nature of a harmonious coexistence of rational
and supra-rational world-views, of a symbiotic interrelation of the quest for new
knowledge and the affirmation of the old faith, indicates that the real force and
direction of eighteenth-century religious antipathy are not easily categorized. Peter
Gay recognizes a private mutual admiration behind the public opposition of
philosopher and Churchman25, but sees these ties as arising more from grudging
affection than from the recognition of a common philosophical aim, from personal
friendship rather than intellectual affinity. Certainly, the philosophers were living and
working in a society dominated by the Christian Church; or rather, in a society where
the Church’s past domination still exercised a significant influence. In their attempt to
free their society from its religious foundations, they were in effect also estranging
themselves from their immediate world, from their own background, education, and
contemporary milieu. They were, moreover, materially dependent upon the social
order whose abolition they called for as loudly as they demanded the dethronement of
the divine26. In France, where the strife was at its keenest, the compromises were
correspondingly at their most pronounced. D’Alembert and d’Holbach were the most
notable aristocrats among the French Enlighteners: but no matter how liberal their
principles and their philosophy, their social rank was - albeit temporarily - assured.
Voltaire, as royal historiographer and dependent on royal patronage, was necessarily
less than vociferous in his condemnation of Court life. Given the political and social
importance of the Church at this time, the abrogation of religion constituted outright
social revolution, but the repudiation of class barriers in any real sense was not a task
24 Cassirer, op. cit., p.215.
25 Gay, op. cit., pp.23ff.
28 Ibid., p.25: ‘The intellectual revolution over which the Enlightenment presided pointed to the 
abolition of hierarchy as much as to the abolition of God’.
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to which the philosophers applied themselves with any overwhelming enthusiasm or 
determination:
Seeking to distinguish themselves, the philosophes had little desire to level all 
distinctions; seeking to be respected, they had no intention of destroying 
respectability. Their gingerly treatment of the masses, which became less 
patronizing as the century went on, reveals their attachment to the old order 
and their fear of too drastic an upheaval.27
Materially, therefore, they inevitably lived off the system they attacked, and seemed
little discomfited by the compromise. Intellectually, they were seeking to eradicate a
cultural tradition the roots of which went very deep indeed, and were in fact
inextricably entangled in their own thoughts and formulations:
... the philosophes boasted that they were making all things new, but far from 
discarding their Christian inheritance, they repressed, and retained, more than 
they knew.28
This is Peter Gay’s account of the persistent force of the Christian tradition and the 
Christian doctrine in the minds of the French proponents of eighteenth-century 
enlightened philosophy. The harder they tried to cut themselves free, the more 
enmeshed in their inherited tradition they became. Theirs was an uneasy dual 
allegiance, but they could not allow themselves to admit it. The cultural background 
they denied intruded continually upon their collective psyche: if the ultimate aim was 
certain, the aspiration to it was troubled and disquieted; if not wholly possessed, the 
rational philosophers of the Enlightenment were indeed ‘haunted’ by the spirit of the 
Christian tradition29. Haunted because, as exponents of what Gay maintains was 
considered an exclusively rational philosophy30, the Enlighteners could not admit to 
being at all susceptible to emotional pressures. Here is the node of the apparently 
uneasy relationship between reason and religion in the eighteenth century in general. 
For what they repressed was, broadly speaking, the emotive appeal of Christianity: 
the Christian tradition as an intrinsic and integral part of their cultural and social
27 Ibid., p.26. Here Gay’s debt to his scholarly predecessor and mentor Carl Becker is evident: ‘Most 
eighteenth-century minds were too accustomed to a stable society with fixed ranks, too habituated to 
an orderly code of manners and a highly conventionalized art, to be at all happy in a disordered 
universe’, Carl L Becker, The Heavenly City o f the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, New Haven, 
1932 , p.49.
28 Ibid., p.59.
29 Ibid.: ‘Christianity did not retain possession of their intellects, but often it haunted them’.
30 An over-simplification in the light of the consideration given to the role of feeling by Diderot and 
certainly by Rousseau; who, despite his ultimate estrangement from the main camp o f the 
Enlighteners, must certainly be considered a major proponent of 18th-century enlightened thought.
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background. What their general assertion of the historical independence of their age 
and their proclaimed new world and world-view vainly attempted to deny was not just 
their material dependence on the existing social order, but their historical conditioning 
as characters on a cultural continuum where the past underpins the present and the 
present relies on the past. The Enlighteners were every bit as historically, materially 
and culturally conditioned as any and all philosophical and intellectual movements 
which had preceded them, and this element of material determination manifested itself 
in their emotional dependence on their cultural tradition, which could not be accounted 
for in rational terms, and which returned uninvited to intrude upon their intellects and 
undermine their philosophical authority. Their denigration of the Christian tradition 
was born of a failure to recognize the appeal and value of this tradition to them, and 
the invalidity of their denigration lies in its over-emphasis on the rational at the 
expense, and attempted denial, of the emotional. If the principal aim of enlightened 
philosophy was to free the individual from received ideologies, and dissolve 
established tradition in preparing a path into modernity, then it was the inability to 
perceive, admit and justify the inevitable subjectivity of their own approach and 
response which prevented the philosophers from fully achieving their objective. It is 
in the subsequent imbalance between rational objectivity and emotional pull that the 
inappropriateness of the eighteenth century’s perception of its own secularization 
process becomes apparent. The progress towards a secular, religionless world, the 
often affirmed goal of enlightened philosophy, is far from a unidirectional and 
unremitting advance. The spirit of the Christian tradition is not so easily exorcised.
There is considerable justification in the notion, therefore, that rather than a 
directly anti-Christian and irreligious movement, instead of an entirely original 
philosophy with no recourse to preceding tradition, the Enlightenment was to some 
extent but a derivative restatement of traditional values. The movement’s very title, of 
course - En/fgA/enment, Aufklarung, ‘siecle des lumieres’ - makes use of an image 
that was theological, and significantly Christological, long before the eighteenth 
century took it for its own31. The triumvirate of Christian virtues - faith, hope and 
charity - is to some extent perpetuated in form but disguised in name. The new 
philosophy is itself a kind of faith; and total, lifelong commitment to its propagation
31 Nisbet’s essay ‘Was ist Aufklarung?’ (loc. cit.) discusses this point in some depth. Paul Hazard 
makes the biblical, Christian connection plain, quoting from John 8:12: ‘I am the Light of the 
world’, Hazard, trans. cit., p.31).
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and dissemination is demanded of its adherents. ‘Optimism’, belief in the ultimate 
goodness of humankind and aspiration towards the achievement of human potential, is 
but a secularized hope: a temporalization of the nebulous Christian promise of other­
worldly sublimity into a call for the realization of potential human happiness in the 
actual world (the cliche notion of the ‘best of all possible worlds’, which Voltaire 
chose as the main focus of his attack on the philosophy of Leibniz, demands of course 
the fulfilment of man in a secular matrix). Charity, disinterested Christian love, found 
its enlightened parallel in the humanitarianism, concern for and understanding of one’s 
fellow human, that was to form the basis of the new society. In this respect, the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment changed nothing; instead they took upon 
themselves what had traditionally been ascribed to religion, for the most part left God 
out of their scheme of things, and claimed credit for what were the traditional precepts 
of the Christian faith. They may have demanded revolution, claimed to have outlawed 
religion forever, but they themselves assumed the yoke and carried out the work. Gay 
purposefully caricatures the philosophers of the Enlightenment as ‘medieval clerks in 
modern dress, ungrateful and forgetful heirs of the Christian tradition’32. What they 
did, according to Gay, was to substitute for Christian values the values of the 
Enlightenment, changing the material matrix of the spiritual notions but perpetuating 
the essence of human emotional and psychical life.
Like all caricatures, however, this of Gay’s is one in which certain notable 
features are accentuated and heightened in order to present a distorted and deliberately 
inaccurate, if corrective, portrait. It is a generalizing picture which, perhaps 
deliberately, quite fails to take into consideration the very different aims and attitudes 
of religion and philosophy in the eighteenth century. What was taking place in some 
particular contexts was, as I hope to demonstrate, not merely a crude derivation but a 
calculated, conscious exploitation. For if, as we have seen, the eighteenth-century 
philosophers appropriated the attributes and the learning of the Christian tradition, 
then their major fault lies therefore only in their failure to acknowledge the debt. The 
object of their concern was humanity itself; the matrix of their operation the real, 
experiential world; their aim the improvement of the material condition and the 
intellectual satisfaction of humankind in this world. But if the process of 
secularization, which for Gay represents little more than a ‘piratical usurpation’ of the
32 Gay, op. cit., p.322.
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inherently Christian religious spirit of the Western tradition, is to be understood as a 
symbiotic inter-relationship of sacral and secular realms, then the common notion of 
the Enlightenment as an age inimical to religion is clearly contradicted, and the cultural 
context relevant to this appraisal of Goethe’s attitude to religion comes into sharper 
focus.
Gay does note that the term ‘secularization’ must be applied with care to the 
movement of eighteenth-century thought, following David Martin’s warning against 
ill-considered application of the term in his (Gay’s) acknowledgement that 
‘secularization is a word easy to use and therefore easy to misuse’33. He denies that the 
categorization of the dissolution of clerical concerns and abrogation of a theocentric 
world may be described merely as the ‘secularization of life in the eighteenth century’. 
For Gay, ‘secularization’ does not denote the overall collapse of the Church, but the 
gradual atrophy of its power, its social, intellectual and political significance and its 
frame of reference:
To speak of secularization, therefore, is to speak of a subtle shift of attention:
religious institutions and religious explanations of events were slowly being
displaced from the center of life to its periphery.34
In these terms, religion is not destroyed, but inexorably rendered impotent; God is not 
obliterated, but dethroned and exiled from the primary concerns of life; religion 
remains a social force, but emasculated, alienated and, ultimately, thoroughly 
unimportant. Gay’s ‘subtle shift of attention’ implies a gradual process of religious 
atrophy and the abrogation of all religious explanations of life which does not seem to 
differ greatly from the notion of a ‘collapse’ in the Church and the clerical sphere he 
so stringently avoids in his careful definition of secularization as a cultural process at 
work in the eighteenth century. His depiction is, of course, metaphorical: the 
‘collapse’ of the Church is taking place in the opinion of the masses; but the 
overwhelming significance of his phraseology is of an emasculated Church and an 
ineffectual religious code brought about by the secularization of life and thought in the 
eighteenth century, and the consequent assumption by the secular realm of values, 
spheres of influence, and powers traditionally ascribed to the Church and to the sacral, 
religious view of humankind in the divinely-ordained and divinely-controlled world.
33 Ibid., p.338.
34 Ibid.
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It is Gay’s assertion of ‘the essential hostility between eighteenth-century 
religion and eighteenth-century secularism’35 which underpins his definition of 
secularization as a phenomenon of the Enlightenment. The realm of the sacral and that 
of the secular are thus perceived as irreconcilable opposites and the relationship 
between them as one of outright antagonism. Robert Clark’s analysis of the influence 
of the early German Enlightenment on the thought and expression of Johann Gottfried 
Herder reveals a similarly inadequate appraisal of the concept of secularization to 
which he so frequently alludes. Christian Wolff and his disciples embarked, according 
to Clark, upon a ‘secularization of religious concepts’; Wolff’s Vemunftige 
Gedanken von den Wirkungen der Natur36 was the expression of a ‘secularization of 
the universe’37; Robert Lowth’s treatise on Hebrew poetry, which Herder apparently 
read and appreciated, served ‘to secularize the Bible by subjecting the revered 
document to a purely secular criticism’38; acquaintance with all of which documents 
contributed, for Clark, to ‘Herder’s constant use of secular sources, his application of 
an inchoate historical method’39. Clark’s juxtaposition of the ‘secularism’ of Herder’s 
expression with the lack of precise historical method the scholar and biographer 
attributes to Herder only adds to the confusion engendered by his assertion of the non- 
anthropological nature of the Enlightenment in general (a secular world-view being 
inherently man-centred; the object of its concern being humanity in the realm of human 
experience). If there is a conceptual difference in the terms ‘secularism’ and 
‘secularization’, it is surely that the former refers to a state and the latter to a process. 
Clark seems to commingle the ‘secularism’ he perceives in the writings of Herder with 
a vague notion of a secularization process at work in the cultural world: what he 
mistakes for a static end-product, something which has been rendered permanently 
secular, is on the contrary representative of an ongoing process through time from 
past to present. A movement which secularizes cannot be a-historical, since to 
secularize involves an awareness of the past and an intuition of the future in the 
transitory apprehension of a present moment. In these terms, secularization in the 
eighteenth century is, therefore, not a finite negation of the divinely-ordained sphere, 
but a progression towards a tangible and apprehensible amelioration of the human
35 Ibid., pp.322f.
36 Halle, 1712.
37 Clark, op. cit., pp.l2f.
38 Ibid., pp.27f.
39 Ibid., p.212.
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condition in the experiential world. What is happening in the prevalent enlightened
philosophy of the eighteenth-century is, I shall argue, not a simple diminution of the
significance of religion, not a mere ‘shift of attention’ from the centre of life to the
estranged and unimportant periphery, but a shift of emphasis within religion and the
religious sphere. Secularization is neither anti-historical nor anti-religious: the Age of
Enlightenment is not a faithless age.
A faithless age is an age without purpose. A faithless age cannot believe in
itself, cannot aspire to any recognizable goals, is therefore unproductive and
insignificant40. Such a purely sceptical outlook as is necessitated by an age of
faithlessness is irreconcilable with the real and positive achievements of the
Enlightenment, with its social and political progress and its intellectual endeavour.
Indeed, according to Ernst Cassirer, the principal achievement of enlightened
philosophy lies not in the abrogation of religion, but, conversely, in the evolution of a
new, valid and lasting religion of its own:
Die starksten gedanklichen Impulse der Aufklarung und ihre eigentliche 
geistige Kraft sind nicht in ihrer Abkehr vom Glauben begriindet, sondern in 
dem neuen Ideal der Glaubigkeit, das sie aufstellt, und in der neuen Form der 
Religion, die sie in sich verkorpert.41
Cassirer defines this ‘new form of religion’ in terms of the Enlightenment’s
‘unquestionable faith in the reformation of the world’42, and of its own appointment
and assumed ability to carry out this reformative mission. Clearly, Cassirer’s
perception of religion within the Enlightenment is not of a crude debasement of
Christian doctrine, nor of the simple substitution of religious faith with philosophical
conviction. What Cassirer seems to point to is precisely the shifting emphasis
suggested by Gay: what matters to the thinkers of the Enlightenment is not the letter of
religious dogma, nor the interpretation and execution of dogma, but the analysis of the
phenomenon of belief per se. For Cassirer, the fundamental objective of the
Enlightenment is not the repudiation of religion, but the rational justification and
40 A commonplace of historiographical thought. See, for example, Goethe’s well-known 
pronouncement: ‘Alle Epochen, in welchen der Glaube herrscht, unter welcher Gestalt er auch 
erscheine, sind glanzend, herzergebend und fruchtbar fiir Mitwelt und Nachwelt. Alle Epochen 
dagegen, in welchen der Unglaube, in welcher Form es sei, einen kummerlichen Sieg behauptet ... 
verschwinden vor der Nachwelt’, West-dstlicher Divan, Noten und Abhandlungen, ‘Israel in der 
Wuste’, HA II 208. Referred to by Cassirer, op. cit., p.181.
41 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 180.
42 Ibid., p.181: ‘Hier herrscht iiberall ein echtschopferisches Grundgefiihl, ein unbedingtes Vertrauen 
zur Weltgestaltung und Weltemeuerung’.
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affirmation of faith as the guiding and defining principle in the individual’s coming to 
terms with its world. Human desire for increased understanding of the self was 
complemented by an investigation of what had for so long been taken for granted, and 
faith - as distinct from the practices of the orthodox Church and the obscurantism of 
superstition which the Enlightenment unilaterally revoked - enjoyed a resurgence of 
interest and concern through the concern rationally to justify its precepts.
Religion, then, was a force to be reckoned with in the eighteenth century. Gay 
finds that historical evidence of the resurgence of belief which flooded Europe in the 
wake of the French Revolution, returning many of the former faithful to the arms of 
the mother Church, bears testimony enough that Christian faith was not put to death 
by the Enlightenment43. One may dispute the logic of Gay’s argument (Christianity is, 
like any other philosophical, intellectual or religious movement, not logically 
justifiable merely in terms of its popularity and its persistence), but his premises are 
clear: religion was trodden underfoot by the march of philosophical progress, but the 
life-force was not stamped out of faith. Christianity did not stand passive and 
crestfallen as the philosophers of the Enlightenment stripped her bare, discarding what 
they disliked, distorting what they mistrusted, assuming for themselves what they 
thought they could exploit. Instead, the old faith itself underwent a major 
reconsideration - and largely thanks to the resurgence of interest and of questing 
intellect encouraged by the demands of enlightened philosophy. The Church had to 
swim with the tide of the times if it were not to be dissolved in its flow, or stagnate in 
a pool of torpor. The Christian faith was forced to examine itself anew, to account for 
itself anew, and to struggle for its recognized place in society and in the popular 
intellect. Theology, first attacked by rationalism, is now invaded by it44. The Christian 
faith defends itself against the movement of the age by the movement of the age. ‘Es 
war die Zeit gekommen’, writes the German literary historian Hermann Hettner, ‘daB 
die Theologie zu ihrer Vertheidigung die Waffen von der Philosophic entlehnen 
muBte’45. Enlightened theology, or rational religion, is the legitimate offspring of
43 Gay, op. cit., p.338: ‘The religious revival that gripped the educated and the intellectuals in the 
wake of the French Revolution testifies to the validity of the Christian persuasion, in the midst of 
and after a century of philosophical propaganda’.
44 See ibid., p.22: ‘One of the most significant social facts of the eighteenth century, a priceless gift 
from the enlightened style to the Enlightenment of the philosophes, was the invasion of theology by 
rationalism’.
45 Hermann Hettner, Geschichte der deutschen Literatur im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, Braunschweig, 
1909, Zweites Buch, p.59.
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eighteenth-century secularization.
It is not without significance that it was a scholar working specifically within 
the historical German cultural tradition who (long before Gay) pointed to this co­
operative amalgamation of reason and religion, of faith in God and investigative 
rationalism, in the eighteenth century. Thus far, for the purposes of orientation, I have 
considered the Enlightenment as a European phenomenon, a single unified movement 
which transcended geographical, political and cultural barriers and united the continent 
of Europe in the proclamation of its philosophical and social goals. Cosmopolitanism 
was the watchword of the fraternity: British sceptics like Hume were welcomed in 
France, French dissidents like Voltaire were received at the court of Prussian kings. 
Enlightened Europe was tolerant, liberal and emancipated: all contrasting cultural 
heritages were apparently likewise disclaimed and discarded in the assertion of a 
unified, modern world of rational purity and cultural autonomy. It would be an 
erroneous over-simplification, however, to assert that the transcendence of 
geographical boundaries heralded a concomitant abrogation of cultural and historical 
differences. As we have seen, it is a common misconception of scholarship of the 
eighteenth century that the Enlightenment is to be considered as an age without 
historical awareness, as a philosophical movement which not only underestimates the 
achievements of the past, but denies that it has a past, which refutes any debt to 
cultural tradition and repudiates its origins on the continuum of Western culture in 
order to proclaim itself unique, unprecedented and unparalleled. It is quite absurd to 
suggest that the Enlightenment landed plump and fortuitous in the lap of a culturally 
unified Europe of the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment was indeed a 
revolutionary movement; but in the historic sense revolution is of course primarily the 
transformation of a pre-existing model, a return to source but in a different form. The 
Enlightenment was the product of a set of very particular social and intellectual 
conditions recognizable in the form and nature of the movement across the different 
cultural traditions which nurtured it. Paul Hazard compares the eighteenth century’s 
view of its cultural history to a cluttered building site which has to be cleared of the 
miscellaneous jumble which encumbers it before a new construction can be erected46. 
The illogicality of the proposition here is obvious: the new building can only be
46 Hazard, op. cit., p.113.
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erected using existing materials. The Enlightenment was not born of nothing. Cultural
tradition may be transformed, but cannot be annulled; and the significance of the
transformation - the ideas engendered, movements born, the very means of expression
and mediation - is dependent to a great extent upon the nature of the pre-existing
culture. Carl Becker’s The Heavenly City o f the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers
depicts a metaphorical destruction and consequent rebuilding of Augustine’s
‘Heavenly City’ which demands a preparation for the future in terms of a re-appraisal
and re-assimilation of the past47; a notion which Hazard seems to have overlooked in
his insistence on the outright novelty of enlightened philosophy, Peter Gay’s essay on
Becker’s thesis emphasizes that this utilization of traditional material and historical
cultural precepts was conscious and deliberate: an informed co-ordination of modern
philosophy and traditional religion, of historically-based rationalism and optimistic
faith, of the materially defined secular world-view and the sacrality of a divinely
ordained world48. This appraisal of the conscious nature of the philosophers’
assimilation of the theological tradition into their proclaimed modern world-view is
one which Gay seems to have revised in his own major work on the Enlightenment,
where he maintains, in a perpetuation of his favoured bellicose leitmotiv, that the
philosophical utilization of the precepts of the Christian tradition was an unconscious
by-product of the philosophers’ inability to rid themselves entirely of the influence
upon them of the Christian way of life:
The battlefields of history are strewn with unintended consequences; the 
appropriation of Christian labors for secular purposes is not the least of 
these.49
If a conscious re-appraisal of traditional cultural material is not recognized and 
acknowledged as a motive-factor in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, it is 
difficult to understand and explain why, despite the Enlightenment’s claim to be an 
international, transcultural movement, there are sharp divergences of opinion and 
attitude, particularly between the German and French models, and particularly and 
most significantly with regard to the ingression of enlightened philosophy into the
47 Becker’s premise is the attempt ‘to show that the Philosophes demolished the Heavenly City of St 
Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials’, op. cit., p. 31.
48 Peter Gay, ‘Carl Becker’s Heavenly City’, loc. cit. p.43: ‘the philosophes knew exactly what they 
were doing; they were building a new, earthly city. And in building it they used, along with much 
new material, some of the old Christian bricks. Far from being less modem than they knew, they 
were even more modem than they claimed’.
49 Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation, op. cit., p.359.
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domain of theology: the seeming paradox of the eighteenth century that is ‘rational 
religion’.
Voltaire adhered to the principles of English deism, the belief in a creative God 
operating according to a process of rational causality, leading to the logical conclusion 
that the world exists and was therefore created, by a Creator by definition divine; 
being something of a final compromise of rationalism with religion by which the 
‘miraculous’ order of the universe is conceded as the sole factor of human earthly life 
which cannot be explained and apprehended in purely rational terms. But John 
Locke’s treatise on religion, tellingly entitled The Reasonableness o f Christianity50, 
seems to have met with little or no favour in the context of the French Enlightenment51, 
which apparently sought not to reconcile rational and religious precepts. French deism 
is essentially reductionist: religion is stripped of all non-rational elements, all 
mythopoeic thinking is filtered out. What remains is but a recognition of the pre­
existence of some principle of universal order and regularity. Diderot and the 
Encyclopaedists, however, as has been seen, would have no truck with any religious 
interpretation o r explanation of life at all. Working against the strong and rigid 
backdrop of Roman Catholicism, these most radical of the French Enlighteners were 
especially uncompromising in their general condemnation of religion. Even deism, 
which in its mechanistic appreciation of a distant, detached creative force, is ultimately 
irreconcilable with the personal, revealed God of Christianity, they rejected as ‘an 
amorphous hybrid and a weak compromise’52. In this respect, the rational theology of 
the eighteenth century is not a significant force in the context of the French 
Enlightenment.
In Germany, however, the relationship between reason and revelation, 
between philosophy and theology, was considerably less polemical. Locke’s The 
Reasonableness o f Christianity finds many echoes and parallels in style and standpoint 
within the writings of the figures generally associated with the German Enlightenment: 
the speculative theology of Lessing’s Das Christentum der Vemunft (1784)53, the
50 The Works o f  John Locke, a New Edition, Corrected, in Ten Volumes, London, 1823, Vol. VII, 
pp.lff.
51 Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation, op. cit., p.321, quotes from ^oltaire’s English 
Notebook (Notebooks, 45): ‘Mr Lock’J\$easonableness Qf Christian relligiofl^s really a new 
relligion’; replacing, for Voltaire, one set of dogmatic precepts with another and hence invalid and 
disagreeable.
62 Cassirer, trans. cit., p.134.
53 Lessings Werke. Vollstandige Ausgabe, ed. Julius Petersen and Waldemar von Olshausen, Berlin, 
Leipzig, Wien, Stuttgart, 1925-35, Vol. 20, pp.l06ff.
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moral authority of Kant’s Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloBen Vernunft
(1793)54, even Fichte’s highly Kantian early work Versuch einer Kritik aller
Offenbarung (1791)55, are all concerned with the ultimate reconciliation of reason and
revelation, of rational anaylsis and the indefinable nature of the revealed God of
Christianity. It is apparent in the accounts of much post-eighteenth century scholarship
of that period that the impetus of the movement of Enlightenment in Germany is held
to be less toward the annihilation of a religious world-view in general than toward the
reconciliation of rational and religious tempers in the propagation of a ‘reasonable
religion’ acceptable to philosophers and Churchmen alike, to men of faith and men of
reason: the appeal, direction and promotion of eighteenth-century philosophy in
Germany was, broadly speaking, toward a ‘reasonable faith’. Within the context of
the German Enlightenment, theology as the science of religion and theological
discussion as a social act retained a quite positive meaning and significance56. The
German Church did not shut its doors to the Enlighteners, and the latter were not
ashamed to take advantage of this hospitality. Ernst Troeltsch points again to the
radically different positions of the French and German Enlightenments in their attitude
to and understanding of the theological tradition:
Gleichwohl hat die Theologie wenigstens in der ersten Halfte des 18. 
Jahrhunderts in England und in der zweiten in Deutschland noch eine postitive 
Bedeutung fur die Aufklarung erlangt, wahrend freilich die franzosische 
Aufklarung durch den todlichen Gegensatz gegen den unbeugsamen 
Katholizismus zu reiner Verneinung verurteilt worden war.57
The disparity of attitude and aim between the French Enlighteners and their German 
counterparts may be explained initially and superficially in terms of the discrete 
cultural traditions which engendered the differing rational tempers of enlightened 
philosophy across Europe. The religious establishment in France was so deeply 
entrenched in the social consciousness of the country, and so solidly fortified a cultural 
bastion, that the philosophical movement which opposed its teaching could not 
concede any value whatsoever in its precepts. Religion meant the Roman Catholic 
Church, and all faith, all active belief in a living, revealed God had to be included in 
the general condemnation of Church doctrine if the Enlightenment in France were to
54 Immanuel Kants Werke, ed. Ernst Cassirer, Berlin, 1922-23, Vol. VI, pp. 139-353.
55 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Sammtliche Werke, Zweite Abtheilung, Berlin, 1845.
58 See Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Aufklarung’, loc. cit., p.270, and Nisbet, ‘Was ist Aufklarung?’, loc. cit.,
p.86.
57 Troeltsch, ‘Aufklarung’, loc. cit., p.270.
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consolidate itself as the only viable alternative to the religious world-view it decried.
The German Aufklarer, on the other hand, were seemingly concerned to promulgate
their corresponding ideas alongside the established Church, to their mutual
advantage. It was not in the annihilation of cultural tradition that the Aufklarer
consolidated their movement, but in the assimilation of their philosophy with the
socio-religious conditions which fostered it. Not by disclaiming all precedents, but by
recognizing their cultural derivation and their debt to tradition did they secure the
foundation, and therefore the future significance, of their ideals. It is in the recognition
of the historical origin and dependency of the relationship between religion and
philosophy in the eighteenth century that the movement of secularization in the
German cultural context is distinct and demands particular attention.
Indeed, the ideas and ideals of enlightened philosophy in Germany were
largely promulgated by means of clerical and theological vehicles: the Sunday sermon,
for example, served as a principal medium for the spreading of reformed thinking,
albeit subject to a certain degree of Christian censorship58. In the German context, it
seems that the philosophers of the Enlightenment recognized the need to ally
themselves to their potential adversary, and that religion in turn drew benefit from the
resurgence of interest and intellectual endeavour which accompanied the questioning
of received ideas. Hermann Hettner aptly encapsulates the fundamental differences
between French and German attitudes to religion in the philosophical eighteenth
century, though with an unaccountable concentration on Catholicism which perhaps
betrays the author’s own religious standpoint:
Der deutsche Aufklarer brach nicht mit den wesenhaften Grundlagen der 
katholischen Kirche, wie der franzosische, aber er suchte den Katholizismus 
innerlich fortzubilden.59
The historical relationship between Enlightenment and theology in the German context 
is not one of outright antagonism, as was so evidently the case in France, but of 
symbiosis; not of irreconcilable opposition, but of mutual productivity and fruitful co­
existence. Cassirer, too, points to a dynamic development in eighteenth-century 
thought in Germany which ensues directly from the reconciliation of at first sight 
antagonistic principles in the formation of a new way of looking at the world:
Freilich hat der Kampf um das Recht der ‘natiirlichen Religion’ und um das 
Verstandnis zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung in Deutschland niemals die
88 See Nisbet, op. cit., p.86.
89 Hettner, op. cit., Zweites Buch, p.277.
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gleiche Scharfe angenommen, die er innerhalb des franzosischen Kulturkreises 
besitzt. Denn hier tritt er auf einen anderen Gegner; hier steht er nicht mehr 
ausschlieGlich einer Orthodoxie und einer kirchlichen Hierarchie gegenuber, 
die mit ihrer Autoritat und ihrem unbedingten Herrschaftsanspruch die freie 
Bewegung des Denkens zu unterdriicken strebt, sondern hier bestand die 
Aufgabe vor allem in der Auflockerung eines religiosen Systems, das selbst 
schon die mannigfachsten Keime einer neuen Denkart in sich trug.60
Fundamental to both these critics’ appraisals of the relationship between reason and
religion in eighteenth-century Germany, then, is an awareness of a positive and
fruitful collaboration between two apparently antagonistic ways of looking at the
world. In particular, it is the religious sphere which is held to have benefited from the
insurgence of rational thought: Hettner implies that the Aufklarer encouraged the
Catholic Church to undergo an internal process of dynamic growth and development;
Cassirer notes that rational analysis and reconsideration furthered the germination of
seeds of new thought which were already present in the religious system. Clearly, the
symbiotic relationship between reason and religion in eighteenth-century Germany is
one of synthesis, of mutually beneficial cooperation. If, as I shall demonstrate, it is to
be perceived as a relationship of mutual subordination as conceptualized in the
principles of binary synthesis, then the significance of Goethe’s cultural milieu for an
appreciation of his mode of secularization is will be clear, and the critical necessity of
tracing his attitude to religion to the ‘crisis of Christianity’ in the eighteenth century
will take on a new force and a new meaning.
Herbert Dieckmann, in an essay which makes direct comment on Cassirer’s
Die Philosophic der Aufklarung and its reception by subsequent scholars, notes not
only that the general view of the Enlightenment as an age inimical to religion does not
hold in the German context, but that it quite fails to take into consideration the nature
and significance of the real tension between rational philosophy and living faith in the
eighteenth century generally:
One of the most frequent misunderstandings in the interpretation of the 
eighteenth century concerns its attitude to religion. Hazard sees in the hostility 
to Christian faith the common denominator of the multiple currents of that 
period. There is undoubtedly some truth in this generalization, and it is quite 
valid for such authors as Morelly or d’Holbach; but when it is extended to 
religion and faith in themselves, it leads to a complete misrepresentation of 
eighteenth-century thought; a thought which, far from simply opposing the
60 Cassirer, op. cit., p.234.
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Church, is deeply engaged in a serious and passionate inner struggle with 
religion and receives many of its problems and even its very methods of 
thinking from the religious tradition. The Age of Englightenment Js/c}, or, to 
be concrete, some of this \sic\ representatives, penetrated to the problem of 
religion and faith itself and sought either new forms of religion or an 
acceptable modification of existing creeds. There is a deep polarity of disbelief 
and belief in the eighteenth century, a polarity which is to be understood as a 
dialectic movement.61
In the specifically German context at least, then, the overwhelming trend must be seen
as being toward what Cassirer calls ‘the collaboration of reason and revelation’; a
fruitful co-operation between the antagonistic opposites of faith and philosophy in the
formulation of a new system which admits the claims of both, furthers the interests of
both, and leads to the enhancement of rational thought and religious faith:
Vernunft und Offenbarung bleiben als urspriingliche Erkenntnisquellen 
anerkannt; sie sollen sich nicht bekampfen, sondern erganzen, und sie diirfen 
gewiB sein, daB kraft dieser Erganzung ein geschlossenes Ganze, ein 
einheitlicher Sinn der religiosen Wahrheit zustande kommt.62
For these scholars at least, then, the relationship between reason and religion in the
context of the Aufklarung is one of a cooperation between apparently polarized
opposites which produces a new ‘whole’, a ‘unity’ of what Cassirer calls ‘religious
truth’, a novel entity which contains and expresses the claims of both antithetical
components. Expression of religious revelation and rational understanding of faith are
equally significant results of this cooperation, which is best explained in terms of a
binary synthesis through which each of the antithetical poles is furthered and enhanced
by subordinating itself to the other.
That the ensuing system is indeed something novel, a new religious and
rational order, has, however, been a matter of some dispute. Bertrand Russell’s
History o f Western Philosophy categorizes Kant, Fichte and the later Hegel as
‘German Idealists’ whose emphasis on the mind rather than on matter distinguishes
them from the primary movement of French philosophy, and leads to what amounts to
a propagation of traditional theology in the new philosophy they claimed to embrace
and promote:
Although their efforts were in part revolutionary, they themselves were not
61 Herbert Dieckmann, Studien zur Europaischen Aufklarung, Miinchen, 1974, pp.218-233, ‘An 
Interpretation of the Eighteenth Century (On: Cassirer, The Philosophy o f  the Enlightenment) ’ 
(p.224).
62 Cassirer, op. cit., p.235.
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intentionally subversive; Fichte and Hegel were very definitely concerned in 
the defence of the State. The lives of all of them were exemplary and academic; 
their views on moral questions were strictly orthodox. They made innovations 
in theology, but they did so in the interests of religion.63
Russell’s entrenched atheism lends his categorization of the ‘German Idealists’ a
rather dismissive ironic tone: clearly, for him, their unwillingness to rid themselves of
religious feeling and to strive wholeheartedly toward a religion-less world is a
philosophical flaw which implicitly negates the value of their ideas and work. His
implicit dismissal of Kant and his immediate philosophical followers as simply
incapable of denying the personal pull of religion in order to postulate a wholly
materialistic world-view is of course (albeit deliberately) naive and one-sided: perhaps
no-one, within the German context, was more aware of the dangers of indiscriminate
religious ‘worship’ and the noxious strangle-hold held by dogmatic religious
intransigence on the march of philosophical progress than Immanuel Kant; possibly
no-one strove more than he to justify and to categorize moral demands in terms of
purely human reason, and to promote the potential amelioration of human existence in
terms of human capacity for self-improvement.
Kant’s preface to the first edition of Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der
bloBen Vemunft starts with the premise:
Die Moral ... bedarf also zum Behuf ihrer selbst (sowohl objectiv, was das 
Wollen, als subjectiv, was das Konnen betrifft,) keinesweges der Religion, 
sondern, vermoge der reinen praktischen Vernunft, ist sie sich selbst genug.64
For Kant, morality points to religion, not vice versa; morality is the necessary
reference to a religious end; and in this religious end is inspired the idea of God.
Morality may well be divinely ordained, but the human being cannot know God or be
sure of his intentions: what is known to the human individual is the moral imperative,
from which notions of God, the soul, and immortality are inferentially derived:
Moral also fiihrt unumganglich zur Religion, wodurch sie sich zur Idee eines 
machthabenden moralischen Gesetzgebers aufier dem Menschen erweitert, in 
dessen Willen dasjenige Endzweck (der Weltschopfung) ist, was zugleich der 
Endzweck des Menschen sein kann und soli.65
It follows that, for Kant, the religious sphere needs must ally itself with reason: for if
63 Russell, History o f  Western Philosophy, ed. cit., p.677.
64 Loc. cit., p. 141.
65 Ibid., pp.l44f. Kant’s footnote emphasises the primacy of morality over religion: ‘Die Moral fiihrt 
unausbleiblich zur Religion’.
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religion insists on maintaining an antagonistic distance from rationalism, religion will
inevitably be the losing party in the war it itself declares66. Religion has first to admit
that it owes its existence to morality, which in Kant’s view is necessarily rational, and
has a function in the material world only in terms of its amelioration of the human
condition in the furtherance of a ‘better’ human being. Kant’s categorization in this
thesis  ^of the radically evil nature of humankind, which naturally prevents full moral
development, stems from his (Kant’s) definition of two contradictory poles striving
against one another for superiority in the human being: the moral law of reason, out of
which religion and the notion of God spring, and the self-love which insists on acting
only in what the individual himself considers to be his or her own best interest.
Morality operates in the general human sphere and subordinates individual concerns to
its all-embracing ameliorative purpose: the human being is radically ‘evil’ in the sense
that it is instinctive self-love - concern for self-preservation, self-propagation and the
satisfaction of personally assumed interest - which conditions observance of morality;
and not the moral law which qualifies and determines the gratification of selfish
concerns. Reason and instinct, when not co-ordinate, fight against one another to the
detriment of general human interest. In this respect, Kant’s acknowledgement of the
role of feeling in mediating between rational causality and pathological concerns in the
sphere of religious investigation is particularly telling:
Vernunftreligion und Schriftgelehrsamkeit sind also die eigentlichen berufenen 
Ausleger und Depositare einer heiligen Urkunde ... Aber es tritt noch ein 
dritter Pratendente zum Amte eines Auslegers auf, welcher weder Vernunft, 
noch Gelehrsamkeit, sondern nur ein innerliches Gefiihl bedarf, um den 
wahren Sinn der Schrift und zugleich ihren gottlichen Ursprung zu erkennen.67
For Kant, it is a particular kind of feeling of moral rectitude which, when harnessed to 
the rationality of a moral code, allows humankind to further the desire for instinctive 
self-proclamation and self-preservation in the co-ordination of the moral dictates of 
rationality with the felt instincts of the experiential sphere. It may be argued that what 
we see in Kant here is an intuition of the role of synthesis of pathological and rational 
drives which Schiller brought to philosophical and rhetorical fruition in his 
Asthetische Briefe and which underpins much of Goethe’s own thought and 
expression. But it is the differences rather than the similarities between Kant’s notion
68 Ibid., p. 105: ‘Denn eine Religion, die der Vernunft unbedenklich den Krieg ankiindigt, wird es auf 
die Dauer gegen sie nicht aushalten’.
67 Ibid., p.211.
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of synthesis in this respect and that of Schiller which are particularly telling here. For 
if one of Kant’s greatest contributions to the rational religion of the eighteenth century 
lies in his acknowledgement of the role of moral feeling, it is important to differentiate 
between Kant’s perception of the legitimate a priori feeling that accompanies moral 
insight, and the practical awareness of the role of the human senses which forms the 
basis of Schiller’s acknowledged ‘challenge to Kant’ in the essay Uber Anmut und 
Wiirde68. Nevertheless, Kant’s perception of the significant role of feeling in the 
determination of man's rational morality and the actions perpetrated under a moral law 
of religion underpins the rational temper of religion in eighteenth-century Germany, 
and distinguishes the German tradition of enlightened thought from the mainstream of 
the French Enlightenment. If the sacral realm of that which is traditionally ascribed to 
God, determined by God, and concerned with the fostering of a divinely ordained 
world-view, and the secular realm of the material world, in which the human being 
operates with the aim of improving his or her own condition, are viewed as correlative 
polarities of the oppos ition of faith and reason, abstraction and concretion, the realm 
of the spiritual and the realm of the material, then what Kant describes as ‘ein 
innerliches Gefiihl’ is that indefinable quality in human consciousness which 
transcends the set boundaries of these opposing domains. It is this kind of moral 
insight which gives life and breath to material existence, which gives abstract morality 
its strength and potency, and which inspires and directs the human being’s fulfilment 
of rational, material objectives. Kant’s exemplary rationalization of religion in the 
eighteenth-century world recognizes the active significance of human emotional 
commitment, albeit in a very narrow and specified way, as giving spirit to the letter 
and inner force to external action. The spirit of the Christian tradition, which for Peter 
Gay returns uninvited to intrude upon the intellects of the eighteenth-century 
philosophers, is, according to Kant, to be recognized and harnessed to fruitful 
productivity69.
In his consideration of the German Enlightenment’s understanding and
68 A concise account of this challenge is found in WW, pp.xxxv. Walter Kaufmann in Discovering 
the Mind, op. cit., Vol. I, offers another dimension to Kant’s reception of Schiller’s criticism with 
the assertion that this prompted Kant to search and account for his own personal feelings and their 
basis (pp.ll7ff.). It seems more pertinent here to concentrate on the ramifications of philosophical 
discussion rather than on those of personal soul-searching.
89 Kaufmann offers a candid account of Immanuel Kant as a wholly regulated human being who lived 
his life according to the dictates of the moral imperative he adduced, and argues, after Nietzsche, that 
this synthesis of rational and moral imperatives is the secret of Kant’s public success (ibid., 
pp.92ff.). Thanks are due to R H Stephenson for bringing this to my attention.
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conception of itself in the eighteenth century, H B Nisbet follows Cassirer in depicting
the German theological tradition as a ‘theology of compromise’70, deriving from the
tendency towards harmony and the reconciliation of antagonistic principles which is,
the linch-pin of the seminal philosophy of Leibniz as popularized and promulgated by
the teachings of Christian Wolff. As Cassirer notes:
Im System Christian Wolffs kommt es nirgends zu einer schroffen Trennung 
zwischen dem Gehalt des Glaubens und dem des Wissens, zwischen 
Offenbarung und Vernunft. Die Rechte beider sollen vielmehr sorgfaltig 
abgewogen und genau gegeneinander abgegrenzt werden.71
For the early German rationalists, then, faith and philosophy, reason and religion, are 
equivalent and equally important, and their equilibrium is maintained by their constant 
reciprocity and interpenetration. Troeltsch’s depiction of the theology of the German 
Enlightenment as ‘durch und durch apologetischer KompromiB’72 is surely born of his 
appreciation of a tradition of reconciliation and synthesis of philosophy and religion. 
However, the notion that contemporary German theology welcomed with open arms 
and minds the theories of Leibniz and Wolff would itself be erroneously simplistic. 
Wolff’s rational philosophy of theology was controversial; he upset the apple-cart of 
conventional received belief, and his polemic was greeted with strong antipathy and 
aversion by the established theologians of his day. Far from a harmonious co­
existence and interaction, the initial impact of enlightened philosophy on the German 
theological tradition was something of a loud and discordant confrontation. The only 
harmony to result from the co-existence of traditional theology and new philosophy in 
the Germany of the eighteenth century was in the initial reaction within the established 
Church itself, as disparate theological circles overlooked their petty doctrinal 
differences in order to present a united front to their rationalist aggressors. Thus a 
degree of opposition between philosophy and religion was indeed established:
Seit der Ausbreitung der Wolff’schen Philosophie und des englischen 
Deismus lag der Schwerpunkt der religiosen und kirchlichen Bewegung nicht 
mehr im Kampf und Gegensatz der einzelnen christlichen Kirchen und 
Bekenntnisse, sondern im Kampf und Gegensatz von Philosophie und 
Theologie, von Vernunft und Offenbarung, von Denken und Glauben.73
The German religious establishment responded to the rationalist threat by entrenching
70 Nisbet, op. cit., p.86.
71 Cassirer, op. cit., p.234.
72 Troeltsch, ‘Aufklarung’, loc. cit., p.272.
73 Hettner, op. cit., Zweites Buch, p.32.
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itself in intransigent fundamentalism. Wolff, whose principal objective was to prove 
by means of reason that God exists, was proclaimed a miscreant, and the ideas he 
expounded were denounced as dangerous, anti-Christian and atheistic. He himself 
was - albeit temporarily - ousted from his professorial post at the University of Halle 
and suffered personal antagonism and ostracism74. Nevertheless, Wolff’s application 
of rational philosophy to theological domains, his reasoning to the existence of God, 
stimulated much interest and fostered a not inconsiderable following in the early 
eighteenth century. The Church’s initial recourse to dogma and biblical absolutism did 
not reflect favourably on the religious establishment against the attractive clarity of 
Wolff’s systematic reasoning. Indeed, the French scholar Marcel Thomann notes that 
one of the first self-appointed tasks of the so-called Encyclopaedists was a translation 
and adaptation of the works of Christian Wolff, recognized by the French 
Enlightenment as a seminal figure in the march of rational, philosophical progress75. 
Voltaire’s personal dislike and philosophical disapproval of Wolff, which Thomann 
concisely documents, stems, according to the scholar, from Wolff’s own intransigent 
dogmatism: ‘ ecrasez l ’infame’ was, after all, directed against all absolute dogmas and 
doctrines, of which Wolff’s metaphysic, which seemed to claim to explain the 
inexplicable and determine the indeterminable, was one76. Despite the judgement of 
Elie Luzac, quoted by Thomann, that Wolff remains ‘1’auteur le moins elegant que 
Ton connaisse’77, Mirabeau’s appraisal that Wolff is ‘celui qui eut l’influence la plus 
grande et la plus utile sur l’esprit humain en Allemagne’78 holds sway over the 
judgement of the significance of Christian Wolff for the spread of enlightened 
philosophy in general and for the German Aufklarung in particular. Indeed, although 
Wolff’s philosophy is generally agreed to be both shallow and derivative, his strength
74 Ibid., Erstes Buch, pp.217f.
75 Marcel Thomann, ‘Voltaire et Christian W olff, in Voltaire und Deutschlanded. Peter Brockmeier 
et al., Stuttgart, 1978, pp.l23f.: ‘Faut-il rappeler que le projet initial des promoteurs de 
1 "Encyclopedic etait l’edition de Wolff, traduit et adapte?’ (p. 129), [Need one be reminded that the 
initial project of the Encyclopaedists was an edition, translation and adaptation of the works of 
Wolff?].
78 Ibid., p. 132: ‘Nul n’ignore cependant qu’en plus de la metaphysique il [Voltaire] deteste les dogmes 
en tout gentre: “Ecrasez l'infame”. Or Wolff est aussi l ’incamation du “systeme” fige et dogmatique. 
Sa metaphysique ne pretend-elle pas expliquer l’inexplicable?’ [All are aware, moreover, that, even 
more than metaphysics, Voltaire detests all dogma: “Ecrasez l'infame”. Now, Wolff is also the 
incarnation of the fixed and dogmatic “system”. Does his metaphysic not itself claim to explain the 
inexplicable?].
77 Ibid., p.125, [the least elegant author known to us].
78 Ibid., p. 124, [he who had the greatest and the most useful influence on the spirit of man in 
Germany].
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lies not in the originality of his thought but in the part he plays in the formation of the 
German mind. ‘Mit Recht sagt Hegel, dafi vor Allen Wolff der Lehrer der Deutschen 
genannt wird’, claims Hettner79. It is the teaching of Christian Wolff which obliges the 
German religious establishment, initially somewhat against its will, to accept and 
assimilate the rationalist trend of enlightened thought, laying the foundation for the 
eventual synthesis of reason and revelation expounded in the^eighteenth century 
initially by Baumgarten and later by Semler80. Wolff’s systematization of the more 
abstruse Leibnizian philosophy was essentially a dogmatic and unimaginative 
popularization, a justification of non-rational belief through a compromise with 
rational proofs; and was quickly overtaken and superseded by the subsequent 
scholarly and philosophical trends of the German eighteenth century81. Wolff it was 
who rocked the boat, harnessing the authority of his predecessor Leibniz to do so; but 
the largest waves were made by those who followed him. In the wake of the Wolffian 
theology of rational proof, the Christian Church was denigrated and ridiculed for its 
radically fundamentalist reaction:
Es wurde zum guten Ton gerechnet, das Christenthum geringzuschatzen und
es hochstens als nutzlichen Ziigel des Pobels gelten zu lassen.82
One positive aspect of this response, however, was the increased exegetic study 
encouraged within the domain of bibliocentric theology. Entrenched biblical 
absolutism engendered an initially negative response to religion in the philosophical 
sphere: the absolute veracity of the Bible claimed by religious fundamentalists, the 
indisputability of its divine revelation, was first questioned and then refuted. 
Fundamentalist recourse to biblical source was, in this respect, essentially counter­
productive. But most significantly, simultaneous with a loss of faith in the primacy of 
biblical text came an appreciation of the Bible as a cultural phenomenon, as a poetic 
work of supreme human value quite consonant with the principles of the enlightened 
movement. Viewed as a work of human endeavour, the Scriptures were perceived as a
79 Hettner, op. cit., Erstes Buch, p.199.
80 See ibid., Zweites Buch, pp.259ff., for a full discussion of Sender's contribution to the tradition of 
German theological rationalism.
81 See Gay, op. cit., pp.329f.
82 Hettner, op. cit., Zweites Buch, p.32. The Marxist overtones, or undertones, in Hettner’s account 
of the early 18th century’s judgement of the role of religion in the light of a rational, materialistic 
theology are not without significance. It has been argued, of course, that Marx’s definition of religion 
as a useful ‘opium of the masses’ implies the social comment that the unconditional acceptance of the 
precepts of religion is only necessary in order to combat man’s sense of helplessness in the face of the 
world’s evils, and that religion would have no function whatsoever if these social evils were 
abolished. (See, for example, H B Acton, What Marx Really Said, London, 1967, pp.24f.)
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creative delight in themselves:
Die Bibel ist, wie schon Herder scharf hervorhebt, unendlich menschlicher 
und darum unendlich diclferischer.83
This appreciation of the Bible as the human conception of the divine order_is_one of 
the major achievements deriving from the inter-relationship of reason and religion, and
v.-
in this respect, no single contribution to the religious character of German eighteenth-
For H e tta e /,
century thought is as significant as that of Johann Gottfried Herder. AHerder’s 
approach to theology may be described as somewhat ‘untheologisch’, rooted as it is 
in his emotional attraction to the Bible as a work and source of poetic folklore. The 
religion he embraces is not dependent upon textual revelation; the theology he 
expounds is not rooted in dogmatic biblical absolutism. Nor is his metaphysic directed 
at the rationalization of faith and the material justification of the existence of God. 
Herder’s faith and the means by which he expresses it are evolved from his 
appreciation and understanding of the position of the Judaeo-Christian Bible on the 
continuum of Western civilization, as a text born of a specific mythological and 
anthropological tradition which it in turn disseminates and perpetuates84. Herder’s 
religion is in this way intensely human and is based on a profoundly personal, yet 
universally significant, appreciation of the fundamentally human and humanitarian 
nature of the biblical text.
Herder’s own avowedly idiosyncratic approach to the Bible and to the 
dissemination of the biblical tradition is based, as he himself admits and to which he 
gave telling notice in a famous essay, on the writings of Thomas Abbt85. Herder 
perceives, in the style of Abbt, echoes and resonances of the style of the Bible: he sees 
Abbt’s imagery to be frequently the imagery of the Scriptures; his message that of the 
theological tradition. Abbt’s overwhelming contribution to the tradition he consciously 
and unashamedly uses is, for Herder, his personal appropriation (‘nur freilich sich zu 
eigen gemachf86) of received biblical notions, images and language. Herder attempts 
to define this .‘biblical style’ of Abbt’s, a style which is often mentioned by preachers 
and non-preachers alike, without, as Herder perceives, a true and fitting appraisal of 
its nature, its significance, or its contribution to the overwhelming message of Abbt’s
83 Hettner, op. cit., Zweites Buch, p. 113.
84 See ibid., Drittes Buch, pp.56ff.
85 Herder, Ueber Thomas Abbts Schriften, Sammtliche Werke, ed. Suphan, Berlin, 1877, Vol.II, 
pp.249ff.
88 Ibid., p.278 (Herder’s italics).
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writings. His appraisal of the force and import of the biblical imagery of Thomas Abbt
is quoted here at length, because it indicates with acute relevance Herder’s awareness
of the emotional power of the Bible as a cultural source with a particular, exceptional,
unparalleled appeal to the reader or listener. The message of the Bible, contained in its
language and expressed in its imagery, is best reiterated and most appropriately
conveyed in the language of the biblical tradition:
Und Bilder aus der Religion? Warum nicht? wenn sie passend, schildernd, 
bekannt oder gar riihrend sind. Die Religion ist eine reiche Quelle solcher 
Bilder, und warum soli ich es mir verbieten, dab, wenn ich nicht bios fur den 
reinen Verstand, sondern mit Bildern reden will, und muB, daB ich zu der 
Quelle eile, in die meine Einbildungskraft in zarter Kindheit getaucht wurde, 
aus der in das GedachtniB meiner Leser Strome geleitet wurden: die mir am 
nachsten zur Hand, meinen Lesern die sicherste, und fur meine Materie 
vielleicht die ergiebigste, die nahrhafteste, die wohlschmeckendste ist? 
Freilich! wenn Philologen auf abenteuerlichen Kreuzziigen, nicht Bilder unsrer 
Religion, sondern bios der Orientalischen Seite unsrer Religion geben: nicht 
sie geben, um in einer edlen, bekannten und nachdriicklichen Sprache, 
sondern um seltsam , fremde, oder gar possierlich zu reden: so mag dies 
Misbrauch sein; nur hebe er nicht den Gebrauch auf, sonst verschliefit man 
uns ein Bilderkabinett, das ehrwurdig, reizend, reich ist, jedem of fen steht, 
und zum Gliicke uns von Jugend auf offen stand.87
What is apparent in the writings of Thomas Abbt, and most effectively conveyed in
Herder’s appraisal thereof, is the emotional power and force of the Bible as a cultural
entity, as an integral part of the human being's upbringing and experience, as a
document - ostensibly arid words on an impersonal page - which arouses feeling,
unleashes emotion, produces a sensuous response. Indeed, the inefficacy of abstract
rationalism without any consideration of and service to human emotionalism is a
recurring theme in the writings of Thomas Abbt:
Kurz, weder die Metaphysik liber das menschliche Herz, noch das alberne 
Zeug ohne Philosophic iiber dasselbe ist fur den gemeinen Mann zugerichtet.88
The important figure is the human being, the significant matrix is the world, but 
material well-being does not discount, negate or abrogate the spiritual: it assimilates 
the emotional into the material, emphasizes the emotional matrix of the human mind, 
and promotes a moral authority dependent on ethical duty in the world, dictated by
87 Ibid., p.286 (Herder’s italics).
88 Thomas Abbt, Vom Verdienste, Berlin, Stettin, 1765, p.353.
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individual conscience and guided by personal feelings89. It is the potential power of the
appeal to human feeling which characterizes the rational religion of the German
Enlightenment in its promotion of a philosophically acceptable religion which accounts
for, builds upon, and in turn disseminates the emotional force of the Scriptures and of
the theological tradition based upon them. Reason, according to Kant’s schematic
analysis of the relationship between human morality and the notion of God, instigates
faith; but it is feeling which gives it force and meaning, and carries it to its potential.
Grimm’s Deutsches Worterbuch defines ‘Glaube’ according to Aquinas’ indisputably
rational appreciation of conscious and informed appropriation of feeling: [Gdes est]
actus intellectus, secundum quod movetur a voluntate ad assentiendum. Human
feeling is recognized as the significant inspiratory force in the fruitful tension between
reason and revelation, between rationalism and religion, in the German eighteenth
century. A study by the modern German scholar Anselm Maler of epic verse in the
eighteenth century categorizes a mid-century movement in Germany as ‘Dieses
Programm einer asthetischen Emanzipation des religiosen Gefiihls’90. Maler’s
particular concern here is with the religious poetry of Friedrich Klopstock, whose
Messias carries the mystical intensity of the Christian tradition into an ostensibly
secular, literary text:
Klopstock bejaht die poetische Darstellung des gottlichen Mysteriums, weil er 
die Dichtkunst als Nachahmung des ‘Geist Schopfers’ fiir ebenbiirtig halt, 
und fiihrt mit seiner Argumentation mitten in die Problematik der asthetischen 
Sakularisation, durch welche die Gegenstande der Bibel mit Heilsgeschichte 
dem privaten Schonheitsempfinden uberantwortet werden.91
The author’s categorization of Klopstock’s utilization of religious material and the 
corresponding effect thereof on the receptive consciousness as ‘aesthetic 
secularization’ conveys precisely the notion of a co-ordination of sacral and secular 
realms of human experience in a personal, emotional response. Clearly, what is held 
to be occurring in the cultural re-appraisal of the religious tradition in the German 
eighteenth century is an awareness of the human significance of religious ideas when
89 Stephenson in Goethe’s  Wisdom Literature notes the distinction common in the 18th century, and 
certainly drawn by Abbt, between intellectual persuasion ( Uberfuhrung) and ethical conviction 
( Uberzeugung): it is in the sensuous appeal of the external, linguistic form that moral truths find their 
true force and meaning (op. cit., pp.l47f.).
80 Anselm Maler, ‘Versepos’, in Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur vom 16. 
Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. Band 3: Deutsche Aufklarung bis zur Franzosischen Revolution 
1680-1789, ed. Rolf Grimminger, Miinchen, Wien, 1980, pp.365ff., (p.384).
81 Ibid., p.379.
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couched in a familiar language which speaks directly to the human being and 
encourages an emotional response in the human consciousness.
The overall trend of eighteenth-century biblical exegesis, then, is toward a
humanistic appreciation of the human origins of the text and its implications, its
significance and its force for humanity as a whole. As the human being understands
and interprets the world according to his or her individual experience, so it is that the
uniqueness of the individual personality lends uniqueness and vitality to the cultural
Gemeingut which has been inherited, of which the religious tradition is an integral
part. Christianity, in its purest form - as the religion of Christ, not in the guise or form
of any particular denomination or creed - is not an arid system of dogma, but demands
active, personal involvement: the Bible, for the enlightened theologians of the German
eighteenth century, is a textbook for living. The stark differentiation is between the
Christian religion as an established system, on the one hand, and the ‘religion of
Christ’ which is to be perceived in the spirit of biblical myth:
Das Christenthum, fortgehend durch alle Zeiten und Nationen, war ... eine 
iiber alien Nationalismus erhohte Menschen- und Volkerreligion; nicht nur 
Religion also, sondern die einzige Religion der Menschheit, hochste Tendenz 
und Bestimmung der menschlichen Natur, Humanitat.92
It is this quest for true Christianity, for the living God of the revealed Christian
religion, untrammelled by formality and untarnished by dogma, which characterizes
the rational temper of religious investigation in the German eighteenth century.
For Johann Christian Edelmann, it is the dogmatic intransigence of the
Lutheran tradition which has transformed the living truths of the Christian Bible into
what Edelmann calls a ‘Gotzen-Bild der Buchstaben’93: the dynamic truths of the
Christian faith are stultified by excessive adherence to the letter of dogma, to the
external forms of prescribed patterns of worship. It is this suffocation of the spirit of
the Christian tradition upon which Edelmann vents his wrath; the spirit itself he
92 Hettner, op. cit., Drittes Buch, p. 82.
93 In Moses mit Aufgedeckten Ansichten (1740), I 80. Quoted by Walter Grossmann in his edition of
Edelmann’s Abgendthigtes jedoch Andern nicht wieder aufgenothigtes Glaubens-BekenntniB.
Faksimile-Neudruck der Ausgabe 1746 mit einer Einleitung von Walter Grossmann, Stuttgart-Bad 
Canstatt, 1969, p.XVII. A notion which Nietzsche may be seen to have taken to heart in his own
parodistic Gotzen-Dammerungr where the implication may be that biblical absolutism stifles human
development by its unconditional observance of the letter of the religious tradition: ‘Ich fiirchte, wir 
werden Gott nicht los, weil wir noch an die Grammatik glauben’ , Werke, ed. Colli, Montinari, 
Berlin, 1969, Sechste Abteilung, Dritter Band, (VI 3), p.72.
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attempts to maintain, to enhance and to promote.
Edelmann’s unashamed Spinozism brought only vilification and castigation 
upon him: his latter-day apologist Walter Grossmann defends him as a ‘spirit out of 
time’, a prophet unwelcome in his own country, categorized and dismissed with the 
stigma of atheistic materialism, of Spinozism, thrust upon him by a contemporary 
world as yet unwilling to listen to a non-orthodox approach to religion, to the inherited 
religious tradition and the accepted religious world-view94. Grossmann notes that the 
overwhelming tone of Edelmann’s writings is ‘ein stolzes aufklarerisches Gefiihr95. 
The object of Edelmann’s most vituperative criticism was not, according to 
Grossmann, religion itself, but the arid, entrenched dogmatism of the Church. His 
own deeply religious feeling and personally engaged theology are held to pervade all 
his writings. Edelmann’s Spinozistic language, for Grossmann, reveals a continuing 
urge to seek after the Creator in the continuing metamorphosis of creation, to convey 
the dynamism of creation in the dynamism of a language of feeling. Grossmann 
asserts that Edelmann’s overwhelming aim is the communication to his readers of the 
living image of the living God (‘des alles erfullenden, alles belebenden and 
bewegenden Wesens’)96. Feeling co-exists with reason: ‘empfinden, schauen und 
betrachten stehen nebenbiirtig neben erkennen’, as Grossmann puts it97. Edelmannn’s 
great and greatly overlooked contribution to the rational temper of religion in 
eighteenth-century Germany is his communication of a God he rationally approved 
and personally experienced in the felt dynamism of his language, and in his castigation 
of an ecclesiastical tradition persistently concerned with the stifling of true religious 
feeling in the furtherance of its formal doctrines.
Lessing, who knew and appreciated the writings of Edelmann, although he did 
not, for very pertinent political reasons, propagandize and openly patronize them as he
84 Walter Grossmann, Johann Christian Edelmann. From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment, Mouton, The 
Hague, 1976: ‘For the first time in Moses a German thinker, writing in his mother tongue, openly 
professed his agreement with Spinoza. Edelmann had no immediate followers, since his work aroused 
only indignation against him and brought only vilification upon him. Half a century later Spinoza’s 
name came to be mentioned openly and with reverence by Goethe and Herder. The story of the 
condemnation or silencing of the work of Edelmann and, with it, of the religious ideas and criticism 
of Spinoza, is part of the history of German intellectual life between 1740 and 1775, particularly in 
the Prussia of Frederick II’, (p. 112).
95 J C Edelmann, Abgenothigtes jedoch Andem etc., ed. cit., p.XVIII.
86 Moses etc., loc.cit., II 157. See Grossmann, J  C Edelmann. From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment, 
ed. cit., pp.130, 135.
97 In his edition of Edelmann’s Abgenothigtes jedoch Andem etc., ed. cit., p.XVII.
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did those of the equally contentious Hermann Samuel Reimarus98, distinguishes the
religion of Christ from the Christian religion in a series of consequent maxims
published under the title Die Religion Christi. Lessing’s premise is primarily and
unequivocally the essential humanity of Jesus Christ:
Ob Christus mehr als Mensch gewesen, das ist ein Problem. DaB er wahrer 
Mensch gewesen, wenn er iiberhaupt gewesen, daB er nie aufgehort hat, 
Mensch zu sein, das ist ausgemacht.
It is therefore, according to Lessing, the humanity of Christ which distinguishes the 
religion embraced and promoted by him as a person from the Christian religion which 
takes his name:
Folglich sind die Religion Christi und die christliche Religion zwei ganz 
verschiedene Dinge."
The quest for the fundamental truths of human existence which fired the
Enlightenment as a general cultural phenomenon, fires equally the search for divine
revelation in the personality of Christ, freed from the shackles of dogmatic apocrypha
and extraneous forms of worship. Lessing’s paramount concern is with the material
basis of the religious faith he expounds: the human existence of the Godhead he
reveres and the active, ameliorative morality of the faith he embraces. His personal
belief does not compromise his philosophical precision. Indeed, in a famous letter to
his brother Karl, Lessing had pointed out the inherent dangers of an indiscriminately
rationalizing approach to religion:
Mit der Orthodoxie war man, Gott sei Dank, ziemlich zu Rande; man hatte 
zwischen ihr und der Philosophic eine Scheidewand gezogen, hinter welcher 
eine jede ihren Weg fortgehen konnte, ohne die andere zu hindern. Aber was 
tut man nun? Man reiBt diese Scheidewand nieder und macht uns unter dem 
Vorwande, uns zu verniinftigen Christen zu machen, zu hochst 
unvemiinftigen Philosophen.100
For Lessing, human reason is necessarily paramount in the search for a valid religion:
Ich sollte es der Welt miBgonnen, daB man sie mehr aufzuklaren suche? Ich 
sollte es nicht von Herzen wiinschen, daB ein jeder iiber die Religion bei 
meinen Sudeleien einen andern Zweck hatte, als jene groBen Absichten
88 See Grossmann, J C Edelmann. From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment, ed. cit., pp.l74ff. Grossmann 
sketches the main political factors hampering free speech and philosophical innovation in the 
Germany of Frederick II: ‘The fact is that in 1780 it was still hazardous to write or to say what 
Edelmann had dared to say in 1740’ (p. 177).
89 Lessings Werke. Vollstandige Ausgabe, ed. cit., Vol. 23, pp.352f.
100 2 ii 1774. See G E Lessing, Ausgewahlte Werke, ed. Wolfgang Stammler, Munchen, 1950, Vol. 
2, pp.H32f.
100
befordern zu helfen?101 
Lessing shows himself contemptuous of the platitude that in the controversy between 
reason and revelation, in the ostensibly irreconcilable polarity of instinctive faith and 
rational investigation, the ‘truth’, whatever it is and however it is to be obtained, lies 
somewhere vaguely between the two extremes. Only reason, for Lessing as for Kant, 
can decide the possibility and claims of revelation in terms consonant with human 
appreciation and understanding102. The standpoint of the eighteenth-century German 
rationalists is, therefore, in this respect, no weak compromise, but an informed co­
operation of reason and religion, of which the ultimate affirmation and only legitimate 
goal is the amelioration of the human material state through the improvement of moral 
awareness. Lessing had no reservations in subscribing to the deist thesis that basic 
Christianity is perfectly simple ethical teaching, that the ultimate aim of religion is to 
promote a better human in a better world through the prescription and propagation of 
certain behavioural requirements.
In Lessing’s Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts, an unequivocal attempt 
to define historically and materially the influence of religious faith on human 
civilization, there is a well-known apparent inadequacy in Lessing’s formulation of 
rationally defined morality over purely revealed religion, which arises from a 
superficial contradiction on Lessing’s part. In the 4th paragraph of his treatise he 
asserts that:
Erziehung gibt dem Menschen nichts, was er nicht auch aus sich selbst haben 
konnte: sie gibt ihm das, was er aus sich selbst haben konnte, nur 
geschwinder und leichter. Also gibt die Offenbarung dem Menschengeschlecht 
nichts, worauf die menschliche Vernunft, sich selbst iiberlassen, nicht auch 
kommen wiirde.103
In the 77th paragraph, however, Lessing revises this judgement and claims that
revealed Christianity has indeed helped the human being to an understanding and
appreciation of his world which human reason would never have reached unaided:
Und warum sollten wir nicht auch durch eine Religion, mit deren historischen 
Wahrheit, wenn man will, es so miBlich aussieht, gleichwohl auf nahere und 
bessere Begriffe vom gottlichen Wesen, von unsrer Natur, von unsern
101 Ibid., p.1132.
102 A particularly interesting point, perhaps, as my supervisor pointed out, in the light of Goethe’s 
saying, ‘Man sagt, zwischen zwei entgegengesetzten Meinungen liege die Wahrheit mitten inne. 
Keineswegs! Das Problem liegt dazwischen, das Unschaubare, das ewig tatige Leben, in Ruhe 
gedacht’ (HA XII 422, §417; Hecker §616).
103 Lessings Werke. Vollstandige Ausgabe, ed. cit., Sechster Teil, pp.61ff., (p.64).
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Verhaltnissen zu Gott, geleitet werden konnen, auf welche die menschliche
Vernunft von selbst nimmermehr gekommen ware?104
One frequently postulated solution to this apparent contradiction in Lessing’s thought 
is the notion, which Lessing himself adumbrated, that revelation, in terms of a non- 
rational religious force, is superfluous in the face of human reason, but that, although 
ultimately unnecessary inasmuch as reason will achieve its own ends unaided in time, 
is nonetheless a help, an attribute to reason, in accelerating the advance towards the 
goal. What must be emphasized here, however, is that this ‘goal’ is a necessarily 
undefined ultimate ‘truth’; undefinable because its definition would be its 
achievement, and its achievement is humanly impossible without its definition. For 
Lessing, reason is the means towards the achievement of this goal: a dynamic 
progression, not a static end-product. Reason and revelation are two conceptually 
irreconcilable polarities which nonetheless work together in the progression to an 
ultimate goal which they cannot define. Lessing’s conception of the Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts depends on the constant co-ordination of reason and revelation; 
the reconciliation, in co-operative tension, of these two philosophical and historical 
polarities.
What is most significant about the universal, positive religion of Christ 
proclaimed by Lessing in particular is that its timelessness, its transcendence of 
temporal and cultural barriers, is rooted firmly in a historical awareness of the 
civilization which nurtured it. Both Lessing and Herder evolved their religious 
concepts from the perspective of a historical appreciation of the cultural origins and 
implications of the Christian tradition. Indeed, it is in the domain of enlightened 
theology, as it advances from the abstractions of Leibniz and the systematization of 
Wolff, that the spirit of historical awareness manifests itself as the fundamental 
principle of the German theological Enlightenment. For in the German context, the 
theologians of the Enlightenment were acutely aware of the debt they owed to their 
forerunners, the scholars of the Renaissance and post-Renaissance cultural periods 
throughout Europe. The study by Semler, a leading exponent of German enlightened 
theology, of the historical basis of biblical events, derives ultimately from Erasmus, 
whom Semler is pleased to call ‘the father of Protestant theology’105. Thus the charge
104 Ibid., p.79.
105 See Cassirer, op. cit., pp.l87f.: ‘Semler ... knupft in seinem Kampf gegen die Orthodoxie wieder 
unmittelbar an Erasmus an, den er als den eigentlichen Schopfer der protestantischen Theologie 
bezeichnet’.
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of anti-traditionalism that is too often levelled at the Age of Enlightenment certainly 
does not hold in the domain of German theological philosophy. Enlightened theology 
is overtly conscious of the general intellectual context out of which it evolved, and the 
imputation of temporal independence, arrogant dismissal of tradition, is definitively 
refuted by a consideration of the historical basis and character of the German 
Enlightenment. For enlightened theology does far more than reconcile faith with 
reason within the confines of a ‘rational religion’. The religious ideals of the German 
Enlightenment cannot be reduced to an equation of belief with the acceptance of certain 
logically valid propositions. To view the Enlightenment as an era of pure 
intellectualism, unconditionally upholding the primacy of thought and theoretical 
evaluation, is to misrepresent the force of enlightened philosophy in its active 
emancipation of religion from the stranglehold of doctrinaire dogmatism. The theology 
of the German Enlightenment, by cementing itself firmly in the bedrock of its 
historical origins, succeeds in transcending all differences and points of conflict within 
the concepts and precepts of religious belief, and, as Cassirer puts it, ‘emphatically 
proclaims the identity of religion amid all its different rites and despite all 
controversies regarding ideas and opinions’106. What the critical spirit of the eighteenth 
century demands, therefore, is a liberation from narrow-minded dogmatic 
intransigence, which will encourage aspiration to a comprehensive and universal 
awareness of God107. Such a transformation of the religious consciousness is effected 
by a synthesis of the rational and historical spirits of the age: the polarity of the 
concepts of reason and history is recognized and defined, and the inner movement of 
religious thought in the eighteenth century depends upon the reciprocal inter­
relationship of these two opposing forces. The relevance and significance of 
Cassirer’s terminology for an understanding of the heuristic usefulness of the concept 
of binary synthesis with regard to the relationship between reason and revelation in the 
German eighteenth century is such that his account deserves to be quoted in full:
Die noch immer herrschende, und, wie es scheint, unausrottbare Vorstellung, 
daB das achtzehnte Jahrhundert der geschichtlichen Welt fremd und 
verstandnislos gegeniibergestanden habe, daB seine Denkweise schlechthin 
‘unhistorisch’ gewesen sei, wird schon durch einen Blick auf die Entwicklung
106 The translation is Koelln and Pettigrove’s, trans. cit., p.165. See p.221 of Cassirer’s original 
Philosophic der Aufklarung: ‘so tritt [die Aufklarung] mit allem Nachdruck fur die Identitat der 
Religion in aller Verschiedenheit der Riten und in allem Gegensatz der Vorstellungen und Meinungen 
ein’.
107 Ibid.
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der religiosen Problematik unmittelbar und schlagend wiederlegt. Denn die 
innere Wandlung, die hier einsetzt, ist eben dadurch bedingt, daB die Religion 
sich der Herrschaft des metaphysischen und theologischen Denkens entringt 
und sich einen neuen MaBstab, eine neue Norm der Beurteilung, erschafft. 
Diese Norm ist keine einfache; sie ist vielmehr auf zwei voneinander 
verschiedene Momente gegriindet, die sie vereint und die sie miteinander in 
Einklang zu setzen sucht. Was sich in ihr darstellt, ist eine Synthese rationalen 
and historischen Geistes. Die Vernunft wird auf die Geschichte, die 
Geschichte auf die Vernunft bezogen: und in dieser Wechselbeziehung wird 
eine neue religiose Gesamtanschauung und ein neues religioses 
Erkenntnisideal gewonnen. Vernunft und Geschichte werden klar geschieden 
und in einer standigen Spannung gegeneinander erhalten, auf welcher die 
gesamte innere Bewegung des religiosen Denkens im achtzehnten Jahrhundert 
beruht.108
The intellectual and cultural forces at work demand that theology, in order to defend 
its metaphysic of religion which is rooted in historical event and material existence, 
effect within itself the transition from dogmatic assertion to historical validation. The 
Age of Enlightenment, in the German context, is essentially an era in which religion is 
able, indeed obliged, to justify itself precisely by taking stock of its cultural origins 
and implications.
It is therefore apparent that the general judgement of the eighteenth century as 
an inherently secular age is one which requires considerable qualification and 
justification. Following Peter Gay’s dictum that secularization ‘is a word easy to use 
and therefore easy to misuse’, it is advisable to found an analysis of the cultural 
processes at work in the age of Enlightenment upon a detailed and precise 
understanding of the nature and implications of the secularization process. The 
relationship between past cultural tradition and the ‘present’ moment in culture plays a 
significant role in this definition of secularization: the notion that the eighteenth 
century was a culturally and temporally automonous age, abrogating all historical 
derivation and debt to tradition, has, it is hoped, been emphatically rejected. The 
Enlightenment, as has been said, was not born of nothing. That many of the principal 
tenets and ideas embraced by the eighteenth-century philosophers derive ultimately 
from pre-eighteenth-century movements: from the primary English materialist 
philosophy of the seventeenth century; from Renaissance and post-Renaissance
108 Ibid., pp.244f.
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humanism; from, indeed, the scholarship of ancient Classical scholars, has been 
indicated above. The Enlightenment as a general philosophical age and socio-cultural 
movement was emphatically aware, therefore, of its own place on a cultural 
continuum progressing onward from past to future through a specious present 
moment: a moment which, if apprehended, reflects the past and projects the future. 
The Enlightenment is the ongoing result of a ‘secular trend’ as defined in the previous 
chapter: a gradual progression from one end to another in a process which may be 
called, for the sake of argument and in anticipation of future justification, a process of 
secularization.
Furthermore, the categorization of the eighteenth century as a secular age does 
not imply the outright negation of the religious world-view. To remain within the 
German context directly relevant to this study, the process of secularization does not 
imply the gradual material atrophy of religious concerns and the intellectual progress 
toward the abolition of the concept of God. On the contrary, secularization points to a 
re-appraisal of religion in terms of objectively investigative rationalism, a justification 
of abstract reason in terms of its meaningfulness for the world in which it operates: in 
short, a mutually underscoring, mutually dependent and mutually conciliative 
communion of rational and religious tempers. The process of secularization ensues 
from the tension between sacral and secular realms of application and understanding: 
the force and implication of the secularization process derive from the co-operation of 
abstract reasoning and instinctive belief, of knowledge and faith, of intellectual 
appreciation and felt existence. Kant’s understanding of objective morality and 
subjective desires harnessed together in productive co-operation only when human 
‘inner feeling’ is recognized and acclaimed; Edelmann’s castigation of arid dogmatism 
which stifles the potential of true human faith; Herder’s acknowledgement of the 
power of language when related to individual experience; Lessing’s insistence on the 
human appeal of the humanity of Jesus Christ; all point towards a conception of the 
religious tradition which is rationally justifiable only insofar as it admits of the power 
of non-rational and non-definable forces in human consciousness. Human feeling 
exists, as a non-manifest, non-tangible force in consciousness: the object of 
eighteenth-century religious rationalism is not only to acknowledge this feeling but to 
express and convey it in and through the arid abstraction of linguistic communication. 
Secularization is this concretion of feeling, the expression of the inchoate, the
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encapsulation in the material matrix of the intangible experience of faith, instinct, 
belief, and feeling. Secularization expresses the otherwise inexpressible. The 
primarily sacral does indeed become ostensibly secular: the material world, in the 
writings of the eighteenth-century religious rationalists, assumes for itself what had 
traditionally been ascribed to religion. But in this respect the entire theological tradition 
would have to be described as a ‘secularization’: the sermons preached and the tracts 
written are expressed and conveyed to the world by the worldly media of the human 
voice and pen. What must be emphasized here is that feeling is not finite; it is not a 
question of a simple transfer from one realm of application to another, but of a 
reciprocal interaction between two opposing realms to their mutual benefit, 
development and dynamic growth. Secularization as a cultural phenomenon of the 
eighteenth century ensues from the productive co-operation of sacral and secular 
realms by which faith finds its justification in the secular matrix, and the material 
world acquires purpose and direction from its active acknowledgement of the working 
presence of the spiritual.
As Lessing had been at pains to point out, the ‘truth’ in the tension between 
these polar oppositions in the eighteenth-century world-view does not lie somewhere 
between the two extremes in a weak compromise of reason with faith, or of belief 
with rationalism. According to Schiller’s schema, to which he gives active expression 
in his philosophical writings, the human being’s approximation of the ‘truth’ of 
existence, the aspiration toward the fulfilment of human potential, demands the co­
ordination of the most radically opposed components of physical and spiritual 
existence by which neither, and yet both, has precedence over the other. Self-interest 
submits to the moral law: the moral law serves a revised and improved self-interest. 
Reason defines faith: faith gives meaning and direction to a committed and experiential 
reason. Lessing, and most emphatically Kant, had emphasized that religion had to 
bow to the demands of reason in order to justify itself - Lessing by proclaiming the 
material origin of the Christian faith in the living personality of Jesus Christ; Kant in 
his declaration that religion loses any war it declares on reason - : conversely, and 
correspondingly, enlightened philosophy finds its force, its direction and its 
justification precisely by taking stock of the non-rational elements within it:
In ihren Urspriingen und in ihrem Wesen ist die Aufklarung nachhaltig und in
vielfaltiger Weise bestimmt worden durch das religiose Denken und Fiihlen
und durch die religiose und metaphysische Tradition, von der sie sich zu
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befreien suchte.109
The polarity between the two primary concepts in eighteenth-century thought is 
recognized and precisely defined; the opposing elements are not compromised one 
with the other in a simple levelling process. Clearly distinguished, reason as the 
guiding principle in the secular world and faith as the driving force in the realm of the 
sacral are kept in a state of constant tension. The ‘new religion’ which is held to ensue 
from the so-called ‘compromises’ of revelation and reason is in this respect a product 
of the ideal equilibrium between these two opposing forces: ‘religion’ is here raised to 
the apex of the diagrammatic triangle through its constant reciprocal tension with its 
polarized opposite; which itself takes precedence over ‘religion’ when viewed 
accordingly. The schema of a process of binary synthesis goes some way to 
explaining the nature and productive capacity of the tension between religion and 
reason in the eighteenth century, and hence the ostensibly conflicting interests and 
priorities of sacral and secular world-views. The process of secularization can no 
longer be understood in terms of a simple unremitting advance from sacral to secular 
realms: what is secularized holds and contains the intimation of its antagonistic sacral 
principle; neither has outright precedence over the other although momentarily one 
polarity may be seen to take the fore. What is sacral is simultaneously secular and 
vice versa: secularization in the eighteenth century implies, promotes and demands a 
corresponding sacralization which is there to be perceived in the phenomenal cultural 
object. Secularization as a cultural process is not a finite transition by which the 
religious interpretation of life is persistently atrophied and ultimately annulled. The 
relationship between philosophy and theology - and between religious practice and 
socio-psychological reflection - evolves into one of intensely fruitful symbiosis: 
religion seeks to apprehend and build on a philosophically valid basis; and the 
Enlightenment, as a brightening and becoming, as a pointer to the fundamental truths 
of human life, as a programme toward the amelioration of the human lot, is a religion 
of revelation in itself.
The eighteenth century is indeed an age which basks in renewed confidence in 
humanity and glorifies humankind and human works. An appreciation of the aesthetic 
merits of the biblical text does not, however, negate the faith the text proclaims. The 
secularization of biblical exegesis does not reduce Scripture to a human fiction, but
109 Herbert Dieckmann, ‘Religiose und Metaphysische Elemente im Denken der Aufklarung’, in 
Studien zur Europaischen Aufklarung, op. cit., pp.258-274, (p.260).
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proclaims the inner certainty of faith in a language which appeals to the human being. 
The ideals of the Enlightenment are but the manifestations of the process of cultural 
history which transforms Augustine’s City o f God to what for Hazard is the ‘City of 
Men’110, and points towards The Secular City of a more recent theological study111. 
The ‘City’ in all three is Western Civilization: the process of transformation is one of 
perpetual evolutionary refinement. The secularization of cultural tradition in the 
eighteenth century encapsulates, in the theology, philosophy and writings of the major 
proponents of enlightened thought, the conscious interaction of theological tradition 
and modern world-view. Neither has ultimate precedence: the resultant philosophy is 
an ongoing process, throught the co-ordination of opposing polarities, in a dynamic 
progression towards a cultural future through an informed assimilation of the past; an 
assimilation which is itself felt and experienced by the individual in his personal 
understanding of the relationship to the cultural entities at his disposal. As a 
phenomenon of the eighteenth century, secularization is born of the ideals and notions 
of the Enlightenment; but the implications of the process carry it beyond mere 
periodization. Secularization as a cultural process is rooted in the historical foundation 
of the eighteenth century, which is itself both an end and a beginning, a culmination 
and a foundation. The eighteenth century is where old and new meet in a cycle of 
completion and inception.
110 Hazard, trans. cit., Part II, pp.ll3ff.
111 Harvey G Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 
New York, 1964.
CHAPTER III
GOETHE’S ACCOUNT OF THE TRADITION OF RELIGION 
IN DICHTUNG UND WAHRHEIT
Am 28. August 1749, mittags mit dem Glockenschlage zwolf, kam ich in 
Frankfurt am Main auf die Welt. Die Konstellation war gliicklich; die Sonne 
stand im Zeichen der Jungfrau, und kulminierte fur den Tag; Jupiter und 
Venus blickten sie freundlich an, Merkur nicht widerwartig; Saturn und Mars 
verhielten sich gleichgiiltig; nur der Mond, der soeben voll ward, iibte die 
Kraft seines Gegenscheins um so mehr, als zugleich seine Planetenstunde 
eingetreten war. Er widersetzte sich daher meiner Geburt, die nicht eher 
erfolgen konnte, als bis diese Stunde voriibergegangen.1
Goethe’s account of the time and place of his birth, with which he, not illogically, 
commences the first book of Dichtung und Wahrheit, subordinates the social, political 
and cultural situation of the world he entered in this way and at that time to the 
cosmical and astrological factors operative at the moment of his coming into the 
world. His insistence on the favourable cosmic setting of his birth eschews reference 
to the actual physical conditions which were, reputedly, far less salutary: a difficult 
birth, a near-asphyxiated, scarce-alive infant, the product of a long and arduous 
labour2 which, as Goethe would seem to have it, resulted not from any earth-bound, 
physical conditions, but from the inexorable movement of the heavenly bodies into the 
largely favourable positions which were to herald an auspicious event. Erich Trunz’s 
commentary to the Hamburger Ausgabe of Goethe’s works points to the embracing 
framework of Dichtung und Wahrheit, which begins and ends with reference to the 
dependence on external, universal factors over which the individual has no control3. 
Goethe’s description of the constellational positions which presided over his birth 
marks his awareness of himself as a historical character born at a specific time, in a 
specific place, over which he himself has no jurisdiction. The circumstances of his 
birth are described not only as a factual, physical occurence, but also as a symbolic 
event: Goethe’s coming into the world is portrayed by him, in the emphatic position of
1 HA IX 10.
2 See Richard Friedenthal, Goethe. Sein Leben und Seine Zeit, op cit., p.7.
3 ‘Mit einem symbolischen Bild beginnt es und mit einem solchen endet es ... jedesmal die Beziehung 
zu hoheren Machten andeutend’ (HA IX 644). Benjamin C Sax also delineates this opening passage as 
an example of Goethe’s symbolizing of the inextricable inter-relationship of the specific self and the 
historical concentration which forms its world (Images o f Identity, op. cit., p.107).
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the opening paragraph of his autobiography, as a pre-determined occurence presided 
over, influenced and carried to fruitfulness by the external, impersonal forces of the 
universe.
From the outset, then, Goethe marks the selectivity of his approach to 
autobiography. This is no quasi-objective portrayal by an individual of the events and 
facts of his life as he remembers them: Dichtung und Wahrheit is a highly conscious 
literary construct, a work of imagination which is rooted in the factual events of a life 
lived, but not entirely reducible to a work of determinably objective historical veracity. 
The author selects his material and portrays this in his own way, emphasizing that 
which is conducive to his purpose and ignoring that which is not. The opening of 
Dichtung und Wahrheit encapsulates the recognized paradox of autobiographical 
writing: the persona is not the author, nor even the narrator, but a presentation by the 
author of an idealized self operating in a set of subjectively remembered or 
symbolically portrayed conditions, re-objectified in the literary text for assimilation 
and apprehension by the reader.
What is immediately striking in Goethe’s account of his century and its temper 
is the tone of detached objectivity in which he relates events, describes personalities 
and depicts the prevalent philosophical and cultural trends. The mature Goethe is of 
course distanced temporally from the society and culture of the late eighteenth century 
which provide the external matrix of Dichtung und Wahrheit, and this must contribute 
to, but cannot wholly account for, his objective detachment from the character whose 
experiences he relates. Goethe achieves distance in style and tone from even his most 
individual and personal experiences. As author, he removes himself as far as possible 
from the historical personality which is himself as experiencing individual, and relates 
his autobiography with affected objectivity and impersonality, creating a literary 
persona ostensibly independent of himself as writer. As the Vorwort to Dichtung und 
Wahrheit makes explicit, Goethe is offering, not the candid, confessional account 
expected in a conventional autobiography, but a ‘halb poetische, halb historische 
Behandlung’4 where the Stoff is historical event and living personality, and the 
Gestalt is the artistic transmutation of this factual basis into the poetic truth of a 
consciously formulated work of art. The purpose of this chapter is to examine in these 
terms Goethe’s accounts of the religious and metaphysical ideas and moments which
4 HA IX 10.
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informed his cultural world in these terms: as a conscious, artistic presentation of the 
views and events which formed the religious tradition he assimilated, and to which 
Goethe evolved, and presented, his own personal attitude.
The relationship between the formative hand of the mature author and the 
experiences of the youthful protagonist, of course, forms the basis for all informed 
critical study of Dichtung und Wahrheit as autobiography. Goethe’s mature reflections 
on the events and influences of his youth are related from a standpoint of authorial 
detachment which is both temporal and experiential, and deliberately ironic, and it 
with this in mind that his account of the development of his religious consciousness 
must be approached. For this is indeed pervaded by a sense of irony which borders at 
times on the gently cynical. The childish desire, for instance, to erect an altar to God 
and effect a sacrifice thereon ‘auf gut alttestamentliche Weise’5 is recounted 
impersonally: the protagonist is not the author, but an artificially quite independent 
character, ‘der Knabe’. Goethe makes his presence felt, however, in his role of ironic 
narrator, finding and stating the moral of the story:
und fast mochte man diesen Zufall als eine Andeutung und Warnung
betrachten, wie gefahrlich es iiberhaupt sei, sich Gott auf dergleichen Wegen
nahern zu wollen.6
Thus we see that the formative hand of Goethe the artist, recounting the early years 
and experiences of himself as the protagonistic ‘Knabe’, is omnipresent in the internal 
structure of Dichtung und Wahrheit. The symbolic framework of the work as a whole 
is reflected microcosmically in the structure of Book I, which ends with an ironic 
description of the young Goethe’s puerile attempts to interfere with the workings of 
the heavenly spheres which presided over his own so auspicious entry into the world. 
The child’s strongly bibliocentric education founds his desire to approach God as did 
the Hebrew forefathers of whom he learns and reads; but the experienced eye and 
ironic tone of the detached narrator highlight the nai've foolishness of such an attempt. 
The haplessness of the individual in the face of the forces of the universe is 
emphatically portrayed: it is the religious motif - in the sense of man at the mercy of 
higher forces operative in the universe - which presents itself as the predominant 
theme and underlying impetus of Dichtung und Wahrheit as a creative and descriptive
6 HA IX 44.
6 HA IX 45.
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whole7.
The more Goethe recedes from his narrative, the more he eclipses himself and
his explicitly personal impressions, the more acutely is the forming and reforming
hand of the author to be perceived in the text. Indeed, Goethe in his autobiography is
never closer to the truth than when at his most ironic, never more present in his text
than when most affecting distance from it; for it is at these times that he, as creative
author, is most at pains to couch the truth of historical event in a veil of artistic
presentation. The basic content of Dichtung und Wahrheit as autobiographical
account, as a personal view of a specific time and place, cannot be divorced from the
elements of discursive sophistication and structural artistry in Goethe’s expression.
Goethe the author of Dichtung und Wahrheit exploits the experiences of Goethe the
boy and young man as the basis for a telling and pertinent commentary on society and
culture, on institutions and traditions, on life and living, and relates these experiences
in turn in a highly conscious exploitation of the medium of language and poetic form.
‘Poetry’ and ‘Truth’ are the mutually dependent polarities in the formation of an
informed, consciously artistic work of creative history.
The perspicacity of childish insight, for example, affords the mature author the
opportunity to comment on the inadequacy of received religion to explain and account
for the world. The boy Goethe is unable to understand and accept the natural
catastrophe of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 in terms of his catechistic education: the
benevolent, patriarchal God of the catechism is not commensurate with the appalling
injustice of this city’s indiscriminate destruction:
Der Knabe, der alles diese wiederholt vernehmen muBte, war nicht wenig 
betroffen. Gott, der Schopfer und Erhalter Himmels und der Erden, den ihm 
die Erklarung des ersten Glaubensartikels so weise und gnadig vorstellte, hatte 
sich, indem er die Gerechten mit den Ungerechten gleichem Verderben 
preisgab, keineswegs vaterlich bewiesen. Vergebens suchte das junge Gemiit 
sich gegen diese Eindriicke herzustellen, welches uberhaupt um so weniger 
moglich war, als die Weisen und Schriftgelehrten selbst sich liber die Art, wie 
man ein solches Phanomen anzusehen habe, nicht vereinigen konnten.8
Goethe thus exploits his autobiographical standpoint to allude to the great wave of
7 Trunz notes with regard to Goethe’s description of this childish religious exercise: ‘DaB er sie an das 
Ende des 1. Buches stellt, deutet an, daB von alien Motiven des Buches dieses - das religiose - 
besondere Bedeutung habe und daB von hier Beziige ausstrahlen zu alien Biichem, die nun folgen’ (HA 
DC 663).
8 HA DC 30f.
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scepticism and doubt which flooded Europe in the wake of the Lisbon earthquake. He 
draws an explicit parallel between his individual childish questioning, and the general 
intellectual and theological confusion and disarray; neither of which could offer a 
coherent explanation of the wanton death and destrucion of Lisbon, and the ensuing 
social dissolution, in terms consonant with established religious teaching. Derek 
Bowman’s commentary points to two levels at which this passage operates: a 
disingenuous portrayal of the boy’s bewilderment, and an awareness of the 
problematic side of human nature on the part of the mature author9. Trunz notes that 
Goethe’s father possessed in his extensive library the most notable academic 
discussions of the Lisbon earthquake and its influence on the prevailing 
understandings of the universe and its workings; books with which the young boy 
might arguably have been familiar, and with which the author of Dichtung und 
Wahrheit most certainly was: Goethe’s own account concentrates on the impact of this 
natural disaster upon the questioning psyche of the boy, without discussing in any 
depth the intellectual repercussions of the event10. Instead, the historical standpoint of 
the young protagonist is exploited to portray the general popular confusion and lack of 
understanding of the event and its implications at the time.
Disillusionment with religious dogma, as part of Goethe’s general education 
and upbringing, evidently set in early. A primary influence, quite apart from insight 
into the inadequacies of the catechism in the face of the actual world, was an obvious 
boredom with the arid intransigence of a received religion which contained little of 
appeal to the active and imaginative child:
Doch war der kirchliche Protestantismus, den man uns iiberlieferte, nur eine
Art von trockner Moral: an einen geistreichen Vortrag ward nicht gedacht, und
9 Life into Autobiography, op. cit., pp.53f.
10 HA IX 654. Goethe’s affectedly childish account eschews reference to the monumental 
philosophical effects of this natural disaster in the 18th century. See, for example, Voltaire’s ‘Poeme 
sur le Desastre de Lisbonne, ou Examen de cet Axiome: Tout est Bien’ (1756), Oeuvres Completes 
de Voltaire, Paris, 1877, Vol. 9, pp.470ff.; the subtitle of which makes plain that the attack is 
directed primarily at the optimistic philosophy of Alexander Pope - encapsulated in his famous 
statement in the Essay on Man, ‘Whatever is, is right’ - in the face of such manifest natural injustice. 
The force of Voltaire’s Preface to his poem (ibid., pp.456ff.) deals principally with a discussion of the 
views presented by Pope in the English tradition of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke, and mentions only 
obliquely Leibniz, whose philosophy of sufficient reason comes in for more studied satirical attack in 
the conte philosophique, Candide (1759). The Leibnizian philosophy of ‘Optimism’, the contention 
of a rationally coherent universe in which all things have a purpose and that existence itself, because 
it exists, is necessarily perfect, is here the principal target of Voltaire’s scom; which conceals but 
barely Voltaire’s own philosophical conviction, corroborated by such natural phenomena as the 
Lisbon disaster, that all is far from right in the world, and that man has to combat evil in order to 
achieve the ultimate putative perfectibility of existence.
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die Lehre konnte weder der Seele noch dem Herzen zusagen.11
Aridity is indeed a recurrent image in Goethe’s account of his religious education.
Elsewhere in Dichtung und Wahrheit, in a chapter (Part II, Seventh Book) concerned
largely with the young man’s reception of the prevailing cultural temper and literary
movements of the time12, Goethe offers a general judgement of the Protestant Church
at the time of his youth and its insistence on rigorous, mechanistic learning by rote at
the expense of any appeal to the senses and to the imagination of the individual.
Mechanistic, formalized and formulaic learning was, for him, barren and
unproductive; and familiarity with the forms of the catechism served only to breed a
certain contempt for the ‘trocknen, geistlosen Schlendrian’ of dogmatic teaching:
Den Katechismus, eine Paraphrase desselben [Religionsunterricht], die 
Heilsordnung wuBte ich an den Fingern herzuerzahlen, von den kraftig 
beweisenden biblischen Spriichen fehlte mir keiner; aber von alledem erntete 
ich keine Frucht.13
It is, Goethe insists, the lack of ‘Fiille und Konsequenz’14 of contemporary Protestant
worship which causes breakaway sects to establish alternative forms of worship
incorporating a more personal involvement in the act of faith. The teaching of
Protestant doctrine, as Goethe experienced it, alienates the individual by its
overwhelming emphasis on the letter of dogma and text, and fails to appeal, according
to Goethe’s autobiographical account, because the emphasis on the letter of dogma
stifles the potential of imaginative apprehension of teaching into a way of life.
Repetition without engagement is, for Goethe, meaningless and unproductive:
um etwas gern zu wiederholen, muB es [dem Menschen] nicht fremd 
geworden sein.15
The insistence on a purely cerebral apprehension of the teachings of Protestantism 
favoured by Goethe’s contemporary religious establishment does nothing to unite 
rational understanding with sensuous appreciation, and cannot therefore sustain the 
interest and promote the active engagement of the individual in the living out of the 
dogmas professed. Protestantism, as experienced by the young Goethe and portrayed
11 HA IX 43.
12 ‘Das 7. Buch bringt den Jungling in Verbindung mit den groBen kulturellen Schopfungen, die auf 
ihn als Kiinstler und als religiosen Menschen wirken, zumal mit der Literatur und der Kirche’, Trunz, 
HA IX 713.
13 HA IX 292.
14 HA IX 288.
15 HA IX 289.
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in Dichtung und Wahrheit, negates the sensuous in its insistence on the rational and 
does not, therefore, hold any lasting and durable significance for the experiencing 
individual.
Such dogmatic absolutism, insisting on one indisputable and immutable
interpretation of religious text, event and practice, and their unquestioning acceptance
by the receptive individual, is, for Goethe, dangerously self-indulgent. It leads to an
unnecessarily abstruse complication into formulaic tenets requiring a set interpretation
of their meaning and application; furthering, in turn, what Goethe describes as an
almost paranoid fixation with one set of ideas and the stipulation of one absolute
interpretation of them which admits of no alternatives and encourages only blind
acceptance thereof and unquestioning adherence thereto:
In der Folge trat jedoch bei mir das Ubel hervor, welches aus unserer durch 
mancherlei Dogmen komplizierten, auf Bibelspriiche, die mehrere 
Auslegungen zulassen, gegriindeten Religion bedenkliche Menschen dergestalt 
anfallt, daB es hypochondrische Zustande nach sich zieht und diese, bis zu 
ihrem hochsten Gipfel, zu fixen Ideen steigert.16
Dogmatic intransigence, which allows of no questioning and admits of no possibility
of alternative views, has, according to Goethe’s depicted understanding of the
religious temper of his age, a negative influence on the growth and development of
religious thought and of the Church which promotes it. It leads to a self-fixated
concentration on one interpretation and ultimately to a brittle, static and hence invalid
conceptualization, into one set form, of intrinsically dynamic notions. Dogma begets
cliche, and what is cliche stops developing and hence, ultimately, ceases to have a
vaild function in the world. The ‘fixen Ideen’ which result from such intransigent
dogmatism are, for Goethe, a negative manifestation of the established Church’s
entrenched preoccupation with the furtherance of its own doctrines.
Elizabeth M Wilkinson’s authoritative study of the concepts of Polaritat and
Steigerung in Goethe’s thought17, concepts which have their primary reference in his
scientific writings but are of vital relevance to his understanding and interpretation of
all natural processes, including intellectual thought-processes and the dynamics of
human feeling, has indicated clearly and unequivocally that any reference on Goethe’s
16 HA IX 293.
17 ‘“Tasso - ein gesteigerter Werther” in the Light of Goethe’s Principle of “Steigerung”’, Modern  
Language Review, Vol. 44 (1949), pp.305-328, reprinted in German in Goethe: Neue Folge des 
Jahrbuchs der Goethe-Gesellschaft, Vol. 13 (1951), pp.28-58, and in Elizabeth M Wilkinson and L A  
Willoughby, Goethe Poet and Thinker, op. cit., pp.185-213.
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part to the principle of Steigerung - especially in those utterances of his later life 
formulated in the light of his scientific experimentation - deserves to be considered 
with care and analyzed as a conscious consideration of a particular process. Wilkinson 
notes that the process of Steigerung, which Goethe analyzed and detailed primarily 
through his scientific observation and experimentation as a natural process inherent in 
the organic development of plants and the physiological growth of animal organisms, 
is a dynamic process present and active in the very pulse of the universe, of which 
thought-processes, cultural development, moral and social issues and human physical 
existence are integral, necessary and equally organic forces. Goethe’s understanding 
of Steigerung is of a vital, dynamic process of life itself, and this reference, in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit, to a Steigerung of dogmatically prescriptive concepts into 
‘fixed notions’ which are paranoically self-preoccupied requires some emphasis, 
justification and analysis.
R H Stephenson has argued that the concept of Steigerung, together with its 
related principle, Polaritat, has a relevant application and a conscious use in texts 
relating to Goethe’s political thought. Stephenson analyzed Goethe’s conceptual 
presentation, in a passage from Dichtung und Wahrheit, of the relevance and active 
presence of a natural, organic process in this sphere of human social intercourse18. 
Wilkinson highlighted the inseparability in Goethe’s scientific observation, his 
thought and his means of expression, of the principles of Steigerung and Polaritat9: an 
organism develops and refines itself, a thought-process increases its application and
18 See R H Stephenson, ‘The Coherence of Goethe’s Political Outlook’, loc. cit., pp.81ff. The 
relevant passage from Dichtung und Wahrheit is to be found in HA X 114ff. Stephenson argues that 
Goethe is concerned ‘to present a normative theory of society’ in which social structures evolve and 
interact through subordination to and coordination with one another. T M Holmes’ article, ‘Goethe’s 
Hermann und Dorothea: The Dissolution of the Embattled Idyll’ (Modem Language R eview , Vol. 82, 
1987, pp.109-118) disagrees that the social theory presented here by Goethe is ‘normative’, and 
contends that the formation Goethe depicts is ‘contingent and temporary’ (p.115). Stephenson had, in 
fact, noted that Goethe was here employing the device of fiction, a projection of postulated ideal 
human relationships upon a historical society, and it is this perception o f a deliberate 
conceptualization on Goethe’s part which clarifies the significance of Steigerung and Polaritat here, 
upon which Holmes’ argument for the final dissolution of unspecified social structures also rests.
19 ‘Here is the idea of a progress organic and slow, achieved not by a soaring leap, but gradually, stage 
by stage, not by reaching out towards some ideal conceived in the mind, but by realizing, through 
activity, the potentialites of one's own nature. Here, too, is the intimate connection of ascent with 
polarity, for in ‘kampfend und spielend’ we recognize that rhythm of tension and release which Goethe 
later felt to be the very pulse of the universe, made palpable to us in our breathing in and breathing 
out. And already he is feeling towards the idea of what he was to call ‘Specification’, the 
differentiation of what is vague and inchoate (here Gefuhle) into something of clearly defined form and 
function (here Fahigkeiten)\ Wilkinson, “‘Tasso - ein gesteigerter Werther’” in Goethe Poet and 
Thinker, op. cit., p.189.
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intensifies its significance, through reciprocity with its opposing principle. This is 
Steigerung operating with, in Goethe’s terms as elucidated by Wilkinson, appropriate 
Specification: reference to, heed of, care and consideration of and interaction with its 
polarized opposite in form and content. For as Wilkinson has noted, ‘Goethe uses the 
same word steigern indifferently in a positive and negative sense’20. Indifferently, but 
not irresponsibly. In his reference to the intensification of fixed dogma into an 
absolute and static set explanation, Goethe is not describing that intensification and 
constant refinement of one aspect of life and thought which is to result from reciprocal 
subordination with its polarized opposite. The hallmark and the guiding force of 
Steigerung as an active, dynamic force, is of a synthesized form of one entity in its 
relation to its polarized opposite in an aspiration toward the highest forms of life and 
thought available to the human being: the Steigerung of intransigent dogma which 
concentrates only upon itself, taking account of nothing else, results, according to 
Goethe, in a brittle fixation of ideas which can only have a detrimental, and ultimately 
destructive, effect. As Wilkinson noted, ‘like everything else, functioning alone and 
unchecked, Steigerung becomes dangerous’21; and according to Stephenson’s analysis 
of Goethe’s political thought, it is precisely such a Steigerung of one idea or set of 
ideas, functioning without reference to, consideration of and interaction with an 
alternative view, which in Goethe’s view leads to the breakdown of society and of 
political and inter-personal relations. Social structures are themselves not fixed and 
intransigent positions, and must evolve through interaction and interdevelopment: the 
failure of one social group to take its subordinates or superiors into consideration will 
result ultimately in the destruction of all coherent social fabric22. For Goethe in his 
description of religious dogmatism, then, it is the arid intransigence of the established 
Church which is to prove its downfall: only in the acceptance of and interaction with 
opposing religious groups, alternative religious - and non-religious - views and 
different biblical and catechetical interpretations will religious thought be able to 
develop its full potential and acquire its true meaning for mankind in the world. 
Religion, and the religious establishment, must view itself and account for itself in 
historical and cultural perspective. Otherwise, what the world has to deal with are the 
extreme dogmas of a self-fixated culture which will perish in the stasis of its own
20 Ibid., p.202. "
21 Ibid., p.200.
22 See Stephenson, ‘The Coherence of Goethe’s Political Outlook’, loc. cit., pp.84f.
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intransigence. This plethora of meaning and implication is present in one reference on 
Goethe’s part to a specific concept which scholarship has indicated to have a 
significance peculiar to Goethe, an awareness and understanding of which is vital to a 
fuller appreciation of the overall import of Goethe’s text. The selective, formative and 
allusive hand of the author is omnipresent in Dichtung und Wahrheit: Goethe’s 
account of the brittle aridity of his received catechetical education points to his 
awareness of the dangers of ignoring the laws which govern all natural processes, 
including cultural development, and intimates the significance of synthesis for the 
evolution of his attitude to religion in general.
Goethe was raised in a predominantly Protestant environment, and his primary 
religious education was conducted, in both familial and official spheres, under the 
historical rubric of the Lutheran confession; but his personal self-education and social 
awareness combined both Protestantism and Catholicism and their respective 
manifestations, in an appreciation of both principal confessions as cultural forces. 
Trunz notes that the societies of Frankfurt and Leipzig of the time Goethe depicts in 
the first books of Dichtung und Wahrheit were almost exclusively Protestant, and that 
the interest in Catholicism which is apparent from the text of Goethe’s autobiography 
reflects the interest and experience of the author at the time of writing, rather than the 
concern and direct dealings of the protagonist at the time described23. Goethe’s main 
criticism of Protestantism - the rigid intransigence of its dogmatism - is here related to 
his awareness that the reformed confession lacked the substance of sacrament to 
sustain the interest and grip the imagination of the faithful. This leads to a favourable 
judgement of Catholic sacramentalism as the symbolic representation of the divine 
principle, as a corporeal manifestation of the numinous; as, therefore, a physical 
encapsulation in the secular world, albeit in the sacral context of a religious ceremony, 
of the very essence of the divine:
Die Sakramente sind das Hochste der Religion, das sinnliche Symbol einer
auBerordentlichen gottlichen Gunst und Gnade. In dem Abendmahle sollen die
irdischen Lippen ein gottliches Wesen verkorpert empfangen und unter der
23 Trunz, HA IX 729: ‘Das Wesen der katholischen Kirche hat Goethe in seiner Leipziger Zeit wohl 
kaum beschaftigt. DaB er dieses Thema hier behandelt, ist begriindet in seinem Interesse zu der Zeit, 
als er Dichtung und Wahrheit schrieb’. Trunz also remarks that the large and comprehensive library of 
Goethe’s father - catholic in the exact sense of the term - would have afforded the younger man the 
opportunity to read and learn of the doctrines and teachings of the Roman Catholic tradition (HA IX 
731).
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Form irdischer Nahrung einer himmlischen teilhaftig werden.24
Here again, Goethe deliberately extricates himself, as authorial subject, from his
autobiography, and gives an account of Roman Catholic religious worship which is
ostensibly impersonal and objectively descriptive. Goethe’s protagonist in his
description of the experience of sacrament is ‘der Mensch’: it is ‘der Mensch’ who
experiences the union of external action and inner feeling in the Eucharistic sacrament:
Er [der Mensch] muB gewohnt sein, die innere Religion des Herzens und die 
der auBeren Kirche als vollkommen eins anzusehen, als das groBe allgemeine 
Sakrament, das sich wieder in so viel andere zergliedert und diesen Teilen 
seine Heiligkeit, Unzerstorlichkeit und Ewigkeit mitteilt.25
It is ‘ein jungendliches Paar’ which experiences the sacrament of marriage in Goethe’s
account; ‘das Kind’ which is presented for baptism; on the body of ‘der ganze
Mensch’ that last unction is performed26: Goethe’s description is ostensibly objective,
uninvolved and impersonal, with the author artfully distanced from the material
objects and events of his autobiographical depiction. Kurt Jahn notes that the
rhetorical artifices employed by Goethe in describing these rituals without admitting
any personal involvement in them or adherence to them was largely lost on his
contemporary readers27. His Protestant friends found the passage ‘anstoBig’; to his
Catholic friends and readers they were, as Diintzer points out in his edition, ‘zu wenig
katholisch’28.
Goethe’s explicitly personal dealings with the Catholic Church are, in fact, 
viewed in a considerably less flattering light. His retrospective description conveys an 
imaginative participation in the felt experience of sacrament, but he does not admit to 
having himself submitted directly to established Roman Catholic ritual forms with any 
meaningful sensation of personal involvement. He reports a sincere desire to avail 
himself of the opportunity for confession and absolution enjoyed by his circle of 
acquaintances, alludes to his personal formulation of a confession he wished to give,
24 HA IX 289.
“ Ibid.
28 HA IX 289f; HA IX 291.
27 Goethes Dichtung und Wahrheit, Halle, 1908, p.264.
28 Goethes Werke, Deutsche National-Litteratur, gen. ed. Joseph Kiirschner, Berlin und Stuttgart 
1882-98, Vol. XCVIII, p.xlvii. Quoted by Cooper, op. cit., p.173, as part of a detailed account of the 
reception of Goethe’s autobiography. An exception to this generally unfavourable reception came 
from the strongly Catholic Sulpiz Boisser6e: ‘Die wunderschone Darstellung der Sakramente erregt 
Bewunderung; ... so ist jeder hingerissen von der tiefen Einsicht und dem schonen Gefiihl, welches 
dem Wesentlichen und Ganzen zu Grunde liegt’ (letter to Goethe, 20 xii 1812). See also Trunz, HA 
DC 732f.
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only to resort, on hearing the unwelcoming, unattractive nasal tones of his putative
confessor, to the simplest formulaic set confessional piece he could find and recite:
... erlosch auf einmal alles Licht meines Geistes und Herzens, die wohl 
memorierte Beichtrede wollte mir nicht iiber die Lippen, ich schlug in der 
Verlegenheit das Buch auf, das ich in Handen hatte, und las daraus die erste 
beste Formel, die so allgemein war, daB ein jeder sie ganz geruhig hatte 
aussprechen konnen.29
Goethe is left unmoved, impenitent and spiritually unenlightened by the experience of
established, ritualized confession. Moreover, he expresses an almost superstitious fear
of the consequences of unworthily partaking of the sacrament of the Eucharist,
evoking images of hellfire and eternal damnation for the desecrator of the ‘Holy Table’
in this way, to the extent that he resolves to sever all contact with the Church as soon
as he leaves the immediate society which thrust this form of established religion upon
him30. Confessional religion seems therefore to have been viewed by Goethe at the
time of his life he is here reporting as a social phenomenon to which he abrogates any
personal commitment or involvement: his natural inclination toward religion is
thwarted and distorted by the empty formality he perceives in established religion.
Evidently, the admiration for, and attraction to, religious sacrament which is manifest
in Dichtung und Wahrheit inheres more in the mature and experienced reflections of
the author than in the contemporary dealings of the historical protagonist with
established rite and ritual. It will be the purpose of this part of my study to postulate a
reconciliation of the apparent impersonal admiration for, but personal abrogation of,
the received religious tradition; to examine how and to what extent a specifically and
peculiarly Goethean stamp is accorded to these comments, views and reported
experiences: for the moment, it suffices to evoke the appropriate context by recording
Goethe’s accounts as indicative of his concern to portray in a superficially objective
manner the main trends and views which informed his religious world.
In his attitude to non-established religion, Goethe’s retrospective account
admits and displays an explicit appreciation of a personalized conception of the divine
being and a more individualistic approach to worship. As noted earlier, it was rigid
confessional dogmatism which was, according to Goethe’s mature judgement, the
29 HA IX 293.
30 ‘Dieser diistre Skrupel qualte mich dergestalt, und die Auskunft, die man mir als hinreichend 
vorstellen wollte, schien mir so kahl und schwach, daB jenes Schreckbild nur an furchtbarem Ansehen 
dadurch gewann und ich mich, sobald ich Leipzig erreicht hatte, von der kirchlichen Verbindung ganz 
und gar loszuwinden suchte’ (HA IX 294).
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reason for the formation of so many breakaway religious groups and sects in the mid­
eighteenth century:
Deswegen ergaben sich gar mancherlei Absonderungen von der gesetzlichen 
Kirche. Es entstanden die Separatisten, Pietisten, Herrnhuter, die ^Stillen im 
Lande’, und wie man sie sonst zu nennen und zu bezeichnen pflegte, die aber 
alle bloB die Absicht hatten, sich der Gottheit, besonders durch Christum, 
mehr zu nahern als es ihnen unter der Form der offentlichen Religion moglich 
zu sein schien.31
Here again the deliberate detachment of the mature author from the views and 
experiences of the youth he is depicting is to be perceived in the slightly ironic tone of 
the account, which gently mocks the profusion of these individual sects in their 
concern to find a suitable name for themselves (‘und wie man sie sonst zu nennen und 
zu bezeichnen pflegte’); and casts implicit doubt on the absolute validity of these 
sundry conceptions of Christian worship with the rhetorical attenuation ‘zu sein 
schien’. And here again, the protagonist experiencing and assimilating these religious 
sects is explicitly distinguished from Goethe the author: the judgements presented here 
in the first book of Dichtung und Wahrheit are artificially attributed to the historical 
‘Knabe’, with whose experiences this first book is largely concerned32. Indeed, 
directly contingent to this first reference in Dichtung und Wahrheit to the historical 
religious phenomenon of Pietism and its various manifestations is the ironically related 
account of the young boy’s attempt personally to approach God through the Old 
Testament altar-building exercise which has been described. It failed; the first book 
ends with a warning as to the inadvisability of such individualistic attempts to tamper 
with the divine spheres; but Goethe’s own interest in the personal religious worship of 
Pietism is apparent throughout Dichtung und Wahrheit. Goethe’s account of his own 
relationship with the devoutly Pietist Susanne von Klettenberg, for instance, is related 
in tones of undisguised reverence and admiration for the purity of the woman’s active 
and engaged faith, for her strength and constant cheerfulness despite her own illness33, 
and the absolute trust she placed in her God. All four books of Dichtung und 
Wahrheit testify to a sustained playfulness in his relationship with Susanne von
31 HA IX 43.
32 Ibid.: ‘Der Knabe horte von diesen Meinungen und Gesinnungen unaufhorlich sprechen: denn die 
Geistlichkeit sowohl als die Laien teilte sich in das Fur und Wider’. Here again is a point to which we 
shall return: the polar oppostition of spiritual and lay (secular) worlds is set; but Goethe’s mode of 
secularization intimates a potential reconciliation of this polarity which must be adduced.
33 See HA IX 338f., HA X 41f., and passim.
Klettenberg, by which he tested her patience and tried to shock her with his 
protestations of heathenism, his irreverent attitude towards God, and his objective 
admiration for a faith which he himself would not wholeheartedly embrace34. Yet 
while admiring and explicitly praising such total religious commitment, Goethe is 
unable, or unwilling, within the context of Dichtung und Wahrheit at any rate, wholly 
to commit himself to the Pietist world-view, to surrender himself utterly to such an 
absolute, unquestioning faith. For the various Pietist groups of Goethe’s time, man is 
inherently sinful and can redeem himself only in the eyes of his professed Lord 
through total faith and commitment. Goethe’s Pelagian rejection of the traditional 
biblical notion of ‘original sin’ - a concept which is Pauline rather than directly 
Christian, being assimilated into the general Christian tradition principally through 
Paul’s letter to the Romans3S - is a doctrinal rejection which Goethe is held to have 
undertaken early in his conscious life, through acquaintance with Gottfried Arnold’s 
Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie, which figured in his father’s library in 
Frankfurt36. Pietism, on the other hand, arose from the Augustinian notion of 
predestination and reliance on the will and mercy of God; compounded by the
See, for example, the self-confessedly arrogant claim, in response to Frl. von Klettenberg’s 
observation that all Goethe’s troubles inhered in his not being reconciled with God, that, far from 
being out of step with the deity, Goethe was himself in a position to forgive God for the latter’s 
failure to exploit better Goethe’s potential: das alles komme daher, weil ich keinen versohnten
Gott habe. Nun hatte ich von Jugend auf geglaubt, mit meinem Gott ganz gut zu stehen, ja, ich 
bildete mir, nach mancherlei Erfahrungen, wohl ein, daB er gegen mich sogar im Rest stehen konne, 
und ich war kiihn genug zu glauben, daB ich ihm einiges zu verzeihen hatte. Dieser Diinkel grundete 
sich auf meinen unendlich guten Willen, dem er, wie mir schien, besser hatte zu Hulfe kommen 
sollen. Es laBt sich denken, wie oft ich und meine Freundin hieriiber in Streit gerieten, der sich doch 
immer auf die freundlichste Weise und manchmal, wie meine Unterhaltung mit dem alten Rektor, 
damit endigte: daB ich ein narrischer Bursche sei, dem man manches nachsehen musse’ (HA IX 340). 
See too the description of his picture, and inclusion in the text of its attributive poem, which 
characterizes the author as a distanced, non-Christian observer, but nonetheless placates its devoutly 
Christian subject in its application of Christian terminology, and only fires the enthusiasm of Frl. 
von Klettenberg’s concern for the spiritual welfare of her ‘wayward’ young friend (HA X 41f.).
35 See Romans 5:12: ‘It was through one man that sin entered the world, and through sin death, and 
thus death pervades the whole human race, inasmuch as all men have sinned’.
38 Gottfried Arnold, Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie, vom Anfang des Neuen Testaments 
biB auf das Jahr Christi 1688, Frankfurt a. Main, 1699-1700. Trunz, explicitly summarizing pre-1949 
scholarship of this aspect of Goethe’s thought, notes that Goethe’s abrogation of the Protestant 
doctrine of original sin is a prominent leitm otiv in Dichtung und Wahrheit', and that Goethe’s 
adherence to the Pelagian heresy was a sustained view: ‘Unter den religiosen Motiven in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit ist der Gegensatz zur protestantischen Siindenlehre eins von den wesentlichsten; 
Gedanken der Jugend, in der Darstellung abgetont durch das Denken spaterer Jahre; Goethes 
Anschauungen iiber diesen Punkt waren sich weitgehend gleichgeblieben’ (HA X 591).
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Lutheran concern for justification through faith37: Goethe’s refusal to admit his own
inherently sinful nature and attempt to reconcile himself with God - while relying
utterly on the mercy of the latter - through constant reverence and inner devotion,
negates the fundamental guiding principle of Pietism and presages Goethe’s ultimate
irreconcilability with this particular form of Christian worship. The subsequent
unwillingness of the Pietist sects to accept Goethe as a fellow-member and fellow-
Christian first disturbs, and then alienates him:
Ich muBte jedoch bemerken, daB die Briider so wenig als Fraulein von 
Klettenberg mich fur einen Christen wollten gelten lassen, welches mich 
anfangs beunruhigte, nachher aber meine Neigung einigermaBen erkaltete.38
Pietism interests Goethe, appeals to his sense of the unorthodox and imaginative: it
remains, however, ultimately but another manifestation of religion in society, a body
\
which presents its own dogmas as unassailable and unquestionable. The Pietistic sects 
and their religion are an integral part of Goethe’s upbringing and education, of his 
inherited tradition in general, and his autobiographical account of their influence upon 
him bears testimony to this religious force as a social factor. The practices of Pietism 
in the eighteenth century in Germany are, for Goethe in the context of his 
autobiography, to be described and evaluated as independent phenomena, as an 
objective reality rooted in personal, subjective experience. In this way, Goethe 
exploits his own particular experience of Pietism as the starting-point for a general 
judgement of individualistic, non-established religion, its conception and its historical 
function within the Western tradition; leading him to an account of the phenomenon of 
‘Positive Religion’39.
‘Positive Religion’ in the German eighteenth century implies adherence to the 
traditional Christian concept of a God revealed to the world in and through the person 
of Jesus Christ; and worship of this personal deity in the thoughts and actions of
See Loewen, Goethe's Response to Protestantism, op. cit., p.13: ‘The principle of justification by 
faith alone (sola fide) stands at the head of the Lutheran teaching ... In the Bible, Luther found 
confirmed the traditional doctrines of the Trinity, the humanity and divinity of Christ, the inspiration 
of the Scriptures, and the belief in the total depravity of man. In the last point in particular Luther 
believed himself to be in direct theological line with the teachings of St. Paul and St. Augustine’. 
Loewen accepts Goethe’s account in Dichtung und Wahrheit that he was not explicitly acquainted 
with the doctrine of Pelagius until a reprimand from his elders prompted him to study the medieval 
theologian (see HA X 44; Loewen, op. cit., pp.29f.). The disputed issue of Goethe’s direct derivation 
of his rejection of ‘original sin’ from Pelagius does not alter the relevance of Goethe’s instinctive 
belief in the inherent goodness and benevolent potential of man.
38 HA X 43.
39 HA X 42.
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everyday life. The theologico-philosophical opposite of such personally felt and 
inwardly impulsed faith is the phenomenon of ‘natiirliche Religion’ which is the 
theological offspring of the Enlightenment. What is ‘natural’ is, according to 
enlightened thought, that which is available to and explicable by man in terms of 
human reason: ‘natiirliche Religion’ is a conscious attempt logically to explain the 
world, to appreciate intellectually the existence of God, and to adhere to logically 
adduced principles of moral conduct, without recourse to the acceptance of the 
burdens of sin and guilt and their putative redemption through the inexplicable 
revelation of God in Christ. ‘Natiirliche Religion’ is therefore broadly equatable with 
the rational religion of the German Aufklarung. The Abhandlungen von den 
vomehmsten Wahrheiten der natiirlichen Religion of Hermann Samuel Reimarus has 
as its premise:
Wer ein lebendiges Erkenntnis von Gott hat, dem eignet man billig eine
Religion zu: und sofern dieses Erkenntnis durch die natiirliche Kraft der
Vernunft zu erhalten ist, nennte man es natiirliche Religion.40
For the principal exponents of German enlightened philosophy, this concept of a 
‘natiirliche Religion’, independent of established doctrinal apocrypha and the implicit 
acceptance of inexplicable ephemeral phenomena in the religious sphere, was the only 
valid means of reconciling a God humankind could not ultimately apprehend, with the 
tools of human reason at the human being's disposal. Erich Trunz’s commentary on 
the concept of ‘natiirliche Religion’ in eighteenth-century Germany cites, among 
others, Edelmann’s Die Gottlichkeit der Vernunft and Lessing’s Die Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts as primary expressions of ‘natiirliche Religion’, which reached 
its philosophical zenith, according to Trunz, in Kant’s Die Religion innerhalb der 
Grenzen der bloBen Vernunft41. Goethe’s own mention of the philosophical 
phenomenon of ‘natiirliche Religion’ in the late eighteenth-century milieu he is 
describing provides no objective consideration and appraisal of these specific works, 
nor of their contribution to his own evolved understanding of rational religion in the 
eighteenth century. He chooses to concentrate on the ‘tendency to arm-chair theology’ 
(the term is R H Stephenson’s) of eighteenth-century Popularphilosophie, views the 
age’s concern with philosophy with a somewhat cynical eye, and expresses this in 
tones of light irony:
40 H S Reimarus, Abhandlungen von den vornehmsten Wahrheiten der natiirlichen Religion , 
Tubingen, 1754. Quoted by Trunz, HA IX 722.
41 See Trunz, HA IX 723.
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Nach einer solcher Vorstellung war nun jeder berechtiget, nicht allein zu 
philosophieren, sondern sich auch nach und nach fur einen Philosoph zu 
halten. Die Philosophic war also ein mehr oder weniger gesunder und geubter 
Menschenverstand, der es wagte, ins Allgemeine zu gehen und iiber innere 
und auBere Erfahrungen abzusprechen.42
It is this general concern with philosophical discussion and rational justification which
causes contemporary theology, in Goethe’s view, to attempt to validate the faith it
propounded in terms of the logical morality of ‘natiirliche Religion’:
Auf diesem Wege muBten die Theologen sich zu der sogenannten natiirlichen 
Religion hinneigen, und wenn zur Sprache kam, inwiefern das Licht der Natur 
uns in der Erkenntnis Gottes, der Verbesserung und Veredlung unserer selbst 
zu fordern hinreichend sei, so wagte man gewohnlich sich zu dessen Gunsten 
ohne viel Bedenken zu entscheiden.43
With this lightly scathing judgement of the age’s sometimes indiscriminate concern 
with philosophical justification, the mature Goethe ostensibly dismisses the 
fundamental impetus of eighteenth-century rational religion as the product of a general 
over-emphasis on intellectual procedure. Within the overall context of Dichtung und 
Wahrheit, however, Goethe’s allusion here to ‘natiirliche Religion’ is not to be 
underestimated. The ‘natiirliche Religion’ of rational justification, and the ‘positive 
Religion’ of inward meditation and acceptance of revelation, together provide one of 
the fundamental religio-philosophical polarities of Goethe’s contemporary world. 
Goethe maintains that his primary response to the mutual disaffection which arose 
between himself and the Pietist sects, with which he had enjoyed some affiliation, was 
a serious programme of research into the theological history of the Christian Church, 
with its pendulum-like swings from orthodoxy to heresy. The polarity of dogma and 
counter-dogma is the linch-pin of historical Christian theology, by which the Christian 
faith has established itself historically, and in terms of which its philosophical growth 
and development may be charted. The primary result of Goethe’s research is an 
overwhelming awareness of the Christian tradition as historical material, of 
Christianity as a body of learning and knowledge which demands to be assimilated 
and perpetuated. In this respect, it is not simply a desire for inner peace and personal 
atonement which prompts Goethe’s formulation of ‘ein Christentum zu meinem 
Privatgebrauch’: his individual conception of the Christian tradition and its function is
42 HA IX 273f.
43 HA IX 274.
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founded on an understanding of Christianity as cultural inheritance, of the history of 
Christian theology, in terms of the opposing and contradictory dogmas engendered 
and explored, as the foundation and perpetuation of knowledge as a general cultural 
body:
die Kluft, die mich von jener Lehre trennte, ward mir deutlich, ich muGte also 
auch aus dieser Gesellschaft scheiden, und da mir meine Neigung zu den 
Heiligen Schriften sowie zu dem Stifter und den friiheren Bekennern nicht 
geraubt werden konnte, so bildete ich mir ein Christentum zu meinem 
Privatgebrauch, und suchte dieses durch fleiBiges Studium der Geschichte, 
und durch genaue Bemerkung derjenigen, die sich zu meinem Sinne 
hingeneigt hatten, zu begriinden und aufzubauen.44
Traditional Christianity is thus the basis of Goethe’s ‘Christentum zu meinem
Privatgebrauch’; the Christianity of textual, biblical origin and specifically, if
obliquely, the Christianity of Christ and the earliest Christian Church. The dogmatic
rigidity of institutionalized Christianity has given rise to alternating polarities of heresy
and orthodoxy: individual assimilated experience and knowledge make of these
heresies and orthodoxies something new and vital that is grounded in tradition and
aspires from this basis to a novel perception of tradition and a significant
understanding of its function. Erich Trunz notes, with reference to Goethe’s reading,
in conjunction with his autobiographically reported interest in religious history, of
Arnold’s Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie:
Er sieht iiberall in der Geschichte eine Polaritat zwischen Innerlichkeit und 
AuBerlichkeit, Mystik und Ratio, Seele und praktischer Lebensbewaltigung. 
Er will nicht Geschichte der Dogmen und Kirchen, sondern Geschichte der 
Frommigkeit, der Seele.45
Goethe’s acquired view of the religious tradition is of a tension of polarized opposites
which, if it is not to manifest itself in barren, dogmatic intransigence, must take
account of alternative doctrines and interpretations, and grow and develop in fruitful,
if tense, coexistence with them. Here again, then, is an intimation of the significance
of the concept of binary synthesis for an appreciation of Goethe’s attitude to religion.
Thus it is that Lavater’s ultimatum, ‘Entweder Christ oder Atheist!’ is met
coldly by Goethe on both an intellectual and a personal level. Such absolutism is, for
Goethe, entirely negative: it leaves no room for questioning, for self-awareness, for
development through analysis and rational justification. It insists that it is right without
44 HA X 45.
45 Trunz, HA X 759.
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any overall awareness of its own significance:
Entweder Christ oder Atheist! Ich erklarte darauf, daB, wenn er mir mein 
Christentum nicht lassen wollte, wie ich es bisher gehegt hatt, so konnte ich 
mich auch wohl zum Atheismus entschlieBen, zumal da ich sah, daB niemand 
recht wisse, was beides eigentlich heiBen solle.46
What Goethe seems to be advocating here, then, is not an absolute, unquestioning 
faith, but a personal and individually evolved relationship with the Christian tradition, 
which recognizes its own uniqueness, and will not impose itself uncompromisingly 
on others. Goethe has ‘cherished’ (gehegt) his own attitude to and understanding of 
Christianity; an individual relationship with the Christian tradition which he himself 
has fostered and which he would not presume to assert as a world-view absolutely 
valid in its own terms and demanding to be accepted unconditionally by others. 
Goethe offers an account of his personally evolved attitude to the Christian tradition in 
the context of his autobiography, but does not demand that these personal views be 
accepted as absolutes: the context makes plain that Goethe’s conception of religion is 
of direct relevance only to him as protagonist. Likewise, the autobiography charts the 
protagonist’s resentment and rejection of the imposition by others of their intransigent 
world-views upon him.
Similarly, Goethe does not concur with the overwhelming body of opinion of 
his century which castigates Spinoza and the Spinozist philosophy as an atheistic, 
anti-Christian heresy47. Spinoza was held to deny not only the existence of God, but 
also any theistic conception of a transcendental deity. David Bell’s work on the 
reception of Spinoza in the German tradition admirably summarizes and analyzes the 
reaction in Germany to Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise subsequent to its 
publication in 1670. Bell intimates the accomplishment of Goethe, deriving from the 
influence of his mentor Herder, and their philosophical and cultural predecessor 
Lessing, in overcoming the general castigation of Spinoza as a stereotypical ‘wicked
46 HA X 16. There is a possible oblique irony here, in the attribution of a dogmatic ‘either/or’ stance 
to Lavater. The novelistic character Werther writes to his friend Wilhelm: ‘Mein Bester, in der Welt 
ist es sehr selten mit dem Entweder-Oder getan; die Empfindungen und Handlungs-weisen schattieren 
sich so mannigfaltig, als Abfalle zwischen einer Habichts- und Stumpfnase sind’ (HA VI 43). 
Commentaries relate the second part of Werther’s remarks here to Goethe’s reading o f Lavater’s 
Physiognomic: the ‘Wilhelm’ character in Werther may, in his apparent dogmatism, have more in 
common with Lavater than is generally realized.
47 The history of the overwhelmingly negative reception of Spinoza in 17th-18th-century Europe is 
summarized by Martin Bollacher in the section ‘Spinoza Maledictus’ of Der junge Goethe und 
Spinoza. Studien zur Geschichte des Spinozismus in der Epoche des Sturms und Drangs, Tubingen, 
1969 (pp.22-37).
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atheist’, and of his philosophy as immoral, socially dangerous and culturally
detrimental. Bell’s language confirms those accounts offered in the previous chapter
of this study of the established Church’s bellicose reaction to new ideas, theologies
and philosophical views which did not cohere with accepted dogma:
It is difficult to appreciate the achievement of men like Lessing, Herder and 
Goethe with regard to their understanding of Spinoza, unless it is realized just 
how distorted was that image by a hysterical and frightened opposition. The 
Theological-Political Treatise was immediately attacked with ferocious 
animosity ... the stereotype of Spinoza as the wicked atheist soon established 
itself.48
As Bell reminds us, it was Pierre Bayle’s attack on Spinoza in his Dictionnaire 
Philosophique which intensified the accusation of atheism to the extent that Spinozism 
became synonymous with atheism49, and any open consideration of Spinoza’s works 
and writings met with public calumny, cultural castigation and stigmatization. The 
extent to which Lessing, even towards the end of his distinguished life, when general 
renown gave weight and credence to his expressed opinions, was prepared openly to 
admit his adherence to the philosophy of Spinoza, still remains under a cloud of 
doubt, and is apparent in his propagandization of the works of Reimarus in preference 
to the unquestionably Spinozistic theories of Edelmann50. The overwhelming opinion 
of the late eighteenth-century world about which Goethe is writing in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit equated Spinozism with atheism and decried any analytical appreciation of 
the Spinozist system.
Bell notes, however, that Gottfried Arnold had pointed out as far back as 1699 
in his Unparteyische Kirchen-und Ketzer-Historie that Spinoza, far from denying that 
God exists, did speak of God and postulate the existence of an absolute and infinite
David Bell, Spinoza in Germany from 1670 to the Age o f  Goethe, Institute of Germanic Studies, 
London, 1984, p.2.
49 Ibid., p3. It is this article in Bayle’s ‘Dictionary’ which, Goethe claims, displeased him to the 
extent that it rekindled his interest in Spinoza and prompted his attempt to form his own opinion of 
Spinozism. (See HA X 76f.).Bollacher offers a detailed analysis of Bayle’s attack on Spinoza in Der 
junge Goethe und Spinoza, op. cit., pp.25ff., noting: ‘Der paradoxe Charakter des Bayleschen 
Spinozabilds tritt in aller Schroffheit hervor, wenn der Autor des “Dictionnaire* Spinozas Lehre abtut 
als “la plus monstrueuse hypothese qui se puisse imaginer, la plus absurde, & la plus diametralement 
opposee aux notions les plus evidentes de notre esprit”, zugleich aber die Personlichkeit Spinozas mit 
Wortem des Respektes, ja der Bewunderung schildert’ (pp.26f.).
60 See Grossmann’s reference in J  C Edelmann. From Orthodoxy to Enlightenment, op. cit., p.177, 
to the ‘offentliches Schweigen’ of Lessing on his Spinozism. For Bollacher, the failure of Lessing to 
propagandize Edelmann’s Spinozism is due more to unfortunate timing: ‘Edelmann ... starb, als 
Lessing sich bereits Spinoza zugewandt hatte’, Der junge Goethe und Spinoza, op. cit., p.36.
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divinity51. The divine being asserted by Spinoza, the deus sive natura, may be
incompatible with the traditional Christian concept of a God revealed to the world in
the person of Jesus Christ, or with the conception of the eighteeth-century deists of a
ruling, transcendental deity, but the notion of an absolute being is inherent in the
metaphysic of Spinoza52. Spinoza’s concept of an immanent God, present and active
in all existent manifestations, was alien to Christians and deists alike. Together with
the vague notion of pantheism, which was indiscriminately applied to Spinoza’s
metaphysic, came the concomitant accusation of a blasphemous materialistic
conception of the Godhead:
The logical development of the charge that Spinoza confused God and the 
world in a gross pantheistic, almost pagan fashion, was the accusation of 
materialism, which was regarded as a blasphemous form of atheism, since it 
reduced God to the level of matter, and also meant that all things were moved 
by a mechanical necessity.53
Bell’s discussion of the problem of pantheism and materialism in Herder’s, and
Goethe’s, reception of Spinoza, disputes the relevance here of the notion of
‘pantheism’, as absolute immanence, and of its corollary concept of ‘panentheism’,
which includes the notion of a transcendent deity, since these are both as loosely-
defined concepts which merely label specific understandings of the world without
attempting to elucidate or explain their application and significance54.
61 See Bell, op. cit., p.4. Bollacher analyzes the content and repercussions of Arnold’s appreciation of 
Spinoza in Der junge Goethe und Spinoza, op. cit., pp.55ff.
62 ‘There is no doubt that in Christian or deist terms Spinoza’s philosophy must be regarded as 
atheistic, for their God is far removed from Spinoza’s ... His monism and determinism were 
incompatible with the anthropomorphism and transcendentalism of Christians and deists’ (Bell, op. 
cit., p.4).
53 Ibid., p.5.
64 ‘The idea of God as the source of all being, which Herder finds and endorses in Spinoza, means that 
the relation of God to the world is necessarily an immanent one. This inevitably raises the spectre of 
pantheism once again, and Herder is just as anxious to free Spinoza from this unjustified charge. The 
application of the term pantheism, however, causes particular problems, since it is often applied in 
the vaguest manner. In its strictest sense it connotes an identification of God with finite nature, and to 
this extent Spinoza’s earliest critics truly believed that he did actually confuse God and the world, and 
thus felt that pantheism, which was considered both atheistic and blasphemous, was a justifiable 
description of his system. In critical literature the use of the term has, however, been less exact, and 
often seems to indicate merely a feeling for the divine element in nature. The fact that Spinoza and 
Herder accept a deity that is immanent in nature does make it possible to speak of their pantheistic 
tendencies, but the use of the term is fraught with such dangers and has such misleading implications 
that it is better avoided. There can be little objection to a judicious application of the term, with 
careful definition, but too often the vagueness of the word can be used with misleading effect: to 
suggest, for example, that the ‘pantheism’ of Spinoza, Herder and Goethe is simply materialism. The 
uncritical and imprecise use of the notion of pantheism can therefore be distorting, since it carries a 
host of undefined implications’ (ibid., p. 112).
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Thus the premise of Bell’s thesis is that the principal achievement of Herder,
Lessing and Goethe is their approach to Spinoza ‘on his own terms’, without recourse
to categorical definitions and conceptual castigations:
Herder, Lessing and Goethe were able to achieve a deeper and more fruitful 
understanding because they were prepared to approach Spinoza on his own 
terms. The failure of Bayle, Leibniz, Wolff, and the innumerable antagonists 
of Spinoza was precisely to approach him from a preconceived standpoint and 
with didactic tendentiousness.55
Goethe’s approach to Spinoza is thus personally derived from the writings of the man
himself; and the correspondence with Jacobi in the course of the year 1785 reveals the
extent to which Goethe’s attitude to and understanding of the teachings of Spinoza set
him apart from the prevailing temper of his century. Initially, he identifies himself
with Jacobi in his point of view, which, Goethe assumes, must imply an appreciation
of Spinoza similar to Goethe’s own:
Du erkennst die hochste Realitat an, welche der Grund des ganzen 
Spinozismus ist, worauf alles iibrige ruht, woraus alles iibrige fliefit. Er 
beweist nicht das Daseyn Gottes, das Daseyn ist Gott. Und wenn ihn andere 
deshalb Atheum schelten, so mochte ich ihn theissimum ia christianissimum 
nennen und preisen.56
The publication of Jacobi’s ‘Uber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses 
Mendelssohn’, the so-called Spinozabriefe, in the same year, however, made apparent 
the divergence of opinion of the two men over the validity and significance of 
Spinoza’s teachings. Jacobi’s interpretation of Goethe’s poem ‘Prometheus’ served, 
as Goethe says in Dichtung und Wahrheit, ‘zum Zfindkraut einer Explosion’57, as 
Goethe’s contemporaries embarked on a heated debate as to the consonance or non­
consonance of Spinoza’s putative pantheistic materialism with the revealed and 
transcendental deity of the Christian tradition. Goethe rejects outright the absolute 
equation of Spinozism with atheism which is the foundation and conclusion of 
Jacobi’s thesis:
DaB ich Dir fiber dein Bfichlein nicht mehr geschrieben verzeih! Ich mag weder 
vornehm noch gleichgfiltig scheinen. Du weiBt daB ich fiber die Sache selbst
55 Ibid., Preface, p.x.
56 Goethe to Jacobi, 9 vi 1785, GA XVIII 851. The attribution of ‘superlative’ Christianity to 
Spinoza is, of course, highly provocative in context, but is surely indicative of more than an attempt 
on Goethe’s part to rile his correspondent. Goethe’s rekindled interest in Spinoza is bom, not of a 
concern to confirm or deny the latter's orthodoxy or atheism, but with a perception in the works of 
the ‘heretic’ Spinoza of the ‘highest form of Christianity’, the Christianity of Christ Himself.
57 HA X 49.
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nicht deiner Meinung bin. DaB mir Spinozismus und Atheismus zweyerlei ist. 
DaB ich den Spinoza wenn ich ihn lese mir nur aus sich selbst erklaren kann, 
und daB ich, ohne seine Vorstellungsart von Natur selbst zu haben, doch wenn 
die Rede ware ein Buch anzugehen, das unter alien die ich kenne, am meisten 
mit der meinigen ubereinkommt, die Ethik nennen miiBte.58
Trunz notes that Jacobi’s understanding of Spinoza is of a rational system of natural
order and causality which is irreconcilable with any active, personally involved form
of religious faith:
Auch Jacobis These war: Spinozismus ist Atheismus. Er versuchte 
philosophisch zu begriinden, daB das rationalistische System Spinozas 
notwendig den Fatalismus und Atheismus in sich enthalte und daB daher “die 
recht verstandene Lehre des Spinozas keine Art von Religion zulasse”.59
It is, according to Bell, the attribution of a fatalistic world-view to Spinoza which
instigated most of the calumny which surrounded Spinozism in the eighteenth century.
This arises, for Bell, from a misunderstanding of Spinoza’s ‘doctrine of necessity’:
In attributing fatalism to Spinoza, Wolff is referring, like Leibniz before him, 
to Spinoza’s doctrine of necessity: but Spinoza explicitly denies that he 
subjects God to fate, since God is determined by his own nature alone.60
Spinoza’s postulation of the necessary self-regulation of existence was held, in Bell’s 
view, to be the most absurd and potentially pernicious aspect of his thought, since it 
heralded a breakdown in the moral order, by which all human actions could be, and, 
indeed, had to be justified in terms of their ultimate derivation in a fatalistic acceptance 
of all things as they are. This is, however, for Bell, an erroneous misconception of 
Spinoza’s doctrine of necessity; a misconception which equated fatalistic acceptance 
with the philosophical specification of determinism, and quite fails to differentiate 
passive submission to an external force from the conscious acceptance of moral 
necessity that is Spinoza’s doctrine. Significantly, Martin Bollacher’s introduction to 
his account of determinism in Spinoza’s writings notes that fundamental to Spinoza’s
58 Goethe to Jacobi, 21 x 1785 (GA XVIII 880). Bell notes, with reference to Jacobi’s reception of 
Prometheus, that Jacobi’s subsequent condemnation of Goethe’s poem as Spinozistic and hence 
atheistic is born of his fundamental misconception of Spinoza’s metaphysic: ‘Spinoza’s rational 
explanation of the physical and mental aspects of naure exclude, indeed, Jacobi claims, are incapable 
of including, the realm of the supersensual, which is the realm of knowledge about God. For Jacobi, 
God is personal, separate from the world, acting on it in a transitive fashion; when he calls Spinoza’s 
system atheistic, then, what he really means is anti-theistic. It was for this reason that the poem 
“Prometheus” was regarded by him as atheistic and Spinozistic, and moreover is the basic reason why 
he considered Lessing a Spinozist’, ibid., p.80.
59 Trunz, HA X 593.
60 Bell, op. cit., p.9.
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theory as appreciated by Goethe is an overcoming of polarized antitheses through their 
reconciliation:
Die Uberwindung des neuplatonisch-christlichen Gradualismus, die sich 
formelhaft in Spinozas Gleichsetzung von ‘Deus’ und ‘Natura’ ankiindigt, 
polarisiert sich sowohl bei Spinoza wie auch bei Goethe in philosophischen 
Antithesen, die auf ihren Ursprung, die Erfahrung der durchgangigen 
Natureinheit, zuriickweisen.61
Bell notes the failure of Spinoza’s early critics to perceive Spinoza’s reconciliation of
necessity and moral freedom, and heralds the perception of this as a significant
contribution to the understanding of Spinoza by Lessing, Herder and Goethe:
... how Spinoza reconciled necessity with a higher concept of freedom which 
not only did not destroy morality, but raised virtue to a rational imperative. 
The recognition of this side of Spinoza’s though [sic. ‘thought’?] was to be 
one of the achievements of Lessing, Herder and Goethe.62
Thus here again we meet an implicit, if undeveloped, critical awareness of the notion
of a synthesis of polarized opposites.The terms of Bollacher and Bell point to
precisely that concept of binary synthesis which promotes the enhancement of one, or
both, of the antithetical opposites - here ‘freedom’ and ‘necessity’ - through their
reciprocal interaction. This postulation of the achievement of Goethe in particular in
recognizing this aspect of Spinozism obviously deserves some further analysis here.
Evidently, there are pointers in Goethe’s appreciation of the writings of Spinoza to
that ‘highest form of Christianity’ he so admired: possibly, the concept of binary
synthesis will be helpful in delineating this religious appreciation and its significance.
In 1812, Goethe wrote to Knebel about his (Goethe’s) ultimate breach with
Jacobi. Spinoza is not explicitly mentioned, but the terms of Goethe’s account offer
some telling pointers to the nature of the irreconciliation of the two men in their debate
of several years before:
DaB es mit Jacobi so enden werde und musse, habe ich lange vorausgesehen, 
und habe unter seinem bornierten und doch immerfort regen Wesen selbst 
genugsam gelitten. Wem es nicht zu Kopfe will, daB Geist und Materie, Seele 
und Korper, Gedanke und Ausdehnung, oder ... Wille und Bewegung die 
notwendigen Doppelingredienzen des Universums waren, sind und sein 
werden, die beide gleiche Rechte fur sich fordern und deswegen beide 
zusammen wohl als Stellvertreter Gottes angesehen werden konnen - wer zu 
dieser Vorstellung sich nicht erheben kann, der hatte das Denken langst
61 Bollacher, op. cit., p. 176.
62 Bell, op. cit., p. 12.
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aufgeben, und auf gemeinen Weltklatsch seine Tage verwenden sollen.63 
Goethe’s frustration with his erstwhile friend is unmistakable, but it is the nature of 
the dispute rather than its expression which is pertinent here. Spirit and matter, body 
and soul, and the other antinomes he mentions, are necessarily cooperative antitheses, 
and God is to be perceived precisely in and through this cooperation. This is the node 
of the Spinozist doctrine; this is the point at which Goethe’s perception of a synthesis 
of polarized opposites in the workings of the universe takes shape and form.
Dichtung und Wahrheit attests to Goethe’s discovery, in the writings of 
Spinoza, of a moral teaching which appeals to him, as he said, in its own terms and 
on its own merits:
Was ich aus diesem Werke [Ethik] mag hinauslesen, davon wiiBte ich keine 
Rechenschaft zu geben, genug, ich fand hier eine Beruhigung meiner 
Leidenschaften, es schien sich mir eine groBe und freie Aussicht fiber die 
sinnliche und sittliche Welt aufzutun.64
It is, moreover, a moral teaching which is not unconsonant with that of Christianity,
for despite the Church’s castigation of Spinoza and accusations of blasphemous,
heretical or simply outright atheism, there is an implicit and explicit appreciation in the
writings of Spinoza of the pure moral message of Christ, when distinguished from the
Christian doctrines perpetuated by the established Church65. Spinoza expresses, for
Goethe, neither atheism nor deism, nor a religion of revelation. Goethe founds on his
reading of Spinoza an understanding of the world which transcends received teaching,
encompassing as it does the dynamism of nature and the function of human ethical
conduct and function in the natural world. Goethe abrogates any compartmentalization
of the Spinozist doctrine: he experiences, assimilates, and adapts.
Dichtung und Wahrheit testifies to a profound first-hand acquaintance with the
writings of Spinoza; despite the discrepancies and irregularities in the explicit
chronology of Goethe’s account of his reading and consideration of Spinoza, as noted
by Bell, who concludes that ‘utilization of Dichtung und Wahrheit requires
63 8 April 1812, GA XIX 652f. (My italics).
64 HA X 35.
65 See Bell, op. cit., p.17: ‘Spinoza regarded Jesus as a prophet with pure intention of God’s essence,
so that he teaches the true road to blessedness. On the other hand, however, Spinoza makes it plain ... 
that he has no time for the church’s doctrines of Jesus’s divinity’. Bell’s explicit consideration of 
Goethe’s reception and understanding of Spinoza attests to the principles of moral behaviour in 
Spinoza’s doctrine which point to the harmony between actual conduct and philosophical theory and
are thus reconcilable with the active teachings of Christ (see p.50 and fn.5, p.169).
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circumspection and may not be entirely reliable’66 as a witness to Goethe’s reception of 
Spinoza’s thought. Bell continues, however, to adduce the significance of Dichtung 
und Wahrheit as an attestation of Goethe’s general and evolved response from his 
earliest acquaintance with the writings of Spinoza to the time of his writing of his 
autobiography67. It is an acquaintance, however, which does not reveal itself in 
frequent explicit references to Spinoza and a detailed account of the relevance of his 
metaphysic to Goethe as autobiographical protagonist. Spinoza is in fact seldom 
mentioned: in connection with Goethe’s relationship with Jacobi68; in the implicit 
reference to Spinozism in the ‘wichtigen Punkte des Denkens und Empfindens’ which 
characterized Lessing’s attack on Jacobi’s reception of Prometheus69; in Goethe’s 
affirmed rediscovery of the writings of Spinoza, prompted by Bayle’s article, in a 
passage which extends to a discussion of nature and natural harmony in general70. 
That Goethe sought not a simple confirmation of his own ideas and principles in 
Spinoza is explicit:
Denke man aber nicht, daB ich seine Schriften hatte unterschreiben und mich 
dazu buchstablich bekennen mogen.71
What Goethe purports to have sought and found in Spinoza is, significantly, the
complement of his own nature, a completion of the strivings of his uneasy personality
in the harmonious natural peace of Spinoza’s metaphysic:
Die alles ausgleichende Ruhe Spinozas kontrastierte mit meinem alles 
aufregenden Streben, seine mathematische Methode war das Widerspiel 
meiner poetischen Sinnes- und Darstellungsweise, und eben jene geregelte 
Behandlungsart, die man sittlichen Gegenstanden nicht angemessen finden 
wollte, machte mich zu seinem entschiedensten Verehrer. Geist und Herz, 
Verstand und Sinn suchten sich mit notwendiger Wahlverwandtschaft, und 
durch diese kam die Vereinigung der verschiedensten Wesen zustande.72
There is a polarity here of a different order: the antithetical opposites are Goethe
himself, with his tireless quest for knowledge and experience, and the serenity he
68 Ibid., p.150.
67 Ibid.: ‘There is no justification in completely disregarding the vital information given, simply 
because Goethe’s account of his relation to Spinoza’s thought may not be chronologically accurate ... 
Therefore, taken as a whole, Goethe’s discussion of Spinoza in Dichtung und Wahrheit can tell us 
only of his response to Spinoza’s ideas in the entire period before he put pen to paper, and is thus of 
great value in more general terms’.
68 HA X 35.
88 HA X 49.
70 HA X 76ff.
71 HA X 78.
72 HA X 35.
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perceives in the writings of Spinoza. Union of mathematical logic and poetic feeling is 
achieved: and the significance of the term ‘Wahlverwandtschaft’ for the later Goethe 
should surely not be overlooked. Goethe is ‘drawn’ to the doctrines and teachings of 
Spinoza precisely because these contain and express the antithesis of his own nature: 
there ensues a fusion of polarized opposites which is fruitful and productive73.
Dichtung und Wahrheit does not explicitly attest to Goethe’s friendship and 
partnership with Herder as the principal stimulus to his (Goethe’s) understanding of 
Spinoza; yet scholarship acknowledges the influence of Herder, both in introducing 
the young Goethe to Spinozism, and in encouraging its comprehension and 
assimilation. Bell’s account of the inconsistent chronology of Goethe’s account of his 
reception of Spinoza offers a reconciliation of these discrepancies by postulating a 
more intense concern with Spinoza on Goethe’s part only after his arrival in Weimar, 
sparked by his disagreement with Bayle, but achieving full significance through 
repeated and protracted discussions with Herder74. Wolfgang Heise’s essay on the 
mutual productivity and co-operation of Goethe and Herder during the early years in 
Weimar uses Goethe’s recognition and recommendation of a cooperative working 
relationship with Herder as the starting-point for his discussion on the implications of 
Spinozism, mediated by Herder’s reception and discussion, for Goethe’s thought. 
Heise’s categorization of Herder’s thought as ‘ein spinozistisch orientierter 
Pantheismus’ demands, and acquires, the qualification that Herder was ‘kein 
konsequenter Spinozist’75: the scholar’s (traditionally Marxist76) equation of pantheism 
with materialism is qualified by a recognition of Herder’s reconciliation of the 
ostensible polarities of materialism and idealism in a dialectic contrapuntalism: 
Spinoza’s pantheism does not, for Herder as interpreted by Heise, reduce God to the 
level of matter, but perceives the idealistic perfectibility of nature in the dynamic
73 Bollacher notes in this respect the tendency among some critics to stress the ‘personal’ affinity with 
Spinoza on Goethe’s part with a corresponding underemphasis on the effects of Spinoza’s teaching: 
‘Das Fragment vom “Ewigen Juden” belegt die Verbindung der Person mit der Lehre Spinozas und 
dementiert damit die haiifige Behauptung, Spinoza habe durch die Harmonie seiner Personlichkeit, 
nicht durch seine Lehre auf den jungen Goethe gewirkt’, (op. cit., p.63). Goethe’s affirmed personal 
attraction to Spinoza is mentioned here, not to undermine the effect of the doctrine, but to highlight a 
polarity of a different order, and because of its evident significance for the appraisal of Spinoza Goethe 
is concerned to portray in Dichtung und Wahrheit.
74 Bell, op. cit., pp.l50f. See also Bollacher., op. cit., pp.70ff.
75 Wolfgang Heise, ‘Der Entwicklungsgedanke als geschichtsphilosophische Programmatik. Zur
Gemeinsamkeit von Herder und Goethe in der friihen Weimarer Zeit’, Goethe: Neue Folge des
Jahrbuchs der Goethe-Gesellschaft, Vol. 93 (1976), pp.ll6ff., (p.125).
78 See Bell, op. cit., p.148.
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interaction of natural matter and spiritual essence:
Herders Pantheismus ist eine Form der Versohnung von Materialismus und 
Idealismus in widerspriichlicher Einheit, bei dominant objectiv-idealistischem 
Charakter, schon durch die theologischen Momente, die jedoch wiederum 
eingeschrankt, z.T. aufgehoben werden durch den stark ausgepragten 
Sensualismus und den GesetzmaBigkeits-gedanken.77
What Herder and Goethe appreciate in Spinoza is a conception of natural order which
is both solid and dynamic, rooted firmly in an apprehension of the physical world, but
which transcends material concretion in a synthesis of immanence and transcendence,
of materialism and idealism. The natural, dynamic ethic which Herder and Goethe
appreciate in Spinoza is far removed from the analytical, mechanical morality of the
deist world-view, by which the divine force is abstracted from the material world to
operate in transcendent abeyance. Deism and pantheism, as absolute transcendence
and absolute immanence, represent one opposition of ostensibly irreconcilable
polarities within Goethe’s immediate religious tradition: the orthodox Christian
doctrine, and the deist world-view, provide another. No synthesis of the polarities of
deism and Christianity is possible in terms of the intransigent, established religion in
Goethe’s society. The deists considered that their conception of a divinely created
world in which man operated with the divine principle of morality within him was
consonant with the established notion of biblical revelation of God to the world
through Christ, but the orthodox Christian Church negated and abrogated the deists’
claims to kinship78. Goethe’s account of his society and its cultural-philosophical
temper notes the fundamental opposition of deism and Christianity, and here again
affirms a potential conciliation of these two apparently antagonistic world-views. This
he bases on his perception, in the history of the Christian tradition, of an uncertain
imbalance between what he calls ‘historical-positive’ deism, as an integral part of the
Christian world-view; and the ‘pure deism’ of enlightened philosophy:
Die christliche Religion schwankte zwischen ihrem eignen Historisch- 
Positiven und einem reinen Deismus, der, auf der Sittlichkeit gegriindet, 
wiederum die Moral begriinden sollte. Die Verschiedenheit der Charaktere und 
Denkweisen zeigte sich hier in unendlichen Abstufungen, besonders da noch 
ein Hauptunterschied mit einwirkte, indem die Frage entstand, wie viel Anteil 
die Vernunft, wie viel die Empfindung an solchen Uberzeugungen haben
77 Heise, loc. cit., p.126.
78 See Trunz, HA IX 746f.
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konne und diirfe.79
It is in this uneasy coexistence of reason and feeling, this polarity of sensuous and 
rational appreciation, that Goethe perceives a potential harmonization of emotional 
relationship and rational analysis, of material concretion and supra-rational 
abstraction, within the totality of the Western religious tradition. If the alternation of 
traditional polarized tendencies becomes a coordination of opposed forces, the energy 
which results from the contingent tension points onward and upward to a new, better, 
and constantly refining function of tradition within tradition. The significance of 
binary synthesis here is manifest: intransigence is barren; co-existence is static; 
synthesis in continuous tension is fruitful and positive.
What is apparent from Goethe’s account of his understanding of the religious 
tradition as a whole, then, in the context of late eighteenth-century Germany, is an 
overall awareness of a cultural dynamism which pivots on a tension of polarized 
opposites, both within and without the immediately credal context. It is this 
appreciation of the implicit cultural dialectic which gives Goethe’s religious perception 
its particular significance, and thereby its general relevance. It is in the uneasy 
coexistence of materialism and transcendentalism, of knowledge and faith, historical 
specification and rational analysis, that lies, for Goethe, the potential momentum of 
cultural progress: the fundamental philosophical and theological polarities of the 
Western tradition are implicitly and inextricably related to one another and dependent 
upon one another in mutual presupposition. And it is this conception of cultural 
development through tension which accords Goethe’s account of religious movements 
and credal trends within the immediate context of eighteenth-century Germany its 
particular and unique inflection. Goethe’s understanding of religion is dependent upon 
his appreciation of the specific intellectual character of the German Aufklarung and the 
broader phenomenon of European Enlightenment; at the same time, his awareness is 
of a religion which takes account of its historical origins in order to transcend a 
contextual particularization which would limit its significance and its application to the 
immediate period in which a particular view and understanding of religion inhered. 
There is a sense of reversion to original forms in order to heighten the significance of 
the past in the present (the proverbial notion of ‘reculer pour mieux sauter’ which is
79 HA IX 334.
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the hallmark of binary synthesis); and, crucially, of cultural progress through a 
tension of polarized opposites. Dependence and independence presuppose each other: 
the implicit dialectic of cultural development determines Goethe’s accounts in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit of enlightened philosophy and rational religion in the 
eighteenth century.
Goethe’s explicit appreciation of his immediate cultural context takes account,
in fact, of an obvious and definite contradiction: the specifically and peculiarly
German tradition has, he perceives, developed from a hybrid collection of influences
and borrowings from other historical sources and their literary manifestations:
Die literarische Epoche, in der ich geboren bin, entwickelte sich aus den 
vorhergehenden durch Widerspruch. Deutschland, so lange von auswartigen 
Volkern uberschwemmt, von anderen Nationen durchdrungen, in gelehrten 
und diplomatischen Verhandlungen an fremde Sprachen gewiesen, konnte 
seine eigene unmoglich ausbilden.80
If such eclectic cultural borrowing is of an indiscriminate nature, the primary potential
effect is, for Goethe, the ruination of the German language and its corresponding
literature by development of:
eine durch fremde Worte, Wortbildungen und Wendungen verunzierte 
Sprache, und sodann die Wertlosigkeit solcher Schriften, die sich von jenem 
Fehler frei zu erhalten besorgt waren.81
Goethe recognizes, however, that the German cultural tradition is not simply to be 
equated with a large sponge which soaks in and greedily retains anything and 
everything that neighbouring and influencing cultures have to offer. There is, 
historically, a specific and indigenous German tradition, evolving and existing in 
relation to, but independent of, other Western political and cultural entities: this 
necessarily determines the nature and extent of external influence. The pre-existing 
culture, a unique set of historical and linguistic elements, itself derives from impinging 
influences, and in turn conditions and defines the continuing influence of source 
cultures upon it. Dependence and independence, within the context of general cultural 
evolution, coexist and complement one another. German cultural eclecticism is not 
eclecticism per se; borrowed material must be made relevant and meaningful to the 
assimilating German context. Culture - in all its literary, philosophical, historico- 
political and rhetorical manifestations - is in the broadest sense a universal process,
80 HA IX 258.
81 HA IX 259.
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and the emergence of a specifically German pattern is due, for Goethe, to this ability 
to assume selected attributes of external cultural influences; which, while implicitly 
expressing and acknowledging their derivation, exist in a novel context independent of 
source. German culture does not require its own wholly unrelated and insular 
language: the concern of the German linguistic tradition is not with the promotion of a 
language peculiar and dependent solely on German possession and utilization (‘seine 
eigene [Sprache] ausbilden ...’); it is able to select elements from source languages 
and cultures, and accord these intrinsically alien attributes a novel and particularly 
German significance and function (‘sich zu eigen machen’). This, then, is for Goethe 
the inherent contradiction of German cutural originality, and indeed a significant 
motivational factor in the development and sustaining of the particular attitude to 
European enlightened thought which is the German Aufklarung.
As in his accounts of religious movements and theological dogma, here again, 
Goethe’s purpose in Dichtung und Wahrheit is not to discuss in any objective, 
analytical depth the leading figures and the philosphical developments of the 
Enlightenment. Not that he underestimates the significance of the movement, for both 
his personal intellectual development and the development of European culture in 
general. What Goethe implies as a specific aim, and presents in his autobiography, is 
a series of related anecdotes, events and personalities which together form a 
background against which may be viewed his own intellectual growth, as he perceived 
it from the vantage-point of his maturity, together with his conception of the 
developmental pattern of culture in his age. Thus it is that Goethe’s account of the 
influence of the Franco-Roman upon his native German tradition occurs in the 
contextual setting of his recollection of a collective rebellion against Gallic language 
and culture in the inherently Gallic society of StraBburg in the early 1770s. It is the 
arrogance of the prevailing French dismissal of all things German as vulgar and 
tasteless, coupled with the predilection of the ruling Prussian monarchy for all things 
French, which prompts Goethe’s peer-group to emphasize their own German cultural 
origins, and provides the impetus for Goethe’s sharp and caustic appraisal of 
contemporary French culture82. ‘Even Voltaire’ does not escape Goethe’s critical 
judgement: his praise for the Frenchman’s literary and philosophical achievements is 
tinged with an affected cynical irony which judges Voltaire passe, a now negative
82 See HA IX 482f.
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influence on a contemporary French culture which seems unable to break the spell of 
Voltairean achievement and generate new life and vigour into the French cultural 
scene:
Und eben dieser Voltaire, das Wunder seiner Zeit, war nun selbst bejahrt wie 
die Literatur, die er beinah ein Jahrhundert hindurch belebt und beherrscht 
hatte. Neben ihm existierten und vegetierten noch, in mehr oder weniger 
tatigem und gliicklichem Alter, viele Literatoren, die nach und nach 
verschwunden.83
The irony, of course, inheres in the authorial standpoint of the mature Goethe, writing 
in his own advanced years of the impressions and judgement of his youth, and 
criticising the lack of dynamic development in a cultural tradition which could not rid 
itself of the influence of one of its most distinguished ‘old men\ Goethe continually 
sets off his own youthfulness and that of his contemporaries against the rigidity of 
Voltaire’s old age. More specifically, he compares the progressiveness, the vitality of 
youth with what he describes as ‘eitles Bestreben eines abgelehnten Alters’; Voltaire is 
‘ein altes eigenwilliges Kind’84 who refuses to grow old gracefully. Voltaire’s 
insistence on the validity of his concept of a deistic godhead becomes, in Goethe’s 
view, ever more hollow and irrelevant in its intransigence, and the mature Goethe 
asserts that he in his youth lost all respect for the elderly Frenchman and for the 
philosophical and metaphysical ideas Voltaire promulgated through the vehemence and 
vengeance of Voltaire’s comprehensive refutation of all the doctrines of established 
Christian worship:
Uns Jiinglingen ... ward die parteiische Unredlichkeit Voltaires und die 
Verbildung so vieler wiirdigen Gegenstande immer mehr zum VerdruB, und 
wir bestarkten uns taglich in der Abneigung gegen ihn. Er hatte die Religion 
und die heiligen Bucher, worauf sie gegriindet ist, um den sogenannten 
Pfaffen zu schaden, niemals genug herabsetzen konnen, und mir dadurch 
manche unangenehme Empfindungen erregt.85
However, Goethe was acutely if tacitly aware that the detrimental effect of Voltaire’s
influence lay not so much in the inherent message of his philosophy and his
expression of it, as in the reception of his ideas by his contemporaries and successors.
For Voltaire’s society and his cultural inheritors, unable to reason with him on his
own terms, radically altered the tenor of Voltaire’s message through simplification and
83 HA IX 484.
84 Ibid.
85 HA IX 485.
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specious categorization86. Ernst Curtius notes that ‘Voltaire is France raised to a higher
power’87, the product of his world, definable and accountable in terms of his world,
yet on a higher and more differentiated level than his immediate society, and
inaccessible to its blinkered and limited aspect. Goethe’s judgement of Voltaire in
Dichtung und Wahrheit concentrates on the personality, rather than the burden of the
works; on the after-effects of Voltaire’s message rather than the message itself: Goethe
offers a personal impression of Voltaire, not an objective critique of a cultural
contribution, and his ironic dismissal of the Frenchman’s literary achievements is by
no means an explicit abrogation of Voltairean thought. Goethe’s criticism of Voltaire
stems primarily from an assertion of Goethe’s own vitality and growth-potential in
comparison with the stagnation of French culture under Voltaire’s dominance, and of
the aridity and intransigence of Voltaire’s theistic world-view which denied any
validity whatsoever to revealed, positive religion. This is, of course, a post-factum
judgement on Goethe’s part: he is implicitly juxtaposing the achievements of his own
long life with those of the elderly Voltaire his youthful vigour so summarily
dismissed. Once again, the fundamental principle of Goethe’s world-view is one of
dynamism, of organic growth and mutual development. Thus it is that Goethe’s
judgement of Diderot and the Encyclopaedists, though brief, is particularly telling. His
image of the Encyclopedic, the self-proclaimed definitive account of French
enlightened thought, is of a monstrous piece of machinery of overpowering noise,
clatter and clutter, which serves only laboriously to produce something unnecessary,
inconsequential, and offensive to the existing goods it is meant to replace:
Wenn wir von den Enzyclopadisten reden horten, oder einem Band ihres 
ungeheuren Werks aufschlugen, so war es uns zu Mute, als wenn man 
zwischen den unzahligen bewegten Spulen und Webstiihlen einer groBen 
Fabrik hingeht, und vor lauter Schnarren und Rasseln, vor alien Aug und 
Sinne verwirrenden Mechanismus, vor lauter Unbegreiflichkeit einer auf das 
mannigfaltigste in einander greifenden Anstalt, in Betrachtung dessen, was 
alles dazu gehort, um ein Stuck Tuch zu fertigen, sich den eignen Rock selbst 
verleiden fiihlt, den man auf dem Leibe tragt.88
A facetious comment on a significant cultural achievement perhaps, and one which 
points again to the perspective of maturity on the arrogance of youth, rather than
86 See Cassirer, Die Phiiosophie der Aufklarung, op. cit., p.215.
87 Ernst Robert Curtius, Essays on European Literature, translated by Michael Kowal, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1973, p.38.
88 HA IX 487.
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offering an objective judgement on the part of the author. Nevertheless, the 
implication is obvious: dogmatism, even the ‘enlightened’ dogmatism of the French 
Encyclopaedists, tends towards barren aridity when rigidly adhered to; mechanism - 
and Goethe’s depiction of the Encyclopedic is decidedly mechanistic - is by its own 
definition inherently fruitless; both are unproductive in terms of cultural progress and - 
as Goethe’s sustained image implies - ultimately offensive to their parent tradition and 
immediate cultural milieu. Any attempt artificially to impose a particular set of beliefs 
and convictions necessarily leads to a cultural stasis which produces eventual atrophy 
and disintegration.
In this way, Goethe expresses his perception of the French Enlightenment as 
an angry world-view which offends and is distasteful in its comprehensive and 
unreflecting dismissal of all pre-existent thought. It would be naive, however, to 
assume that the Enlightenment as a philosophical movement, and enlightened thought 
as a means of approaching and evaluating the social and cultural world, signified 
nothing more to Goethe than a series of untenable fulminations and violent rejections. 
Goethe’s reported reaction to the Enlightenment in France is that of his peer-group: 
Goethe here identifies his own response, in ironic retrospect, with the collective 
response of his intellectual friends and colleagues; another distancing device by which 
Goethe the autobiographical protagonist is not made explicitly responsible for the 
account and judgements given of his life and experiences. Goethe and his circle 
deemed themselves ‘self-enlightened’, well-enough versed in the temper of their 
contemporary social and philosophical world to rise above and be wholly indifferent 
to the struggle between the French Enlightenment and its principal adversary, the 
Catholic Church:
Auf philosophische Weise erleuchtert und gefordert zu werden, hatten wir 
keinen Trieb noch Hang, iiber religiose Gegenstande glaubten wir uns selbst 
aufgeklart zu haben, und so war der heftige Streit franzosischer Philosophen 
mit dem Pfafftum uns ziemlich gleichgiiltig.89
The arrogance of youth makes a mockery of the ideas propagated by the ‘old men’ of 
the French Enlightenment. Holbach’s Systeme de la Nature*0, that most polemical and 
controversial vehicle of French enlightened thought, is ridiculed as the bitter and
89 HA IX 490.
90 Systeme de la Nature, ou des lois du monde physique et du monde moral. Par M Mirabaud. [The 1st 
edition (London, 1770) attributed the work to Mirabaud, rather than to its authentic author, Baron P H 
D d’Holbach.]
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prejudiced ramblings of ‘ein abgelehnter Greis’:
Wir lachten [den Verfasser] aus: denn wir glaubten bemerkt zu haben, daB von 
alten Leuten eigentlich an der Welt nichts geschatzt werde, und so schien uns 
jenes Buch, als die rechte Quintessenz der Greisenheit, unschmackhaft, ja 
abgeschmackt.91
Goethe intimates a primary group-response of disillusionment with Holbach’s work: 
the title promises much, the contents disappoint (again, the implicit ironic comment of 
maturity on the arrogance of youth which is prepared summarily to dismiss the work 
without any sustained and objective consideration of it is not to be overlooked in 
context):
Keiner von uns hatte das Buch hinausgelesen, denn wir fanden uns in der 
Erwartung getauscht, in der wir es aufgeschlagen hatten.92
However, implicit in Goethe’s account is a more significant and more telling reaction
to Holbach’s Systeme than the simple boredom and dismissal of his youthful
prejudices. He claims indifference, but admits simultaneously, by careful and
conscious use of language, to have been shaken and disturbed by Holbach’s polemic:
Wir begriffen nicht, wie ein solches Buch gefahrlich sein konnte. Es kam uns 
so grau, so cimmerisch vor, daB wir Miihe hatten, seine Gegenwart 
auszuhalten, daB wir davor wie vor einem Gespenste schauderten.93
Again, the force of Goethe’s individual and personal response is attenuated through
the attribution of this reaction to the peer-group: Holbach’s work is received and
reviewed by a plural entity of young critics, and Goethe assigns the group’s response
this place in his autobiography. The grammatical plural here again also fulfils the
rhetorical function of distancing the author from his text, and hence from his own
response. Goethe’s inability to bear the presence of the book as a physical object is
itself a physical, almost a pathological reaction, which he aptly encapsulates in the
verb schaudern; a term, and a concept, which for the mature author of Dichtung und
Wahrheit is full of meaning and implication. Goethe is appalled not only by the
content, but by the very existence of such a text, and feels perhaps compelled to
dismiss the work in such disparaging terms in order to mitigate his particular interest,
albeit born of abhorrence, in Holbach’s work. To read, consider and reject the thesis
is an acceptable intellectual response; to personify the book as an object of human
81 HA IX 490.
92 HA IX 491.
93 HA IX 490.
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morbidity and dread, without proper consideration of its message, is suspiciously 
defensive. Something in this purely materialistic conception of nature and morality is 
disturbing to Goethe; something in Holbach’s justification of existence in terms of 
atheistic humanism touches a raw nerve. Goethe may purport to have dismissed the 
writings of the French Enlightenment as quintessentially senile, arid and moribund, 
but he cannot and will not, as author of Dichtung und Wahrheit, deny the significantly 
deeper and more far-reaching effect of enlightened philosophy in general upon him. 
His criticisms are dually personal: of the character and mode of communication of the 
principal Enlighteners, and of the response elicited by these in him. Objectively and 
intellectually, the ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment necessarily form a part of 
Goethe’s cultural self-education and self-awareness so integral and integrated as, for 
him, to be self-explanatory, immanent in his chosen medium and necessitating no 
further discussion. And yet, what is apparent from Dichtung und Wahrheit as a post­
factum autobiographical account is an almost gleeful refutation of Voltaire’s anti- 
biblical polemic94; antipathy toward the vehemence in character and nature of French 
Encyclopaedism95; and distaste for the ‘triste, atheistische Halbnacht’ of Holbach’s 
materialism96. The experienced eye of maturity and the enthusiastic vigour of youth 
combine to produce a vehicle for ostensibly contradictory thoughts, impressions and 
judgements, through which the true burden of Goethe’s meaning must be dimly 
perceived, brought to conceptual clarity, and apprehended.
Goethe’s explicit account of the German Enlightenment, its contextual setting 
in the history of culture and its role in the development of his own intellectual 
awareness, is even more cursory and understated than his discussion of contemporary 
French culture. Again he provides an ostensibly objective and impersonal appraisal of 
the principal personalities and works of the German eighteenth century. He mentions 
Gottsched’s Kritische Dichtkunst, useful because it provided Goethe and his
n\
contemporaries with a historicA perspective through which they were able to view the 
development of the poetic genre as a valid art-form97; he alludes fleetingly to the 
dispute between Gottsched and the Swiss pair, Bodmer and Breitinger98, and in so
94 HA IX 485.
95 HA IX 487.
96 HA IX 491.
97 Johann Christian Gottsched, Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst, durchgehends m it Exempeln 
unserer besten Dichter erlautert, Leipzig, 1740. (See HA IX 262).
98 HA IX 262.
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doing cites the names, but nothing of the substance, of Gellert, Lichtwer, and 
Lessing; Georg Schlosser is in fact described personally, being a close personal 
acquaintance, but his most significant contemporary work, his parodistic imitation of 
Pope’s Essay on Man, is mentioned but obliquely. The principal public dispute of 
eighteenth-century German aesthetics - whether German art should look to English or 
Franco-classical models for inspiration in form and direction - is, for Goethe, quite 
beside the point: what he perceives is, as has been discussed, the need not to imitate 
an extraneous cultural form, but to integrate relevant borrowed material to the pre­
existent historical and cultural tradition, and form thereby a dynamic and original 
German cultural tradition. Thus it may be that his discussion of the leading figures and 
principal debates of the eighteenth-century German cultural scene does not play an 
ostensibly major role within the broad context of Goethe’s autobiography, because his 
concern is with a higher, more significant and more refined notion of cultural 
synthesis and appreciative development.
Goethe’s judgements and observations about his cultural context in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit are generally related from the standpoint of personal experience: the 
relationship of the individual to his culture and the influence of culture on the 
individual is the beginning and end of Goethe’s historico-cultural appreciation. His 
attitude to the reader is almost playful and teasing: one isolated allusion may carry the 
weight of a serious and far-reaching pronouncement; Goethe piles layer upon layer of 
significance and implication onto an oblique and cursory reference to a contemporary 
philosophical, social or literary notion. The opposition of freedom and necessity, for 
instance, is an accepted commonplace of Goethe’s philosophical world:
Unser Leben ist, wie das Ganze in dem wir erhalten sind, auf eine
unbegreifliche Weise aus Freiheit und Notwendigkeit zusammengesetzt."
Goethe, however, takes this fundamental polarity as the starting-point in his 
discussion of his turning away from French language and culture; and in so doing he 
alludes to something considerably more significant than general antipathy toward an 
ageing and retrograde cultural model. From the vantage-point of authorial maturity and 
experience, Goethe refers to the intellectual climate of his youth which insisted that 
life’s primary task was the conscious and aware acceptance of the absolutes of human 
existence (the polarity of freedom and necessity being one such absolute). What is 
advocated is no fatalistic submission to external factors over which the human being
99 HA IX 478.
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exercises no control, but the application of these absolutes truths to the amelioration
and deeper understanding of the human condition:
Das Was liegt in uns, das Wie hangt selten von uns ab, nach dem Warum 
diirfen wir nicht fragen, und deshalb verweist man uns mit Recht aufs Quia100
That Goethe employs the latin term Quia in place of the German Weil belies the
apparent insignificance of this little sentence in context. The foreign word is here
incongruous; the term is not a commonpolace borrowing, and the indigenous German
word seems more contextually appropriate, by virtue of its grammatical and rhetorical
similarities to the other significant elements in the phrase. Goethe is here emphasizing
the notion of causation, drawing particular attention to this specific concept by very
subtle use of the medium of language. What he is referring to here is not merely a
justification of his rejection of French language and culture in preference to the
German: Goethe is here introducing the whole notion of a posteriori teleological
reasoning, the definition of all natural phenomena in terms of purpose, the justification
of cause in terms of effect, which was the dominant trend of eighteenth-century
German rational philosophy, and which the great thinkers of the Aufklarung were
concerned to transcend.
Voltaire gave ridiculous embodiment to the extreme rationalism of eighteenth-
century German teleology in the character of the loquacious Dr Pangloss in the conte
philosophique, Candide. Pangloss states categorically that the human nose possesses
100*
the shape it does in order that spectacles may comfortably sit upon it.^For Goethe, it is 
Kant who pulls German philosophy from this morass of specious a posteriori 
reasoning, who revitalizes the arid lifelessness of theological rationalism, by founding 
a new critique of reason upon which a valid and vital German philosophy may base 
itself:
Kant ... ist auch derjenige, dessen Lehre sich fortwirkend erwiesen hat, und 
die in unsere deutsche Kultur am tiefsten eingedrungen ist ... Die 
Unterscheidung des Subjekts vom Objekt, und ferner die Ansicht, daJ3 jedes 
Geschopf um sein selbst willen existiert und nicht etwa der Korkbaum 
gewachsen ist, damit wir unsere Flaschen propfen konnen, dieses hatte Kant 
mit mir gemein, und ich freute mich, ihm hierin zu begegnen.101
100 Ibid. ,oc>a Oetwro Complek*, ed- cik, Vol. 24, p.I3tf.
101 Conversation with Eckermann, 11 iv 1827 (GA XXIV 248). See also Erster Entwurf einer 
allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende Ana tom ie, in: Goethe. D ie Schriften zu r  
Naturwissenschaft, ed. Dorothea Kuhn, Weimar, 1977, (1,9): ‘So ist auch jedes Geschopf Zweck ihrer 
selbst...’.
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Thus can the most ostensibly throwaway remark of Goethe’s convey a wealth and 
depth of meaning and implication which transcend the immediately autobiographical 
context. His awareness of the tradition in which he is working, and of the wider 
tradition which fostered it, is implicit and integrated. In fact, the commonplaces of 
Goethe’s philosophical and cultural environment are for him so necessary and so 
integral that explicit allusion would detract from the force of his argument. What is 
commonplace is so and must remain so, as a foundation and corner-stone for 
consequent cultural progress. Goethe’s account of his cultural context must therefore 
be viewed and appraised in conjunction with an awareness of what the notion of 
‘tradition’ meant to him; what Goethe understood by ‘traditional material’; how, why 
and to what extent he used the substance of his general cultural inheritance - the 
commonplace notions of his intellectual age, the ideas, concepts and thoughts of his 
predecessors, the very medium of language - in his own oeuvre. For in Goethe’s 
theory of tradition, if the existence of such a notion may be assumed, lies the core of 
his appreciation of religion as a cultural entity, and hence leads to an ultimate 
clarification of his understanding of the process of secularization.
Hans Reiss, in his editorial intrduction to the collection Goethe und die
Tradition, asserts that Goethe developed no explicit theory of tradition, that his
various utterances on the notion of tradition as an objective cultural phenomenon were
eclectic and unsystematic:
er entwickelte weder eine Theorie der Tradition noch entwarf er genaue 
Kriterien, wonach man die Giite einer Tradition beurteilen sollte. Seine 
gelegentlichen Aufierungen zur Frage der Tradition sind unsystematischer 
Art.102
As was observed with reference to Goethe’s putative failure to provide a systematic 
account of his religious convictions, however, a lack of obvious unified 
systematization does not necessarily imply a lack of inner coherence. Goethe’s 
apparent failure to provide a systematic account of his attitude to and use of tradition 
does not necessitate the judgement of his understanding of tradition as something 
unanalyzable and essentially incoherent. For Ernst Curtius, writing over twenty years 
before Reiss, in the historico-cultural context of a Europe, and more particularly a 
German-speaking Europe, still attempting to recover from and come to terms with the
102 Hans Reiss (ed.), Goethe und die Tradition, Frankfurt am Main, 1972, p. 16.
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ravages of the previous decades, there is a specific and crucial Goethean theory of 
tradition which has remained unappraised and unappreciated:
Goethes Lehre von der Uberlieferung ist, soviel ich sehe, nie gewurdigt
worden. Es konnte sein, dafi sie in der heutigen Verworrenheit das wichtigste
Stuck seiner Botschaft ware.103
This theory of tradition, of a systematic use of inherited material in a novel context, is 
not, as Reiss remarks, explicitly and specifically worked out by Goethe. It is rather, 
as is implied by Curtius, implicit in his oeuvre as a whole. What is required is a 
recognition, appraisal and bringing forth of the nature and implications of a 
specifically Goethean understanding of the process of cultural tradition and its 
function, within the broader context of his consequent reciprocal contribution to that 
cultural tradition.
One of the fundamental tenets of any positive theory of tradition is the 
ultimately metaphysical postulate that the past has a function in the present. Curtius 
introduces the notion of cyclical recurrence in the pattern of cultural progress by 
referring, ironically, to the repeated attempts within the history of European culture to 
deny that very history itself, to draw an unbreachable line across the continuum of 
cultural progress by which the continuum itself is abrogated and a wholly new, unique 
and original beginning proclaimed. What Curtius refers to as ‘schriftsturmender Wut’, 
or ‘graphoclastic rage’104, is the absolute rejection of all pre-existing culture which 
prompted, throughout the course of European cultural history, such disparate events 
as the iconoclastic riots of medieval uprisings; the political and literary sansculottism 
of the radical Enlightenment; the desperate attempt of the post-war German 
Kahlschlag literary movement to found a new German culture which owed no debt to 
the tradition which, in the opinion of the exponents of this tradition, had let itself and 
them down so badly. The Kahlschlager failed because the premises of their 
movement, though noble, were nai've and untenable: cultural tradition is an integral 
and ultimately definitive factor of the German language which was their medium. The 
attempt of the radical Enlighteners to abolish their tradition and rebuild afresh failed 
because no physical object, and by extension no cultural notion, can be created 
entirely anew. Re-creation is by definition the reformation of existing materials, the
103 Ernst Robert Curtius, Kritische Essays zur europaischen Literatur, Bern, 1950. See pp.59ff.: 
‘Goethe - Grundziige seiner Welt’ (p.68). Trans, cit. pp.73ff.: ‘Fundamental features of Goethe’s 
world’, p.82.
104 Curtius, op. cit., p.68; trans. cit., p.82.
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reformulation of existing words, images and ideas. Tradition, the foundation and 
perpetuation of culture as a living process, is not to be denied, cannot be rejected, but 
demands growth and dynamic development.
For Rudolf Bultmann, tradition is primarily a recollection, a repetition of the 
cultural past:
Unter Tradition verstehen wir zunachst die weitergegebene Erinnerung an die 
Vergangenheit.105
This is, however, as Bultmann acknowledges, a wholly inadequate simplification.
The mere recollection of past data of cultural entites, established philosophical
notions, literary images and ideas, leads, inevitably, to a kind of cultural stasis and
fixity by which no development is encouraged, no originality inspired, no growth
forthcoming. Such an ‘erstarrte Tradition’106 renders culture fixed, static, cliche; and
what fails to grow and develop eventually atrophies out of existence. For Curtius, it is
Goethe’s awareness of the dangers of such cultural ossification that lends his theory
of tradition its particular and vital significance:
Das Heilmittel konnte nur in einem neuen Ergreifen der Uberlieferung liegen. 
In Goethes Jugend hatten die Original-genies einer verknocherten 
Uberlieferung den Kampf angesagt. Tradition und Originalitat schienen sich 
auszuschlieBen. Aber es gibt einen Ausgleich zwischen ihnen.107
Past and present, old and new, beginning and end, form some of the metaphysical 
antinomes which structure and govern all reasoned thinking. They are, as pairs of 
opposites, logically exclusive but mutually implicit: there is no end which does not 
necessarily imply a beginning, no present moment which is not pre-conditioned by a 
past, nothing new which does not contain within it a corresponding notion of 
something old. Inheritance and originality function in culture as another such pair of 
conceptually exclusive and implicit concepts. The Ausgleich between inheritance and 
originality, to which Curtius refers, implies more than an unstable balance achieved 
between two more or less equal constituent parts. At the core of Goethe’s 
understanding and treatment of his tradition lies an awareness of the part he himself 
has to play in its apprehension and assimilation, in its furtherance and continuity. 
There is no valid inheritance without a valid assimilating mind operating within its
105 Rudolf Bultmann, ‘Reflexionen zum Thema Geschichte und Tradition’, in Weltbewohner und 
Weimaraner, Zurich, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 10.
106 Ibid., p.12.
107 Curtius, op. cit., p.68.
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tradition. Inheritance and originality coexist and complement one another, being 
implicitly linked, not as a pair of static concepts, but as simultaneously existent and 
mutually necessary factors in the dynamic process of culture.
Reiss maintains that the essence of creative freedom lies in the ability to 
evaluate and to profit from traditional material:
Es gilt hier, die schopferische Freiheit nicht zu verlieren, die uns erlaubt, das 
Uberlieferte zu verwerten ... Es geht also darum, eine Tradition zu nutzen.108
Curtius’s notion of an Ausgleich between cultural inheritance and creative
individuality would imply, however, that tradition is. inherent and necessarily present
in all cultural creation, and that its ‘calling forth’ is not, surely, an exploitation, but a
completion. The re-evaluation of existing material advocated by Reiss cannot be
objectively calculative, but is an active encouragement of the dynamism of cultural
evolution. For historical continuity and the development of culture depend on the
active acknowledgement of the past’s function in the present:
wie es keine Tradition ohne Geschichte, wenn anders Tradition nicht nur in 
der Weitergabe und unreflektierten Ubernahme alter Ordnungen und 
Vorstellungen besteht, sondern wenn es zur Tradition gehort, daB sie 
wesenhaft variabel, lebendig ist, das heiBt aber, wenn sie selbst geschichtlich 
ist. Geschichte bringt Tradition hervor, und Tradition stiftet die Kontinuitat der 
Geschichte.109
It is the synthesis of discrete traditional elements in a contemporary cultural context 
which validates and justifies that present context, and promises a future significance 
which is itself a synthesis of polarized opposites. Inheritance and creation, tradition 
and originality, ‘Vergangenheit und Gegenwart wie Thesis und Antithesis aufeinander 
bezogen’110, past and present are mutually dependent and, in their integration, point 
onward and upward to a constantly developing, self-refining process of cultural 
evolution.
This is, then, an outline of the theory of the function of tradition in culture 
which details the peculiar and unique significance of Goethe’s attitude to and treatment 
of the specific tradition of religion. For a significant factor in Goethe’s particular 
contribution to the consideration and reconsideration of religion as a cultural entity in
108 Reiss, op. cit., p.18.
109 Bultmann, op. cit, p.14.
1,0 Ibid., p.13.
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the eighteenth century is his awareness that nothing is new, but that everything, 
including religion, exists to be re-created. Purely original creation is, for Goethe, a 
vain and impossible notion111: originality lies, for Goethe, in the concrete assimilation 
of existing ideas, accepted commonplaces and defined areas of thought, in a novel 
manner and fresh context. The continuity of tradition depends on the consideration of 
all elements of culture - including religious creed and dogma, Church history, 
theological debate, the language of religious teaching and reverence - as pure matter, 
as raw material to be reformed and refined into something new and original on the 
continuum of culture112. This function is the generation of cultural progress as a 
continuum, depending on the reformulation of basic inherited material into a new 
entity in the present, which is itself basic inheritable material for future reformulation.
In this synthesis of old and new, of past and present, in the simultaneous 
combination of what has gone before and anticipation and determination of what is to 
come, lies the key to Goethe’s conception of the function of secularization as a cultural 
process which is both a temporalization and a desacralization. The temporalizing of 
traditional religious material is the recollection of the past in the present which points 
toward a future universality and generality; the desacralizing of religious elements 
through a novel contextualization is itself a corresponding resacralization, a re­
enactment of religion and a re-evaluation of its original function which is of validity 
and worth independent of source. Secularization is thus a manifestation of cultural 
dynamism; a cycle of organic inception and fruition which determines the very 
existence, and the developmental pattern, of cultural civilization. Goethe’s 
autobiographical writings bear testimony to the immediate philosophical and 
theological context in which he lived and worked, to the wider tradition which 
fostered it, and, most significantly, to the potential function of the past remembered in 
the present moment in culture for the future momentum of cultural progress. The 
synthesis of existing polarities is, as we have seen, a recurrent factor in his discussion 
of historical religion; and, in the context of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, of 
reason and faith, of human-centred and God-centred world-views, of the realms of the
111 See, as one example among many, his poetic depiction of the necessary awareness of a debt to 
tradition in the epigram from the Zahme Xenien, ‘Gem war’ ich Uberliefrung los/Und ganz original
(HA I 310).
112 Cf. Goethe’s conversation with Eckermann, 2 v 1824: ‘Die Religion ... steht in demselbigen 
Verhaltnis zur Kunst wie jedes andere hohere Lebensinteresse auch. Sie ist bloB als Stoff zu 
betrachten, der mit alien iibrigen Lebenstoffen gleiche Rechte hat’ (GA XXIV 115).
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sacral and the secular. This would evidence a concern with the logically acceptable 
premises of a synthesis of polarized opposites, but Goethe expresses his interest in the 
forms and content of ‘original Christianity’ in a way which implies that sense of 
recourse to previous forms in order to progress into the future which is the hallmark 
of binary synthesis. His ‘theory of tradition’, his appreciation of the significance of 
the past for and in the present, is not explicitly evaluated, but is implicit in the very 
language and form of his account of his age, and of his own role within his broader 
cultural tradition:
Ein Gefiihl aber, das bei mir gewaltig iiberhand nahm, war die Empfindung
der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart in Eins, eine Anschauung, die etwas
GespenstermaBiges in die Gegenwart brachte.113
Goethe’s awareness of the potential and necessary synthesis of past and present 
occurs to him as an almost tangible, sensible experience: an inchoate emotional 
response is engendered by this fusion of tradition and creation; something 
indeterminate and yet specific, something ethereal and yet existent, is called up from 
the past to function independently in the present. Thus it is that Goethe’s account of 
his own life is underpinned by the determining experiences of his childhood, youth 
and early manhood; that his autobiography is largely a general account of his world; 
that this account of his contemporary age never loses touch with the broader tradition 
which preceded, nurtured and determined it; and that the form of his account betrays 
this. The cultural background of the events and personalities described is a latent 
feature of Goethe’s depiction: assimilation of this background depends on the subject- 
object relation by which the subject-reader perceives the background in the object of 
the text. Goethe’s account of his objective background is channelled by his subjective 
perception and re-presented for perception by the reader in the objective form of his 
depiction. He ‘secularizes’ in his re-presentation of historical material. Secularization 
as a Verzeitlichung is this re-enactment of the past in the present to create something 
independent and yet derived; secularization as a Verweltlichung is the redeployment of 
existing cultural entities, specifically religious entities, in a fresh, ostensibly worldly 
context, by which the original meaning is not lost but heightened, the primary sense 
not abolished but completed. All culture, including Dichtung und Wahrheit as a 
literary text, is necessarily a derivation and a repetition, a constant process of 
recollection, re-enactment and re-creation. Religious material is essentially material
1,3 HA X 32.
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existent within the cultural tradition in general; religion has a place and function on the 
broad continuum of culture. The secularization of religious material means primarily 
that the basic entity undergoes, through re-situation, a tranfer of function. 
Concomitantly, there operates that aspect of redeployment whereby the re-located 
religious entity enjoys a novel context, a novel meaning, a novel appreciation which 
transcends, but does not negate, the original meaning. Goethe’s use of the material of 
his inherited religious tradition is, in these terms, both a secularization and a 
corresponding sacralization. It is with this in mind that we now proceed to analyze 
some of the key ‘religious’ passages in Dichtung und Wahrheit. The significance of 
potential synthesis for the religious tradition and Goethe’s account thereof is, I hope, 
evident. But if it is a process of binary synthesis which informs Goethe’s treatment of 
sacral material in a secular context, then his secularized texts will contain some 
intimation of a feeling of faith, of the sense and import of ancient historical religious 
feeling, and this sacral import in a secular context will in some sense be open to 
perception and appreciation by the reader.
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Great poetry carries beliefs into its language in such a way that it 
can achieve a communication transcending the bounds of those 
beliefs. But we must learn how to read it.1
CHAPTER IV
GOETHE’S MODE OF SECULARIZATION:
THE RECREATION OF RELIGIOUS FAITH
The critical assertion that Goethe was indebted to the philosophical and cultural 
tradition in which he operated is, primarily, a statement of the obvious. Obvious 
because, in the first instance, ‘no man is an Island, entire of itself’, and Donne’s 
‘Continent’ applies no less to the activity and productivity of humanity than to 
humanity itself. The artist does not work in a cultural vacuum, a hermetically sealed 
and antiseptic bubble which is clinically free from potential contamination through any 
conceivable contact with the world outside. Artistic creation is no spontaneous 
parthenogenesis; it is necessarily communicative and hence contaminative. The artist 
interacts with his or her world, and the ensuing artistic product is the assimilation and 
the objectification of this interaction. Indebtedness to tradition and interplay with the 
prevailing environment are the accepted facts of cultural life.
And yet critics are generally agreed in acknowledging that Goethe was a 
special and unique artist; that his writings display a massive and awe-inspiring 
originality which cannot be confined to a few peripheral novel ideas, but is integral to 
and inherent in the corpus of his works. Neither the works of creative artistry, nor the 
scientific writings, nor the manifold autobiographical and epistolary texts from Goethe 
are to be dismissed as mere reiterations of known and accepted truths, Goethe’s 
account of his world reduced to an undifferentiated reflection of contemporary reality. 
Goethe is held somehow to achieve originality in his treatment of derived material, to 
create something new out of a body of old and accepted cultural notions and entities. 
Indeed, it is precisely in his statements of the obvious, in his reiterations of the 
accepted and the commonplace, that the full force of Goethe’s originality and his 
unique contribution to his cultural tradition are held to be perceived. Ernst Robert
1 David Daiches, God and the Poets, op. cit., p.219.
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Curtius proclaims Goethe’s ‘Originalitat auf dem festen Grund der Uberlieferung’2: 
Goethe’s artistic creativity is founded firmly on derived and unoriginal material. 
Founded on cultural inheritance, certainly, but not reducible to and explicable in terms 
of mere derivation and repetition. Curtius praises the exemplary phenomenon of the 
artist with the strength and courage:
sein originelles Wesen selbststandig auszubilden und das vielfach
Aufgenommene nach seiner Weise zu bearbeiten.3
Something of the artist must be brought to bear in the statement of the obvious and the 
reiteration of the accepted: if these are not to remain among the ranks of the cliche, 
outworn, unconsidered, then they have to be re-said and re-stated in a way which 
encourages reconsideration; shedding, as it were, new light on old truths. And it is the 
way in which Goethe states the obvious, his manipulation of accepted commonplaces 
in the medium of language, which allows what is now acknowledged to be the 
characteristically Goethean articulation of old truths in a way which encourages their 
rethinking. It is the manner of the reformulation of traditional material which renders 
original what is undisputably derived, which gives new voice to old songs; in the 
manner of Goethe’s articulation of established commonplace cultural notions that the 
tension between derivation and originality is apparently resolved. In short, Goethe 
treats unoriginal themes originally, and a search for his particular contribution to his 
cultural heritage, as the introduction to Stephenson’s Goethe's Wisdom Literature 
makes plain, must concern itself with the nature and function of his reformulations of 
accepted truths.
The notion that it is Goethe’s characteristic treatment of borrowed and derived 
material which renders his writings unique, peculiar to him, and worthy of the 
appellation of originality is not, of course, a novel critical approach. It is this notion 
which informs Erich Trunz’s reference to Goethe’s ‘Umarbeitungen’ of contemporary 
and classical formal dictates in his own neo-classical poetry, and which, more 
recently, forms the basis of Stephenson’s study of the relationship of form and 
content in Goethe’s Spriiche in Reimen\  It is, moreover, a notion which has found
Kritische Essays zur europaischen Literatur; op. cit, p.68.
3 Ibid. (My italics).
4 Goethe's Wisdom Literature, op. cit., pp. 14 and 19. Reference is to Trunz’s ‘Anmerkungen’ to 
Goethe’s poetry in HA I, and to Wolfgang Preisendanz, Die Spruchform in der Lyrik des alten 
Goethe und ihre Vorgeschichte seit Opitz, Heidelberger Forschung, Heft 1, Heidelberg, 1962, where 
the author refers to the ‘inextricable interfusion of form and meaning’ that results from the 
‘transformation of borrowed material into poetry’.
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particular favour with those seeking to explain Goethe’s attitude to religion.
Religious material is most obviously derived: it is obviously not directly 
attributable to Goethe, nor to any other writer of ostensibly non-religious texts. This 
lack of explicit religious authority need not, however, deny these texts a religious 
function. Goethe did not invent religion, but he does use its attributes inventively, 
making frequent explicit and implicit reference to material of religious and biblical 
origin in his works: this, as has been seen, is what critics tend to refer to as Goethe’s 
‘secularization’. Paul Stocklein’s discussion of the derived religious content of many 
of Goethe’s maxims speaks of a ‘Neuformulierung’5 of religious material in his 
wisdom literature seemingly synonymous with what Trunz called Goethe’s 
‘Umarbeitung’ of formal conceits in poetry. Stocklein asserts that all the various 
strands of thought present and functioning in the body of material that constitutes 
Goethe’s maxims culminate and fuse together in one single intention, which for 
Stocklein is inherently and definitively ‘religious’. Indeed, Stocklein views Goethe’s 
self-expression in terms of religious formulations, his use of biblical language, as an 
inner compulsion:
Die wissenschaftstheoretischen, die naturwissenschaftlichen, die ethischen, 
die kunsttheoretischen und die eigentlichst philosophischen Aphorismen, sie 
kommen alle am Ende in einem Punkt zusammen; sie gipfeln in einem 
bestimmten religiosen Absehen. Von alien Seiten her kommt der Denker auf 
einem Gebiet zu sprechen, in dem er, schon aufierlich, biblische 
Formulierungen zu bemitzen sich gedrangt fiihlt .6
Stocklein’s account would seem to imply that this use of religious language is due as 
much to a willingness to comply with external expectations, conditions and demands 
as to inner motivation on the part of the writer. That Goethe employs religious 
language in his maxims is manifest and obvious: to suppose that this is in deference to 
contemporary taste surely belittles both the author and his public, and by-passes the 
important issue that the significance of the religious content of the maxims lies not in 
the fact that this is derived, but in the nature, and more specifically, in the function, of 
its reformulation. Stephenson notes that the intentional function of Goethe’s maxims, 
which Stocklein considers ‘purely religious’, is quite irreconcilable with the 
apparently contradictory view of the maxims, as a body of literature, as ‘purely 
poetic’:
5 Paul Stocklein, Wege zum spaten Goethe, Hamburg, 1960, p.284.
6 Ibid., p.283. (My italics).
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Knowledge of the political and cultural history of the time reveals a clear 
intention on Goethe’s part, in at least some of his maxims and aphorisms, to 
get across a message, an intention which is obviously not consonant with the 
view of the whole of his wisdom literature as ‘pure poetry’.7
Neither term, ‘purely religious’ or ‘purely poetic’, caters adequately for the function 
of Goethe’s reformulation of religious material in his maxims. The critical inadequacy 
of the approach to Goethe’s writings which ignores his formulation in situ in order to 
hunt and pin down the source of his material is equally apparent in a reading of his 
works which dismisses the derived content of his thought by concentrating on the 
speciously ‘poetic’ aspects of his formulation. And this is of especial relevance to the 
nature and overall import of Goethe’s treatment of his religious tradition in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit.
The intention of Goethe’s autobiography cannot be described as ‘purely 
religious’: religion is, however, one of the fundamental elements of historical culture 
which provide the objective historical and cultural background to the work. Moreover, 
autobiography is by no means an obviously ‘poetic’ genre. ‘Knowledge of the 
political and cultural history of the time’ is both the foundation and the intention of the 
work, which itself explicitly intends ‘to get across a message’. There is no ‘poetry’ 
without foundation in experience and derived culture: conversely, there can be no 
relation of experience that is not channelled by the differing consciousness of the 
artist. That the experiences related in the autobiography have been ‘felt’ and ‘lived’ is 
accepted: but it is, as Wilkinson suggests in a different context, in the formulation of 
experience in the autobiographical text that the transition from deed to thought, the 
transformation of life into art, occurs. It is the communication of lived experience 
through the medium of language that renders life ‘poetic’ and gives poetry the illusion 
of ‘life’; the expression of the sentience of life itself in sensuous language of phonetic 
sound and physical structure which transcends the inherent abstraction of language’s 
semantic message to articulate experience as it was, and is, lived. These linguistic 
features exist formally in the structure of the text: they have a manifest presence within 
the physical body of the text. Their function is, however, less easily apprehended. 
They operate inchoately on the inchoate psyche of the percipient reader, appealing, 
through the sensuous links they draw between what is semantically said, and what is 
felt by the reader as s/he receives this message, to the inner sentient life of the
7 Stephenson, Goethe’s  Wisdom Literature, op. cit., p.20.
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individual. The sounds which are evoked, and the visible appearance of the words on
the page (the ‘sound-look’ of language), operate as a ‘veil’ drawn across the surface
of the discursive, rhetorical structure, revealing the dim, confused and incoherent
realities of sensuous and emotional life. It is in the binary relationship between
discursive content and the poetic ‘veil’ that a linguistic structure operates aesthetically.
Stephenson noted that this particular kind of linguistic patterning is:
what Goethe aptly called the ‘veil of poetry’ (der Dichtung Schleier), which, 
like all veils, by interposing itself between the object and the observer, hides a 
good deal while, at the same time, heightening what is revealed.8
These features are inherent in the text itself, they are products of the process of artistic
creation derived, as Goethe’s poetic coining of the term suggests, as a sort of legacy -
or testament - from the ‘truths’ of lived experience: ‘Der Dichtung Schleier aus der
Hand der Wahrheit’9.
The very title of Goethe’s autobiography implies this inter-relationship. The
‘truth’ inheres in the ‘poetry’ and the ‘poetry’ in the ‘truth’, in mutual presupposition
and interdependence. The inchoate realities of life-experience are articulated in and
through the visible and phonetic manifestation of the literary text: sentient feeling,
which cannot adequately be expressed in terms of semantic abstraction, is
communicated through the sensuous body of language.
The ‘Dichtung’ of Goethe’s autobiography cannot, therefore, be accounted for
merely as the mature assimilation of early experience. It is in the poetic formulation of
derived material that Goethe’s acknowledged originality inheres; in his highly stylised
articulation of the paradoxically concomitant constituent elements of ‘truth’ and
‘poetry’ that he re-objectifies his differentiated experience of his contemporary world
and the tradition which shaped it. By according this autobiographical work the
appellation ‘poetic’, Goethe calls into question all barriers between the genres of prose
and poetry, and makes explicit the implication that inherently poetic functions are in
operation in the transformation of ostensibly prosaic material, drawn from life itself,
into meaningful art. The autobiography, like the body of Goethe’s wisdom literature,
is neither pure invention nor pure derivation; it is derived experience differentiated by
the mind of the artist and given its most subtle expression in his formal manipulation
of his linguistic medium. It is, then, in the binary relationship of ‘truth’ and ‘poetry’
8 Ibid., p.161.
8 HA I 152.
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that the mode of secularization in Dichtung und Wahrheit which I argue for may be 
seen to operate: as a ‘veil’ of sounds and looks in the linguistic structure of the text, 
which interacts with the discursive content to instigate a particular kind of response in 
the reader.
Any consideration of Goethe’s deployment of religious material in Dichtung 
und Wahrheit will need, therefore, to offer an account of the significance of his mode 
of secularization as a means of preserving this most crucial aspect of his derived 
tradition while transforming the unoriginal religious material into something highly 
original. For while there are manifold references to traditional religion in the pages of 
Goethe’s autobiography - in explicit reference to cults and trends of his age, the 
position of the Church, the writer’s uneasy relationship with both orthodox and 
unorthodox religious groups - the significance of Goethe’s secularization runs deeper 
than is expressed by a mere acknowledgement of his reflection of contemporary 
religious trends. The mode of Goethe’s secularization incorporates both this reflection 
of religion in his age and in his environment, and the significance of the manner of its 
manifestation in the literary text. An enquiry into Goethe’s mode of secularization 
needs to investigate the aesthetic import of religion in art by examining the formal 
conditions of Goethe’s reiteration of known religious truths and analysing the 
functional aspects of his linguistic medium in his literary transmutation of experienced 
reality.
Before embarking on a formal analysis of Dichtung und Wahrheit, I propose 
to consider aspects of Goethe’s mode of secularization operational in another context, 
with a view to placing in perspective the prevalent and relevant linguistic and semantic 
features which are brought to bear in Goethe’s artistic treatment of his derived 
religious tradition. An analysis of one of Goethe’s late philosophical aphorisms will, I 
hope, indicate the significant inter-relationship of derived culture and its reformulation 
by elucidating the nature of Goethe’s secularization of religious materials and motifs, 
and their mode, in an ostensibly non-religious literary context.
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Den teleologischen Beweis vom Dasein Gottes hat die kritische Vernunft 
beseitigt; wir lassen es uns gefallen. Was aber nicht als Beweis gilt, soil uns 
als Gefiihl gelten, und wir rufen daher von der Brontotheologie bis zur 
Niphotheologie alle dergleichen fromme Bemuhungen wieder heran. Sollten 
wir im Blitz, Donner und Sturm nicht die Nahe einer iibergewaltigen Macht, in 
Bliitenduft und lauem Luftsauseln nicht ein liebevoll sich annaherndes Wesen 
empfinden durfen?10
Here Goethe treats, in the form of a philosophical reflection, perhaps the most 
fundamental question of the entire tradition of Western metaphysics; that of the 
existence of God. He iterates thus in this context the fundamentally commonplace 
tension between rational ‘proof’ and supra-rational ‘faith’; between apprehension of 
the deity as an absolute, existent reality, and approximation of God in human 
consciousness; which has characterized theological debate since the very beginnings 
of theology. The semantic burden of Goethe’s aphorism is that Kantian and post- 
Kantian philosophy, here alluded to metonymically as ‘die kritische Vernunft’ (the 
relevance of which for Goethe’s contemporary world as he saw it was discussed in 
the previous chapter) has transcended the crude teleology of previous theological 
rationalism. But Goethe also contends that alongside the abstract philosophical notion 
of absolute ‘proof’ through rational deduction, there exists the significant sensuous 
element of ‘feeling’, which no amount of abstract reasoning and speculation can 
effectively deal with. Goethe’s aphorism thus places itself and its rhetorical locutor 
firmly within the broad tradition of Western philosophy, and accords the philosophical 
temper of Goethe’s contemporary world - in its abrogation of Leibnizian teleology, the 
subsequent pre-eminence of Kantian critical reason, and the indeterminate but 
significant role of feeling therein - a significant and recognizable place on this wider, 
general, philosophical continuum. Moreover, the tension between rational proof and 
sensuous experience is a pivotal aspect of this wider tradition: Goethe is here giving 
expression to the significance of this tension for his immediate, post-Enlightenment 
philosophical milieu, according his expression of received thought a contemporary 
relevance while simultaneously communicating the origins of the thought itself within 
its more general cultural history. This compatibility of reason and feeling which 
characterizes Goethe’s post-Kantian philosophical world is but a contemporary 
realization of an ancient epistemological problem; and the primary theological concerns 
of the eighteenth century are seen in this way as recurrent manifestations on a
10 HA XII 365f., §9; Hecker §808.
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continuum, through Western culture, of theological and metaphysical speculation.
The thought itself, however, as the most recent available edition of Goethe’s 
maxims points out, is ‘so common that it is scarcely necessary to trace it to one special 
passage: it is implicit in Thomas Aquinas and in Kant’11. If Goethe intended more in 
this aphorism than a mere reiteration of commonplace truths and a repetition of the 
accepted philosophical concerns of his day, then consideration of the significance of 
the aphorism must not stop at an appreciation of the semantic burden of his expressed 
thought and its recognizable place in the history of Western philosophy. Clearly, there 
is another, parallel message - secondary in appearance but by no means in importance 
- inherent in Goethe’s formulation of the thought.
Goethe’s use of certain key-terms at once confirms this putative extension of 
the aphorism’s ostensible burden, and an analysis of their place and function within 
the text indicates the import and significance of his ‘poetic’ formulation of the ‘truths’ 
of his philosophical tradition. ‘Gefiihl’, for Goethe, is and implies far more than one 
pole in a tension of opposites which is a topos of his contemporary world. ‘Gefiihl’ in 
the eighteenth century, as Wilkinson and Willoughby have observed12, implies the 
whole continuum from tactile sensory perception to reasoning that T S Eliot called 
‘felt-thought’; a highly ambivalent process combining rational deduction rooted in 
feeling and emotional attributes within the thinking process. Thus in Goethe’s 
reference to ‘feeling’ here we already meet an implicit progression from the Kantian 
notion of a priori moral feeling to which he alludes, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter of this study. It is feeling in this combinative sense of rational and 
sensuous perception which Herder commanded the poet to express in the ‘dead letter’ 
of his linguistic medium:
du sollst deine Empfindungen aufs Blatt mahlen, ... du sollst deine ganze
lebendige Seele in todte Buchstaben hinmahlen.13
It is precisely this that Goethe does in the linguistic body of his aphorism: the 
significance of the concept of ‘feeling’ in the eighteenth century is, alongside the 
objective expression of the notion of feeling in the semantic context, itself to be felt in 
the aesthetic formulation of the phrase. The syntactic rhythm of the locution ‘Was aber 
nicht als Beweis gilt, soli uns als Gefiihl gelten’, conveys, through the patterning of
11 Goethe’s  ‘Maximen und Reflexionen’. A  Selection, ed. Stephenson, ed. cit., p.161.
12 See WW, pp.lxvii and 308, and Stephenson, Goethe’s  Wisdom Literature, op. cit., p.157.
13 ‘Uber die neuere deutsche Litteratur’, Sammtliche Werke, ed. Suphan, (ed. cit.), Vol. 1, p.395.
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hard consonantal sounds which give the formulation a palpable, tangible plasticity - an
appreciation of feeling as the basis for thought, of sensuous life as the determinant of
rational speculation. This is what Herder articulated in his convocation to join the
developing child in the tactile enviroment of the playroom:
Kommt aber in die Spielkammer des Kindes, und sehet, wie der kleine 
Erfahrungsmensch faBet, greift, nimmt, wagt, tastet, miBt mit Handen und 
FiiBen, um sich iiberall die schweren, ersten und nothwendigen Begriffe von 
Korpern, Gestalten, GroBe, Raum, Entfernung u. dgl. treu und sicher zu 
verschaffen.14
Goethe expresses the inherent worth and validity of ‘feeling’ in the syntactic proximity 
of ‘Gefiihl’ and ‘gelten’, compounded by the alliterative repetition of ‘ge’, and the 
chain of liquid ‘1’ sounds which link aurally and visually the concepts of feeling and 
validity, and the compulsion of their governing verb ‘sollen’. He perceives a depth 
and wealth of feeling which exists and functions where reason is powerless: what 
makes Goethe stand out from the general philosophical consensus of his age is not 
only his appreciation of the role of the sensuous drive in the inherent tension between 
reason and feeling, but his formulation - and communication - of this intuition through 
exploitation of the material body of his linguistic medium. Physical contact with the 
deity, whose proximity is affirmed, is advocated and validated in language that is itelf 
palpable in its sensuous sonority: the sounds exist to be perceived, their implication 
felt.
In his deployment of the terms ‘Brontotheologie’ and ‘Niphotheologie’, 
Goethe displays an apparent conversance with some of the more obscure, uncommon, 
theological terminology. The concepts he mentions are, however, not merely obscure, 
but deliberately obfuscatory and esoteric: Goethe’s use of them is almost certainly, 
given the context and overall burden of the aphorism, an attempt to ridicule extreme 
theological rationalism which would search to prove definitively the existence of God 
in terms of natural and meteorological phenomena, and accord its conceptualizations a 
specious justification in complicated, pompously classical terminology. ‘Bronto­
theologie’, from the Greek Ppovre, would imply the recognition and apprehension of
God in thunder; ‘Niphotheologie’, from the Greek vi<|>oa, would seek a 
corresponding apprehension of God in snow. Neither concept is a standard,
14 ‘Plastik’, Sammtliche Werke, ed. cit., Vol. VIII, p.7f.
162
recognized theological term: in fact, both are conspicuous by their absence from 
standard works of historical theological reference15. The terms are thus both highly 
unusual and hence striking, but are used here by Goethe, with certain irony, as though 
they were so commonplace as to merit no elucidation or explanation whatsoever. 
Goethe’s contemporary world would almost certainly not be conversant with this 
terminology: as rhetor, Goethe is drawing deliberate attention to the ridiculous 
extremism of exaggerated theological rationalism, and mocking thereby the pious 
practice which issues in these weird and obscurantist religious concepts. For the 
reference to ‘alle dergleichen fromme Bemuhungen’ is in the first instance a 
dismissive comment on such manifestations of religious faith in word and action, 
from ridiculous extreme to ridiculous extreme, throughout the general history of pious 
practice.
There is, however, a force to be reckoned with in Goethe’s use of the word 
‘fromm’, an extremely positive term for him which is not to be equated with the arid 
emptiness of merely formal piety. The implicit warmth and value of the term for 
Goethe is here underlined by the alliterative ‘m’ sounds, the comforting labial nasal 
consonant, and their plosive equivalent in the initial ‘b’ of ‘ Bemuhungen’, which link 
aurally and hence sensuously the conceptually adherent notions of ‘piety’ and 
‘activity’. Semantically, Goethe represents a dismissal of religious practice which is 
manifested in pseudo-rational justifications: sensuously, through the material body of 
his language, he articulates the genuine worth of actively emotional faith.
Moreover, these sensuously validated pious practices are here enveloped by 
the describing verbal phrase ‘wieder heranrufen’. The primary meaning of the verb 
implies a repeated alternation of rational deduction and sensuous apprehension which 
furthers thereby a constant and cyclical process; a spiral of philosophy instigated by 
feeling, then transcended by feeling which in turn transcends itself, in a combination 
and coordination of sensual and rational forces. For ‘wieder heranrufen’ is an active, 
transitive verb suggesting more than arid memory-recall; it implies a recollection of the 
past in the present that is a re-living and a re-enactment; a calling to mind which is an 
active and dynamic process. The past, by virtue of being recalled, functions anew in
15 See for example Lexikon fur Theologie und Kirche, Zweite, neubearbeitete Auflage, herausgegeben 
von Dr. Michael Hamburger, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1930 (10 vols.); Kirchenlexikon oder 
Encyclopadie der katholischen Kirche und ihrer Hulfswissenschaft (Wetzer und Welte), zweite Auflage, 
begonnen von Joseph Cardinal Hergenrother, fortgesetzt von Dr. Franz Kaulen, Freiburg im Breisgau, 
1883 (12 vols.); Realencyclopadie fur protestantische Theologie und Kirche, herausgegeben von D. 
Albert Hanke, Leipzig, 1904 (24 vols.).
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the present: ‘wieder heranrufen’ conveys this sense of the haunting presence of the 
past represented, that is, re-manifested. Remembrance is of itself an active mental 
process: what Goethe here conveys is a transcendence of merely mechanistic, logically 
justified and rationally validated thought-processes through the additional operative 
presence of sensuous communication, a feeling in the sense of emotional engagement, 
which renders the act of remembrance dynamic and alive in the percipient. Goethe the 
rhetorical spokesman is thus exploiting the semantic burden of his expressed thought 
to place the aphorism, and the message it conveys, on a temporal continuum of action 
and re-enaction, of expression and reformulation, of recollection which renews and 
recreates.
Secularization is thus taking place on several sub-strata and super-strata in 
relation to the basic burden of Goethe’s aphorism. Primarily, secularization is 
apparent in the discussion of a fundamentally religious notion in the non-religious - 
here literary-epigrammatic - context of the Maximen und Reflexionen. Parallel to this 
runs, moreover, the inherent appreciation of religious entities as part of a body of 
general historico-cultural material; here represented in the reference to strange, 
inventive religious theories which combine the terminologies of ancient classicism, 
orthodox Christianity, and eighteenth-century theological rationalism. Most relevant to 
an enquiry into Goethe’s mode of secularization is, however, the allusion to the 
process of recollection and re-enaction by which cultural entities, abstracted from the 
general body of historico-cultural material, come into existence when they are re­
applied anew: the representation of the past in a present context gives embodied life, in 
and through the inherent power of language to articulate dynamic feeling, to concepts 
which are past, over, and hence, ostensibly, dead. Goethe’s mode of secularization is 
thus manifest in this active re-materialization of inherited culture through the constant 
reworking of historical religious commonplaces. By bringing the past back into the 
present, by articulating its concepts in a particular, significant manner, the process of 
cultural secularization assures the continued validity and function of historical material 
in general and religious material in particular. And Goethe describes this process in a 
terminology that is itself redolent of significance for our understanding of 
secularization: ‘wieder heranrufen’ is an uncommon verbal structure, afforded 
prominence by this very unusualness, which means, on the semantic level, memory- 
recall, and implies a great deal more besides. In his use of the verbal concept of
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‘wieder heranrufen’, Goethe makes allusion to a fundamental aspect of orthodox 
Christian exegesis: the Eucharistic liturgy pivots around the active ‘calling to mind’ of 
the presence of Christ at the Last Supper which is formally re-enacted in the sacrament 
of Christian communion according to the prescriptive dictates of the apostle Paul16. In 
an essay entitled ‘The Eucharist as Anamnesis’17, M H Sykes discusses the inherent 
validity of remembering in this context, remembering not as a passive mental process, 
but as a conscious act of memorial, which in turn ought to lead to positive action on 
the part of the remembering individual as the vital power of the remembered 
personality is channelled into the remembering individual’s contemporary world18. 
Pauline anamnesis brings Christ into the present in the Eucharist: it demands the 
physical re-manifestation and representation of Christ in a memorial act which accords 
memory of him an active function, within the collective consciousness of the 
recollecting individuals, in the remembering present. Christ is present as an actual, 
vital force in the act of remembering which recalls His past presence into actuality.
Active personal involvement in the Passion of Christ through re-enactive 
remembrance, and encouragement to positive action on this basis, are particular 
significances given within the Christian tradition to a fundamentally pre-Christian 
notion: anamnesis is recognized in the history of philosophy as a primarily Platonic 
concept of recollection, being a distinctive mode of apprehension of the ‘truths’ of 
human experiential knowledge19. What Goethe’s use of ‘wieder heranrufen’ indicates 
here is that the Eucharist, the fundament and linch-pin of the orthodox Christian faith, 
is itself founded on the secular notion of Platonic anamnesis. Goethe’s aphorism thus 
articulates that this calling-up of the past to function in the present is itself a recurrent 
cultural notion: the Christian tradition has sacralized into its doctrines a pre-existent,
18 I Cor. 11:25. Paul’s use here of the Greek a v a p v e o io  acquires the nominally agreed English 
translation of ‘memorial’ (‘Do this as a memorial of me’) in the text of the N ew English Bible, and 
the German ‘zu meinem Gedachtnis’ in the Lutheran translation. That the term ‘has been subjected to 
centuries of discussion’ {The New English Bible Companion to the New Tewstament, Oxford, 1971, 
p.559), is due largely to the incapacity of the translations given to render the continuous present 
verbal tense of the original Greek, perhaps most adequately expressed in the modern German 
translation by Jorg Zink, Stuttgart, 1965, ‘zum Gedenken an mich’.
17 M H Sykes, ‘The Eucharist as Anamnesis’, The Expository Times, Vol. LXXI, Edinburgh, 1959- 
60, pp.115-118.
18 Ibid., p. 117: ‘The celebration of the Eucharist as a “memorial” is the releasing of Christ’s power 
and personality afresh. He is vitally alive once more in the presence of his disciples ... To remember 
Christ in this way is thus to experience a peculiarly intimate relationship with Him which must 
inevitably lead to action, both on the part of Christ and on the part of His worshippers’.
19 See Norman Gulley, ‘Plato’s Theory of Recollection’, Classical Quarterly, N S 4, Oxford, 1954, 
pp.194-213.
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and thus inherently secular, notion, which Goethe now secularizes into the content of 
his aphorism. Christianity has derived a fundamental aspect of its doctrine from the 
pre-Christian tradition, and Goethe’s account of the position of Christianity in his 
contemporary world makes implicit reference to these pre-Christian origins. Goethe’s 
mode of secularization thus transcends the notion of a unidirectional passage from 
Church to State to anticipate a broad-based cultural programme where all sources and 
all aspects of cultural history combine in the present moment, which, by virtue of this 
inherent combination of things past, accords a vital function to the past in the vitality 
of the present. The ‘wieder heranrufen’ of Goethe’s formulation itself recalls, in the 
secular context of his literary epigram, this most central issue of the Christian faith, 
bringing a crucially Christian point to bear in his discussion of the outward exigencies 
of religious practice. His consideration of religious concepts is in a language redolent 
of latent religious significance: the mode of Goethe’s secularization adds an ‘extra 
dimension’ of the inherent secularity of fundamental sacral concepts to his 
epigrammatic discussion of religious topics.
The final sentence of Goethe’s aphorism is also expressed in language of 
theological derivation: it reveals linguistic and conceptual references to the Old 
Testament story of the flight and divine encouragement of the prophet Elijah in the 
wilderness20. The apposition of the natural phenomena of violent thunderstorm and 
gentle breeze, of strength, might and power on the one hand, and sweet, gentle 
embalmment on the other, is of course a common cultural concern based on 
appreciation of the natural world, a concern which has acquired religious force 
through inclusion in the Hebrew text. In the Old Testament passage, the active 
presence of God is to be perceived and apprehended in the violent turbulences of 
nature and in the ‘stilles, sanftes Sauseln’, the paradoxical sound of silence, which 
succeeds them. The burden of Goethe’s thought is that through both of these natural 
extremes some objective existence, an indeterminate ‘something’, is to make its 
presence ‘felt’. Here the ‘extra dimension’ of Goethe’s formulation is to be perceived 
not only in his re-secularization of a sacral notion that is implicitly and originally 
cultural: what is significant is that Goethe’s articulation of sentient experience is itself 
made felt, tangibly and sonorously functioning in and through the material fabric of
20 See I Kings 19:11-12: ‘For the Lord was passing by: a great and strong wind came rending 
mountains and shattering rocks before him, but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind there 
was an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake fire, but the Lord 
was not in the fire; and after the fire a low, murmuring sound’.
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his linguistic medium. The natural elements ‘Blitz, Donner und Sturm’ are placed 
together conceptually and syntactically: they form one tripartite syntactic entity in the 
structure of the sentence. Their issue, the force that is to proceed out of the ‘Blitz, 
Donner und Sturm’, is also a corresponding tripartite semantic structure, ‘die Nahe 
einer iibergewaltigen Macht’. Complement adjective and noun are here linked by a 
vocal assonance which compounds the conceptual consonance of ‘Gewalt’ and 
‘Macht’: similarly, ‘Nahe’ is bound, by virtue of its middle vowel, visually if not 
aurally with the other two phrastic elements. Most significantly, the conceptual 
violence of ‘Blitz, Donner und Sturm’ is articulated in the rhetorical brutality of the 
language which describes the force which ensues: the mutated ‘ii’ and ‘a’ represent 
linguistically a harsher, sharper vocal sound; the rhythmical alliteration of ‘ge’ in 
‘iibergewaltiger’ articulates an almost percussive beat; ‘Macht’ is itself a short, sharp 
thrust of linguistic force. The rhythmical cadences of the second part of the sentence 
link two more sets of tripartite phrastic elements: ‘Bliitenduft und lauem Luftsauseln’, 
and ‘ein liebevoll sich annaherndes Wesen’, each comprise three rhythmically 
emphasized elements. In the first set, the semantic significance is compounded by a 
linguistic formulation which communicates the inherent sentience of the concepts 
described. The notions here alluded to are of immediate sensory appeal - sight, scent, 
taste, touch, and hearing are all involved in the perception of ‘Bliitenduft und lauem 
Luftsauseln’ - and the rhetorical structure of the phrase articulates and communicates 
this synaesthetic appeal to the senses. The onomatopoeia of ‘sauseln’ gives perceptive 
linguistic form to the sound which is thereby both described and evoked; alliterative 
repetition of liquid ‘1’ sounds links all the semantic elements in an articulation of 
general embalming gentleness; ‘lau’ and ‘sauseln’ compound this alliteration with a 
visual and tonal similarity provided by their shared diphthong, hinting at a fusion of 
tactile warmth and aural comfort; the semantic closeness of ‘Duft’ and ‘Luft’ which, 
enhanced by their innate rhyme, has made of the pair a commonplace of the German 
poetic language, is there to be felt in the tactile and sonorous rhythms and rhymes of 
the phrase which conceal the obviousness of the connection by making of one a 
nominal suffix and of the other a prefix; this connection is again compounded by the 
overall chain of ‘u’ sounds which links all the elements in the phrase, drawing even 
the relatively insignificant ‘und’ into the significant aesthetic structure. The ‘liebevoll 
sich annaherndes Wesen’ which is to make its presence felt in the natural gentleness
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described is itself ‘felt’ in the fabric of the phrase: the T  sounds soothe and caress, in 
sentient correspondence with the semantic import of personal, emotional warmth; 
assonance and consonance of ‘es’ and ‘n’ link the conceptually contingent elements in 
‘annaherndes Wesen’. Moreover, the ‘liebevoll sich annaherndes Wesen’ which is to 
ensue from the apprehension of gentle nature is linked rhetorically, through the figure 
of polyptoton, as well as conceptually, with the ‘Nahe einer iibergewaltiger Macht’ 
which issues from nature’s turbulence. The semantic import of the nominal ‘Nahe’ 
and the verbal-progressive ‘sich-annahernd’ is represented in the very structure of the 
phrase. The state of being close, and the action of moving closer, enclose and embrace 
all the elements of might and power, natural calm and sweetness, human warmth and 
emotion, which are involved in the approximation and apprehension of this 
unfathomable inchoate existence that is to make its presence felt in the combination 
and coordination of all these elements of the natural world. In short, the notion of God 
being proximate and all-embracing is expressed in and through the language, and the 
reader is invited to feel this for himself in his appreciation of the text.
There is, therefore, an inherently sensuous appeal in the language of Goethe’s 
articulation of violent meteorological phenomena and in his expression of gentle, 
caressing and comforting nature. All the perceptive senses are engaged in alternation 
and combination in Goethe’s communication of human apprehension of the natural 
world, and the inchoate ‘something’ which manifests itself through these phenomena 
is itself articulated, made palpable and apprehensible, in the very language of Goethe’s 
formulation. Goethe’s aphorism thus operates as what Stephenson has described and 
analysed as an ‘aesthetic symbol’21, articulating the inner, emotional life of the 
perceiving individual, communicating the felt-life of inchoate sentience through the 
inherent sentience of its linguistic fabric. This communication is there to be perceived 
by the reader at a level of perception between the apprehensible levels of the 
appearance of language on the page and the sounds its symbols represent on the one 
hand, and the conceptual meaning these convey on the other. Such aesthetic structures 
exist objectively only when they are perceived by the individual subject, and can only 
be perceived when they are have a meaning for, and strike a chord in, him or her22.
21 See Stephenson, Goethe's Wisdom Literature, op. cit., p.157 and passim.
22 See ibid., p.161: ‘Since an aesthetic structure lies, as it were, between the sound-look and semantic 
levels of language, it can only be discerned if their coordination does, in fact, serve as a symbol of 
felt-thought alive in the percipient. An aesthetic rule is only “there” if it is perceived, and it will only 
be perceived if it is meaningful’. (Stephenson’s italics).
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They are the dim realities of human emotional life given aesthetic form by the ‘veil of 
poetry’ which articulates and communicates them. The rhetorical attenuations in the 
initial and final phrases both govern the tentative action of Feeling (‘Sollten wir ... 
empfinden diirfen?’): the aphorism as an aesthetic symbol articulates this feeling, for 
the percipient who feels, in the sensuous representation of its words and letters.
The mode of Goethe’s secularization is thus to be perceived in his aesthetic 
transmutation of the language of culture, and the symbols, ideas and notions 
represented therein, into the form of his literary art, which articulates primal feeling at 
the same time as it expresses logical meaning. The language, symbolism and 
philosophy of Goethe’s inherited religious tradition - the mythology of the Old 
Testament, its history, prophecy and doctrine; the Christian eschatology and exegesis 
in the new mythology of the New Testament - as part of the general culture of Western 
tradition as a coherent whole, are integrated into the aesthetic symbol he creates, to be 
perceived and relived by the perceiving individual. Secularization is the re­
materialization of religious culture into literary culture: Goethe’s mode of 
secularization makes of these notions a functioning aesthetic symbol which 
communicates the inherent life and dynamism of religious experience in and through 
the ostensibly ‘dead’ letter of language, by offering a semblance of the living truths of 
real experience portrayed therein.
Crucial factors and elements of Goethe’s mode of secularization are, evidently, 
present and functioning in this philosophical aphorism. It deals in a literary context - 
the body of wisdom literature that constitutes Goethe’s Maximen und ReFlexionen - 
with the most essential religious question - that of the existence of God - in such a 
way as to view this perennial problem against the contemporary seasonal blossoming 
of eighteenth-century theological rationalism. Above all, this essential religious matter, 
in its essentially non-religious context, operates, in its redolence of religious nuances 
and significances, sensuously and hence apprehensively on the psyche of the 
percipient. Goethe’s aphorism functions as a re-secularization of sacral notions which 
are necessarily, in their elemental essence, secular. Sacrality and secularity co-exist in 
the maxim as they have co-existed throughout the history of cultural evolution in all its 
ostensibly sacral and secular manifestations. There is nothing inherently sacral in the 
media of the sacral message (the Bible exists primarily as a book, theology is a
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metaphysical science); nothing that is uni-dimensionally secular, to the exclusion of all
religious overtones and undertones, in the existence and function of culturally
accepted sacral elements in a new, ostensibly non-sacral, context. Goethe’s aphorism
blurs the contours of sacrality and secularity - as it blurs the contours of prose and
poetry in articulating human sensibilities through the fabric of its medium - in a mode
of secularization which presents a religious theme in a non-religious context, alludes
to the inherently secular origins of the sacral material exploited, and expresses the
sacral theme in such a way as to articulate its essence in language of vital immediacy.
Sacrality and secularity, and past and present, are mutually implicit opposites in the
fabric of Goethe’s aphorism: they are irreconcilable yet mutually interdependent
opposites in the evolution of culture and the significant role of religious faith therein.
What is apparent in Goethe’s mode of secularization in this context is that office of all
art which Wilkinson and Willoughby recognized as Schiller’s concept of art as
adumbrated in the Asthetische Briefer.
Art which takes as its material the ideas and values of our cultural life, and - 
with superb irreverence for the authority of the contexts from which they are 
drawn - transmutes them into forms which challenge us to reshape even our 
most cherished attitudes in the light of a newly-stretched imagination.23
Goethe’s use, in the secular context of his wisdom literature, of material that is 
recognizably religious in a way which points to the essentially non-religious character 
of the materials’ origins, is clearly in the mould of that cultural model represented 
conceptually by what Wilkinson and Willoughby, in their analysis of Schiller’s 
philosophy and its presentation, have termed the ‘binary-type synthesis’. Such an 
abstract concept should not cloud appreciation of the process at work in culture as one 
of dynamic growth, of improvement and constant refinement, which is always on the 
basis of the fundamental concepts: though transcended, they are never wholly 
abolished. The constituent elements of the basic polarities are not annulled, but 
enhanced, in an infinite process of aspiration and progression through reversion to 
primary cultural entities. It is this necessary co-existence of the primary polarized 
opposites of sacrality and secularity that Goethe expresses in the maxim under 
discussion. A sacral message is communicated in the secular form of Goethe’s 
language: the secular origin of primary sacral concepts is simultaneously alluded to. 
The two ostensibly irreconcilable realms are revealed as mutually interdependent
23 WW, p.lxxxvii.
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factors in the continuation of cultural evolution, and the role of religious faith therein 
is enhanced through fusion with its apparently antagonistic opposite. Goethe 
encapsulates this fusion of sacral and secular realms in the fabric of his maxim and 
articulates the significance of the synthesis, as a means of transcending the arid 
alternation of a separation of religious and worldly realms, in a linguistic form which, 
through its sensuous dynamism, functions as a paradigm of cultural growth and 
aspiration. Goethe’s maxim bridges two worlds, and the bridging material he uses is 
not merely fabricated by him, but is composed of pre-existent and primordial factors 
in the development of culture as a general whole. Cultural dynamism - the 
evolutionary progress of culture from the historical finiteness of the past, through the 
re-materialization of the past in the present, towards a refined and itself progressive 
future - necessitates the promotion of factors already present in the cultural world, the 
‘self-renewal characteristic of all growth’24 that demands originality which inheres in 
tradition, creation based firmly on experience, poetic formulation of the fundamental 
truths of human existence. The model of the binary synthesis, which represents in 
conceptual form the actual factors which constitute the dynamism of human cultural 
life, includes the notion of a return - to one of the limited concepts at the base of the 
triangular representation - that is in reality a progress: the entity at the apex includes 
this limited concept in a higher form, either of itself, or in conjunction with its 
polarized opposite. The fundamental notions which constitute the basic matter of 
historical culture are, through the process of their reformulation and re- 
contextualization, both affirmed and annulled, abolished and preserved, in a 
progression which resorts to original notions in order to move forward on that basis: 
as a negation and an annullment which simultaneously demand the continued function 
of what is progressively abolished. It is artistic creation in the Schillerian sense of a 
‘positive destruction’25 that is apparent in Goethe’s mode of secularization of the 
primordial notions of religious culture. It is a process of ‘organic transformation’26 by 
which the raw material of cultural history is reduced to its constituent parts, which are 
held in abeyance as culture progresses, then subjected to a novel, and newly 
functioning, process of organization. It is a synthesis of the mutually implicit but 
historically irreconcilable polarities of past and present which furthers and nurtures
24 Ibid.
25 AB XXII 5, WW pp.l54f.: ‘Darin also besteht das eigentliche Kunstgeheimnis des Meisters, dass 
er den Stoff durch die Form vertilgf. (Schiller’s italics).
26 WW, p.267.
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their simultaneous preservation, abolition, and transcendence. The relevance of this to 
Goethe’s mode of secularization lies in the potential synthesis of sacral and secular 
realms of history and historical culture in the creation of a functioning aesthetic 
symbol of primordial cultural notions in a vitally active reformulation. The aphorism 
analyzed above, as an aesthetic symbol, functions as a cultural paradigm of this 
conceptual process of simultaneous negation, affirmation and transcendence. Elements 
from pre-existent cultural traditions are re-materialized in a form which both clouds 
and clarifies their origins, and in so doing implies something more besides, an 
implicit, functioning significance inhering in the individual perception of the integral 
parts of the medium and its message as a dynamic whole.
The material content of the aphorism and its function in context demand an 
understanding of the passing of time as a process of forward movement through 
backward awareness; of progression through regressive recognition and re-appraisal; 
of a cultural present which appreciates its past and, in so doing, founds and directs its 
future. Recognition of the historical origins of Goethe’s cultural material implies the 
simultaneous appreciation of a transcendence of historical contingency, a pointing 
onwards toward a greater, extraneous yet implicit significance. The Platonic origins of 
the Christian Eucharist, the atmospheric calm which succeeds meteorological 
tempestuousness, as inherent parts of the secular world rendered sacral by their 
integration into the Hebrew and Christian traditions, are there to be appreciated in the 
burden of Goethe’s maxim. But their appreciation is also a sensible apprehension 
occasioned by the form in which the message is couched. The necessary dynamic 
growth of cultural progress through regression to pre-existent elements is represented 
dynamically in the vitality of a linguistic form which contains and expresses, echoes 
and encourages, the sentient life of the living individual. Goethe’s mode of 
secularization represents the cultural co-existence of sacrality and secularity, like past 
and present, on a continuum of cultural development pointing onward and upward, 
through a transcendence of linguistic form, to portray the dynamism of felt life itself.
Now, there are obvious differences between the treatment of religion in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit and the use of religious material in Goethe’s philosophical 
maxims. In his wisdom literature, Goethe communicates what has been seen to be
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primarily derived and commonplace thought27: religion is part of a received cultural 
tradition, and its doctrines, its external trappings and its inherent message are 
reiterated, in aphoristic form, as accepted cultural notions. Goethe may refer to God in 
his maxims as an inherent entity of historical culture, an acknowledged notional 
concept in human consciousness, without having to define his own understanding and 
appreciation of the deity28. He may allude to the pantheistic revelation of God in 
nature29, to the position of the Christian Church vis-a-vis of the Judaic tradition30, to 
the primary axioms of Christianity itself31, as integers in the totality of his cultural 
world, as traditional elements of received knowledge, without directly indicating his 
own views or elucidating any explicitly personal standpoint. Religion in the maxims is 
recognized as part of Goethe’s cultural tradition, and treated accordingly. Religion in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit has, on the other hand, a perceived bearing on the persona of 
the author. The autobiography relates inherited tradition and the contemporary world 
as they operate on the developing psyche of the experiencing individual. Goethe’s 
account of religion in Dichtung und Wahrheit presents the religious tradition as an 
integral part of the process of his upbringing and education, as an existent, 
functioning cultural entity in the world he experienced and the experience of which he 
describes. The common denominator of both portrayals of religion is in its existence 
as an elemental part of cultural tradition experienced by the individual - in the routines 
of social life, in the cultural milieu he encounters and absorbs - which is differentiated 
by his appreciating psyche and represented to the world in manifest literary form. And 
Goethe’s mode of secularization, which breaks the conventional barriers of sacrality 
and secularity to present an aesthetic symbol of functioning religious experience, is no 
less in operation in the lengthy prose of his autobiography than in the pithiness of his 
philosophical maxims. A study of some representative passages of Dichtung und 
Wahrheit will, it is hoped, corroborate the argument for Goethe’s mode of 
secularization as a dissolution of notional barriers into a synthesis of contrary forces,
27 Stephenson notes in Goethe's Wisdom Literature, op. cit., pp.l5ff., the growing, if grudging, 
awareness this century of the unoriginal and derivative nature of much of Goethe’s thought expressed 
in the Maximen und Reflexionen. Harald Fricke, for example, has recently taken some of 
Stephenson’s points explicitly to heart in delineating the ‘banality’ o f much of Goethe’s material in 
the Maximen und Reflexionen, and of the significance of the rhetorical form of its reformulation. See 
Fricke, Aphorismus, Stuttgart, 1984, pp.8 & 111.
28 See, for example, HA XII 372, §50, 51; Hecker §813, 814.
29 eg. HA XII 365, §2,3; Hecker §810, 811.
30 eg. HA XII 377, §83; Hecker §818.
31 eg. HA XII 372, §56; Hecker §858.
173
as both the preservation of antithetical oppositions and their transcendence in new 
propositions, as a recollection of the historical past which functions dynamically in the 
actuality of the cultural present, as an articulation in the letter of prose of the sentient 
vitality of experiential religious life.
As it is Goethe’s depiction of the Roman Catholic sacraments in Book Seven 
which has prompted some critics to call for a stylistic analysis of the religious 
passages in Dichtung und Wahrheit, it is with this passage that I shall test the theory in 
the first instance. As was emphasized with reference to the aphorism analyzed above, 
the sacramentalism of established religious practice manifests in tangible and visible 
form the transcendence of the material world through a paradoxical re-materialization 
of a spiritual ideal. In the sacrament of the Christian Eucharist, the pains of Christ are 
evoked and re-enacted in order that their liberation be both represented and fulfilled. 
Spiritual release is the objective for the participant in this dramatic re-enactment of 
pain: it is in the re-presentation of the sufferings of Christ that their transcendence is 
proposed and their significance universalized. Pain and death are materially 
symbolized in order that their spiritual over-coming may be forwarded and brought to 
fruition. Goethe perceives of Christian sacramentalism in terms of a union of inner 
faith and outer manifestation which both recalls and anticipates his account of the 
function of poetic art in synthesizing the realms of inner emotionalism and its formal 
externalization:
[Der Christ] muB gewohnt sein, die innere Religion des Herzens und die der 
auBeren Kirche als vollkommen eins anzusehen, als das groBe allgemeine 
Sakrament.32
The repeated juxtaposition of sensory-material and spiritual-abstract realms of
perception in Goethe’s account of the nature and function of the Christian sacrament
conveys, in the fabric of his narrative, the close inter-relation of the material and the
spiritual in the representative Eucharist, as the re-materialization of a numinous ideal
with an actual and manifest existence and function:
Die Sakramente sind das Hochste der Religion, das sinnliche Symbol einer 
auBerordentlichen gottlichen Gunst und Gnade. In dem Abendmahle sollen die 
irdischen Lippen ein gottliches Wesen verkorpert empfangen und unter der 
Form irdischer Nahrung einer himmlischen teilhaftig werden.
Here Goethe presents an apparently objective account of a received truism of religious
32 HA IX 289f.
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practice. Material pain and want, which can of course be alleviated and satisfied to a 
certain extent in terms of and within the matrix of the world itself, are utterly 
transfigured and abolished in the spiritual nourishment of the Eucharistic sacrament, 
through this phenomenal, experiential act which transcends its material self in its 
symbolism of something above and beyond the phenomenal world. This is the 
conceptual message of Goethe’s text, the ‘religious’ import of his discourse in prose. 
But his formulation operates simultaneously at a different level of consciousness and 
perception. Linguistic consonance links the syntactic elements of Goethe’s phrase in a 
felt corroboration of its semantic meaning: ‘Sakramente’; ‘Hochste’; ‘sinnliche 
Symbol’; ‘auBerordentlich’; ‘Gunst’, are all bound up with one another by virtue of 
their initial or medial ‘s ’ sounds. The symbolic force of sacrament as an earthly 
approximation of the numinous is reflected in the form of Goethe’s description; itself a 
linguistic symbol of the symbolism to which it conceptually refers. The alternation of 
‘irdisch’; ‘gottlich’; ‘irdisch’; ‘himmlisch’ in the second sentence reflects syntactically 
the interweaving of abstract noumenon and concrete phenomenon which is the essence 
of the Eucharistic sacrament here described: Goethe’s depiction of Catholic 
sacramentalism conveys a deep sense of felt experience, communicated to and shared 
by the reader of his text. Spiritual communion with Christ in the re-enactment of the 
Last Supper:
ist kein gemeines Essen und Trinken, was befriedigt, es ist eine
Himmelsspeise, die nach himmlischem Tranke durstig macht.
Food and drink, in the phenomenal world, offer material comfort and satisfaction. But 
the intensified satisfaction afforded by this particular symbolic meal inheres in the 
union of its physical and spiritual aspects, in its encapsulation in the material objects 
of bread and wine of the liberating notion of spiritual freedom. Goethe’s use of the 
polyptoton ‘Himmelsspeise’/‘himmlischem’ integrates the notion of the spiritual into 
the material body of the phrase and makes manifest its role in the physical act 
depicted. The spiritual realm is, moreover, within the context of Goethe’s depiction, 
the inner element of a rhetorical chiasmus enclosed within the outer arms, provided by 
the further polyptoton ‘Trinken’/‘Tranke’, of acts of physical nourishment: it is in and 
through the material that the power of the spiritual is released. Goethe’s manipulation 
of his linguistic medium both articulates and evokes this liberation of the spiritual from 
the material through their co-existence and fusion in the act of communion. Thus the
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conceptual import of the passage is here coordinate with the linguistic formulation, 
and Goethe’s account of the symbolic essence of Christianity itself operates, in this 
fusion of meaning and form, as an aesthetic symbol, and thus as a pertinent example 
of Schillerian ‘schoner Vortrag’, or aesthetic discourse, in the representation of 
received religion in Dichtung und Wahrheit.
This transcendence of the merely material and the purely spiritual, through 
their fusion in a physical enactment that affords both material and spiritual satisfaction, 
is, as we have seen, the manifestation in a Christian context of the cultural process of 
a synthesis of opposing entities, which together found a novel cultural proposition 
which both preserves and abolishes its constituent parts. But the significant point to be 
drawn from this formulation is that the freedom of the spirit which inheres in the 
sacramental union of the material and the spiritual is crucially similar to the manifest 
freedom promoted by the synthesis of historical objective culture and its contemporary 
re-contextualization which functions throughout Goethe’s writings, as the re­
manifestation of the past in the present which transcends historical contingency and 
the new literary form in an anticipation of future cultural significance. The union of 
past and present, which is the hallmark of Goethe’s mode of secularization, is in 
operation in his depiction of the sentient reality of spiritual experience through the 
fusion, in literary form, of the polarities of matter and spirit. And the ‘something else 
besides’ that results from such a fusion is in traditional Christian terms that sense of 
spiritual liberation provided by Christian hope. There are, therefore, implicit links 
between the ‘spiritual freedom’ accorded by participation in the Christian sacraments, 
and the ‘aesthetic freedom’ born of the evocation of coordinated rational and emotional 
drives in the subject who perceives the text which presents this as a functioning 
aesthetic symbol.
In this respect, Goethe’s account of his growing awareness of the relevance 
and function of the past in the present, mentioned in the previous chapter as evidence 
of Goethe’s eminently sensuous attitude to tradition, merits some reconsideration 
here. It is surely not without significance that this admission occurs in a passage 
where Goethe is dealing with his erstwhile inability to enter into fruitful and positive 
exchanges with his contemporaries regarding his religious views. For it reveals 
linguistic and conceptual links with that notion of a transcendence of physical barriers 
which is the corner-stone of the Christian faith:
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Ein Gefiihl aber, das bei mir gewaltig iiberhand nahm, und sich nicht 
wundersam genug auBern konnte, war die Empfindung der Vergangenheit und 
Gegenwart in Eins: eine Anschauung, die etwas GespenstermaBiges in die 
Gegenwart brachte.33
‘Gefuhl’ and ‘Empfindung’ are used interchangeably in this context in a conceptual 
emphasis of the inherent sentience of the phenomenon Goethe is describing. What is 
of especial significance in his description is, however, the confirmation and 
heightening of his conceptual meaning by its coordination with the rhetorical form of 
his account: the text functions aesthetically, in that the feeling described by Goethe is 
itself articulated and evoked in the fabric of his linguistic matrix. The ‘Gefuhl’ assails 
him in a manner that is ‘gewaltig’: the conceptual meaning of a violent sentient 
experience is itself experienced in the sonorous initial consonance of the two terms. 
This sense of the physical experience of feeling continues throughout the relevant 
passage, as the concepts of presence, in the two-fold reference to ‘ Gegenwart’, and 
the strange, ensuing impulse, ‘etwas GespenstermaBiges’, are in the same way pulled 
into the rhetorical fabric which articulates the strong, impulsive force of feeling which 
is conceptually described. The fusion of past and present into a single sentient unity is 
a physical experience which is felt by the author who describes his experience, and by 
the reader who perceives, and thus in turn also experiences, this feeling in the 
sentience of the language in which it is depicted. Goethe’s account of this interaction 
of past and present, in a real experience of it, functions here too as an aesthetic symbol 
communicating the living realities of vital sensation.
This ‘Empfindung der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart in Eins’, then, is the 
sensory perception of the historical past within the cultural present that is the 
foundation and linch-pin of the understanding and appreciation of cultural tradition 
Goethe is concerned to convey: a sentient re-manifestation of traditional notions 
abstracted from the material body of history in a contemporary cultural form which 
both preserves and abolishes the past in the present. In the significant element of 
feeling, the received matter of historical culture is both presented for appreciation and 
understanding, and transcended: sentience is here at play, but functions only when the 
percipient is able to allow himself to be affected. Fully meaningful appreciation of the 
conception of tradition offered here by Goethe evidently depends on the perceptive 
faculties in his reader, who is invited, not only to note the conceptual message, but
33 HA X 32.
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actively to engage in the dynamic, aspiring and continuing role of the past in the 
present. What this sentient experience of the two in fusion produces is that strange 
quantity, ‘etwas GespenstermaBiges’: something that is perceived without having an 
objective, physical existence34, an abstract entity which is both illusive (in terms of 
physical existence) and experientially valid (it exists insofar as it is perceived to exist). 
In this illusory sensation which inheres in the fusion of past and present, is to be felt 
Goethe’s conception of the ongoing synthesis of polarized opposites which forms and 
promotes a third entity that is both the transcendence and the preservation of the other 
two. Moreover, its function in the present depends on its being actively brought into 
the present: this process of mental recollection of an abstract notion, which then 
functions in a fusion of its material origin and its notional abstraction with an apparent 
physical presence and an effect in sensory perception, echoes the function of the 
process of ‘wieder heranrufen’; that spiritual recollection of an actual, physical 
presence which functions both physically and spiritually and transcends, through 
synthesis, the exclusive nature of both realms of appreciation. What this ‘ghost-like’ 
and illusory quality represents, then, is the synthesis of the spiritual and the physical, 
the abstract and the concrete, the sacral and the worldly, into a transcendent third 
entity which preserves both elements of the polarity in whose tension it inheres, and 
annuls them in its aspiration, through regression to original forms, toward a higher 
sense, function, and import.
The ‘etwas GespenstermaBiges’ produced by a synthesis of past and present 
perceived in this way acquires a specifically religious significance in Goethe’s account 
in Dichtung und Wahrheit of the quality of faith occurring in the recourse to the 
intensity of feeling of early Christianity which is the foundation and aspiration of the 
Pietist religion:
Seit meiner Annaherung an die Briidergemeine hatte meine Neigung zu dieser 
Gesellschaft, die sich unter der Siegesfahne Christi versammelte, immer 
zugenommen. Jede positive Religion hat ihren groBten Reiz, wenn sie im 
Werden begriffen ist; deswegen ist es so angenehm, sich in die Zeiten der 
Apostel zu denken, wo sich alles noch frisch und unmittelbar geistig darstellt, 
und die Briidergemeine hatte hierin etwas Magisches, daB sie jenen ersten 
Zustand fortzusetzen, ja zu verewigen schien. Sie knupfte ihren Ursprung an 
die friihsten Zeiten an, sie war niemals fertig geworden, sie hatte sich nur in 
unbemerkten Ranken durch die rohe Welt hindurchgewunden; nun schlug ein
34 Trunz notes Goethe’s use of the term ‘Gespenst’ in the FarbenJehre to describe ‘etwas, was man 
sieht und was doch nicht da ist’ (HA X 582).
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einzelnes Auge, unter dem Schutz eines frommen vorziiglichen Mannes, 
Wurzel, um sich abermals aus unmerklichen, zufallig scheinenden Anfangen 
weit iiber die Welt auszubreiten.35
This, ostensibly, is Goethe’s account in Dichtung und Wahrheit of the phenomenon of 
‘positive religion’ as he experienced and appreciated it: this is the conceptual import of 
his message. But the passage also operates on a different level: here, too, is an 
example of aesthetic discourse in the interactive fusing of form and meaning. In the 
continuation and reformulation of traditional Christianity is contained the essence of 
Pietist mysticism and attraction, and Goethe’s formulation encapsulates in the fabric of 
his linguistic medium a hint of the tangible reality, the spiritual immediacy, of 
individual religious experience which he objectively perceives as the principal value of 
Pietist practice. Goethe as commentator acknowledges this attraction and this worth; 
Goethe as individual rejects the fundaments of this unorthodox sect, as he rejected the 
dogmas of institutionalized Christianity, and is in turn rejected by the leaders of the 
sect itself; Goethe as manipulator of his artistic medium conveys a sense of the worth 
and attraction of positive religion in the fabric of his formulation. The appearance of 
eternally functioning religious feeling in the workings of Pietist faith derives from a 
recourse to original forms, to the very nature of the early Church, which thus continue 
to function in and act upon the present world: religious worship in the present is 
accorded a sense and a validity which is justified in the past, and which at the same 
time points forward, for the adherents of this type of faith, to an unassailable and 
eternal religious future. Through this regression to the primal and original religious 
world the sense and import of the early Church are both preserved and transcended: 
past and present fuse in an anticipation and direction of the future of religious faith. 
And this synthesis of original forms and contemporary spirituality is itself re­
manifested in the form of Goethe’s account, which freezes in the temporal, 
phenomenal abeyance and physical re-materialization of literary contextualization the 
spiritual notions with which it deals. The alliterative link between ‘Religion’ and 
‘Reiz’ compounds Goethe’s conceptual discussion of the attraction of this type of 
religion, transmuting his objective appraisal of positive religion into something felt 
and tangible; a subjective experience inherent in his formulation and implicit in his 
account. Thus the nature and function of objective, historical religion is inextricably 
fused, in the material body of Goethe’s maxim, with its appreciation in terms of
35 HA X 42f.
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sentient reaction. Goethe’s own temporal manifestation of spiritual notions echoes the 
nature of Pietism’s appropriation of the essence of positive religion: ‘im Werden 
begriffen’ expresses the nominalization and objectification of the progressive 
implications of the action of ‘becoming’ in phenomenal, palpable, and hence 
manipulable form, thus materializing the significance of ongoing religious forms in an 
assimilative, functional perception of their evolutionary progress. To imagine oneself 
back in the nurture and caring body of the early Church is ‘angenehm’; a positive and 
personal sensuous reaction inhering in the fusion of reality, through the natural 
freshness, and spirituality, in the unaffected and unmediated sacrality, of this pre­
existent and progressive religious form. And the result of this fusion is also depicted 
as ‘etwas Magisches’: there is something inherently mystical in the manifestations of 
Pietism, which stems directly from their resemblance to, and re-enactment of, the 
fundaments of the earliest Christian Church. And, moreover, it is this illusory quality, 
this undefinable ‘something’, which apparently - appearance being itself a fusion of 
the phenomenal world and its perception - externalizes and eternalizes the nature and 
function of original religious forms. The process of recourse to essential religion is 
described in the physical act of ‘ankniipfen’. Here, the conceptual concretion of the 
process is aesthetically evoked in the vocal chain which concretely links the notions of 
‘latching on’ (‘ankniipfen’), ‘originality’ (‘Ursprung’), and ‘primariness’ (‘friihst’): 
Goethe’s literary representation of the metaphorically physical act of ‘buttoning onto 
the past’ renders its sensuous apprehension perceptible in the physical sensuousness 
of his language. The phenomenal world is, however, transcended in the infinite 
evolution of this projection of finite forms, ‘sie war niemals fertig geworden’. The 
effects of this recourse to the past remain abstract as long as they go unnoticed and 
remain unperceived, but enmesh themselves physically in the very fabric of the world, 
‘in unbemerkten Ranken durch die rohe Welt hindurchgewunden’. Goethe’s 
representation of the process in the concretion of his imagery renders it open to 
perception, open to re-interpretation in terms of the present world in which its 
significance and significant function are renewed, and operates thus as a re-enactment 
of the manifest materialization of the workings of traditional religion through their 
perception in the world of his text. His use of an unequivocally mixed metaphor, ‘nun 
schlug ein einzelnes Auge ... Wurzel’, fuses the abstraction of metaphorical 
association and the concretion of sense in an image of the concrete apprehension of
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abstract religious faith, by which the arbitrary appearance of the exigencies of 
religious faith and its historical manifestations transcend the physical world in a 
progression and continuation of the nature, function and power of faith itself. The 
secularization of past religious forms to function actively in the present is, for Goethe, 
an ongoing religious experience: the relocation of essential religion does not render 
impotent the power of primal faith, but, on the contrary, increases its scope and 
significance in the projection of an active, inherent force. Past and present combine to 
produce a novel, functioning cultural form: sacrality and secularity fuse in the 
inception and projection of an inchoate, but real, religious feeling. Goethe’s mode of 
secularization is such that this essential feeling is present in the palpable, tangible form 
of his language: through his mode of secularization the very essence of the religious 
faith he describes is open to perception, apprehension and re-liberation.
If the argument for a mode of secularization which fuses form and meaning to 
offer a new perspective on Goethe’s treatment of the religious tradition in his 
autobiography is to be truly persuasive, then it must surely be applied to what has 
been acknowledged as the crucial religious passage in the work, that perplexingly 
diffuse account of Goethe’s conception and development of ‘his own religion’ which 
he places in a pivotal position (it is ‘crucial’, then, in terms of a ‘crux’) at the end of 
Book 8 of Dichtung und Wahrhetf6.
Most commentators point to the Gnostic elements of the religious conception 
detailed by Goethe in these pages, and this notion deserves some brief consideration
here. T v o a ia , as ‘understanding’ or ‘knowledge’, is, according to the theological
historian H Daniel-Rops, a philosophy which is founded on ‘man’s effort to grasp the 
divine’37. Gnosticism as a philosophical system has been described as the aspiration 
towards a point where knowledge and faith combine (Daniel-Rops speaks of an 
‘intimate mingling’), a blurring of the contours of self-surrendering ecstasy and 
intellectual speculation. Cerebral understanding is thus linked with physical seizure, 
with precisely that paradoxical holding and encapsulation of the ineffable which 
informs Goethe’s mode of secularization. For Daniel-Rops:
36 See Trunz, HA IX 736: ‘Und dann gipfelt das [religiose] Motiv in einem religiosen Ausschnitt, der 
einerseits die Beziehung zu einer jahrhundertealten Uberlieferung, andererseits die personliche geistige 
Eigenart sehen laBt. Er steht im Zusammenhang der anderen groBen - iiber das ganze Werk verteilten - 
religiosen Parteien und ist als BuchschluB an eine betonte Stelle geriickt’.
37 H Daniel-Rops, The Church o f the Apostles and Martyrs, New York, 1960, p.297.
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Gnosticism is this complex mixture of Christian ideals and heterogenous 
speculations, which resulted in a world of aberrant reflections.38
Or, as Goethe put it, with affected simplicity in understatement, ‘so erbaute ich mir 
eine Welt, die seltsam genug aussah’39.
Despite acknowledging its significance for an understanding of Goethe’s 
‘religion’, critical references to this recognized crux passage are curiously short on 
analytical depth. Kurt Jahn, for example, refers briefly to it as the product of Goethe’s 
reading of Gnostic literature at the time of writing, and thus as an example of the 
philosophical outlook of the mature author occluding the predominantly Pietistic 
leanings of the protagonist40. Erich Trunz’s commentary in the Hamburger Ausgabe 
points too to the derivativeness of the analysis, and suggests sources of information 
from which Goethe may have drawn. Trunz alludes to a kind of originality in 
Goethe’s expression, but here again, no coherent account is offered of precisely what 
it is that might constitute Goethe’s ‘originality in derivativeness’, or its import. That 
Trunz notes a ‘Klarheit und kiinstlerische Abrundung des Bildes’41 on Goethe’s part is 
interesting, for these two and a half pages of the Hamburg edition are packed with 
some of the densest explicit philosophical arguments to occur in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit. Indeed, if there is an ‘artistic rounding off’ of the world-view here 
discussed, then its ‘clarity’ is surely all the more difficult to perceive, and must refer 
to the forms of expression used rather than to the thoughts themselves. Derek 
Bowman delineates this passage as evidence of ‘Goethe’s early cabbalistic world-view 
and his later realization of the burden placed on his shoulders by the “Naturgabe” of 
poetry’42. For Bowman, the passage is a clear example, too, of Goethe’s concern to 
‘work things out for himself’, and is also evidenced as another telling example of 
Goethe’s habit of writing on matters religious with a profusion of concessives, 
subjunctives and modal verbs; and of what Bowman somewhat dismissively describes 
as Goethe’s ‘high-handed knowingness which he reserves for stating his own 
youthful views’43.
38 Ibid.
39 HA IX 350.
40 Jahn, Goethes Dichtung und Wahrheit, op. cit., pp.264f.: ‘sodaB sich aus der allgemeinen Religion 
der individuellen entwickelt, die in seinem Leben iibrigens in weit hoherem Grade die pietistische 
Bekenntnisform angenommen hat, als es seine Darstellung eigentlich zugibt, die aus der mystischen 
Richtung seiner damaligen Lektiire ein gnostisches System zusammenbaut’.
41 HA IX 761.
42 Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.59.
43 Ibid., p.52.
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Goethe does indeed introduce this account of his youthful quest for a religious
standpoint with a tone of playful enjoyment and exuberance in religious speculation
(for Bowman, “the old man’s disclaimer”; or an indication that what follows is not
necessarily the view of the author!44):
Ich studierte fleifiig die verschiedenen Meinungen, und da ich oft genug hatte 
sagen horen, jeder Mensch habe am Ende doch seine eigene Religion, so kam 
mir nichts natiirlicher vor, als dab ich mir auch meine eigene bilden konne, 
und dieses tat ich mit vieler Behaglichkeit.45
However, this tone does not apparently continue into the speculative passage itself, 
which commences not with the modal subjunctive ‘ich mochte’, as stated by 
Bowman46, but, as Trunz insists in the Hamburger Ausgabe, with the indicative 
imperfect ‘ich mochte’. Trunz’s interpretation of ‘mochte’ in the sense of ‘konnte mit 
dem Anklang von “ich tat es gem’” 47 would confirm the mature Goethe’s starting- 
point as an affirmation of youthful exuberance; this attitude is expressed not in terms 
of concessive tentativeness, however, but as a statement of descriptive fact. There is 
no linguistic expression of an unwillingness on Goethe’s part to commit himself to 
any specific theological viewpoint here: what Goethe presents is a dense account of a 
world-view interweaving complicated and convoluted strands of thought in a 
particular way and for a particular effect. It is the following purpose - why the mature 
Goethe chose the structures, terms and phrases he did to represent the religious quest 
of the young man - which is to form the focus of this analysis of the passage in terms 
of the relationship between thought and expression, and between sentient experience 
and material form.
Bowman is wrong about the location of this passage in Dichtung und
Wahrheit it concludes Book 8, not Book 7 as he states. However, his commentary is
informed by some major insights which merit further analysis; notably the implication
that the text is somehow ‘poetic’ (for Bowman, this poetry inheres in the formative
hand of the mature Goethe moulding the exuberant and extravagant thoughts of the
young man) and, furthermore, that Goethe’s account is somehow dynamic:
He has made the old static cosmology dynamic ... Where the old pansophist 
writers regarded the fall and salvation as historical fact he feels them as a 
constantly recurring process in each man’s life. This process expresses the
44 Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.64.
45 HA IX 350.
46 Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.52.
47 HA IX 760.
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rhythm of the universe beating in each man’s breast.48 
Bowman seeks corroboration of Goethe’s poetic gift, this ‘burden’, as he puts it, in a 
poem: he cites ‘Im Atemholen sind zweierlei Gnaden’49. That he hesitates to 
corroborate his own insight into the poetic functions of Goethe’s religious 
considerations here may lie in a failure to appreciate the fundamental difference 
between ‘poetry proper’ and ‘aesthetic discourse’, or ‘schoner Vortrag’. I hope to 
show that the rhythms of life as intimated by Bowman are indeed there to be perceived 
in the autobiographical text itself. Detailed analysis of this passage should reveal 
precisely how Goethe dynamizes a received world-view, how the recognized ‘artistry’ 
functions in presenting an underlying message to be perceived and appreciated by the 
reader, how a sacral import is communicated in a secular form, and how the past - the 
concerns of the youthful Goethe with his religious tradition - is re-presented by the 
mature author in a manner which communicates with actual relevance and vital 
insistence.
Goethe is embarked here on the (very human) concern to conceptualize God,
and the image he derives for himself, with unashamed relish, is strange and
unequivocally personal. The conception for which he is striving is timeless, rooted in
an eternal past and projecting into an eternal future:
Ich mochte mir wohl eine Gottheit vorstellen, die sich von Ewigkeit her selbst 
produziert; da sich aber Produktion nicht ohne Mannigfaltigkeit denken laBt, 
so muBte sie sich notwendig sogleich als ein Zweites erscheinen, welches wir 
unter den Namen des Sohns anerkennen; diese beiden muBten nun den Akt des 
Hervorbringens fortsetzen, und erschienen sich selbst wieder im Dritten, 
welches nun ebenso bestehend lebendig und ewig als das Ganze war.
Here is Goethe’s conceptual presentation of the Christian Trinity: the Godhead is
involved in an eternal process of reproduction, which, as a natural process, leads
inevitably to multiplicity. Thus the Godhead must reproduce itself in another form,
which the Christian tradition recognizes as ‘the Son’. But the compulsive process of
reproduction and multiplicity cannot stop there, and is continued by the two together
to produce a third entity. The first two appear in the concept of the third: the third is as
vital and as eternal as the whole.
The history of theological speculation is full of attempts to rationalize and
prove the intellectual validity of the Christian tradition. For the early Church, many of
48 Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.64.
49 Ibid. See HA II 10.
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these gave rise to prominent heresies, which, as some commentators have pointed out, 
formed much of Goethe’s reading material at the time of writing. The Arian heresy, 
springing from the noble idea of a sublime and ineffable God, states that God the 
Father and Christ the Son are distinct beings; the Son had a state of existence prior to 
his appearance on earth, but does not spring from eternity. Athanasius, on the other 
hand, with the Council of Nicaea behind him, stated that the Son is ‘of the same 
substance’ as the Father50. Goethe’s allusion here to an eternal process of production 
and reproduction is in fact a contradiction of the Arian heresy: since the multiplicity 
process inheres in an eternal past and projects towards an eternal future, the Godhead 
cannot be given temporal precedence or qualitative superiority over the Son. 
However, any human attempt to analyze the process, to render it rationally acceptable, 
is an attempt to fix the process in language and hence, inevitably, leads to an artificial 
depiction of primacy and predominance. Goethe’s use of linguistic concepts and 
structures is particularly telling in this regard.
The logical, linear progression through the text is from the Godhead, to the 
second entity (the Son), to the third entity, which claims equalness with ‘the whole’. 
The polyptoton ‘Ewigkeit’/ ‘ewig’, however, contradicts the conceptual message that 
one entity logically precedes another, by rooting the entire process in a cycle of 
eternity. Furthermore, the notion that God appeared ‘notwendig sogleich’ in the 
second entity intimates that, although the linear nature of human conceptualization 
demands that something be given primacy, the process by which Christ comes from 
God is not a simple linear progression of cause and effect: the entity which we 
conceive as ‘the Son’ inheres directly in the ‘Godhead’ and has equal, simultaneous 
existence therewith. Moreover, ‘Gottheit’ and ‘Mannigfaltigkeit’ comprise two arms 
of a chiasmus embracing the polyptoton of ‘produziert’ and ‘Produktion’: the core 
notion of production is what the semantically primal ‘Godhead’ and subsequent 
‘multiplicity’ have in common, and is, indeed, what results from their interaction. The 
syntax expresses the logical view that production leads to multiplicity: the structure of 
Goethe’s aesthetic formulation conveys the inseparability of God and the reproduction 
of God by linking the two concepts in a cycle around the notion of production. Thus
50 Daniel-Rops, op. cit., pp.463ff., summarizes the arguments of Arius, Athanasius, and the other 
major figures of 4th century Christianity, and highlights the exact point at which the Arian heresy 
occurs: ‘Arius does not distinguish between the person and the nature; Jesus, the Christ, the Son, is 
not like God the Father; He is not His equal; He is not of the same essence as God. This opened an 
abyss between God and Christ, the abyss which separates the finite from the infinite’ (p.463).
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the concepts of God and multiplicity may be perceived as having equal primacy, 
functioning together in a reproductive capacity.
The concepts of eternity, reproduction, necessity and dynamism are interlinked 
throughout this long sentence to underline the semantic message of their natural 
interaction. But the chain of verbs Goethe uses, which express the human activity 
involved in understanding the process, are verbs of static conceptualization: 
‘vorstellen’, ‘denken lassen’, ‘anerkennen’. Beginning and End are inconceivable in 
this timeless process: the Christian conception of the relationship between God and 
Christ is a historical attempt to encapsulate the notion of constant divine reproduction 
and multiplicity by concentrating on one part of the process. Thus the Christian notion 
of God the Father with Christ as His Son is just one aspect, frozen in religious 
tradition, of a constantly moving process of divine reproduction and remanifestation. 
Semantically, Goethe reiterates this process, and the human activities involved in 
conceptualizing it: aesthetically, he conveys the simultaneity and equal inter­
relationship of God, Christ and their continuing progression.
Binary synthesis is operating at many levels in this sentence. Goethe exploits 
the linguistic form of his account to convey messages which sometimes corroborate, 
sometimes contradict, the semantic import. When form simply reinforces meaning, the 
human activity involved in appreciating the message is logical. If, however, form and 
semantic meaning fuse to yield yet another meaning - as in poetry - then the message 
is communicated at a level above and beyond the logical, at a point where human 
feeling is involved. The reader may well understand the conceptual import of the 
message, but if he is left with some inchoate sense of perceived comprehension, then 
Goethe’s depiction of the Christian Trinity is far more than a formula for rational 
understanding: it is a communication of real, that is, felt, comprehension.
Furthermore, the process of reproduction cannot logically stop at a third 
manifestation, and continues to produce what theological history recognizes as 
Lucifer, a being likewise deriving from and equal to God:
Hiermit war jedoch der Kreis der Gottheit geschlossen, und es ware ihnen 
selbst nicht moglich gewesen, abermals ein ihnen vollig Gleiches 
hervorzubringen. Da jedoch der Produktionstrieb immer fortging, so 
erschufen sie ein Viertes, das aber schon in sich ein Widerspruch hegte, indem 
es, wie sie, unbedingt und doch zugleich in ihnen enthalten und durch sie 
begrenzt sein sollte. Diese war nun Luzifer, welchem von nun an die ganze 
Schopfungskraft iibertragen war, und von dem alles iibrige Sein ausgehen
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sollte.
God, Christ, the Spirit, Lucifer and the power of creation: concepts sufficient to 
themselves, having equal primacy and enjoying equal significance. Their inter­
relationship has been described by theologian J K S Reid as a ‘trinitarian triune 
triplex’51: I suggest that what Goethe is presenting here is the notion of a thesis 
projecting an antithesis, and that these two function together to produce a synthesis 
containing and expressing one or both of the antithetical terms; itself projecting an 
antithesis with which it enters a synthesis, continuing the process of reproduction and 
unity in multiplicity which Goethe called ‘Steigerung’. Through use of binary 
synthesis, then, Goethe conceptualizes the relationship between eternity and 
temporality, between God and the world, between the spiritual and the secular: and in 
turn the binary synthesis of semantic message and aesthetic form reiterates this 
relationship.
Moreover, Goethe’s account of the fall of Lucifer also contains a warning 
about the dangers of unchecked progression of one entity at the expense of others, 
which is significantly evocative of the process of ‘Steigerung’ without appropriate 
‘Spezification’:
Er bewies sogleich seine unendliche Tatigkeit, indem er die samtlichen Engel 
erschuf, alle wieder nach seinem Gleichnis, unbedingt, aber in ihm enthalten 
und durch ihn begrenzt. Umgeben von einer solchen Glorie vergaB er seines 
hoheren Ursprungs und glaubte ihn in sich selbst zu finden, und aus diesem 
ersten Undank entsprang alles, was uns nicht mit dem Sinne und den 
Absichten der Gottheit iibereinzustimmen scheint. Je mehr er sich nun in sich 
selbst konzentrierte, je unwohler muBte es ihm werden, sowie alien den 
Geistern, denen er die siiBe Erhebung zu ihrem Ursprung verkummerte. Und 
so ereignete sich das, was uns unter der Form des Abfalls der Engel 
bezeichnet wird.
Thus Goethe explains the genesis of the antithesis of goodness through the 
concentration of one entity on itself, attempting to function alone and unchecked. It is 
this antithetical opposition, says Goethe, which produces the schism of matter and 
spirit:
Aus dieser Konzentration der ganzen Schopfung, denn sie war von Luzifer 
ausgegangen und muBte ihm folgen, entsprang nun alles das, was wir unter 
der Gestalt der Materie gewahr werden, was wir als schwer, fest und finster 
vorstellen.
51 See Reid, Christian Apologetics, London, 1969, pp.65f.
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Matter transpires from the unfruitful tension of spirit in itself: matter has the same
essence as spirit, the same origins as spirit, and results from one engendered aspect of
the Godhead attempting to function alone and unspecified. From this attempt at
unidirectional progress (that is, without recourse to and mutual subordination with the
other reproduced entities), transpires evil, a loss of purity through betrayal of essence,
a lost connection with eternity and a binding fixation in time:
Da nun das ganze Unheil, wenn wir es so nennen diirfen, bloB durch die 
einseitige Richtung Luzifers entstand; so fehlte freilich dieser Schopfung die 
bessere Halfte; denn alles, was durch Konzentration gewonnen wird, besaB 
sie, aber es fehlte ihr alles, was durch Expansion allein bewirkt werden kann; 
und so hatte die samtliche Schopfung durch immerwahrende Konzentration 
sich selbst aufreiben, sich mit ihrem Vater Luzifer vernichten und alle ihre 
Anspriiche an eine gleiche Ewigkeit mit der Gottheit verlieren konnen.
Goethe’s use of two borrowed Latin words both rhetorically underlines, and
aesthetically expresses a unity in, his conceptual opposition of concentration and static
possession on the one hand, and expansion and dynamic functioning on the other; and
an intimation of the purity of that which has been lost is expressed in the inherent
assonance of the phrase ‘eine gleiche Ewigkeit mit der Gottheit’. Thus the material
form of Goethe’s text iterates the inherent sense of his message: matter and spirit are
of the same essence, but must function together, in a process of reciprocal
subordination, in order to preserve the very rhythms of life itself:
Sie [die Elohim] gaben dem unendlichen Sein die Fahigkeit, sich 
auszudehnen, sich gegen sie zu bewegen; der eigentliche Puls des Lebens war 
wieder hergestellt, und Luzifer selbst konnte sich dieser Einwirkung nicht 
entziehen. Diese ist die Epoche, wo dasjenige hervortrat, was wir als Licht 
kennen, und wo dasjenige begann, was wir mit dem Worte Schopfung zu 
bezeichnen pflegen.
But the concept of ‘creation’, like those of production, multiplicity and eternity, runs 
throughout this passage, and Goethe’s apparent attempt to chronologize the process is 
contradicted by the form of his account. Repeatedly, man’s concern to understand the 
process is referred to in terms of conceptual recognition (‘kennen’, ‘bezeichnen’), and 
Goethe’s affected distancing of himself from his account through recourse to the 
rhetorical plural, which for some commentators is but another indicator of his 
unwillingness to commit himself to a particular religious standpoint, is surely here far 
more a pointer to his awareness that any attempt to conceptualize the immaterial is a
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false and inadequate freezing of the ineffable in form, of the eternal in time.
The paragraph with which Goethe concludes this account of a religious world­
view commences, not only with an asserted ease in understanding which can only be 
interpreted as ironic understatement, but with a reiteration of the concepts of ‘eternity’ 
and ‘necessity’ with which the passage itself starts:
Man sieht leicht, wie hier die Erlosung nicht allein von Ewigkeit her 
beschlossen, sondern als ewig notwendig gedacht wird, ja daB sie durch die 
ganze Zeit des Werdens und Seins sich immer wieder emeuem muB.
The cycle is complete, and yet continues, and the rhetorical structure of Goethe’s
account underlines his conceptual message of a natural, dynamic process which now
issues in the central Christian notion of redemption. Goethe’s text is itself an example
of the constant and continuous process of being and becoming: his summary refers to
his starting point, containing and expressing all that has been achieved therein, where
the process of creation, of spirit and matter, God and the world, the sacral and the
secular, is described as one of eternal return, of mutually subordinating polarities
functioning together in progressive refinement. But the aesthetic features of Goethe’s
formulations operate at a level above and beyond the merely conceptual, heightening
the reader’s perception of the process, and actually, by inviting participation in the text
and its message, subtly confirming the validity of the process leading to redemption.
The congruity of sound-look and meaning in the phrase ‘ewig notwendig’ offers a
palpable experience of that inexorable, unremitting progression towards redemption.
The chain of vocal and consonantal sounds linking ‘Zeit’, ‘Werden’, ‘Sein’ and
‘wieder’ expresses the interactive fusion of time, development, being and recurrence.
Goethe may introduce redemption with a logical account of the notion’s historical
origins on the continuum, but his expression conveys a sense, a palpable experience,
of human involvement in this very process.
And so Goethe concludes:
... genug, wenn nur anerkannt wird, daB wir uns in einem Zustand befinden, 
der, wenn er uns auch niederzuziehen und zu drucken scheint, dennoch 
Gelegenheit gibt, ja zur Pflicht macht, uns zu erheben und die Absichten der 
Gottheit dadurch zu erfiillen, daB wir, indem wir von einer Seite uns zu 
verselbsten genotigt sind, von den andern in regelmaBigen Pulsen uns zu 
entselbstigen nicht versaumen.
From ‘verselbsten’ to ‘entselbstigen’, the underlying unity of which is conveyed by
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polyptoton, from eternal divinity through reproduction and multiplicity to the 
manfestation of God in Man, the rhythms of life are there to be perceived and are 
themselves present in the text which discusses them. Goethe’s passage reverberates 
with ‘regelmaGigen Pulsen’ in the rhythmical beatings of the words he uses; his 
account of dynamic recurrence itself recurs dynamically throughout; the conceptual 
message and its rhetorical form are operating together on the perceptive psyche of the 
reader. They may be appreciated in separation: as a statement about a youthful quest 
for religious enlightenment, or as an example of the poetic abilities of the mature 
Goethe. But it is surely in terms of the mutual functioning of meaning and form that 
the full import of Goethe’s message is to be appreciated: the sacral tradition and the 
secular medium are interwoven in such a way that the reader may actually feel that 
dynamism which is under discussion, and intimate some sense of the essential inter­
relationship of spirit and matter which is depicted. The reader who experiences these 
rhythms of the universe is himself projected into the continuum of production, 
multiplicity and eternity: the force of Goethe’s message, concessively impersonal as it 
is, invites active participation in, and genuine comprehension of, the sense of its 
import.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of binary synthesis in 
presenting for renewed and enhanced appreciation the religious feeling which informs 
and directs faith itself in Goethe’s treatment of aspects of his religious tradition. 
Aspects as discrete as the central sacrament of Roman Catholicism, the mystical 
reverence of Pietism, and the abstract theologizing of the Gnostic world-view. 
Goethe’s representation in Dichtung und Wahrheit of his childhood concern with 
ancient biblical tradition, culminating in his reformulation of the Genesis story will, I 
hope, confirm the argument in a predominantly Old Testament context, and will also 
serve to illustrate the quality of linguistic ‘play’ which is crucial to an understanding of 
the recreational aspect of Goethe’s attitude to religion.
From the previous chapter, which analyzed Goethe’s explicit account of his 
social and intellectual milieu in Dichtung und Wahrheit, it emerged that scholarship 
has long been aware of the need to view the substance of Goethe’s account in terms of 
the linguistic and stylistic form in which he couched it. The events, deeds, and 
personalities related and described by Goethe are mediated by the time which has
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lapsed from the immediacy of experience to the point of biographical reflection upon 
them; by the accumulative experience of those intervening years; by the assimilating 
mind of the reflecting individual; and by the creative and formative impulse of the 
author apparent in the style and tone of his story-telling. Goethe’s narrative reveals a 
constant authorial irony by which the author is repeatedly dissociated nominally from 
the account, to provide what becomes, in parts, a speciously and ironically impersonal 
autobiography. Goethe is playing an elaborate game with his reader, but not just out 
of any merely gratuitous sense of fun. The personae he evokes with calculated 
impersonality are integers in the totality of his own self: they are not, however, within 
the fabric of the narrative, to be identified wholly with the creative personality of the 
author. His authorial stance is necessarily impersonal and detached in order that his 
account may seem to stand and function alone, speciously independent of the ultimate 
source and point of reference that is Goethe himself. This affected detachment is, of 
course, a typically Goethean ploy with earnest intent. Goethe’s game has a very 
serious instructive and constructive function. It is a stylistic affectation in which 
Goethe’s more serious over-riding message is inherent in the humour of the account; 
the subtle, quietly pervasive humour of ironic detachment which exists to be perceived 
by the reader who, by the very act of perceiving the authorial detatchment, involves 
himself in the fabric of Goethe’s message, and is himself drawn into the game. And it 
is a game which is at its most subtle, and hence its most potentially penetrating, when 
the mature and distanced Goethe is discussing the religious education and milieu of his 
youth and their repercussions52. Religion is, traditionally, a serious topic, and 
Goethe’s depiction and account in Dichtung und Wahrheit of the influence of religion 
upon him reveals a light humorous touch whose gentle pervasiveness is directly 
proportional to the inherent weightiness of the topic. Goethe’s earliest formal biblical 
education was on the basis of a subterfuge: the learning of Hebrew in order, 
ostensibly, better to study the text of the Old Testament, but actually, he confesses, to 
satisfy his interest in Yiddish53. The peculiar accents and gurgling sounds of the 
Hebrew language provide the young Goethe temporarily with a sort of childish
52 Goethe’s use of irony and affected humour when discussing matters religious in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit has been noted by scholars. See Jahn, Goethes Dichtung und Wahrheit, op. cit., pp.262ff.; 
Bowman, Life into Autobiography, op. cit., pp. 52f. and passim; Cooper, op. cit., p.171.
53 HA IX 126: ‘Ich verschwieg ihm die Absicht auf das Judendeutsch, und sprach von besserem 
Verstandnis des Grundtexts’.
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amusement, but he soon tires of what he terms ‘diese schalen SpaGe’54, and enters into 
a protracted bantering exchange with his tutor, whom he seeks to divert from 
grammatical tuition in order ‘auf den Sinn der Sache loszugehen’55, attempting to 
outmatch and outplay him by citing improbabilities and unrealities in the Old 
Testament text, and demanding their logical explanation. The tutor’s chuckling 
conclusion that Goethe is a ‘foolish’ little boy - “Er narrischer Kerl! Er narrischer 
Junge!”56 - points not to any inherent stupidity in the enquiring mind, but implies the 
ironic interchange of foolishness and seriousness, naivety and ingenuity, through 
which the essential sense is brought to the fore and an elevated form of knowledge 
through play furthered.
This bantering sense of educative fun is present, in varying degrees of 
obviousness and subtlety, throughout Goethe’s account of his religious upbringing 
and its continuing significance. His natural language is, he asserts, full of the biblical 
allusions and colourful religious imagery of his native upper German dialect, and it is 
these ‘Anspielungen auf biblische Kernstellen’57 that Goethe is particularly advised to 
eradicate from his speech in order to conform to the dictates of correct social 
discourse. He notes, however, that these ‘plays’ on words and images are the life­
blood of language and hence of thought, and that their denial leads to a truncated and 
suffocated form of self-expression58. The irony of authorial manipulation allows 
Goethe to further his game, and the play with words and allusions, to depict a prank 
perpetrated by some contemporaries, who sought to imitate Christ by appropriating and 
riding a donkey. Goethe notes with light but terse irony the lack of success of the 
ploy: ‘Nachahmer fand er doch keinen und wenig Gesellen’59. Biblical allusions are a 
social discursive taboo but nonetheless find expression in practical jokes: humour and 
religion, in the youthful society depicted by the mature Goethe, are implicitly linked, 
and the significance of the ludatory impulse brought out, be it in objective deed or in 
linguistic practice.
A more elaborate practical joke is enacted in the convoluted Goethean humour 
in which, after describing the extent to which he had to curb his idiomatic dialect,
54 HA IX 127.
55 HA IX 128.
58 Ibid.
67 HA IX 251.
58 Ibid., f.: ‘Ich fuhlte mich in meinem Innem paralysiert und wuBte kaum mehr, wie ich mich tiber 
die gemeinsten Dinge zu auBern hatte’.
59 HA IX 253.
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Goethe accounts for his social intercourse in Leipzig in terms of a biblical image,
which he exploits to describe and evoke the contemporary influence of the prominent
figure of Johann Christoph Gottsched:
Das Gottschedische Gewasser hatte die deutsche Welt mit einer wahren 
Siindflut iiberschwemmt, welche sogar fiber die hochsten Berge 
hinaufzusteigen drohte.60
Goethe does not have to make explicit his sceptical attitude towards the theories of
Gottsched and their considerable influence: the image of a ‘Siindflut’ which threatens
even the most inaccessible and intransigent points of intellectual society, lightened by
the preceding discussion of the necessary avoidance of such imagery, suffices to make
his point; and, moreover, to indicate the inadequacy and untenability of the linguistic
fetters which would deny him such a means of expression. His allusion to ‘das
Gottschedische Gewasser’ is an easy and natural secularization of a primary biblical
event in an ironic play on language, source, and influence, in which alliteration, play
on the sounds and cadences of language, itself plays a significant part. Humour is, for
Goethe, second nature, an irreplaceably effective means of portraying ‘the most
serious things’. A member of his adolescent society reveals a predilection in speech
for:
eine Kapuzinade, fratzenhafter als je, vielleicht gerade darum, weil er die 
ernsthaftesten Dinge zu sagen gedachte. Er ffihrte namlich mit Sprfichen aus 
der Bibel, die nicht zur Sache pafiten, mit Gleichnissen, die nicht trafen, mit 
Anspielungen, die nichts erlauterten, den Satz aus.61
Humour is never absent from this ebullient society, from ribald puns on names (Horn
was a particular victim62), through play with comic masks and affected physical
handicaps63, to playful but telling parodies of contemporary poetic norms. Here the
inherent seriousness of the practice of literary parody is brought out by an observation
by Goethe on the dangers and pitfalls of widespread and indiscriminate literary
imitation:
Es ist nicht wunderbar, aber es erregt doch Verwunderung, wenn man bei 
Betrachtung einer Literatur, besonders der deutschen, beobachtet, wie eine 
ganze Nation von einem einmal gegebenen und in einer gewissen Form mit 
Glfick behandelten Gegenstand nicht wieder loskommen kann, sondem ihn
60 HA IX 254.
61 HA IX 236.
62 Ibid.: ‘Horn, dessen Name schon zu allerlei Scherzen AnlaB gab
63 HA IX 237.
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auf alle Weise wiederholt haben will; da denn zuletzt, unter den angehauften 
Nachahmungen, das Original selbst verdeckt und erstickt wird.64
Goethe’s passage warns against indiscriminate reiteration and repetition, and describes 
the pull of cultural inheritance which encourages derivation and repetition, in a 
linguistic form which ironically makes manifest the writer’s ability to transcend 
inheritance in his application of his craft to the unoriginal material with which he is 
dealing. Goethe makes use of the rhetorical figure of polyptoton 
(‘wunderbar’/‘Verwunderung’) to hint at the manifold potentiality of this craft, the 
exploitation of the myriad nuances of words and letters. He exploits alliterative 
repetition of initial plosive ‘b’ consonants to create the illusion, within the text, of a 
natural, rhythmical drum-beat which emphasises, in its appeal to sensory perception, 
the conceptual significance of his message (‘Wenn man bei Betrachtung einer 
Literatur, besonders der deutschen, beobachtet . . .’). He repeats the prefix ‘ein’ to 
stress, again through the sense of beating rhythm which sensuously confirms the 
conceptual message, the singularity of the object under discussion, despite the 
plurality of its potential manifestations (‘von einem einmal gegebenen und in einer 
gewissen Form behandelten Gegenstand’); alliterating again on the initial ‘ge’ sounds 
of ‘gegebenen’, ‘gewissen’, and ‘Gegenstand’; of which the first and third examples 
are themselves linked formally, by the association of the medial ‘be’ in ‘gegebenen’, 
with the preceding chain of plosives, facilitating thereby the rhetorical connection of 
‘gegeben’ with the ‘Gegenstand’ to which it is conceptually applied. Alliteration 
further links elements in the phrase ‘auf alle Weise wiederholt haben will’, and 
compounds the semantic linking of ‘verdeckt’ and ‘erstickt’ with a sonorous similarity 
which enhances their conceptual import by articulating, in crisp consonantal 
evocation, the linguistic strangulation that is described. The significance of these 
rhetorical links and chains is only perceived in terms of their meaning for the 
percipient: the double irony of Goethe’s articulation in context is that imitation need 
never be mere repetition if the artist exploits the natural material fabric of his medium 
to express a given message, and that this transcendence of derivation will only be 
appreciated by those open to its perception. What Goethe’s presentation suggests, 
then, is not only that no given cultural object or theme is exempt from artistic treatment 
and re-manipulation in a novel cultural context, but that through this process, the 
creative artistic mind can and must apply itself to the most recalcitrant cultural notions
64 HA IX 238.
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and, in their reformulation, bring forth the inherent worth of the original object in such
a way as not only to reiterate and retain, but to enhance, embellish, and increase in
value and significance:
Denn der innere Gehalt des bearbeiteten Gegenstands ist der Anfang und das 
Ende der Kunst. Man wird zwar nicht leugnen, daB das Genie, das 
ausgebildete Kunsttalent, durch Behandlung aus allem alles machen und den 
widerspenstigsten Stoff bezwingen konne. Genau besehen, entsteht aber 
alsdann immer mehr ein Kunststiick als ein Kunstwerk, welches auf einem 
wiirdigen Gegenstande ruhen soil, damit uns zuletzt die Behandlung, durch 
Geschick, Miihe und FleiB, die Wiirde des Stoffes nur desto gliicklicher und 
herrlicher entgegenbringe.65
The process of indiscriminate cultural repetition, which Goethe has ostensibly berated 
in his account of the potential suffocation of original sense under a welter of imitation, 
is here mutated to refer to a very necessary cultural process, allusion to which was 
already present in the form of the criticism of contemporary artistic practice quoted 
above, by which the creative genius of the artist is required to be in play in order to 
bring forth the inherent sense of the received cultural object or notion. This ‘innere 
Gehalt’ is, Goethe maintains, ‘der Anfang und das Ende der Kunst’ (itself a 
reformulation and novel contextualization of the concept of Alpha and Omega which 
has become an integral part of the Christian tradition): beginning, in that the artist 
reverts to a given object; ending, in the sense of an infinite projection which results 
from a fusion of the past entity with the present form, into a new proposition which is 
both the past retained and the present created, transcending thereby the particularity of 
past and present in an infinite plurality and universality, ‘durch Behandlung aus allem 
alles machen’. The resultant process is one of progressive refinement through 
regressive appreciation: the inherent value of the original material is brought forth and 
enhanced. The relevance of the concept of binary synthesis here is apparent in 
Goethe’s presentation of cultural progression as a reversion to original norms in order 
to reiterate them in a novel cultural context, and in so doing to repeat the past in the 
present in an aesthetic re-representation which both transcends historical contingency 
and present re-contextualization, projecting the inherent values of the past improved 
and enhanced into the cultural future.
Goethe’s reiteration of the Genesis story66 manifests his mode of secularization
65 HA IX 280.
66 HA IX 129ff.
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in the artistic reworking of a received cultural notion which reveals both historical 
particularization and universalizing generalization. The events he describes - the 
banishment of first man, the ensuing nomadic existence and the principal figures 
which emerge and dominate therein - are accepted traditional and cultural accounts: the 
contemporary relevance and significance of these historical notions is brought out in 
Goethe’s re-manifestation thereof in the pages of Dichtung und Wahrheit. The biblical 
story is autobiographically justified in that it ensues from the young Goethe’s interest 
in Hebrew and the subsequent appeal of the story to his boyish quest after food for his 
imagination67: its significance transcends the author’s account of his own life in its 
overall relevance to the contemporary society he describes and, by extension, to all 
civilizations which have this biblical narrative as an integral part of their cultural 
foundation. Use of the historical present tense throughout the account affects 
immediacy of the past events described: the past is artificially but effectively brought 
into the present of Goethe’s narrative. Goethe as rhetor here most emphatically 
distances himself, through rhetorical artifice, from his account, and simultaneously 
draws the reader into its narrative fabric by use of the rhetorical device of identification 
of author and reader as a plural percipient entity68. His narrative here is particularly 
redolent of a subtle, ironic humour which also serves to distance the author from his 
m aterial69. Most significant, however, are the little moral asides and social 
observations with which Goethe peppers his pseudo-biblical narrative. His reference 
to the cohesiveness and indivisibility of family relationships70 inheres in the biblical 
tale, but is apocryphal to it, and is part of the contemporary message, of, perhaps, part 
personal and part general significance, that Goethe perceives and reveals in the ancient 
account. On this basis, too, he finds occasion to mention some of the principal 
theological concerns of his day, in a passage71 which discusses the relative merits and 
the interdependence of natural and revealed religions. Implicit in Goethe’s paraphrastic
67 HA IX 130: ‘eine lebhaftere Vorstellung in meiner Einbildungskraft vorging’.
68 See for example: ‘in denen bisher unsere Einbildungskraft verweilt’, ibid., p.134; ‘Bleiben wir aber 
bei den Opfer stehen’, ibid., p.136.
69 See for example: ‘Vom Euphrat aus, nicht ohne gottlichen Fingerzeig, wandert Abraham gegen 
Westen’, ibid., p.130. Humour is of course not the only factor operative in this passage. Derek 
Bowman refers to it as ‘a mature, rationalist exposition of the rise of religion’, and perceives it to 
have been written in a ‘bold, enlightened tone’ (Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.63). Bowman’s 
acknowledgement of Goethe’s use of irony and attenuation when discussing matters religious has been 
noted: here, however, he seems to have missed the joke.
70 Ibid., p.132: ‘Familien halten zusammen; sie vereinigen sich’.
71 HA DC 134, 11.15ff.
196
relocation of the Genesis story is the relevance of historical culture to the 
contemporary world; the re-manifestation of past cultural notions, mediated by the 
perceptive psyche of the individual and the formative hand of the artist; in a present 
context which both reveals this relevance and imparts something of the original values 
reiterated. Goethe’s re-presentation in Dichtung und Wahrheit of some aspects of the 
first book of Moses (note that Goethe avoids discussion of the best-known events of 
the Genesis story - the six days of Creation, Adam and Eve, the Fall, Noah’s Ark - in 
order, perhaps, better to distil the essence of his contemporary message from the 
multifarious phenomena of received accounts of ancient biblical civilization) is a 
recollection of the past in the present which, by means of its reversion to ancient 
cultural forms, founds and directs the progression of cultural evolution. His artistic 
treatment brings out the inherent value of the original form, ‘die Wiirde des Stoffes’, 
in a manner which refines and enhances, making explicit the relevance of the past to 
the present in a manifest revelation of the necessity of present recourse to the past, and 
offering a cultural paradigm of transcendence through reversion; of the fusion of past 
and present, derivation and re-manifestation, in a novel, functional and aspiring 
cultural proposition.
This new cultural proposition, which inheres in the fusion of historical cultural 
matter, through its transcendence in notional tradition, with a re-materialization in the 
cultural present that evokes both the absolute concretion of history and the abstraction 
of its inherent notions, is both material - a re-manifestation in literary form - and 
spiritual: the present form is itself transcended through the contemporary and projected 
significance of the evocation of past notions. The present re-materialization is both the 
original matter and its traditional significance, both concrete and abstract, both material 
and spiritual. Goethe’s mode of secularization, as the re-materialization of religious 
history and its spiritual significance, itself transcends the notional barriers of 
abstraction and concretion in a manifest literary form which in turn transcends itself, 
being a material form with an abstract significance that is itself implicitly material: the 
evocation and depiction of life in and through the apparently lifeless formalism of 
language. And it is precisely this fusion of abstraction and concretion, of the 
phenomenal world of material appearance and the spiritual world of notions and moral 
ideals, that Goethe refers to in his discussion of theoretical and critical trends in the 
cultural world of his youth:
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Nun zur Kritik! und zwar vorerst zu den theoretischen Versuchen. Wir holen 
nicht zu weit aus, wenn wir sagen, daB damals das Ideelle sich aus der Welt in 
die Religion gefliichtet hatte, ja sogar in der Sittenlehre kaum zum Vorschein 
kam; von einem hochsten Prinzip der Kunst hatte niemand eine Ahndung.72
This ‘highest principle’ intimates a potential synthesis of worldly and religious ideals:
for Goethe, a synthesis of the spiritual and the material, the religious and the worldly,
the inner realm of the emotions and the outer world of phenomenal appearance, is not
only possible, but partakes of the ultimate nature and function of art. This ‘highest
principle of art’ is in fact crucially akin to what Goethe later (in terms of his
autobiographical narration) calls the function of ‘true poetry’:
Die wahre Poesie kiindet sich dadurch an, daB sie, als ein weltliches 
Evangelium, durch innere Heiterkeit, durch auBeres Behagen, uns von den 
irdischen Lasten zu befreien weiB, die auf uns drucken.73
Goethe’s terms here are particularly telling and particularly relevant to an enquiry into
his mode of secularization. For the synthesis of material form and spiritual notion
affords a transcendence of the concrete finiteness of earthly existence in a liberation
from the pains of the world through ‘true poetry’ functioning as what Goethe calls a
‘worldly gospel’: an explicit secularization of an inherently sacral notion. Sacral and
secular realms are therefore to combine and inter-relate in the formation and effectation
of a new order, affording spiritual comfort and material well-being through the
received and perceived poetic formulations. ‘True poetry’, then, frees the percipient
from the burdens of earthly life: the Christian terminology of liberation from the pains
of this existence through aspiration towards the spiritual purity of the next is here
secularized into the aesthetic freedom which inheres in the manifestation of the
spiritual in the material, the encapsulation and simultaneous liberation of the numinous
in the phenomenon of poetic language. What we have here, then, is a candid
conceptualization from Goethe of what is the function of art in the representation of
religion. ‘Die wahre Poesie’ is open to perception ‘ als ein weltliches Evangelium’:
not, then, as ‘poetry proper’, where meaning is coordinate with form, but in the
binary process of a mutual subordination of conceptual and poetic relations whereby
the percipient actually experiences the conceptual message which is conveyed. It is
aesthetic discourse in this sense which informs the passages from Dichtung und
Wahrheit analyzed above; aesthetic discourse in this sense which accounts for
72 HA IX 26 If.
73 HA IX 580.
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Goethe’s representation and perpetuation of the feeling of faith in his discussion of his 
religious tradition.
As a final example of the nature and import of Goethe’s concern to breath new 
life into received accounts of religious tradition in Dichtung und Wahrheit, I shall 
consider the critical account offered of an emphatically Christian work by one of 
Goethe’s contemporaries, Klopstock’s Messias74. Here the substrata of temporal 
secularization are obvious: Goethe is ostensibly offering a review of Klopstock’s epic 
account of the received biblical narratives relating the story of Christ. Moreover, a 
careful reading of this passage reveals Goethe’s underlying concern to involve the 
reader in a very particular appreciation of this cultural element by encapsulating in the 
fabric of his text those aspects of human felt-life which are here conceptually 
described. In short, Goethe conceptualizes in his text the accomplishment of 
Klopstock in his Messias in recounting a sacral story in a secular form, through which 
the original message acquires renewed sacralization. But Goethe goes farther than this: 
he produces an account of Klopstock’s own work in which, by means of binary 
synthesis, the sacral elements are re-presented for renewed appreciation and 
assimilation in the secular world.
This particular passage is instinct with those rhetorical forms and devices 
which Derek Bowman delineates as typical of Goethe’s treatment of religion in 
general: concessives and subjunctives, the grammatical mood of doubt, and a subtle, 
pervasive but indubitably distancing irony75. The formative hand of the author is 
omnipresent in the text, and the significance of his chosen formulations is not to be 
underestimated.
Der Messias, ein Name, der unendliche Eigenschaften bezeichnet, sollte durch 
ihn [Klopstock] aufs neue verherrlicht werden. Der Erloser sollte der Held 
sein, den er [Klopstock] durch irdische Gemeinheit und Leiden, zu den 
hochsten himmlischen Triumphen zu begleiten gedachte.
The name iteself connotes eternity and endlessness: Klopstock’s use thereof 
encourages a renewed glorification of the name. Paradoxically - or more correctly, 
perhaps, with a logic all of its own - the glory of the Eternal is (or as Goethe puts it, 
should be) increased through its temporalization and concretion in the name itself. The
74 HA IX 398f.
75 Bowman, Life into Autobiography, op. cit., p.52.
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‘Redeemer’ is portrayed by Klopstock as a hero - the intrinsically sacral notion of
redemption assumes the secular mantle of a literary-cultural construct - who is
accompanied by Klopstock on a journey through earthly pain and suffering to the
‘highest heavenly triumph’. The irony of Klopstock’s poetic journey is not lost on
Goethe, who is here concerned to present his own readers with an intimation of what
‘accompaniment’, as a physical experience, actually means. For while Klopstock’s
work describes the essence of the Christian message, Goethe’s curt account of it
expresses this essence. Between the appositions of the ‘Redeemer’ and the ‘hero’,
‘earthly suffering’ and ‘heavenly triumph’, Goethe weaves an intricate web of sounds
and meanings which convey to the reader a sense of that very process of ultimate
salvation through regression which Klopstock relates. ‘Gemeinheit’ and ‘Leiden’ are
linked by assonance: their conceptual similarity underlined by a sound-look congruity.
Klopstock’s concern was to accompany his ‘hero’ on this journey: Goethe’s portrayal
goes farther in expressing this proximity by continuing the chain of assonance to
‘begleiten’ and, indeed, emphasizing the point by exploiting the general rhetorical
similarity of ‘Leiden’ and ‘begleiten’. Not only is the authorial intent described: the
effect on the reader is conveyed; the reader is drawn into the fabric of the text and
hence into the journey through pain to triumphant redemption. Klopstock’s proximity
to his redemptive hero is transmuted into a particular, individual approximation of the
Messiah through a personal assimilation of the ultimate religious journey which is
conveyed in the sounds and look of Goethe’s text76.
Klopstock, says Goethe, puts his entire world-view of a continuum from the
divine through the realm of angels to the human into this work:
Alles, was Gottliches, Englisches, Menschliches in der jungen Seele lag, ward 
hier in Anspruch genommen. Er, an der Bibel erzogen und durch ihre Kraft 
genahrt, lebt nun mit Erzvatern, Propheten und Vorlaufer als Gegenwartigen; 
doch alle sind seit Jahrhunderten nur dazu berufen, einen lichten Kreis um den 
einen zu ziehn, dessen Erniedrigung sie mit Staunen beschauen, und an dessen 
Verherrlichung sie glorreich teilnehmen sollen.
Goethe notes that Klopstock is recounting his personal experience in his present world 
of the religious tradition in which he was educated. But, as Goethe’s account implies, 
this is just one aspect of a gradual temporal process - a secular process operative ‘seit
76 Eric A  Blackall’s account of Klopstock in The Emergence o f  German as a Literary Language 1700- 
1775  (Second Edition, Ithaca and London, 1978) notes Goethe’s criticism of a lack of plasticity in 
Klopstock’s language, which for Goethe is tantamount to a lack of poetry (see pp.337 and 343): a 
shortcoming which Goethe is here concerned to point out in the prose of his own autobiography!
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Jahrhunderten’ - by which the glory of God is increased through adulation of one 
central ‘object’ (Goethe prefers to use the masculine objective pronoun here rather 
than name Christ explicitly), through observation of the earthly debasement of this 
‘object’ and, in turn, through taking part in its/His ultimate glorification. This is 
Klopstock’s conceptual message, which is again conveyed by Goethe to be perceived 
and felt by the reader. The apposition of ‘Erniedrigung’ and ‘Verherrlichung’ is 
expressed in the grammatical structure of the sentence, through repetition of the 
relative pronoun ‘dessen’, and underlined by the figure of homeoteleuton, together 
with the quatro-syllabic rhythm of both terms. Klopstock’s depiction of the Christian 
notion of ultimate glorification through debasement is expressed by Goethe in a 
linguistic structure which conveys the notion that ‘Erniedrigung’ and ‘Verherrlichung’ 
exist separately, and equally, since the achievement of their potential depends on their 
functioning together in reciprocal subordination. Moreover, consonance and 
assonance implicitly link the notion of ‘Verherrlichung’ and that of its achievement, 
‘glorreich teilnehmen’. Goethe takes this gradual, secular process - part of the 
received Christian tradition - and secularizes it by transmuting Klopstock’s account of 
detached observation and wonderment into active experience in and through the text. 
What Goethe expresses is not just the drawing of a circle of light around the Messiah, 
but the wonderment that is felt in contemplating the light; not just a basking in 
reflected glory, but an intimated experience of ultimate glorification. Goethe takes that 
sacral notion of ultimate salvation and redemption which is central to the Christian 
message and secularizes it by means of a fusion of form and meaning which 
transcends that material in its appeal to human feeling. This is no simple resume of a 
literary account of a religious story: it is the re-presentation of a crucial sacral notion - 
the crucial notion of the Christian tradition - which invites renewed appreciation and 
comprehension by the reader of the secular text.
As a literary rival whose review has its own specific purpose, Goethe is, of 
course, unwilling to leave Klopstock’s Messias without some indication of Goethe’s 
own ability to transcend the significance of the work in even such a short account. 
That this transcendence has been a conscious intention on Goethe’s part, and that he is 
aware of, and invites his readership to appreciate, the overriding significance of his 
own account, is conveyed with typically subtle, but nonetheless tantalizingly cutting, 
irony:
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Der himmlische Friede, welchen Klopstock bei Konzeption und Ausfiihrung 
dieses Gedichtes empfunden, teilt sich noch jetzt einem jeden mit, der die 
ersten zehn Gesange liest, ohne die Forderung bei sich laut werden zu lassen, 
auf die eine fortriickende Bildung nicht gerne Verzicht tut.
Klopstock, says Goethe, had personal sentient experience of the process he describes,
and its effects on him are marked and lasting. He has experienced the personal
sacralization afforded by contemplation of the light of the Messiah, by participating in
the earthly sufferings of Christ. It is left to the reader to decide whether Goethe’s
account of Klopstock’s personal experience of Christianity is tinged with admiration
or tainted with cynicism:
Die Wurde des Gegenstandes erhohte dem Dichter das Gefuhl eigner 
Personlichkeit ... So erwarb sich Klopstock das vollige Recht, sich als eine 
geheiligte Person anzusehen, und so befliB er sich auch in seinem Tun der 
aufmerksamsten Reinigkeit.
For it is Goethe who articulates in a few hundred words the essence of this pre­
eminent sacral message. Klopstock felt: Goethe re-presents this feeling to be felt 
anew, dynamized and revitalized through his exploitation of those deceptively simple, 
but tremendously important, sonorous and visible rhetorical links which are inherent 
in his linguistic medium, and which operate on the psyche of the reader to convey the 
experience described. The sacral is secularized in a mode of secularization which 
contains, expresses and re-presents in vital form those elements of religious culture 
which are central to our enhanced understanding and appreciation of our world.
Thus the manifold accounts in Dichtung und Wahrheit of Goethe’s religious 
tradition evidently offer insight into Goethe’s intention to communicate the essence of 
that very tradition, not only in the concepts to which he refers, not only in the words 
he uses, but in the fusion of sound and concept for which Stephenson’s analysis of 
‘schoner Vortrag’ has argued. Appreciation of the religious world-view offered by 
Goethe in Dichtung und Wahrheit depends on the reader’s ability and propensity to 
perceive the functions of the text in terms of a reciprocal subordination of the material 
of the conceptual message (Stoff) and the manner of its presentation {Gestalt), to 
produce the Gehalt of a sensed import which represents, in the secular fabric of the 
text, the very essence of that particular form of feeling we call faith. Goethe’s 
intention in discussing frequently, but not, at first sight, cogently, in Dichtung und
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Wahrheit the fundamental religious questions which informed his contemporary world 
and his own assimilation thereof, is to be perceived in the mutual subordination of 
conceptual and poetic relations, of meaning and form, of semantics and aesthetics.
The manner of Goethe’s depiction of religion in Dichtung und Wahrheitu 
therefore, makes manifest the ongoing function of active religious faith in the letter of 
his text. Goethe’s literary embodiment of the notions, ideals, and symbols of religion 
as a cultural entity reflects his concern to uphold the constituent elements of his 
cultural tradition by affording these a vital significance in the novel cultural form he 
creates, and this he does by making of the notions of his cultural religious past a 
sentient reality of actively functioning faith in the cultural present of his text. The 
apprehension and assimilation of Goethe’s religious message in Dichtung und 
Wahrheit depends on the active engagement of the reader in the perception of Goethe’s 
communication of the vital immediacy of sentient experience in and through his 
linguistic medium. It is a communication which is active because it demands 
participation, and because it is dynamic: the ongoing and productive appreciation of 
the vitality of real experience incites and promotes a real, experiential response. Above 
all, it is an activity that is re-creational because it is recreational: the recourse to 
original cultural models, which for Goethe is necessary for any valid and tenable 
cultural development, is implicitly and etymologically linked to the notion of a 
‘pleasure principle’ which imbues all his religious experiences and which characterizes 
their autobiographical reproduction. The sense of fun, the playful impulse, which are 
explicitly referred to in Goethe’s account of his early biblical and catechetical 
education, are implicit in serious mode in his depiction of religious experience 
throughout the autobiography. Plays on words do more than reveal the author’s 
capacity to manipulate language and meaning: the rhetorical links which are forged in 
the fabric of the text operate sensuously on the psyche of the percipient, articulating 
internal emotions which are otherwise inexpressible. When Goethe ‘plays’ with his 
language, manipulates his medium, exploiting the sounds and the look and the 
relations between the two, he conveys a sense of the plasticity of his medium, and 
makes use of it as a sentient body, in a way which may be without obvious conceptual 
meaning, but is never insignificant. It is the sort of ‘play’ that informs Herder’s 
Plastik, that the child grows and develops only in tangible contact with his world, that 
only by active manipulation of the physical universe is spiritual growth initiated and
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encouraged. Likewise, for Schiller, in the physical world it is in aesthetic ‘play’ that 
the true self is manifest, and the inner world which is concealed by artifice and 
semblance shines through unwittingly in the realm of recreational experience and 
manipulation. In Goethe’s playful manipulation of the plasticity of language the 
essential and inherent sense of his textual message shines through. The formal 
appearance of Goethe’s text is its ‘veil of poetry’; his manipulation of the sound-look 
of language exploits formal aspects which may appear fortuitous, but are never 
gratuitous in their offering of a semblance of life itself, in their significance of a realm 
of apprehension and experience outwith the immediate form of the text, a realm which 
is approached only through engagement of the physical perceptive senses:
Die hochste Aufgabe einer jeden Kunst ist, durch den Schein die Tauschung
einer hoheren Wirklichkeit zu geben.77
What the above analysis of selected passages from Dichtung und Wahrheit 
shows, then, is that the significant recreational motif, the seriousness in play, which is 
the recognized hallmark of art, functions in Goethe’s extended discursive prose as it 
does in his aphorisms and Spruche. Goethe ‘plays’ as external manipulator, but is 
engaged in drawing the reader into the game, inviting him to ‘let go’ of the artifices of 
rhetorical communicaton and give in to the sheer pleasure in sound and look which 
transcend the form and apparent function of rhetoric. In the realm of aesthetic 
discourse, writer and reader enter into a game of language and communication where 
the insight into feeling accords sensuous experience the settled security of conviction, 
where enjoyment of bodily form opens the reader to that sense of freedom in form that 
is the precondition and the resultant force of aesthetic play in discursive 
communication. The reader who senses ‘manifest freedom’ in the physical form of a 
writer’s language is engaged in a game of mutual perception and experience of feeling, 
with the writer, through the text. The re-creation which is, in this instance, the 
reformulation of known truths in new language, is just such a game: as a re-creation 
and a recreation, it reveals and opens to perception an inherent and essential sense 
which transcends manifest form, creating and sustaining a sense of freedom and 
liberation from the encumbering effects of the physical world.
Goethe’s reformulation of commonplace religious truths and accepted ideas is 
playful, but it is far from flippant. His over-riding concern to maintain the traditions
77 HA IX 488.
204
he inherited is irreconcilable with any disregard for their inherent validity. His mode
of secularization does not denigrate the concepts he secularizes: it enhances them in a
perceptible fusion of historical form and present formulation, of sacral notion and
secular medium, which supersedes both in its intuition and projection of an immanent
and transcendent significance. Goethe’s mode of secularization manifests this
intuition: it is significant of a religious faith which bases its present function on
historical forms; which is to be experienced in and through the letter of his
reformulation; which is maintained and enhanced by a re-contextualization of historical
form which carries forward its future significance and function. Goethe’s manifest
aesthetic play with the accepted truths of cultural religion is a re-creation in the sense
of a refreshment and a reinvigoration: a regression to original forms to express the
ongoing functional vitality of that which is ostensibly past and over; a re-manifestation
of historically finite notions in an infinite semblance of sentient life. Goethe’s mode of
secularization is both the preservation and the revitalization of the essential feeling of
religion, the element of faith which no rational analysis can effectively master, which
no conceptual account of religion can effectively convey. This is precisely what
Goethe expresses in the distinction he offers between felt faith and rational knowledge
in Dichtung und Wahrheit:
Beim Glauben, sagte ich, komme alles darauf an, daB man glaube; was man 
glaube, sei vollig gleichgultig. Der Glaube sei ein groBes Gefiihl von 
Sicherheit fur die Gegenwart und Zukunft, und diese Sicherheit entspringe aus 
dem Zuvertrauen auf ein iibergroBes, iibermachtiges und unerforschliches 
Wesen.78
Faith is ‘ein groBes Gefiihl’ that is settled and secure, and it attains this security by 
understanding, through experience, of that ‘iibergroBes Wesen’ we call God. 
Goethe’s definition of faith here makes manifest this settled conviction by expressing 
the certainty of secure feeling - this confidence in the present and confident expectation 
of the future - in the material fabric of his text.
Goethe’s mode of secularization in representing his received religious tradition 
in his autobiography articulates this ‘great feeling’ by exploiting the sensuous basis of 
language to convey a spiritual message through a material form. If the reader closes 
Dichtung und Wahrheit with a sense, however inchoate, of having experienced 
something of the sacral, of having felt an approximation of something above and
78 HA X 23.
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beyond his rational comprehension, then Goethe has succeeded in articulating the 
central issues of human conviction, of recreating the sacral force and message through 
the interactive, functional fusion of message with medium. Goethe’s treatment of 
religion in Dichtung und Wahrheit offers an intensely dynamic articulation of the vital 
essence of inherited religious faith.
206
“Der Kiinstler miiBte ihm vielleicht noch etwas geben.” (...)
“Und das ware?”
“Das Gottliche, das wir freilich nicht kennen wiirden, wenn es 
der Mensch nicht fiihlte und selbst hervorbrachte.”1
CONCLUSION
The idea for this thesis was initially generated when it was pointed out to me that there 
still remained considerable scholarly disagreement on how to view and adduce 
Goethe’s attitude to religion. For at the same time, I was becoming aware that the 
concept of aesthetic freedom - central to Weimar Classicism - which inheres in the 
contemplation of the fusion of form and feeling in an artistic object, is remarkably 
similar in kind and function to the notion of the perfectibility of human spiritual life in 
the felt approximation of the divine principle which is the essence of religious faith, 
certainly within the Christian tradition. It became apparent, then, that the answer to the 
problem of Goethe’s attitude to religion might lie, not in the conceptual meaning of his 
manifold religious utterances per se - which have, as we have seen, been the principal 
cause of scholarly disagreement by virtue of their evident lack of conceptual coherence 
- but in a perception of the nature and function of his reformulation of the discrete 
elements of his inherited religious tradition. Proceeding from this starting-point, it 
emerged that the binary-type synthesis offered the most pertinent theoretical model 
with which to approach the evident ‘problem’ of Goethe’s ‘religion’, since this type of 
synthesis, when applied to textual interpretation, suggests a particular kind of fusion 
of conceptual and sensuous messages, reliant on the perceptive needs and capacities of 
the reader, appreciation of which leads to active, felt involvement in the text and its 
import. Goethe presents a bequest, or testament, to posterity in his autobiography: I 
have argued that in the reformulations of religious tradition in Dichtung und Wahrheit 
there is an intimation of the very essence of that tradition, which is human felt 
conviction in the existence and ongoing function of the divine principle, and that 
perception of this inheres in appreciation of his aesthetic representation of faith 
through the fusion of conceptual meaning and sensuous form in his text. It is the 
office of the poet to express feelings; that of the historian to present the events and
1 Goethe, ‘Der Sammler und die Seinigen’, HA XII 84.
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movements of political, cultural and philosophical tradition. Dichtung und Wahrheit 
offers both, and was chosen as the focus for this search for a fusion of form and 
meaning in Goethe’s religious utterances principally because it is here that Goethe 
most explicitly expresses his account of his world, and hence gives form to the 
essence of the religious tradition he received.
I have called this communication of the essence of religious faith in the context 
of the written word ‘Goethe’s mode of secularization’. ‘Secularization’ is a word 
much in use in critical accounts of Goethe’s attitude to religion, but the etymological 
and epistemological definition I offer of the concept reveals the particular potential of 
secularization - and the relevance of the binary-type synthesis to the secularization 
process - as a heuristic for approaching Goethe’s attitude to religion through his 
representations thereof. Fundamental to the definition of secularization I have 
proposed is the potential synthesis of the polarity of sacral and secular realms, of 
noumenon and phenomenon, of matter and spirit. Concomitantly, secularization 
expresses the potential synthesis of past and present, through precisely that process 
conceptualized in the notion of ‘reculer pour mieux sauter’, of regression in order to 
progress, of refinement for the future through recourse to the past. I have argued that 
Goethe’s representation of his religious tradition in Dichtung und Wahrheit expresses 
the binary fusion of these polarities of sacral and secular and past and present in the 
synthesis of another polarity, that of form and feeling, of human conviction, or faith, 
and literary contextualization. The reader of Goethe’s autobiography is presented with 
an account of the author’s early life, and the events which informed his social, 
philosophical, cultural and religious education, mediated by the experience of 
maturity. But the obvious polarity of past and present here has a corollary: the 
conceptual message of Goethe’s account is presented in a linguistic form which has a 
concurrent, sometimes confirmative and sometimes contradictory, function. This 
mutual subordination of form and meaning is expressed in the binary process of 
aesthetic discourse, and if the conceptual message of Goethe’s accounts of his 
religious tradition is perceived in and through the light of aesthetic patterning in the 
linguistic form of his accounts, then Goethe as religious historian has expressed the 
very essence of that tradition, and the reader is invited to feel the conviction of faith in 
a sacral principle in the secular matrix of Goethe’s text. Therefore, Goethe’s 
‘testament’ may be understood both as a legacy bequeathed to posterity, and in that
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sense of a ‘covenant’ which the etymology of the term implies and the Judaeo- 
Christian Bible proclaims: the ‘testament’ of Dichtung und Wahrheit encapsulates in 
itself the essence of the secularization process.
For Goethe’s concern to preserve and revitalize his religious heritage in 
representing it for posterity is in turn the re-manifestation of a process of preservation 
and revitalization which is inherent and operational in the historical manifestations of 
religion itself: the Christian gospels proclaim a message of simultaneous continuity 
with and transcendence of the tradition out of which they came into being. Goethe’s 
mode of secularization in Dichtung und Wahrheit takes its place on a spiral of 
manifestation and transcendence, of maintenance and reinvigoration, which conditions 
and promotes the nature and ongoing function of faith in the world. As it is the 
essential feeling of early faith which, for Goethe, founds and directs the future 
potential of religious belief, so it is the primal sacral message of fundamental 
Christianity which expresses the inherent sentience of real, religious experience which 
is to be promoted, enhanced and revitalized, in the secular textual context of the 
literary medium. Thus Goethe’s mode of secularization, if it indeed functions of a 
perpetuation and enhancement of the essence of religious faith, must reveal an integral 
binding with the form and substance of the initial proclamation it reproclaims.
The relationship between originality and derivativeness is, of course, central to 
my analysis of Goethe’s use of religious material, and hence to the definition of 
secularization I propose. But the mode of secularization Goethe adopts is itself not 
original to him, and is in fact deeply rooted in the religious tradition it is Goethe’s 
concern to perpetuate. Of course, all religious creeds, theologies and world-views are 
attempts to encapsulate in terms open to human understanding the essence of the 
numinous principle which informs them, and in this respect, all religions are attempts 
to secularize the sacral. But the Christian religion, which, in all its various sectarian 
and cultic manifestations, held the most deep-seated and lasting influence over 
Goethe, and proposes the kind of faith that Goethe’s reformulations present, depends 
implicitly and inherently on the interrelationship of spiritual and material realms which 
Goethe’s mode of secularization proposes. The Christian religion proclaims Christ as 
the physical manifestation of a non-physical force; the actions He perpetrates alleviate 
physical suffering and promote spiritual enhancement by means of the transcendent 
reality with which He communicates, with which He is the means of communication,
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and of which He, Himself, is the epiphany, the manifestation of the divine. The 
sublime significance of the Christian model is encapsulated in the dual function of 
Christ as both temporal and spiritual, natural and supra-natural, secular and sacral, by 
which the natural world is both preserved and transcended in the perception and 
understanding - initially reflected, ultimately sublimely clear - of the proclaimed 
message. The force of the deity comes into phenomenal existence: God is made Man 
through woman. The actions of Christ as a historical figure, as presented in the Bible 
which transmits them to tradition, are real in their own terms, and symbolic of 
something else: in the events of Christ’s life are fused together the realms of physical 
phenomenon and abstract significance which characterized his coming into existence. 
The words of Christ are aural manifestations, in essentially concrete imagery, which 
intimate the functional power of the divine. Physical entity and abstract significance 
again fuse together in the formation of a novel proposition: the essentially 
metaphorical character of language is to be superseded, the irreconcilable polarities of 
abstraction and concretion dissolved, in the ultimate attainment of perfect 
understanding, the fusion of physical and spiritual realms of existence and 
appreciation.
Christ, then, is both secular - a historically defined character rooted in physical 
time and place - and sacral: his birth and death, and the events of His life, are, 
according to the Christian tradition, divinely inspired, divinely ordained, and divinely 
perpetrated. The antagonistic polarities of sacrality and secularity co-exist and co­
function in the historical personality of Christ. He transcends the world by being 
rooted within it; and the ultimate transcendence of earthly life He proclaims and 
promotes is itself determined by the synthesis of incarnate and numinous realities 
incorporated, expressed and projected in and through Him.
Moreover, this synthesis of temporal and eternal worlds which is the essence 
of the Christian message and its propagation is also determined by the notion of a 
progression - towards spiritual purity - that is promoted by an initial and active 
regression. The power of Christ is unleashed in the world through the assumption of 
mundane form, and in the humblest possible human incarnation: the evangelistic 
accounts of the Advent of the Messiah proclaim not a conquering king, but a helpless, 
hapless, and essentially humble child. Furthermore, it is axiomatic of the Christian 
message that man must regress to his child-like origins in order to progress to ‘the
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Kingdom of Heaven’; to attain spiritual purity in a re-acquisition of the innocent,
untarnished and unaffected human purity of childhood. Throughout the evangelistic
accounts of the life and gospel of Christ are repeated references to the notion that
‘many who are first shall be last and the last first’: divine glory is based not on earthly
glory but in essential humility and purity, and it is in regression to and acceptance of
the undifferentiated innocence of a child-like state of being that ultimate transcendence
of earthly life and attainment of enlightened spiritual purity is to be achieved. The
notions of a fusion of sacral principle and secular matrix and of regression in order to
progress enhanced which inform Goethe’s mode of secularization are central to the
Christian tradition itself.
It is in recognition of the inherent derivativeness of Goethe’s conception of
secularization that the wider significance of the concept for his oeuvre as a whole is
anticipated. It is widely accepted, for example, that the Goethean notion of
‘Entsagung’ has much in common with Christian humility, but is there not scope for a
reconsideration of Goethe’s ‘Entsagung’ in terms of his potential communication of
the human feeling involved in the act of renunciation? Is there, perhaps, even a case to
be made for the religious implications, and their corresponding secularization, of that
perplexing quality, ‘das Ewig-Weibliche’? For the Christian notion of ‘grace’, the
undeserved but willingly given mercy of God, also implies an elegance in form or
manner, the contemplation of which accords not only pleasure, but a sense of freedom
from the bounds and strictures of the physical world. This would certainly seem to be
a plausible implication of Schiller’s letter to Goethe of 17th August 1795:
Ich finde in der christlichen Religion virtualiter die Anlage zu dem Hochsten 
und Edelsten, und die verschiedenen Erscheinungen derselben im Leben 
scheinen mir bloB deswegen so widrig und abgeschmackt, weil sie verfehlte 
Darstellungen dieses Hochsten sind. Halt man sich an den eigentlichen 
Charakterzug des Christentums, der es von alien monotheistischen Religionen 
unterscheidet, so liegt er in nichts anderm als in der Aufhebung des Gesetzes 
oder des Kantischen Imperativs, an dessen Stelle das Christentum eine freie 
Neigung gesetzt haben will. Es ist also in seiner reinen Form Darstellung 
schoner Sittlichkeit oder der Menschwerdung des Heiligen, und in diesem 
Sinn die einzige asthetische Religion; daher ich es mir auch erklare, warum 
diese Religion bei der weiblichen Natur so viel Gluck gemacht, und nur in 
Weibern noch in einer gewissen ertraglichen Form angetroffen wird.2
Schiller’s comments anticipate and underpin Goethe’s own conception of an aesthetic
2 GA XX 98f.
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ideal which is inherently feminine, appealing not only to the higher idealism of beauty
found in women in general, but to that of femininity as the highest perceptible form of
appreciation and furtherance of beauty in form that is open to all reasoning and feeling
human beings. I would suggest that a study of the relationship between femininity and
Christianity, in terms of secularization in the sense I have suggested, in Goethe’s use
of the notion of ‘das Ewig-Weibliche’, is potentially very enlightening indeed.
As we have seen, Goethe’s conception of the Christian tradition represented
and reformulated some aspects of that tradition which were themselves abstracted
from pre-existent traditions: Platonic, Gnostic and Judaic elements, for example, are
all encapsulated in the religious tradition which Goethe re-presents. The mode of
secularization he offers is dynamic in itself, and presents a view of cultural
progression through regression which points to a continual process of self-reflexive
growth and development. It is, then, perhaps not as surprising as it at first sight
appears that I find corroboration of what I believe to be Goethe’s mode of
secularization from a novelist working firmly within the tradition of the erstwhile
German Democratic Republic, in a novel set in ancient Greece:
Nie sah ich wie hier, daB man die Kulturschichten nicht voneinander abheben 
kann, daB sie einander durchdringen, daB durch den heutigen Kult der friihere 
durchscheint, durch diesen der noch friihere. DaB es kaum Dauernhafteres gibt 
als die Rituale, die der Erzahler nach Bedarf umzudeuten hat. Vor der 
sakularisierten Erzahlung die Heiligenlegende, vor dieser das Heroenepos, vor 
diesem der Mythos. Die Erfahrung von Zeittiefe an einem Ort, der fremder 
kaum sein konnte.3
Certainly, the aesthetic appreciation, noted above, which German eighteenth-century 
figures expressed for the Bible-as-text, indicates that Goethe’s mode of secularization 
is itself, as a technique, traditional. That, at least, would account for his judgement 
that the beauty of the biblical accounts increased as the interaction between self, text, 
environment, and history progressed:
Ich bin iiberzeugt, daB die Bibel immer schoner wird, je mehr man sie 
versteht, das heiBt, je mehr man einsieht und anschaut, daB jedes Wort, das 
wir allgemein auffassen und im besondern auf uns anwenden, nach gewissen 
Umstanden, nach Zeit- und Ortverhaltnissen einen eignen, besondern, 
unmittelbar individuellen Bezug gehabt hat.4
3 Christa Wolf, Kassandra. Erzahlung und Voraussetzungen einer Erzahlung: Kassandra, Berlin und 
Weimar, 1983, p.88.
4 HA XII 374, §65; Hecker §672.
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If my argument has done anything to place Goethe more firmly in this perpetually self- 
renewing tradition, and to chip away at the misleading image of him as Heide, then 
that would be the most fruitful of any of its possible repercussions. For his 
significance in the future may well be grounded in his insistence on the reality of the 
spiritual life, rooted though he held it must be in time-dependent contingency:
Dann ist Vergangenheit bestandig,
Das Kiinftige voraus lebendig,
Der Augenblick ist Ewigkeit.5
5 ‘Vermachtnis’, HA I 370.
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